Andrej Karicka v Slovakian Judicial Authority [2025] EWHC 1234 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 1234 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-002964
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 19/05/2025
Before
MRS JUSTICE FOSTER
Between
ANDREJ KARICKAAppellantSLOVAKIAN JUDICIAL AUTHORITYRespondent
Malcolm Hawkes (instructed by Stokoe Partnership) for AppellantLaura Herbert (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 14th May 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 15:00 on 19 th May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MRS JUSTICE FOSTER

Introduction

[1]This is an appeal from the decision of District Judge Jackson delivered on 28th August 2024, ordering the applicant’s extradition to Slovakia by permission of Cavanagh J on 23 December 2024. The single ground of appeal is that the District Judge was wrong to order his extradition to serve a custodial sentence of one year for an offence of driving whilst disqualified on 31st December 2010. All of the one year remains to be served.[2]The appellant’s central contention succinctly expressed in the Appellant’s skeleton argument by Mr Malcolm Hawkes who did not appear below, is that the gravity of the index offence is so low, the sentence of one year’s imprisonment so harsh, the overall passage of time so great and his family circumstances so compelling as to render his extradition now a disproportionate interference with his rights to private and family life, and those of his vulnerable partner and their four young children.[3]In granting leave to appeal Cavanagh J said :
“This appeal is arguable. It is arguable that the Judge was wrong about the weight given to the Appellant’s family links in the UK, the difficulty his young children might have to adapting to life in Slovakia, especially as they did not speak the language, and the difficulties for the Appellant’s partner, who is Czech, not Slovak. Also, the Appellant’s partner will suffer real financial hardship if the Appellant is extradited. Furthermore, the offence was not the most serious, though, on the other hand, the Applicant was fairly heavily convicted when he committed it.”
[4]The challenged findings are thus those made under Article 8 and family life pursuant to Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003.[5]The appeal is resisted on the basis that whilst this court might reasonably disagree with the District Judge, it was not possible, correctly applying authority, successfully to challenge her conclusions. It is argued by Ms Laura Herbert for the Judicial Authority (also not appearing before the District Judge) that she did in terms consider the position of the Appellant’s partner and four children and conducted the required balancing exercise, listing those factors for and against extradition. Her decision could not properly be characterised as appealably wrong.

The background

[6]Mr Karicka was born on 21 February 1984. He is now aged 41. He was arrested on 6 December 2023 under a conviction warrant issued on 8 March 2023 by the District Court Trebisov, Slovakia. The warrant was certified by the National Crime Agency on 11th April 2023. It seeks surrender to Slovakia The enforceable judgment was made by District Court of Trebisov on 14th June 2014.[7]The warrant was served on Mr Karicka on 6 December 2024 when he was at the Police Station. He was granted conditional bail. This Court was informed he secured representation in April 2024. After adjournments the hearing was set down for 31st July 2024.The Appellant told police on arrest in the UK that he had been in the United Kingdom for around 10 years, and had worked at the carwash for six years. The police’ statement indicates that when they checked on him he was described as being the subject of what they called Interpol Red “Circulation”, as circulated by Slovakia.[8]The issues before the District Judge concerned section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003: oppression due to the passage of time, and section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003: Article 8 of the ECHR. She found against him on all grounds determining that he was a fugitive, that in any event the passage of time did not amount to oppression, and that the intrusion into rights arising under Article 8 was not disproportionate.[9]The factual context before the District Judge contained some uncertainty. As to the character of the offence for which the warrant had issued, before the District Judge the Appellant accepted he was at the wheel of his car on his driveway about 8pm on New Year’s Eve. His evidence was he had only started the engine, it was midwinter, he could not drive in the icy conditions, he had needed to fix the car. The location of the offence is recorded as the street on which he lived which, whilst not proving it, was at least consistent with that assertion. He said the police came over and assumed that he was driving it but he wasn’t (it appears there was no discussion as to whether or not this was in any event regarded as an offence under the law). It appears he was interviewed by police in February 2011, and on 6 April 2011 was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, signing on 14 April 2011 to indicate, so the Further Information (“FI”) stated, that he had received the notification of sentence, and signing on 18 April to the effect that he was submitting an appeal against it. It appears that he was not present at the appeal hearing. His statement and his answers in cross-examination, were, as recorded in the Decision, inconsistent and confused. He said he received a sentence straight away and did not appeal, but learnt of the sentence first in the UK.[10]A domestic Arrest Warrant was issued for him on 18 May 2011 in Slovakia but had not been activated. The Arrest Warrant also stated that a European Arrest Warrant was issued in addition. What is described as the “main trial” took place in absentia on 10 June 2014 when an attorney was appointed by the court. The FI also states that on that day the unconditional sentence of imprisonment for a year was imposed. He admitted and it was not in issue that he had several previous convictions in Slovakia, 3 of these appear to have been sentenced when he was 16. He received 2 suspended sentences- the latter one was later activated - and the later two dated 2006 and 2008 when he was 22 and 24 attracting respectively 6 months and a year’s imprisonment. He accepted the convictions, but could only remember a sentence of 6 months, not the later one of a year. He has no convictions in the UK but there is a caution for possession of Cannabis in 2015. A statement before the Judge on behalf of the Home Office accepted that he had come to their attention about this time, but no action had been taken.[11]In his statement the Appellant had said that he left Slovakia in 2009 ( i.e. 15 years ago). He was cross-examined to the effect that that could not be right, and he was untruthful. In answer to the District Judge he said yes, he had come to the UK at a time after his police interview, and as to whether it might have been 2010 or 2011 he said he did not remember. He accepted that he was told he had to inform the police of any change of address when he was interviewed for the driving offence but did not do so.[12]The Decision records that he could not remember dates properly and accepted he may have got mixed up with years. His evidence was he came here initially because his mother was here, and he had been often out of work in Slovakia. His mother became sick and returned in 2015 with the rest of his family. He and his partner had been together for the last 10 years and had four children together born in the UK in 2016, 2019, 2021 and 2022. The elder two children attend a local primary school.[13]His partner who was born on 22 November 1990 in the Czech Republic, is Czech not Slovakian. She did not attend the court below in person due to their child care responsibilities. Her evidence by Section 9 Statement was that she had moved to the UK in 2012, previously living with her parents in her home country. She had come to the UK wanting to start a new life in part due to a sexual assault in the Czech Republic when she was 16 whilst walking to school. Her evidence was she was still affected by that incident and had never returned there. She had lived first with an uncle, meeting the Appellant in about 2013/14 .[14]His unchallenged evidence was that he had worked since his arrival here, but he lost the job of 6 years’ in the carwash because of his arrest in December 2023 requiring him to report to the police station three times a week, which his employer would not tolerate. His partner who does not have settled status is unable to take employed work, aside from childcare responsibilities. He has been on benefits since the loss of that job; there are no other family or friends here who can support.[15]The District Judge held he had been untruthful about the date of his arrival and found him to be a fugitive. It is not suggested before me that conclusion was unavailable to the District Judge. The challenge under section 14 accordingly failed and she held he had not shown on the balance of probabilities it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite due to the passage of time anyway.

The Decision of the District Judge

[16]The Judge made findings about the children under that part of the judgment headed “Section 14 and passage of time” before that part of her decision relating to Article 8.[17]The section 14 passages read as follows:
“49. ….. No doubt his children and partner would find it difficult to lose the financial and emotional support he gives them with him being the only breadwinner of the family. Ms Kuzebouchova does not have settled status and cannot work legally in UK limiting her ability to financially support the children. 50. It would be very difficult for the four children to have to leave UK where they were born, if that in fact is a consequence of Mr Karicka’s extradition. However other than Mr Karicka and Ms Kuzebouchova saying they do not want to live in Slovakia or Czech Republic (which is where Ms Kuzebouchova is from originally), indicating that healthcare, education and crime is much worse in those countries, there is not any evidence before me of this amounting to such difficulties to render extradition oppressive.”
[18]Later, accepting the evidence advanced by the Appellant, the Judge said this when she listed factors against extradition: “a. Mr Karicka has been in the UK for many years and has settled UK status. b. Mr Karicka does not have any convictions in UK, except a caution in 2015, which is very old and a significant period of time has lapsed since. c. Mr Karicka has a partner of 10 years and 4 young children who were born in UK. His partner does not have settled status, and he is the financial provider for the family. He was working from arriving in UK until December 2023. The financial implications for the family if Mr Karicka were to be extradited are significant. Furthermore, Ms Kuzebouchova would struggle to find work and look after the children at the same time. She says there is not anyone else who can look after the children which might allow her to work if she were legally able to. d. It is not known whether his partner and children could remain in UK if he were to be extradited, and the prospect of moving to Slovakia or Czech Republic for both Mr Karicka and Ms Kuzebouchova is very worrying as both believe the education, healthcare and work prospects are not as good as in UK. e. The children and Ms Kuzebouchova would suffer emotionally from being separated from Mr Karicka if he were to be extradited.[19]The Judge’s reasoning on Article 8 was as follows. She, uncontroversially, gave particular weight to the public interest in extradition, to the fact that the UK should not be seen as a safe haven for fugitives; that a 1 year sentence was “not insignificant”, and she trusted the Judicial Authorities would afford him an appeal. Then she said:
“Mr Karicka’s partner and children live in UK, and it is unknown if they will be able to remain in UK. The children will be looked after by their mother, and there is not any suggestion of them being taken into care. The real difficulty is a lack of financial support to the family. However, Ms Kuzebouchova has stated she will apply for settled status again in UK. It is not certain at all that the family would have to leave UK and return to Slovakia or Czech Republic. Mr Karicka has family in Slovakia and the only difficulty raised about the family moving in with his parents is that the accommodation is too small. Nothing further has been said about the family living in Slovakia other than a desire not to do so. The children only speak English language, but again this will only provide a temporary difficulty. These factors will cause hardship to Ms Kuzebouchova and the children but in my judgement that does not render interference in his and his family’s Article 8 ECHR rights such that it is incompatible with them.”
[20]In fact there was significant evidence before the District Judge on a number of the matters she referred to: a) With respect to the mother and 4 children moving to the Slovakia:
“the only difficulty raised about the family moving in with his parents is that the accommodation is too small. Nothing further has been said about the family living in Slovakia other than a desire not to do so. ”
In fact the evidence showed that the Appellant’s two brothers aged 37 and 43 already living with his parents in Slovakia. One brother suffers from epilepsy, the other is physically disabled. b) As to the 4 children:
“The children only speak English language, but again this will only provide a temporary difficulty”
. The older children are fully settled at school in the UK and all of them have known no other life or culture. Their mother is not Slovakian, she is Czech. Slovakia is not a country with which she has any connection. c) As to “The real difficulty is a lack of financial support to the family.” It was uncontested evidence that the family was dependent upon the Appellant who had worked since his arrival in the UK at least 10 years, possibly 13 years ago, and the mother was not entitled to earn money in the UK. There would therefore be no income referrable to the Appellant. A calculation (not contested by the Respondent) made by Mr Hawkes showed that financially, even if the Appellant’s partner could receive child benefit in his absence, at present rates, that would amount to only £25.60 per week for their eldest child, and £16.95 for all three of the younger children, namely £42.55 per week in total, or £6.07 per day for four children. d) As to the effect of the removal of the Appellant, his partner had said in her section 9 statement (reflecting her liability to prosecution if the contents were false or not believed to be true):
“ If Andrej was extradited, I feel our family would fall apart. I feel I would go insane without Andrej. I would be unable to look after 4 children alone. I would not be able to work. We would have absolutely no income as a family. I am not in receipt of any benefits as I cannot claim them as I do not have settled status or pre settled status. I would not be able to apply for benefits unless I got settled status. The only income at the moment is from Andrej’s universal credit he receives. He also receives child benefit payments. This is £1800 per month. I would not get this anymore if Andrej was extradited as I do not have settled status. This is what keeps our family going. This is just about enough to live on. We are left with £250 for the month after outgoings such as rent, electricity and food. We paid £700 for Andrej’s bail deposit which the owner of Andrej’s kindly offered to pay. When we can we pay him £50. We still owe him £350. I believe we would end up homeless and living on the streets if Andrej is extradited. I have no family in the UK. I don’t have many friends in the UK either. It is just me, Andrej the children. We would not be able to eat. We would not have a roof over our head due to lack of money. .. “In short, I believe our family would be totally lost without Andrej if he were to be extradited to Slovakia. I cannot imagine what the future for our family might be without Andrej.”
She had also deposed to her continuing anxiety over the sexual attack. The Legal Framework

The Legal Framework

[21]There was no dispute about the applicable legal framework nor the principles upon which this Court should act on an Article 8 appeal such as this. Powers of appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act are as set out in section 27 and indicate the court may allow the appeal where it is of the view the appropriate judge ought to have decided a question before him at the hearing differently, and had he done so he would have been required to order that person’s discharge. The single question being, whether or not the District Judge made the wrong decision.[22]On an issue of Article 8 proportionality the Court will approach the matter as a review (see Belbin v Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] E WHC 149 (Admin) paragraph 66. The Supreme Court’s exposition of the test in Re (B) [2013] UK SC 33 applies here where, in often repeated words, Lord Neuburger indicated the various views a

judge might have on the proportionality decision of the lower court thus:

“93 There is a danger in over-analysis, but I would add this. An appellate Judge may conclude that the trial judge’s conclusion on proportionality was (i) the only possible view, (ii) a view which she considers was right, (iii) a view on which she has doubts, but on balance considers was right, (iv) a view which she cannot say was right or wrong, (v) a view on which she has doubts, but on balance considers was wrong, (vi) a view which she considers was wrong, or (vii) a view which is unsupportable. The appeal must be dismissed if the appellate judge’s view is in category (i) to (iv) and allowed if it is in category (vi) or (vii). 94. As to category (iv), there will be a number of cases where an appellate court may think that there is no right answer, in the sense that reasonable judges could differ in their conclusions. As with many evaluative assessments, cases raising an issue on proportionality will include those where the answer is in a grey area, as well as those where the answer is in a black or a white area. An appellate court is much less likely to conclude that category (iv) applies in cases where the trial judge’s decision was not based on his assessment of the witnesses’ reliability or likely future conduct. So far as category (v) is concerned, the appellate judge should think very carefully about the benefit the trial judge had in seeing the witnesses and hearing the evidence, which are factors whose significance depends on the particular case. However, if, after such anxious consideration, an appellate judge adheres to her view that the trial judge’s decision was wrong, then I think that she should allow the appeal.”
[23]Propositions (4) to (6) in the leading authority of H (H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic [2012] UKSC 25 [2013] 1 AC 338 at paragraph 8(7) are relevant. There Lady Hale said this: “… It is likely that the public interest in extradition will outweigh the article 8 rights of the family unless the consequences of the interference with family life will be exceptionally severe. … “…(3) The question is always when the interference with the private and family lives of the extraditee and other members of his family is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. (4) There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition: that people accused of crimes should be brought to trial; the people convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; the United Kingdom should honour its treaty obligations to other countries; and that there should be no ‘safe havens’ to which either can flee in the belief that they will not be sent back. (5) That public interest will always carry great weight, but the weight to be attached to it in the particular case does vary according to the nature and seriousness of the crime or crimes involved. (6) the delay since the crimes were committed may both diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest and increase the impact upon private and family life. “ …[24]My attention was drawn to a recent summary of the overall approach in Kasper Lipski v Regional Court in Torin, Poland [2020] EWHC 1257 (Admin) per Fordham J, citing Celinski v Polish Judicial Authority [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) [2016] 1 WLR 551 at paragraphs 5 to 24, recalling that in Love v United States of America [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin) at paragraph 26 the Divisional Court had said “the appellate court is entitled to stand back and say that … the overall evaluation was wrong: crucial factors should have should have been weighed so significantly differently as to make the decision wrong, such that the appeal in consequence should be allowed. “ And as recently expressed by Fordham J (ibidem supra): “This is therefore a classic, dynamic balancing exercise, involving giving appropriate weight to the relevant factors but one in which the language of “exceptionally severe” and “exceptionally serious”, from Lord Phillips and Lady Hale serve as authoritative guides. “ The Submissions Gravity of the offence And as recently expressed by Fordham J (ibidem supra): The Submissions

Gravity of the offence

[25]On behalf of Mr Karicka it was submitted that the issue of the gravity of the index offence was not dealt with by the district judge. An offence of driving while disqualified could not, in circumstances where no one is alleged to have been injured to be considered as at the peak of offending seriousness. As he put it, colloquially, and Ms Herbert agreed, it was not “the crime of the century”. It came on the back of a traffic misdemeanour in July 2010 following which he had been banned from driving for a calendar year – hence breach by the incident on 31 December 2010. Further context to the consideration, impacting the appropriate view of the seriousness of the offence, and the matters to be weighed in the balance was delay. Delay[26]He submitted that having complied for five months of the ban, it could not be said to be both proportionate and necessary and in the public interest, so long after the events in question to extradite Mr Karicka to serve a full year’s sentence for that offence. He pointed to what he described as the very great passage of time in the case set against the gravity of the index offence. He highlighted the uncertainties in the evidence, some of which are set out above, accepting that Mr Karicka was absent for the hearing of his appeal, submitting there was an unexplained three year period in which nothing appears to have been done before the appeal against the driving offence. The extradition request was not drafted until 8 March 2023 some 12 years after the original conviction and nine years after the affirmation of the sentence. No explanation had been given; further the domestic warrant, dated 18 May 2011, is in force and had not been executed. He submitted that since the applicant was agreed to have settled status under the U.K.’s Brexit arrangements with the EU, he would have been found very quickly after any Interpol alert. This delay was unexplained.[27]In answer the Respondent submitted the evidence showed clearly that since 18 April 2011 the Appellant had been avoiding prosecution – he had been searched for, he knew the appeal process was continuing and ought to have been present. He had accepted the breach of the obligation to give a change of address. There was an unchallengeable finding of fugitivity. It was submitted the judicial authority acted quickly once they knew where he was. It could not be said the delay was material in the circumstances.[28]The public interest was very strong and the previous convictions of the Appellant should not be overlooked. For the first, when aged 16, for theft, he was given 6 months suspended, as to the second, also sentenced at 16, and described as sexual exploitation of children, he received 15 months, also suspended; the third conviction was for illegal entry and intentional damage of property, again he was sentenced aged 16, to seven months imprisonment, and then in December 2006 (as a 22 year old adult) sentenced for causing a minor bodily injury to 6 months, for a similar offence two years later aged 24 in 2008 - 1 year. A conviction for a “traffic misdemeanour” in June 2010 gave rise to the disqualification in breach of which the index offence had been committed. It was not a matter of controversy between the parties that the suspended sentences must have reflected criminality at a reasonably low level.

Time served on curfew

[29]It was argued before this court, although not before the District Judge that it was appropriate to consider in the overall balancing exercise the factor of curfew. This showed there had not been impunity in respect of the offence for which extradition was sought. Mr Hawkes relied upon the case of Prusianu v Romania [2022] EWHC 1929 (Admin) in which the court held that whilst a curfew does not reduce the sentence to be served in the requesting state, thrice weekly reporting to the police and a 4 hours’ a night curfew amounted to a “real restriction on freedom of movement and autonomy”. It should be borne in mind that the Appellant had undergone a degree of deprivation of liberty in this case which should be weighed in the balance against extradition, as it had been in Mr Prusianu’s favour in that case.[30]Here there had been over 17 months of a significant restriction on liberty. This was longer than his sentence of 12 months, accordingly Mr Karicka had not escaped punishment. Although this was a new point, relying upon section 27(4) of the 2003 Act, it was submitted that had the facts and evidence been as they are now before the District Judge she would have decided the case differently and ordered his discharge. Accordingly the material was admissible in support of his case. With regard to the offences, it was emphasised the Appellant is now 41 and has committed no offence in the UK although attracting a caution in February 2015, over 10 years ago. It was submitted the appellant was not the man he once was, as a youth.[31]Mr Hawkes supplemented his argument that the index offence and its true gravity were inadequately considered by reference to the absence of evidence that this was a serious offence taking place on the open highway. He pointed (correctly and without contrary contention) that a court may look at the gravity of the offending when considering the balancing exercise for proportionality under Article 8. This exercise was different from second-guessing the sentencing regime in the requesting jurisdiction, which he did not do. Nonetheless he advanced a submission that for an offence of the character of the index offence it was unthinkable that a custodial sentence of one year would be imposed in this jurisdiction. The gravity of this offence could be deduced from its circumstances, as reflected in the FI and by reference to the Appellants own evidence which was to this extent, not in dispute. He reiterated, the unhurried approach of the requesting authority was relevant also as the character of the offending was reflected in the lack of urgency.[32]In response the Requesting Authority emphasised that the Judge had undertaken a particular and it was submitted careful balancing exercise. It was accepted that the curfew point was a matter which could properly be taken into account but noted in this case five hours was of short duration and, for a man unemployed, with four small children, it would not present a significant intrusion into autonomy. Such relevance as this factor might have had upon the Judge’s mind below, was marginal in the circumstances. It was not clear she said why reporting to the police would have had an effect upon his employment. The family[33]The central submission of the Appellant focused upon the family position and what was said to be the plainly flawed approach of the Judge. There was no proper consideration of the effect upon these four young children of what would be the sudden disappearance of their father. The mother’s position would likely mean the loss of their home, and her vulnerability had formed no part of the reasoning. He reminded the court of caselaw in which the interests of children are required to be treated as a primary consideration. That could not be said to have been the case here.[34]The Respondent pointed to the listing by the Judge of the factors in support of extradition, and her relation of the evidence concerning the likely effect upon the children. This was adequate to fulfil the duties in these circumstances emphasising that reasonable judges could differ in their conclusions, there was no error of approach and this court should remember that the trial judge had the benefit of seeing the Appellant for herself. This was not a case like HH where both of the parents were required to answer to warrants for their extradition. There was no expert evidence that the mother was unable to care for the children, her position had been expressly considered on the basis of the authorities, listing the factors taken into account was sufficient evidence of the reasoning process, this was not an appealable decision. Consideration[35]I have reached the clear conclusion this appeal must be allowed. The totality of the District Judge’s findings – even reading across those matters in evidence which she had recorded, for example with regard to section 14, rather than section 21, Article 8, nowhere grapple with the dire predicted factual outcome for this family. This proceeds as a matter of common sense deduction and did not require, in these circumstances, expert opinion. In my judgement it goes well beyond the expected hardship from the fact of extradition of a man with family ties. Nor do the findings approach the question of the nature and gravity of the offence in light of that potential factual outcome. The balancing exercise required more consideration and nuance and an express consideration of the particular facts here.[36]The DJ had recorded earlier in the decision under “other evidence” that The Appellant and Ms Kuzebouchova “ … have 4 children together. She has applied for settled status in UK which has been refused. She is not allowed to work in UK without settled status. She and the children rely upon Andrej for financial support. She came to UK for a better life. She does not know how she will cope if Andrej were extradited. She does not have any family or many friends in UK. She suffered a miscarriage when expecting twins in December 2023 because of the stress of Andrej being arrested on the extradition warrant. One of the twins was miscarried and the other was still born 2 months later.”[37]Even aside from the extreme compassionate circumstances of the loss of the two children, the absence of a right to work and a right to the same benefits as her partner, would render the position of this family emotionally and financially, very precarious indeed. These matters may not in every case weigh so heavily in the balance such that extradition is impossible. In this present case, these factors go into the scales and this is an offence which on its face is minor and for which there is no evidence to suggest it should be characterised differently. It was not an offence of violence, there was no suggestion of injury or damage to property, there is no evidence to suggest the Appellant was a recidivist driver whilst disqualified or other special factors obtained. The court is entitled to at least reflect that it is, as submitted, wholly improbable that 12 months incarceration would result in this jurisdiction, given the background set out in the Warrant and the FI. This is not to diminish the right and the interest of the requesting state in the return of a fugitive, but rather to characterise the offending in respect of which the warrant was issued as nonetheless, relatively minor, and relatively inconsequential when put in the balance against the incursion into the rights of the Appellant, his partner and their four young children. It is a logical deduction that the absence of urgency reflects the relative absence of social disapprobation inherent in the warrant offence.[38]In particular the District Judge was in my judgement just wrong to state that “The real difficulty is a lack of financial support to the family”, when dealing with the position in which Ms Kuzebouchova would find herself. As to accommodation, the evidence was also not merely that the parents’ house was too small, but that there were two impaired adults already living there with this older couple upon whom, (the consideration postulated), 4 young children and their mother would be imposed, awaiting at least the end of the Appellants incarceration. This was cogent evidence of the likely impossibility of them living with family were their father to be extradited to be imprisoned.[39]The District Judge failed to consider properly the breadth and depth of the relevant evidence from the statements and as articulated by the Appellant which went to support the Article 8 case. Much time was spent, inevitably, and properly and coherently, on issues of fugitivity and the true sequence of events. However, the reasoning pertaining to Article 8, even when read with those passages of evidence set out earlier by the Judge, does not properly seek to investigate the balance between the offending, supporting the extradition, and the deleterious effects it would have on the children and partner. She did not examine the gravity of the offence and therefore, afford to it appropriate weight when considering the interests in extradition.[40]The balancing exercise, if re-considered might in certain circumstances produce the same outcome in a case. Here, however, that is not the position. Had that exercise been properly carried out in this case and deeper analysis of the likely situation of the family on the Appellant’s extradition been explored in more depth, the District Judge could not have reached the conclusion which she did.[41]The new submissions concerning time on curfew add to the argument but are not central to it. They enhance the Appellants Article 8 argument, but in my judgement this was in any event a case which falls into Lord Neuburgers category (vii); that is to say that the District Judge’s conclusion on proportionality was appealably wrong, indeed it was with a view which is unsupportable.[42]This appeal must be allowed.