Karol Sztakowski v Regional Court in Wlcoclawek (Poland) [2025] EWHC 1037 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 1037 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-001059
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 30/04/2025
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING
Between
Karol SZTAKOWSKIAppellantRegional Court in WLCOCLAWEK (Poland)Respondent
John Howey (instructed by JFH Law) for AppellantKiera Oluwunmi (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 27 th March 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING

Introduction

[1]This is my judgment in the appeal of Karol Sztakowski (“the Appellant”) against the decision of the District Judge at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court, made on 21st March 2024, to order his extradition to Poland.[2]The Appellant is wanted in Poland to serve a sentence of 4 years and 9 months’ imprisonment in relation to three sets of offences.[3]This appeal is brought pursuant to section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003. Permission to appeal was granted by Mr Justice Garnham on 29th November 2024.[4]The central argument was that the District Judge's decision was wrong because it constituted a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s and his family's rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[5]The argument was advanced on the following bases: i) The District Judge's conclusion regarding fugitivity was wrong and should not have been factored against the Appellant in the Article 8 balancing exercise. ii) The welfare of the Appellant's children, particularly his older daughter Wiktoria, was not given sufficient weight by the District Judge, especially in light of her subsequent decline in mental health following the extradition order. iii) The impact of extradition on the entire family, including the practical and emotional upheaval for his partner and all four children, was more severe than the District Judge acknowledged. If this was not true at the time of the decision it was nevertheless the case in the light of subsequent events and fresh evidence. iv) There were arguments relating to delay in the proceedings, which the Appellant contended should diminish the public interest in extradition. v) The Appellant also pointed to a change in his offending lifestyle as a factor weighing against extradition.[6]The Appellant submitted that when all these factors were properly balanced, the interference with his and his family's Article 8 rights outweighed the public interest in his extradition to Poland. The respondent argued that the District Judge's decision was correct, that he had properly considered all relevant factors, and that the fresh evidence submitted on appeal did not render his conclusion wrong.

The Family Background

[7]The Appellant has a partner, with whom he owns a property in Wrexham. They are both in full-time employment. The Appellant earns £34,000 per year and his partner earns between £18,000 and £20,000 per year.[8]The Appellant has four children, all girls, who live with him and his partner. Two of the children are the Appellant’s from a previous relationship, one child is the Appellant’s partner’s child from a previous relationship, and one child is the child of the Appellant and his partner.[9]The children are: i) Wiktoria Szatkowska, born on 24th January 2007, Mr. Sztakowski's daughter from a previous relationship. She is now 18 years old. ii) Natalia Szatkowska, born on 23rd May 2011, also Mr. Sztakowski's daughter from a previous relationship. She is 13 years old. iii) A daughter of Lidia Kurkowska from a previous relationship, born in 2013, who considers Mr. Sztakowski to be her father. She is 12 years old. iv) Lena Sztakowski, born on 31st August 2017, the daughter of Mr. Sztakowski and Lidia Kurkowska. She is 7 years old.[10]Prior to June 2023, Wiktoria and Natalia lived with their biological mother in Somerset and, it is said, experienced domestic violence, parental substance misuse, and neglect. There was police involvement, and the children reported feeling scared and unsafe. One daughter needed mental health support, and the other felt unsafe. Social Services in Somerset were involved due to concerns about their health needs and exposure to domestic abuse. In June 2023, Wiktoria and Natalia moved to live with their father and Lidia Kurkowska in Wrexham. A Social Service report (see further below) noted that since moving no concerns had been raised for their well-being. Both girls felt safe, settled, and happy, and wished to remain with their father and family. They have a close relationship with their siblings and Lidia Kurkowska.[11]Lidia Kurkowska is employed part-time and shares caring responsibilities with Mr. Sztakowski. She indicated for the purpose of the hearing before the District Judge that she is willing to care for all four children if he is extradited, despite the difficulties, including the potential financial strain and the possible need to sell their home.[12]The welfare of all four children was a significant factor in the Article 8 balancing exercise undertaken by the District Judge. More recent evidence highlighted potential impacts on Wiktoria and Natalia's mental health due to the extradition proceedings, as well as Lidia Kurkowska's well-being.

Extradition

[13]The Appellant is the subject of an Extradition Warrant issued by the Polish authorities on 14th February 2023 and certified by the NCA on 6th June 2023. His surrender is sought in relation to a conviction warrant for a total sentence of 4 years and 9 months imprisonment, which remains to be served. This sentence is comprised of three judgments from the District Court in Lipno, Poland: i) A judgment dated 6th November 2006 for 1 year and 3 months imprisonment, which became valid and enforceable on 4th April 2007. This sentence was initially suspended but was activated on 15th September 2010 due to Mr Sztakowski committing an intentional offence during the probation period. ii) A judgment dated 29th June 2006 for 1 year and 6 months imprisonment, which became valid and enforceable on 8th November 2006. This sentence was also initially suspended but was activated on 22nd June 2017 with reference to Mr Sztakowski having infringed the court order by committing offences in this country. iii) A judgment dated 19th May 2010 for 2 years imprisonment, which became valid and enforceable on 27th May 2010. This sentence was postponed twice and then conditionally suspended on 28th February 2012. It was activated on 12th April 2017 partly as a result of Mr Sztakowski’s convictions in the UK.[14]The offences leading to these sentences are: i) Two incidents of burglary at a grocery shop in Sumin in July 2005, involving the theft of alcohol, food, tobacco, chips, and chewing gum. ii) A burglary in Czernikowo in July 2005, involving the theft of various items from a building. iii) An attempted robbery in Czernikowo and Wygoda in November 2009, involving the use of violence and threats against the victim to attempt to extort money.[15]The Appellant was 20 years old when the first and second sets of offences were committed and 25 years old when the third offence was committed.[16]The Appellant has been convicted of several offences in this jurisdiction. i) On 17th August 2016, he was sentenced for failing to provide a specimen for analysis, contrary to S7(6) of the Road Traffic Act, speeding, and failing to surrender to custody, to which he had previously pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 8 weeks imprisonment, which was varied on appeal to a suspended sentence of 8 weeks imprisonment, as well as ancillary orders disqualifying him from driving. ii) On 5th October 2016, he was given a suspended sentence of imprisonment of 3 months, suspended for 12 months, with an unpaid work requirement, for possession of an offensive weapon. He subsequently breached the terms of the order and was sentenced to 10 weeks imprisonment.[17]The District Judge noted that the Appellant's life in the UK has "hardly been exemplary". The International Conviction Certificate (ICC) also discloses eight convictions, including personal possession of drugs, pre-dating the offences in the Polish Arrest Warrant.

The Extradition Proceedings

[18]Mr Sztakowski was arrested on 27th July 2023, and an initial hearing took place on 28th July 2023. He was granted conditional bail at this initial hearing and has remained on bail throughout the proceedings in the lower court.[19]The extradition hearing was initially listed for 9 November 2023. However, the hearing was adjourned to 21 February 2024 to allow for a Section 7 report to be prepared. The report was prepared by Wrexham Children and Young People Services following a direction from District Judge Pilling. The purpose of a Section 7 report under the Children Act 1989, is generally to provide the court with information to help it make decisions about the welfare of children. In this case, the report focused on Karol Sztakowski's children, Wiktoria and Natalia, and the likely effect on them of his extradition to Poland. The report detailed their current living arrangements with their father and his partner and their past experiences living with their biological mother. The social worker who prepared the report did not speak to the children's mother. The District Judge considered the content of this report in his judgment.[20]The extradition hearing was held before District Judge Curtis, who ordered extradition on 21st March 2024. The sole issue raised at the extradition hearing was in respect of Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the right to family life. Mr Sztakowski lodged his appeal on 27th March 2024.

The Judgment

[21]The District Judge acknowledged "harrowing reading" in the Section 7 report regarding the experiences of the Appellant's older daughters, Wiktoria and Natalia, in their biological mother's care. He noted the 999 calls to the police, their feelings of fear and not wanting to be in her care, with one daughter needing support for her mental health while the other simply felt unsafe.[22]The District Judge specifically mentioned the "sea change in terms of their wellbeing and safety, a direct contrast to their previous placement with their mother" following their placement with the Appellant. He further stated that Social Services did not consider there was any other viable option for the children other than with the Appellant and that their quality of life had been dramatically enhanced when they came to live with him.[23]Whilst the Appellant's partner would look after the children if he were extradited, the District Judge recognised that this would be "a truly difficult ask, likely to cause a sale of their home and substantial personal difficulty in caring for four young daughters".[24]In his overall conclusion on Article 8, the District Judge stated that this was a "finely balanced decision". While acknowledging the strong factors against extradition, including the impact on the Appellant’s children and partner, he ultimately concluded that it would "not be a disproportionate interference with the engaged Article 8 rights of the RP and his partner".[25]The District Judge attached significant weight to the fact that the Appellant’s partner would step in to care for the children, despite the difficulties of doing so, as a factor mitigating against the severity of the interference with family life. He considered the Section 7 report, which indicated that the only safe placement for the children was with the Appellant's partner (although the best placement would be with the Appellant present). He noted the strength of the bond between the Appellant and his partner, given her offer to care for all four children.[26]The District Judge found that he could not be sure to the required standard that the Appellant had been a fugitive since 2010 or 2011, which he considered the more likely dates at which the Appellant had left Poland. He noted that the International Conviction Certificate appeared to indicate postponements of proceedings, and the Polish Judicial Authority could not contradict the Appellant's assertion that he had continued to comply with his probation officer’s requirements during that period. The District Judge also found that there was nothing before him to show that the Appellant was obliged to remain in Poland during that time.[27]However, the District Judge reached a different conclusion for the period from 2017 onwards. Whilst he was prepared to give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt for the period between 2010 and 2017, he did not do so thereafter.[28]The District Judge's reasoning for finding the Appellant to be a fugitive from 2017 was that he "placed himself beyond the reach of the authorities and did not return to Poland". He took into account the Appellant's own admissions that he had attended Poland and engaged with his probation officer while appeal processes and legal arguments continued, but that he left without return in 2017 before that process had completed. The District Judge considered that the Appellant did this "in the knowledge given the existence of suspended sentences [and intervening offending] that he may have a sentence to serve".[29]The District Judge acknowledged the length of time since the offences, noting that the earliest was almost 19 years ago and the more recent 14 years ago, identifying this as a factor against extradition.[30]However, the District Judge considered that the delay was diminished by the Appellant's absence from Poland and presence in the UK between 2017 and the issue of the warrant in 2023, balancing this against the assertion that the Polish Judicial Authority knew the Appellant's location.[31]The District Judge conducted the balancing exercise under Article 8 of the ECHR by weighing the factors for and against extradition. This involved considering the potential interference with Mr. Sztakowski's and his family's right to respect for private and family life against the public interest in extradition.[32]The factors relied upon against extradition, were: i) The length of time since the offences were committed. ii) The delay between the Polish Judicial Authority being aware of his presence in the UK and the issuing of the warrant. iii) Mr. Sztakowski's reliance on legal advice regarding the statute of limitations. iv) His assertion of continued compliance with his probation officer while in the UK. v) The life he had built in the UK since 2011/2012, including employment and home ownership. vi) The fact that his daughters lived with him and his partner, with a Section 7 report confirming their wish to remain with his partner if he were extradited.[33]The factors identified in favour of extradition, were principally: i) The seriousness of the offences and the comparatively long remaining sentence of 4 years and 9 months. ii) The finding that Mr. Sztakowski was a fugitive from 2017 onwards, which diminished the weight to be given to delay. iii) Mr. Sztakowski's offending in the UK in 2016, indicating that his life in the UK was not exemplary.[34]Despite the significant factors militating against extradition, he concluded that "the balance here tips in the favour of the JA" and that extradition would "not be a disproportionate interference" with Article 8 rights, noting the Appellant’s partner's indication that she would care for the children. The Legal Framework Appeals

The Legal Framework

[35]The powers of this Court on appeal are set out in section 27 of the EA 2003. This Court may allow the appeal where(a) the District Judge ought to have decided a question before him differently and had he done so he would have been bound to have ordered the person’s discharge, or(b) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing, or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing and the issue or evidence could have resulted in the District Judge answering a question differently that would have resulted in the judge being bound to order the person’s discharge.

Article 8 and Extradition

[36]The sole ground of appeal in this case concerns Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), specifically the argument that the District Judge erred in concluding that the Appellant’s extradition is not a disproportionate interference with his, and his family’s rights under Article 8 ECHR.[37]The general principles in relation to the application of Article 8 in the context of extradition proceedings are well-established and have been set out in authorities such as Norris v Government of the USA [2010] (No.2) UKSC 9, 2 AC 487 and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25, 1 AC 338, as well as the approach laid out in Celinski and others [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin).[38]In HH, Baroness Hale summarised the principles relevant to Article 8 in extradition cases, including that the court must carefully examine the way in which extradition will interfere with family life, that there is no test of exceptionality, and that the question is always whether the interference with private and family life is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. The interests of the child are a primary consideration.[39]There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition; in particular that those accused of crimes should be brought to trial, those convicted should serve their sentences, the UK should honour its treaty obligations, and there should be no “safe havens”. However, the weight attached to this public interest varies according to the nature and seriousness of the crimes. Delay since the crimes were committed may diminish the weight of the public interest and increase the impact on private and family life.[40]The test on appeal is whether the District Judge’s decision was wrong, meaning whether the District Judge erred in such a way that they ought to have answered the statutory question differently. In a case such as the present, the appellate court must decide whether the decision of the district judge was wrong because the overall evaluation was wrong, (see Love v Government of the United States of America [2018] 1 WLR 2889). The judgment of the District Judge on Article 8 proportionality falls to be considered in line with the categories referred to in Celinski, adopting Lord Neuberger’s approach in Re B (A Child) (FC) [2016] UKSC 33.

Fugitivity

[41]The fundamental principle is that a person who has knowingly placed themselves beyond the reach of a legal process is a fugitive (Ristin v Romania [2022] EWHC 3163 (Admin), 2022 WL 17587238). It is for the requesting state to establish fugitive status to the criminal standard. The principle is wider than simply fleeing to avoid arrest. In the case of Wisniewski v Poland EWHC [2016] 386 (Admin) 1 WLR 3750 for example, the Divisional Court found that individuals who left Poland in breach of conditions attached to their suspended sentences, knowingly preventing compliance with those conditions, were fugitives. This was the case even though the suspended sentences were only activated later, and they were not aware of the activation. The court held that their conduct in leaving met the core principle of knowingly placing themselves beyond the reach of legal process.[42]The concept of fugitivity is of substantial significance in the assessment of whether extradition would constitute a disproportionate infringement of an individual's Article 8 rights. A judicial determination that a requested person is a fugitive is a factor that weighs heavily in favour of granting extradition. The principle of preventing the United Kingdom from becoming a 'safe haven' for those seeking to evade justice in other jurisdictions is a crucial aspect of the public interest in extradition and is most compelling when the individual in question is deemed to be a fugitive. Thus, a finding of fugitivity can have the effect of diminishing the weight accorded to arguments predicated on private and family life, particularly those that have developed during the period when the individual has knowingly remained outside the jurisdiction of the requesting state.[43]Thus, establishing fugitive status canstrengthen the public interest arguments supporting extradition, encompassing not only the 'safe haven' principle but also the broader imperative that individuals should face the consequences of their actions within the legal framework of the requesting state and not evade their responsibilities. Fugitivity is not however an absolute bar to a claim under Article 8, nor does the absence of fugitive status guarantee the success of such a claim.[44]In Ristin the extradition background involved two drink-driving offences for which Mr. Ristin had been convicted in Romania. On 29th January 2016, he committed the first drink-driving offence. Subsequently, on 20th October 2016, he was convicted and received a 12-month suspended sentence for this offence, which took effect the following month. The second drink-driving offence occurred on 20th January 2017, during the currency of this suspended sentence. This breach led to the activation of the suspended sentence, resulting in the 15-month custodial sentence that formed the basis of the extradition request. The District Judge in Ristin found the Appellant to be a fugitive because he left Romania while his appeal was pending, knowing he faced imprisonment if unsuccessful. Fordham J ultimately dismissed the appeal. The judgment included a detailed analysis of the issue of fugitivity, upholding the District Judge's finding, concluding that it was legally correct and open to the Judge based on the factual findings made:
“30. In the present case, based on his findings of fact, the Judge concluded that the positive steps to evade the authorities in the requesting state, in the context of what the Appellant knew and was facing, were sufficient to mean that he was a fugitive. I do not accept that the Judge was "wrong" in finding [vi] that the Appellant had "taken positive steps to evade the authorities in the requesting state"; nor that the Judge's finding of fugitivity was "wrong". The Judge found sufficient factual indicators in the knowingly evasive actions of the Appellant, who to his knowledge had been convicted and sentenced, to constitute him as having evaded the authorities. It is true that he was going back to the UK which had previously been his home. It is true that there was no legal obligation imposed on him to stay in Romania. But an individual can be a fugitive by returning to a country where they have previously been living. And an individual can be a fugitive by leaving a country, notwithstanding that no legal obligation to stay has been imposed upon them. Indeed, the classic instance of "evading arrest" need not arise in the context of any obligation having been imposed. I think that, in De Zorzi, the idea of having "left the court with the permission of the court" (§55) was something distinctive and positive, more than simply the absence of a restriction on leaving the country. In the present case, on 16 May 2019 the Appellant was present when he was convicted. He knew about his sentence and that he faced serving it, subject only to an appeal. He came to the UK three months later in August 2019, returning here, to pursue an appeal from here. These circumstances could properly be characterised as falling squarely within the ambit of the classic character of fugitivity: knowing and evasive relocation. This fits with the basic idea of fugitivity: action which is knowingly evasive of criminal process and undermines the ability of the individual convincingly to complain about delay in their pursuit by the requesting authorities”
[45]The Court considered an alternative analysis assuming Mr. Ristin was not a fugitive but still concluded that the circumstances of his departure from Romania and his knowledge of the impending custodial sentence were relevant to the Article 8 proportionality balance and did not render the District Judge's overall conclusion wrong.[46]The judgment in Ristin clarifies that a person can be considered a fugitive if they chose to leave the requesting state while their appeal was ongoing, knowing that if the appeal was unsuccessful, they would have to serve an immediate custodial sentence. An individual may be deemed a fugitive even if there was no domestic warrant requiring their surrender to custody at the time they left the requesting state and even if they were not subject to any formal restriction on leaving. The crucial factor is whether they knowingly left to avoid the legal process. The act of pursuing an appeal from the United Kingdom does not automatically negate a finding of fugitivity. Similarly, declining to voluntarily return to the requesting state and resisting extradition proceedings can be considered within the context of fugitivity. Fresh Evidence[47]There were three applications to adduce fresh evidence to be considered in the appeal. The admission of fresh evidence on appeal is not automatic and is a matter for the discretion of the Court. The Court considers whether it is in the interests of justice to admit such evidence, keeping in mind the policy that extradition cases should be dealt with speedily and not delayed by introducing evidence that could and should have been relied upon below. Evidence that was “not available at the extradition hearing” means evidence that either did not exist at the time or was not at the disposal of the party wishing to adduce it and could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence. Furthermore, the Court needs to be satisfied that if the evidence had been adduced, the result would have been different, resulting in the person's discharge; the fresh evidence must be decisive.[48]The first two applications were dated 21st May 2024 and 31st May 2024. These applications were granted by Mr Justice Garnham on 29th November 2024. The fresh evidence included in these applications related to: i) A further witness statement of Karol Sztakowski dated 11th April 2024. ii) A further witness statement of Karol Sztakowski dated 29th May 2024. iii) A further witness statement of Lidia Kurkowska. iv) Documents relating to Wiktoria, including a statement of conduct, mental health support information, a psychiatric referral, and a CAMHS initial assessment. v) Documents relating to Natalia, including a referral to Aim High, a psychiatric referral, and a CAMHS initial assessment. vi) Documents relating to Lidia Kurkowska, including medical notes.[49]A third application was made by the Appellant, dated 11th March 2025. This application sought permission to adduce further statements and supporting documents. I granted this application given that this was material of the same sort that had featured in the earlier applications and was essentially updating the position. The documents included in this third application were: i) A further witness statement of Karol Sztakowski dated 12th March 2025. ii) A further witness statement of Karol Sztakowski dated 21st October 2024. iii) Documents relating to Wiktoria, including a Cambria College letter dated 24th May 2024, an Inspire letter dated 17th September 2024, a CAMHS letter dated 19th July 2024, CAMHS appointment letters, and a referral to “Parabl” dated 17th February 2025. iv) Documents relating to Natalia, including a school support group letter. v) Documents relating to Lidia Kurkowska, including GP records dated 6th March 2025 and a sick note dated 25th February 2025.[50]The Respondent accepted that this fresh evidence was not available at the extradition hearing but did not concede that it was decisive in rendering the District Judge's decision wrong.

The Appellant's Arguments

[51]The Appellant contends that the District Judge erred in concluding that his extradition is not a disproportionate interference with his and his family’s rights under Article 8 ECHR. His arguments can be summarised as follows: i) The District Judge was wrong to conclude that the Appellant was a fugitive. The information provided by the Polish authorities regarding the history of the proceedings was significantly deficient. It is argued that the Polish authorities were aware of the Appellant’s whereabouts. The Appellant argues that the District Judge's conclusions on fugitivity were wrong for several reasons: a) The Appellant contends that the District Judge was not assisted by the fact that the information provided by the Polish Judicial Authority regarding the history of proceedings was "significantly deficient". The warrant did not fully explain the postponements and re-suspensions of sentences before their eventual activation. b) The Appellant submits that it can be "reasonably inferred" from the postponements and re-suspension of sentences that he was in contact with the Polish Court and that they knew his whereabouts. Evidence from case c) (II K 1088/09) allegedly shows the court communicating with him by post at his home address. c) The Appellant's evidence was that he left Poland at the end of 2011 or the beginning of 2012, when the execution of sentences had been postponed and were soon to become suspended. By the time he was obliged to serve the sentences (activated in 2017), he had already been in the UK for several years. Therefore, he "did not place himself beyond the reach of the authorities; he was already beyond the reach of the authorities". d) The Appellant's situation is argued to be different from those who leave knowing they are breaching conditions of a suspended sentence by not notifying authorities or obtaining permission. e) The Appellant argues that any criticism for not attending later hearings is unfounded, as many jurisdictions do not require a defendant's presence, especially if represented. ii) The District Judge should have placed greater weight on the welfare of all four children living with Mr Sztakowski and his partner, and the impact his extradition would have on them. This includes the risk of the older daughters having to return to their mother’s care, as highlighted in the Section 7 Social Services report. The potential loss of their family home due to inability to meet mortgage repayments if the Appellant is extradited was also raised. iii) The offences were committed many years ago, and the District Judge was wrong to diminish the effect of this delay due to the Appellant’s presence in the UK from 2017 until the warrant was issued. It is argued that until the activation of the sentences in 2017, the Appellant remained in contact with the Polish authorities. iv) While accepting that his life in the UK has not been exemplary, the Appellant's personal circumstances are now very different, and he has made a significant effort to change his lifestyle. v) The public interest in extradition is reduced by the age of the offences, the delay in proceedings, and the approach of the Polish authorities.

The Respondent's Arguments

[52]The Respondent, submits that the District Judge’s decision was not wrong and that the balancing exercise under Article 8 ECHR does not need to be conducted again because: i) The District Judge considered all the information before him, including hearing live evidence from the Appellant. ii) The District Judge considered the defence submissions on delay and was entitled to find that the delay was diminished by the Appellant’s absence from Poland and presence in the UK between 2017 and 2023. iii) The District Judge considered the issue of fugitivity and was entitled to conclude that the Appellant was a fugitive from 2017 onwards. In this respect the Respondent argued that: a) The District Judge had the benefit of live evidence and findings of fact by the District Judge should be respected. b) The Appellant left Poland in the knowledge of ongoing appeal proceedings and the possibility that his appeal against imprisonment would fail. c) He left in the knowledge that due to his suspended sentences and subsequent offending; prison was a real possibility. d) He accepted that he did not provide details of his change of address in any of the three cases where he was obliged to, because he did not want to be found. iv) The District Judge considered the Section 7 Social Services report thoroughly and was aware of the potential impact of extradition on all the children. v) The fresh evidence adduced by the Appellant, while relevant, is not decisive and does not render the District Judge's conclusion on Article 8 wrong. The respondent argues that the support accessed by the Appellant’s daughters and partner is positive and does not demonstrate that extradition would be disproportionate. vi) There remains a constant and weighty public interest in extradition, and the offences the Appellant was convicted of are not trivial. Mr Sztakowski's fugitivity reduces the impact of any delay.

Discussion & Conclusions

[53]The District Judge concluded that the Appellant knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of the Polish authorities and did not return to Poland. This was a fact sensitive finding by the tribunal that had heard the evidence.[54]The District Judge's reasoning, focusing on the 2017 departure in the context of ongoing legal proceedings and the Appellant's knowledge, provides a basis for his conclusion of fugitivity from that point onwards. The impact of this finding on the appeal is that it strengthens the case for extradition when balancing it against Article 8 rights. The District Judge’s reasoning is coherent and based on the evidence presented, particularly the Appellant’s engagement with Polish authorities until 2017 and his subsequent departure before the finalisation of the proceedings.[55]His reasoning was grounded in his assessment of the Appellant's own evidence and the timing of his departure from Poland in relation to the ongoing legal proceedings and his knowledge of potential imprisonment. The District Judge noted the Appellant's evidence of returning to Poland twice a year to see his probation officer, with the last contact in 2017. He reached his overall conclusion having given the Appellant the benefit of the doubt for the period between 2010 and 2017. I conclude that the District Judge was entitled to come to the conclusions that he did in relation to the issue of fugitivity. He was therefore entitled to weigh fugitivity in the overall balancing exercise, when considering delay and reaching his conclusion that extradition would not constitute a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights.[56]The District Judge was also entitled to take into account the seriousness of the offences for which the Appellant was convicted, and the substantial prison sentence imposed by the Polish courts as significant factors in favour of extradition. These factors are central to the well-established public interest in ensuring that convicted criminals serve their sentences and that the United Kingdom does not become a safe haven for those seeking to evade justice. The District Judge weighed them appropriately in his overall assessment of proportionality under Article 8. I note in this respect that notwithstanding the age of the offences the activation of one of the suspended sentences was directly linked to the Appellant's offending in the UK in 2016.[57]The Section 7 report, completed on 4th January 2023, provides an assessment of the welfare of the Appellant’s daughters, Wiktoria and Natalia. The investigations undertaken included discussions with the Appellant, his partner Lidia Kurkowska, and both Wiktoria and Natalia.[58]The report details the children's current, and presently unchanged, living arrangements with their father and Lidia Kurkowska. It notes that both Wiktoria and Natalia reported wanting to live with their father and that he would deal with their worries. The report specifically highlights that Wiktoria was more affected by arguing and shouting at home (presumably their mother's home prior to moving in with their father) and that their mother would text her to make her feel guilty for living with her father.[59]Significantly, the Section 7 report provides a conclusion regarding the impact of Mr. Sztakowski's extradition: "It is felt that the extradition of Mr Karol Sztakowski would have significant impact on Natalia and Wiktoria’s emotional well-being and put them at risk of having to return to their mother’s care. The extradition would not only impact Natalia and Wiktoria but also their younger half-sister and Ms Lidia Kurkowska’s daughter who calls Mr Karol Sztakowski Dad as he has maintained that role in her life for the last 7 years".[60]The District Judge summarised this aspect of the Section 7 report in his judgment, noting that it was "harrowing reading as far as what his children have been privy to in their biological mother's care, first identified in 2020, the 999 calls to the police, not wanting to be in her care and feeling scared. The impact on one daughter needing support for her mental health, the other simply not feeling safe with her". The District Judge acknowledged the report's conclusion that the only safe placement available to the children was with the Appellant's partner, although the best placement would be with the Appellant present. He recognised this as a "very powerful feature in the RPs favour and the welfare of the children was a primary consideration".[61]The court admitted fresh evidence after the District Judge's decision of 21st March 2024. This evidence primarily related to developments concerning the welfare and mental health of the Appellant’s children, particularly Wiktoria and Natalia, that occurred after the judgment.[62]In relation to Wiktoria, the fresh evidence included a statement of conduct indicating a steady decline in her well-being since January 2024, with investigations by her college revealing "distress over her family situation, particularly in anticipation of another significant event involving her father, which caused her to be scared to lose another parent figure". It further detailed her referral to the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) and an initial assessment noting that she had not received support for her childhood experiences and felt numb and frustrated regarding the extradition situation. Later fresh evidence indicated that Wiktoria had dropped out of college, attended CAMHS sessions (which concluded as she turned 18) for potential PTSD and suicidal thoughts and self-harm tendencies, and was referred to therapy sessions.[63]For Natalia, the fresh evidence included her referral to the "Aim High" service and her inclusion in a school support group to build self-esteem.[64]The fresh evidence also included information about Lidia Kurkowska, such as medical notes showing a prescription for anti-depressants and a diagnosis of depression, as well as a sick note indicating she was not fit to work. This was put before the court to suggest a potential impact on her ability to care for the four children in Mr. Sztakowski's absence.[65]Upon comparing the evidence in the Section 7 report with the fresh evidence, it is apparent that while the fresh evidence provides updated and more specific details about the children's well-being after the District Judge's decision, it is not fundamentally different in nature from the factors already considered by the District Judge.[66]The Section 7 report had already highlighted the significant emotional impact that the Appellant’s extradition would have on both Wiktoria and Natalia. It explicitly set out the risk to their emotional well-being and the potential for them to be returned to their mother's care, a situation described as dangerous. The District Judge acknowledged this "harrowing" background and the children's fear of their mother. The report also noted the general impact on the younger children and Mr. Sztakowski's partner.[67]The fresh evidence elaborates on these existing concerns. Wiktoria's declining mental health, her referral to CAMHS, and subsequent distress are all developments falling under the umbrella of the "significant impact on ... emotional well-being" already identified in the Section 7 report. Similarly, Natalia's need for additional support at school, while a new detail, is consistent with the pre-existing concern about the potential negative effects of extradition on her overall welfare. The evidence concerning Lidia Kurkowska's mental health and ability to cope with sole care of the children also relates directly to the District Judge's consideration of who would care for the children in Mr. Sztakowski's absence and the potential difficulties involved.[68]The crucial point is that the categories of impact – emotional distress in the older daughters, potential instability in their living arrangements, and challenges for the partner in caring for all the children – were all factors brought to the District Judge's attention through the Section 7 report. The fresh evidence provides further details and evidence of the progression of these issues in the period following the judgment.[69]As argued by the Respondent, the fresh evidence primarily illustrates the hardship caused by the prospect of extradition, a factor that was already anticipated and considered by the District Judge when assessing the proportionality of extradition under Article 8. The District Judge was aware of the children's difficult background and the potential detrimental impact of removing their father, as evidenced by his summary of the Section 7 report and his acknowledgment of the welfare of the older daughters as central to the decision.[70]While the fresh evidence details the manifestation and progression of these difficulties, it does not introduce a fundamentally different type of impact that was not already within the scope of the District Judge's considerations. The District Judge conducted a balancing exercise taking into account the potential consequences for the entire family, as highlighted in paragraph 41 of his judgment. The fresh evidence, whilst providing updated specifics, essentially reinforces and elaborates on the negative impacts that were already a key part of that balancing exercise.[71]Therefore, despite the additional details provided in the fresh evidence, I conclude that it is not fundamentally different from the factors relating to the welfare of the appellant's daughters and his family that were already before and considered by the District Judge in ordering extradition on 21st March 2024. The core concerns about the emotional well-being of the children and the stability of their care arrangements in the event of their father's extradition were central to the Section 7 report and remained the primary focus of the subsequent fresh evidence. The further material detailed the support to which the children had access. It strikes me as unremarkable that there should be heightened apprehensiveness as the prospect of extradition grew closer.[72]While I acknowledge the potential impact of the Appellant’s extradition on his family, the legal threshold for refusing extradition on Article 8 grounds is high, requiring the consequences of the interference with family life to be exceptionally severe. Having reviewed the fresh evidence alongside the material that was before the District Judge, including the Section 7 Social Services report I am not for myself, persuaded that the impact on the Appellant’s family reaches this level. In the domestic context it seems unlikely that breaches of a suspended sentence order imposed in respect of burglaries and a violent robbery would not result in a custodial sentence notwithstanding the family background.[73]The District Judge considered the welfare of the children as a primary factor against extradition. The fresh evidence, while providing an updated picture, does not fundamentally alter the overall proportionality assessment. Wiktoria, who appears to have been the most affected by previous events and potential extradition, is now an adult. This was not a case involving the extradition of both parents or a single carer.[74]The approach of this Court on appeal is not to conduct a fresh balancing exercise but rather to determine whether the District Judge’s decision was wrong by applying established legal principles.I am not persuaded that the District Judge misapplied the law, made any findings of fact that no reasonable judge could have reached, failed to take into account a relevant factor, or reached an irrational or perverse conclusion. The District Judge’s judgment clearly demonstrates a careful and comprehensive consideration of all the relevant factors in his assessment of proportionality under Article 8. As the District Judge observed this was a finely balanced decision with strong factors both for and against extradition. The balancing act required in extradition proceedings involving Article 8 rights inherently involves the assessment of very different factors relating to the individual and their family life on one hand, and the public interest in extradition on the other.[75]For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the District Judge was correct to take the seriousness of the offences and the prison sentence imposed into account as significant factors favouring extradition. It was open to him to conclude, as he did, that the Appellant had fugitive status from 2017 and that the public interest in the Appellant's extradition outweighs the considerations raised under Article 8 of the ECHR. Consequently, the appeal against the extradition order must be dismissed. END