“10.72 Turning then to the listed bridge. The Turnover bridge is identified in the GUC CA management plan, as a Grade II listed bridge providing an opportunity for horses to cross from one side of the canal to the other. It provides important context to the historic use of the canal and its significance is therefore both architectural and historic. As set out above, this bridge provides access from a nearby car park to the canal and towpath and a link on the Rothersthorpe circular walk. Its historic value and functional purpose is intrinsically linked to the canal, which is therefore the key component of its setting, although on crossing the bridge, parts of the northern parcel would be evident. [5.46, 6.3, 6.33, 7.19, 8.2] 10.73 I consider the northern parcel is part of the setting of the bridge. Although the proposed planting, which would increasingly screen those views which establish a relationship between the site and the bridge, there would be a low level of harm to that setting. I consider this to be at the lower end of less than substantial harm as set out in the Framework.” … 10.68 The effect of the site on the landscape or visual experience are not the same as its contribution to the heritage significance of the canal, nonetheless, I consider the introduction of solar panels would alter the relationship to the canal and appreciation of its embanked form within a rural landscape. Consequently, I consider there would be harm to the setting of the GUC. 10.69 The scale of this is limited to the short stretch in what is a very long linear CA. The harm to the CA as a whole, would therefore be limited and at the lower end of less than substantial harm, when considered on the context of the Framework.”
“[29] The Secretary of State notes that the GUC CA Management Plan describes the overall character as being defined by the gently curving canal, the modest grassy towpath and the surviving bridges, with its setting being of particular note as it passes through the river valleys (IR10.66). He agrees at IR10.66 that the significance of the GUC lies in its historic and architectural value, which includes the engineering of the contoured route of the canal. For the reasons given at IR10.67 he agrees that the northern parcel of the appeal site is an element of the setting of the GUC CA. He agrees at IR10.68 that the introduction of solar panels would alter the relationship to the canal and appreciation of its embanked form within a rural landscape and that there would be harm to the setting of the GUC. The Secretary of State agrees that the harm is limited to a short stretch in what is a very long linear CA (IR10.69). However, he finds the harm to the setting of the GUC, even in this short stretch, is moderate and in the lower to middle end of less than substantial harm unlike the Inspector who finds limited harm at IR10.69. … [31]. The Secretary of State agrees that the Turnover Bridge provides important context to the historic use of the canal and its significance is therefore both architectural and historic (IR10.72). He further agrees at IR10.72 that its historic value and functional purpose is intrinsically linked to the canal, which is therefore the key component of its setting, although on crossing the bridge, parts of the northern parcel would be evident. The Secretary of State finds, unlike the inspector at IR10.73 who finds low harm, that the northern parcel is part of the setting of the bridge and even with proposed planting the introduction of solar panels here would cause moderate harm to the setting of the Turnover Bridge in the lower to middle end of less than substantial harm.” (Emphasis added).
“38. The GUC Management Plan does make reference to the importance of landscape to the setting of the canal. That is true, but it is not equally true for all parts of the setting for the full 26-mile stretch of the canal through the authority area. That is why the management plan has identified what truly is ‘important’ to the significance of the canal and it does not include the appeal site or views towards it. Further, the general amenity provided by the landscape surrounding the canal should not be conflated with heritage significance, the two are separate and in terms of visual receptors experiencing any harm to amenity, this falls to the landscape evidence to assess.”
“5.9.27 When considering the impact of a proposed development on the significance of a designated heritage asset, the Secretary of State should give great weight to the asset’s conservation. The more important the asset, the greater the weight should be. This is irrespective of whether any potential harm amounts to substantial harm, total loss, or less than substantial harm to its significance. 5.9.28 The Secretary of State should give considerable importance and weight to the desirability of preserving all heritage assets. Any harm or loss of significance of a designated heritage asset (from its alteration or destruction, or from development within its setting) should require clear and convincing justification… …5.9.36 When considering applications for development affecting the setting of a designated heritage asset, the Secretary of State should give appropriate weight to the desirability of preserving the setting such assets and treat favourably applications that preserve those elements of the setting that make a positive contribution to, or better reveal the significance of, the asset. When considering applications that do not do this, the Secretary of State should give great weight to any negative effects, when weighing them against the wider benefits of the application. The greater the negative impact on the significance of the designated heritage asset, the greater the benefits that will be needed to justify approval.”
“ The surroundings in which a heritage asset is experienced. Its extent is not fixed and may change as the asset and its surroundings evolve. Elements of a setting may make a positive or negative contribution to the significance of an asset, may affect the ability to appreciate that significance or may be neutral.”
“The value of a heritage asset to this and future generations because of its heritage interest. The interest may be archaeological, architectural, artistic or historic. Significance derives not only from a heritage asset’s physical presences, but also from its setting.”
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the 'principal important controversial issues', disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
“The Planning Court – and this court too – must always be vigilant against excessive legalism infecting the planning system. A planning decision is not akin to an adjudication made by a court (see paragraph 50 of my judgment in Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council). The courts must keep in mind that the function of planning decision making has been assigned by Parliament, not to judges, but – at local level – to elected councillors with the benefit of advice given to them by planning officers, most of whom are professional planners, and – on appeal – to the Secretary of State and his inspectors. They should remember too that the making of planning policy is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving reasonably predictable decision-making, consistent with the aims of the policy-maker. Though the interpretation of planning policy is, ultimately, a matter for the court, planning policies do not normally require intricate discussion of their meaning. A particular policy, or even a particular phrase or word in a policy, will sometimes provide disagree as to the meaning of the words in dispute, and even when the policy-maker’s own understanding of the policy has not been accepted, the debate in which lawyers have engaged may turn out to have been in vain – because, when a planning decision has to be made, the effect of the relevant policies, taken together, may be exactly the same whichever construction is right (see paragraph 22 of my judgment in Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council). That of course may not always be so. One thing, however, is certain, and ought to be stressed. Planning officers and inspectors are entitled to expect that both national and local planning policy is as simply and clearly stated as it can be, and also – however well or badly a policy is expressed – that the court’s interpretation of it will be straightforward, without undue or elaborate exposition. Equally, they are entitled to expect – in every case – good sense and fairness in the court’s review of a planning decision, not the hypercritical approach the court is often urged to adopt.”