Glaister & Anor, R (on the application of) v Assistant Coroner for North Wales [2025] EWHC 1018 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 1018 (Admin)AC-2024-MAN-000187 & 186
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue SITTING IN MANCHESTERDate Wednesday, 30 th April 2025
Between
FORDHAM JClaimants- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Between:THE KING (GLAISTER and CARR)ASSISTANT CORONER FOR NORTH WALESDefendant(1) FAMILY OF BENJAMIN LEONARDInterested Parties(2) THE SCOUT ASSOCIATION
Helen Evans KC and Melody Hadfield (instructed by Fieldfisher LLP)for Fieldfisher LLP, Jill Greenfield and Andrew DoddDavid Halpern KC (instructed by DAC Beachcroft LLP) for Nicola PearsonBen Smiley by written submissions (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for Leonard Family for The other parties did not appear and were not represented
Hearing Hearing dates: 18.3.25Further evidence: 25.3.25Draft judgment: 14.4.25
Approved Judgment
FORDHAM JThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 30 April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

FORDHAM J:

[1]This judgment has at its heart a vital distinction between a Court Embargo and a Journalism Embargo: see §§14-20 below. The judgment is the product of a dual enquiry by the Court into what happened after a Confidential Embargoed Draft Judgment (“CEDJ”) was circulated to the parties; into why it matters; and into what the Court should do about it. Within this judgment, I record findings of shortcomings and breaches of the terms of the Court Embargo: §§8-9 below.[2]This had been a judicial review case. Two of the parties were the Leonard Family represented by Fieldfisher with Mr Richmond KC as Lead Counsel; and the Scout Association (“TSA”) represented by Kennedys with Jamas Hodivala KC as Lead Counsel. I record that I have found no breach or shortcoming by any member of the Leonard Family; nor by anyone at TSA or Kennedys; nor by any other party or lawyer. The only breaches and shortcomings are within Fieldfisher.[3]From the Court’s end of things, this is what happened. i) The CEDJ was circulated by my clerk on 20.1.25 at 10:23. Hand-down of the finalised judgment was scheduled for 30.1.25 at 10:00. ii) On 29.1.25 at 13:27 my clerk received an email from Mr Hodivala KC, saying that an individual at TSA had been approached for comment by a journalist who appeared to have a copy of the CEDJ. An attached email from a BBC journalist to TSA (29.1.25 at 12:46) said “I have had a draft embargoed copy ahead of its official publication”. I was also shown an earlier email to TSA from a Guardian journalist (12:59 on 28.1.25) which said “I hear judgment is going to be handed down on Thursday”. That earlier email had not been taken by Kennedys to indicate receipt of the CEDJ or knowledge of the outcome. iii) The Court responded. I alerted all legal representatives (29.1.25 at 13:56), sharing the emails. I invited, and received, observations as to next steps. On my behalf, the BBC journalist was contacted by the Judicial Press Office (29.1.25 at 15:02) and by Kennedys (at 16:07): see §26 below. iv) At 15:31, Jill Greenfield of Fieldfisher emailed to say that “a breach has been identified within Fieldfisher”. On 30.1.24 at 00:23 Mr Richmond KC emailed with further information: that “the source of the breach of the embargo” was Nicola Pearson, “a Publicity and Media Manager at Fieldfisher”; that “upon discovering the breach” Ms Greenfield had taken “urgent action” and “immediately instructed Ms Pearson” to “name each of the individuals who had been sent the judgment”, to “contact each of them to notify them of the embargo” and to require them “to return” the CEDJ; that Ms Pearson “has complied” with those instructions; and that copies of the CEDJ “have been returned.” v) The finalised judgment was duly handed-down on 30.1.25 at 10:00. It is [2025] EWHC 167 (Admin).[4]It was in these circumstances that the Court decided to undertake an enquiry. In doing so, it was important to pause, take time, and allow time. Those involved, and those parties not involved, had time to consider the nature of their participation. Legal representation was secured. Materials were provided. I convened a one-day oral hearing. There was no oral evidence. Fieldfisher provided a candid and comprehensive bundle of all relevant contemporaneous documents including email traffic and call logs. There are witness statements from the firm’s general counsel (Andrew Dodd), the partner with conduct of the case (Ms Greenfield) and the head of media and marketing (Ms Pearson). Helen Evans KC and Melody Hadfield appeared for Fieldfisher, Ms Greenfield and Mr Dodd. David Halpern KC (instructed by DAC Beachcroft) appeared for Nicola Pearson. Ben Smiley (instructed by Clyde & Co) appeared by written submissions for members of the Leonard family. I also had witness statements from Jackie, Dave and Tom Leonard.

Dual Enquiry

[5]I have used the phrase “dual enquiry”. That is because, as all Counsel agree, the Court has had two overlapping functions to perform. One function is to enquire into the facts and circumstances, to decide whether there have been any breach or breaches of the Court Embargo, with what nature and in what circumstances. That enquiry can properly result in what Ms Evans KC and Ms Hadfield called a “narrative judgment making clear what has gone wrong”. The Court’s second function involves asking the questions posed by CPR 81.6(1):(i) whether “a contempt of court may have been committed”; and if so(ii) whether to proceed against the individual or individuals concerned in contempt proceedings. If the Court proceeds, it issues a summons (CPR 81.6(3)). An alternative course is to refer the case to the Attorney General or Solicitor General.

The Position of the Media

[6]This judgment follows an enquiry relating to, and admissions made by, Fieldfisher, Andrew Dodd, Jill Greenfield and Nicola Pearson. It does not make any finding against any other person. That includes any journalist or media individual named in this judgment. It would not be fair to treat this judgment, or any part of it, as constituting or evidencing findings against any such person. They were not party to these proceedings. They were not heard by the Court.

The Duty Immediately to Report a Breach to the Court

[7]Fieldfisher, through Ms Evans KC and Ms Hadfield, have rightly acknowledged “the reporting duties owed to the Court” by solicitors (and barristers), in circumstances where any breach of the Court Embargo comes to light. As they acknowledge, that includes a breach which comes to light internally. This is an aspect of the higher calling (§25i below). Counsel helpfully identified authorities addressing this point. In Optis Cellular Technology Inc v Apple Retail UK Ltd [2021] EWHC 2694 (Pat) the Court recorded (at §19) that it is an essential obligation of a recipient of a CEDJ who believes there has been a breach of the Court Embargo to “find out what happened with care, urgency and rigour” and to “make clear and complete disclosure to the court and the opposing party”. In Public Institution for Social Security v Banque Pictet [2022] EWCA Civ 368, Carr LJ recorded (at §10vi) that a solicitor who had become aware of a breach of the Court Embargo “now appreciated that he should have brought the incident to the court’s attention at this stage but did not recognise this at the time”. She emphasised (at §18iii) that: All recipients [of a CEDJ] need to understand clearly … Any breach of an embargo must be drawn to the court's attention as soon as it is identified. This was repeated in Match Group LLC v Muzmatch [2022] EWHC 1023 (IPEC) at §39.

Shortcomings

[8]I start by identifying shortcomings. These did not constitute embargo breaches. But they are the context in which embargo breaches took place. i) By way of context, I record that Ms Greenfield is an experienced solicitor but her practice has not tended to encounter CEDJs; that she clearly and correctly told the Leonard Family that they could not discuss the judgment or outcome with anyone (20.1.25 at 18:15); that she gave a verbal explanation along these same lines to Ms Pearson (24.1.25 at 11:20); and that upon learning that the CEDJ had been sent to Steve Morris at the Guardian she reached out to Mr Dodd promptly for his guidance (28.1.25 at 11:01). Nevertheless, there were – in my judgment – the following shortcomings on the part of Ms Greenfield. First, on and after receiving the CEDJ from the Court (20.1.25 at 10:23), Ms Greenfield did not ensure that she fully understood the Court Embargo. That meant she was not aware that internal marketing-preparations were impermissible. It also meant she was “not sure what the rules are” (27.1.25 at 12:06) regarding “embargoed” disclosure to journalists. Secondly, when emailing the CEDJ to Ms Pearson (27.1.25 at 11:59), Ms Greenfield did not give clear written instructions, notwithstanding that Ms Pearson is a non-lawyer whose roles within the firm included external-facing media and marketing roles. Thirdly, Ms Greenfield did not step in and stop Ms Pearson’s communicated plans to send the CEDJ to journalists (from 27.1.25 at 12:04); to send quotes to journalists (from 27.1.25 at 14:34); and to carry out internal marketing-preparation steps (from 27.1.25 at 17:16). ii) By way of context, I record that Ms Pearson is a non-lawyer whose roles within the firm included external-facing media and marketing roles; and that she communicated to Ms Greenfield her plans to send the CEDJ to journalists (from 27.1.25 at 12:04); to send quotes to journalists (from 27.1.25 at 14:34); and to carry out internal marketing-preparation steps (from 27.1.25 at 17:16). Nevertheless, there were – in my judgment – the following shortcomings on the part of Ms Pearson. First, having received a verbal explanation (24.1.25 at 11:20) and then the CEDJ from Ms Greenfield (27.1.25 at 11:59), Ms Pearson did not read the Court Embargo; nor did she ask anyone for help in understanding what it meant. That was so, even when Ms Pearson decided to tell the client (Mrs Leonard) that it was permissible to speak to journalists about the CEDJ, contradicting the message to the family from Ms Greenfield. Secondly, Ms Pearson sent the fourth of four emails attaching the CEDJ (to Mr Hurst on 28.1.25 at 15:13) after receiving instruction from Mr Dodd (28.1.25, after 11:21) that it was impermissible to send the CEDJ to journalists. Thirdly, on the afternoon of 29.1.25 – knowing that the Court was aware that the BBC had the CEDJ and the firm was aware that the Guardian had the CEDJ – Ms Pearson did not say to Mr Dodd, Ms Greenfield or Mr Richmond KC that she had also sent it to ITV (Mr Scott) and the Press Association (Mr Hurst). iii) By way of context, I record that Mr Dodd responded promptly (28.1.25 at 11:21), making clear to Ms Greenfield and Ms Pearson that the Court Embargo did not allow the CEDJ to be sent to any journalist, and instructing that communications with journalists about the judgment be shut down. He also promptly discussed the matter with Ms Greenfield, Mr Richmond KC and Ms Pearson (on 29.1.25 at 14:24) after being alerted to the Court’s email. Nevertheless, there were – in my judgment – the following shortcomings on the part of both Ms Greenfield and Mr Dodd. First, having established (on 28.1.25 at 11:21) that Ms Pearson had sent the CEDJ to Steven Morris at the Guardian, Mr Dodd and Ms Greenfield did not obtain the full picture (“find out what happened with care, urgency and rigour”); or inform Counsel; or report the position to the Court (pursuant to the obligation described at §7 above); or provide clear written instruction to Ms Pearson. Secondly, knowing (on 29.1.25 at 13:57) that the Court was now aware that the BBC had the CEDJ, Mr Dodd and Ms Greenfield did not tell Mr Richmond KC that they had known of a breach the previous day.

Breaches

[9]I have concluded that the Court Embargo in this case was breached in all the following ways. The fact that these were breaches does not mean that these were deliberate breaches, or that they were breaches in known contravention of the terms of the Court Embargo. i) The following conduct of Ms Pearson constituted a breach. First, her actions in sending two external emails to journalists which implied the outcome: 24.1.25 at 11:44 to Louis Goss at the Daily Telegraph; and 24.1.25 at 12:55 to Rajeev Syal at the Guardian. Secondly, her actions in sending the CEDJ externally to four journalists:(i) 27.1.25 at 12:46 to Steven Morris at the Guardian;(ii) 27.1.25 at 13:05 to Phil McCann at BBC North West;(iii) 27.1.25 at 13:07 to Timothy Scott at ITV; and(iv) 28.1.25 at 15:13 to Pat Hurst of the Press Association. Thirdly, her actions in providing quotations and content to journalists: 28.1.25 at 10:53 to Mr Scott (ITV); 28.1.25 at 11:00, 14:44 and 21:04 to Mr Morris (Guardian); 29.1.25 at 12:40 to Mr Hurst (PA). Fourthly, her actions in the organising (on 28/29.1.25) of marketing-preparation steps for the firm. These were a video interview on 29.1.25 (shortly after 12:00) given by Ms Greenfield and the writing of a case study. These steps involved disclosure of the substance of the CEDJ to the firm’s Social Media Executive (Kieran Kaey) and Digital Marketing Manager (Alaa Akwan). ii) The following conduct of Ms Greenfield constituted a breach. First, her actions in commenting on the outcome of the case in an interview with Mr Morris (28.1.25 at 10:00). Secondly, her actions in approving quotations and content (28.1.25 at 14:44) for Mr Morris. Thirdly, her actions in participation in the marketing-preparation steps, by giving the internal video interview on 29.1.25 (shortly after 12:00).[10]All breaches of the Court Embargo are significant and matters of concern. Each was a contravention of the express terms of the Court Embargo. None of them should have occurred. They arose in the context of the shortcomings (§8 above).

The Court Embargo

[11]The CEDJ said on page 1:
“Confidential Draft Judgment”
. It also said “Confidential Draft Judgment” in a running header, on every page. In distributing the CEDJ to the lawyers (20.1.25 at 10:23), my clerk’s email said: Note the box on page 1. IN CONFIDENCE AND SUBJECT TO EMBARGO. This is a draft judgment to which CPR40PDE applies. The judgment will be handed down electronically (in accordance with the Practice Guidance dated 16.12.21) at 10am on Thurs 30.1.25. This draft is confidential to the parties and their legal representatives. Neither the draft itself nor its substance may be disclosed to any other person or made public in any way. The parties must take all reasonable steps to ensure that it is kept confidential. As explained in Counsel General [2022] EWCA Civ 181, the draft judgment is only to be used to enable the parties to make suggestions for the correction of errors, prepare submissions on consequential matters and draft orders and to prepare themselves for the publication of the judgment. A breach of any of these obligations may be treated as a contempt of court. The Court will wish to hand down its judgment in an approved final form, and at the same time make an Order disposing of the case. Counsel should therefore submit any list of typing corrections and other obvious errors in writing (nil returns are required), together with any submissions on unagreed consequential matters and a draft Order (agreed to the extent possible), to the clerk to Fordham J [email], by 12 noon on Tues 28.1.25 so that changes can be incorporated (if accepted) in the handed down judgment, all consequential matters resolved in the judgment and the Order made. The official version of the judgment will be available from the clerk after hand down.[12]CPR40PDE is a Practice Direction within the Civil Procedure Rules. It was expressly referenced in the box on page 1. It is freely available on the internet. It provides as follows at §§2.4 to 2.8: 2.4 A copy of the draft judgment may be supplied, in confidence, to the parties provided that –(a) neither the draft judgment nor its substance is disclosed to any other person or used in the public domain; and(b) no action is taken (other than internally) in response to the draft judgment, before the judgment is handed down. 2.5 Where a copy of the draft judgment is supplied to a party’s legal representatives in electronic form, they may supply a copy to that party in the same form. 2.6 If a party to whom a copy of the draft judgment is supplied under paragraph 2.4 is a partnership, company, government department, local authority or other organisation of a similar nature, additional copies may be distributed in confidence within the organisation, provided that all reasonable steps are taken to preserve its confidential nature and the requirements of paragraph 2.4 are adhered to. 2.7 If the parties or their legal representatives are in any doubt about the persons to whom copies of the draft judgment may be distributed they should enquire of the judge or Presiding Judge. 2.8 Any breach of the obligations or restrictions under paragraph 2.4 or failure to take all reasonable steps under paragraph 2.6 may be treated as contempt of court.[13]Counsel General [2022] EWCA Civ 181 is a judgment of the Court of Appeal. It was referenced and hyperlinked in the box. It is freely available on the internet. It was a case where a CEDJ was used to prepare a press release which appeared (for 5 hours) on the website of barristers’ chambers ahead of the hand-down of the finalised judgment. The press release was seen externally (§12) and the Chambers’ practice manager proactively alerted the Court and apologised (§4). The Master of the Rolls (§5) wrote asking for a written explanation from the barristers and indicating the intention to hear oral representations as to what had occurred and what consequences should follow. The judgment includes this (§§24, 26, 28): 24… [J]udgments are handed down in draft under embargo … to enable the parties to make suggestions for the correction of errors, prepare submissions and agree orders on consequential matters and to prepare themselves for the publication of the judgment. The process is not for any other purpose and dissemination of the judgment itself or its substance beyond those that I have specifically mentioned is forbidden (unless the court expressly gives consent)… 26… [D]rafting press releases to publicise chambers is not a legitimate activity to undertake within the embargo. It would be different if a corporate party wished to issue a press release immediately on hand down to explain to the public what had occurred in the judgment. But barristers (and solicitors) are not parties to the proceedings; they are legal representatives, who are provided with the draft judgment to make suggestions for the correction of errors and to prepare submissions and agree orders on consequential matters. They have no need to prepare themselves for the publication of the judgment, as an individual or other party might need to do. Of course, counsel and solicitors can properly assist and advise their client to make such preparations but that was not what happened in this case. 28… Each of para 2.4 of CPR PD 40E, the standard rubric on draft judgments and the standard form e-mail sent out with judgments are in mandatory form. The latter two documents say that:
“The parties must take all reasonable steps to ensure that it is kept confidential”… [P]ara 2.4 of CPR PD 40E provides that “neither the draft judgment nor its substance is [to be] disclosed to any other person or used in the public domain”, and “no action is [to be] taken (other than internally) in response to the draft judgment, before the judgment is handed down”
. Counsel and solicitors are personally responsible to the court for ensuring that these mandatory requirements are adhered to. It is their duty to explain those same obligations on the parties to their clients. There are passages drawing attention to Counsel General in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2024 at §11.6 (freely accessible online); in the King’s Bench Guide 2024 §14.33 (freely accessible online); and in the White Book 2024 §40.2.3. Articles on Counsel General appeared in the Law Society’s Gazette at 2023 120(7) p.6; and the New Law Journal 2022 172 (7971) pp.9-10. The Court of Appeal had itself reinforced the message on 22 March 2022, in Banque Pictet at §18.

About the Journalism Embargo

[14]Ms Pearson is a non-lawyer whose background is in media. She is described in the evidence as a highly valued colleague within Fieldfisher; bringing expertise in dealing with the press in high profile cases; assisting (often vulnerable) clients; and assisting the Leonard family in the inquest and court proceedings with skill and sensitivity. It was legitimate that she be given the CEDJ, to help “properly assist and advise” the Leonard family in “preparations” for the handed-down judgment (Counsel General at §26: see §13 above). Ms Pearson has considerable experience of the convention of a Journalism Embargo. She expresses her confidence in it. This is her description, within her first witness statement: The meaning of the term ‘under embargo’ in journalism. I generally work directly with individual journalists rather than circulating press releases, but in my previous roles, I would regularly send around what press officers and journalists refer to as “embargoed press releases”. This refers to press releases which are sent to news reporters to alert them ahead of the scheduled release of the information. The original custodian of that news sets the date and time on which it will be released. Reporters agree to not publish any news about it until the date and time agreed. The term “embargo” carries a different and non-legal meaning in this context. This practice is to allow multiple media outlets to report the story simultaneously, rather than one journalist having a ‘scoop’. Sending an embargoed release allows journalists to research the story and to interview the parties before the embargo ends. It also might be to ensure reporting coincides with the publication of an academic paper, for example. It relies on sufficient information being shared to pique a journalist’s interest to report the story. This is a recognised and trusted way of working between press officers and journalists. There is no formal or legal repercussion for a journalist who breaks an embargo in this context, but it would damage the relationship between the parties and may undermine the journalist’s reputation. Ms Pearson is here describing an “original custodian of news” who chooses to use a Journalism Embargo to set a date and time on which that “news” will be released. The “trusted” journalist is said to “agree” with the custodian. If the “trusted” journalist breaks the agreement, the repercussions are not “formal” or “legal”. Rather, it could cause damage to “the relationship” between the custodian and the journalist; and it could undermine the journalist’s reputation. These are the elements within the description. But there is not a single element, within the description, which reads-across to the Court Embargo.

The Court Embargo is Fundamentally Different from the Journalism Embargo

[15]The CEDJ is a Court document. The Court is the custodian. The Court has imposed strict conditions. Those strict conditions appear on the document itself. They are “formal”. Their consequences are “legal”. There is nothing “informal” about any of this. Nobody who receives the CEDJ is being allowed to decide they are a custodian of news; or that they can identify “trusted” recipients; that all that matters is that the draft judgment or its substance should not be “made public”; that this can be achieved because it can “agree” a position with other recipients; or that damage to a relationship or reputation is an adequate protection or consequence.

Express Terms of the Court Embargo

[16]Looking at the terms of the Court Embargo, in the context and circumstances of the present case, there are really these three key points: i) First, the CEDJ is expressly “confidential”. Its circulation is highly restricted. That expressly means “the draft” and its “substance”. They are both expressly “confidential to the parties and their legal representatives”. They are expressly not to be “disclosed to any other person or made public in any way”. A journalist is an “other person”. Disclosure to a journalist is forbidden. That is independent of whether the judgment or outcome would be being “made public”. There is an express duty on the parties, who “must take all reasonable steps to ensure that it is kept confidential”. The Court Embargo and Counsel General make clear that this “all reasonable steps” duty applies to all parties and all lawyers, not just particular types of party (CPR40PDE §2.6). ii) Secondly, the permitted use of the CEDJ is expressly restricted to the specified purposes. The CEDJ “is only to be used to enable the parties to make suggestions for the correction of errors, prepare submissions on consequential matters and draft orders and to prepare themselves for the publication of the judgment”. No part of these stated purposes extends to allowing persons who are not “parties” to “prepare themselves for the publication of the judgment”. That would include a journalist. iii) Thirdly, the CEDJ is expressly a confidential “draft” judgment. The contents of the judgment to be handed down have not been finalised. Those contents may change. It is the finalised judgment which will be the Court’s “approved” judgment. The document says “Confidential Draft Judgment”, not “Confidential Judgment”. It is expressly stated that this is “the draft”; that the Court “will wish to hand down its judgment in an approved final form”; that the CEDJ is to be “used to enable the parties to make suggestions for the correction of errors”; that the deadline for suggestions is so that “changes can be incorporated”, if they are “accepted” by the Court; and that the “official version of the judgment will be available from the clerk after hand down”. The CEDJ is not the Court’s judgment. It will not become the Court’s judgment. It is not a document being held ahead of its publication. What is published is the approved judgment.

A Big Mistake

[17]Ms Pearson’s evidence is that she understood “embargo” to indicate that it was permissible to circulate the CEDJ to journalists, emphasising the embargo and that nothing could be reported in public. It is important to record that this was a big mistake. She had a mistaken understanding when she sent her two emails implying the outcome: 24.1.25 at 11:44 to Mr Goss (Daily Telegraph) and at 12:55 to Mr Syal (Guardian). I accept it was Ms Pearson’s understanding when she spoke to Mrs Leonard, telling Mrs Leonard that it was permissible to discuss the outcome with journalists, unwisely contradicting Ms Greenfield’s clear instruction to the Leonard Family not to discuss the judgment or outcome with anyone. Mrs Leonard followed Ms Greenfield’s instruction and acted with journalists as if she did not know the outcome. I accept it was still Ms Pearson’s understanding when she sent the first three emails attaching the CEDJ:(i) 27.1.25 at 12:46 to Steven Morris at the Guardian;(ii) 27.1.25 at 13:05 to Phil McCann at BBC North West; and(iii) 27.1.25 at 13:07 to Timothy Scott at ITV. In doing so, she emphasised to each of the journalists the “embargo”. That indicates that she thought she was herself acting consistently with it. Moreover, these were actions which did not involve going behind anyone’s back at the firm. Ms Pearson was open in an email to Ms Greenfield (27.1.25 at 12:04) that “I’d like to send the Order confidentially to Pat, Tim ITV and Phil BBC on Weds”. By “Order” she meant the CEDJ, and Ms Greenfield’s evidence is that she understood that meaning. Ms Greenfield replied (27.1.25 at 12:06) and said:
“I am not sure what the rules are for giving it to press before Thursday – it has to be very clear that it is embargoed whatever”
. Ms Greenfield for her part says she thought nothing would happen until Wednesday, and I can see why. Ms Pearson for her part says she saw the response as a green light (provided that the embargo was made clear), and I can see why. But it was – I repeat – a big mistake.

Embargoed Disclosure to Journalists is a Breach

[18]The “rules … for giving it to the press before [hand-down]”, about which Ms Greenfield told Ms Pearson she was “not sure”, are clear and express. Embargoed disclosure to journalists is a breach of the terms of the Court Embargo. It is a breach of the Court’s confidentiality. It can be a contempt of court. Page 1 of the CEDJ, CPR40PDE and Counsel General are all clear: This draft is confidential to the parties and their legal representatives. Neither the draft itself nor its substance may be disclosed to any other person or made public in any way. The parties must take all reasonable steps to ensure that it is kept confidential.[19]In Match Group, the Court was given this explanation why a party (Mr Younas) had shared information with journalists (at §33): Mr Younas makes clear that he is deeply remorseful and wholeheartedly apologises to the court for his actions regarding this disclosure of information to journalists. His explanation is that he honestly believed that he could communicate the outcome of the case and share a press release with journalists provided it was done on a strictly confidential basis and provided the information was not published before the judgment was formally handed down. He comments that, when he worked in banking, it was common for embargoed information to be dealt with in such a manner. the outcome of the case was not something that should have been the subject of press releases sent to journalists prior to the formal handing down of the judgment, even on terms that they respected the embargo.[20]In R (Kinsey) v Lewisham LBC [2022] EWHC 2723 (Admin), there was embargoed disclosure of the outcome to journalists, 45 minutes before hand-down. I said this (§11): It was … a breach of the Court’s embargo to send an EPR [Embargoed Press Release] to the press, communicating substantive content from the CEDJ. This was a breach, notwithstanding that the publication at 09:15 on 11 July 2022 was not to the public at large but to a portion of the press; that it was premature by 45 minutes; that it bore an ‘embargo’ of its own, as to reporting to the public; and that there was no press reporting until after 10am – indeed not until 13:06 – on 11 July 2022. Mr Parker Humphreys mistakenly thought that a press release could be sent out prior to hand-down, with an ‘embargo on reporting’ prior to 10am. This sort of ‘media embargo’ is standard practice for other announcements in the course of the Defendant’s general business, where Mr Parker Humphreys would usually liaise with journalists to issue press releases. His approach was a “media embargo” rather than a “court embargo”.

Indications and Quotes were a Breach

[21]I have recorded the breaches of the Court Embargo in the sending by Ms Pearson of two emails to journalists which implied the outcome (24.1.25 at 11:44 to Mr Goss and 12:55 to Mr Syal at the Guardian); and in providing externally suggested content and quotes about the outcome to journalists (28.1.25 at 10:53 to Mr Scott at 11:00, 14:44 and 21:04 to Mr Morris; and 29.1.25 at 12:40 to Mr Hurst). I have recorded the breaches of the Court Embargo by Ms Greenfield, in commenting externally on the outcome of the case in an interview with Mr Morris (28.1.25 at 10:00) and in approving suggested content and quotes about the outcome for external provision to a journalist (28.1.25 at 14:44 for Mr Morris). Again, Ms Pearson did not act behind anyone’s back. She communicated her plan to send quotes and content to journalists. Ms Greenfield did not intervene to stop this. It was during the interview with Mr Morris (28.1.25 at 10:00) that Ms Greenfield realised that Mr Morris had received the CEDJ from Ms Pearson, and was drawn into commenting about the outcome rather than just about the case. At that point she had alarm bells as to the propriety of the disclosure, and initiated the discussion with Mr Dodd (on 28.1.25 at 11:21). Ms Pearson was brought into that discussion, in consequence of which (from 11:28) Ms Pearson sent emails cancelling other scheduled interviews. But she continued to supply quotes for the journalists indicating the outcome. I have found to be a shortcoming that she was not provided clear and written instructions. I have found to be a breach that Ms Greenfield approved quotes about the outcome (28.1.25 at 14:44 for Mr Morris). I record that Ms Greenfield’s evidence is that she did not realise, from the email chain, that these were going to be disclosed ahead of the hand-down of the judgment. There were clear breaches of the Court Embargo in giving indications and quotes. There were clear shortcomings.

Further Communications as Further Breach

[22]A point was appropriately raised in argument as to whether it can be a breach of the Court Embargo to communicate about the outcome with a journalist who has already received a CEDJ. In my judgment, the answer is “yes it can”. It is by nature an impermissible communication; and a communication to a prohibited class of recipient; and a continued use of the confidential information for a prohibited purpose.

Internal Marketing-Preparations were a Breach

[23]I have recorded the breaches in Ms Pearson’s actions of organising (on 28/29.1.25) post-judgment social media material promoting Fieldfisher (the video interview on 29.1.25 by Ms Greenfield and a written case study), during the course of preparing which she internally disclosed the outcome to Mx Kaey and Mr Akwan; and by Ms Greenfield in participating internally in preparing post-judgment social media material promoting Fieldfisher, by giving the internal video interview on 29.1.25. Again, Ms Pearson did not act behind anyone’s back. She communicated to Ms Greenfield her plan to carry out internal marketing preparations. Ms Greenfield did not intervene to stop this. I have recorded the shortcomings by Ms Greenfield in not making sure she understood the full effect of the Court Embargo; and in not intervening to stop Ms Pearson’s communicated plan to carry out internal marketing-preparation steps. Ms Pearson had two roles. One was in assisting the Leonard Family – as the firm’s clients – with potentially intrusive press interest. For that purpose, disclosure of the CEDJ and outcome to Ms Pearson was proper and legitimate. The other was in marketing for the firm. Marketing preparation was not a legitimate use of the CEDJ or outcome, as was explained in Counsel General. The distinction was not recognised by Ms Greenfield. It was not communicated to Ms Pearson. Nobody told or asked Mr Dodd about any of this. None of it should have taken place.

Shortcomings as to Clarity and Proactivity

[24]After the interview with Mr Morris (28.1.25 at 10:00), Ms Greenfield was uneasy about the fact that Mr Morris had received the CEDJ. She was right to have alarm bells. She was right to reach out to Mr Dodd for advice. They then spoke (at 11:21) and brought Ms Pearson into the call. On the evidence, Mr Dodd said that a CEDJ should not be provided to a journalist; that nobody at the firm should be talking to a journalist about the CEDJ; that future scheduled interviews should be cancelled; and that the strict embargo should be reiterated to journalists who had received the CEDJ. These steps were important and correct. But Mr Dodd has rightly recognised that they did not go far enough. There was, moreover, room for ambiguity in any reference to not “talking” to journalists. In the event, Ms Pearson continued to provide quotations and content by email. In my judgment, the following were called for: a prompt and clear picture of what Ms Pearson had done; clear written instructions to Ms Pearson; contact with Leading Counsel; and prompt notification to the Court under the reporting duties (§7 above). These further steps were not taken. The duties were not appreciated. It was only the following day (29.1.25 at 13:57), when the Court alerted the lawyers to the information regarding the BBC’s Mr Herd, that the position was discussed by Mr Dodd and Ms Greenfield with Mr Richmond KC (on 29.1.25 at 14:29). But then Mr Richmond KC was not told that the firm had been aware of breach the previous morning. I have recorded these as shortcomings in the actions of Ms Greenfield and Mr Dodd.

The Implications of Inadequate Clarity and Proactivity

[25]I pause to identify what it means that there was inadequate clarity and proactivity. i) First, it means that the Court was only alerted to the breach of the Court Embargo because a journalist (Mr Herd) happened to contact another party (TSA) and happened to refer to having received a copy of the CEDJ. There is a striking email from Ms Pearson to Mr McCann (29.1.25 at 14:12) in which she says “I think you passed on the judgment to George [Herd] without telling me, which is the problem”. That is not the “problem”. The “problem” is that the CEDJ and outcome were being shared with journalists by Ms Pearson. The true problem was recognised immediately by Mr Dodd when he was asked. But I think I can be confident that – had Mr Herd not said what he said to TSA – this Court would never have known of any breach. The firm did not tell Mr Richmond KC or the Court on 28.1.25 after 11:21. There was no plan to do so. The matter was addressed internally within the firm, and in communications with journalists. The Court was never involved in this matter by Fieldfisher. Fieldfisher was involved in the matter by the Court. And that was all because of the alert from TSA. For their part, Mr Richmond KC – like Mr Hodivala KC – knew that the Court needed promptly to be informed. The Court needs to be confident that it will be informed of a breach, fully and promptly, warts and all: see §7 above. The Court recognises that “this can be embarrassing and painful, but it is essential” (Optis Cellular at §19). Adverse findings or comments will always be accompanied by appropriate judicial acknowledgment of a party’s candour and proactivity. There is here something more fundamental that any criticism or praise of any individual or organisation. The integrity of the justice system is always, for lawyers, a higher calling. I am confident that the lawyers at Fieldfisher understood, and understand, that. I am reassured by what I have been told about new measures within the firm. ii) Secondly, it means there was no prompt and clear picture of exactly what had happened. If there had been proactive clarity, Fieldfisher would have had a clear and prompt handle on exactly what had been done. For example, the firm would have been able to tell the Court – and Mr Richmond KC – which journalists had been sent a copy of the CEDJ. As it happens, the Court was told of “a breach”, and was given an impression of “urgent” action taken “upon discovering the breach” and “immediately”. I am satisfied that Mr Richmond KC would not for his part have been using that language had he been made aware that in fact the firm had known of the breach more than 24 hours earlier. iii) Thirdly, it means the Court was hampered in what it could do, and when it could do it. A message was sent to Mr Herd at BBC Wales by the Judicial Office (29.1.25 at 15:02) and by Kennedys (at 16:07), on my behalf: see §26 below. This could, and would, have been sent to others. But the only indication to Kennedys and to the Court of a journalist having received the CEDJ from Fieldfisher was Mr Herd of the BBC.

The Court’s Communication

[26]I have referred to the communication which was sent on my behalf by the Judicial Press Office to Mr Herd (see §§3iii, 25iii above). It could and would have been sent to other members of the media had the Court been made aware that the CEDJ was in their hands too. The communication was in these terms: Dear Mr Herd, I am writing from the Judicial Press Office on behalf of the Judge in the Glaister and Carr judicial review case. The Court’s published cause list will include the case for hand down of the final, public judgment at 10am tomorrow: Daily Cause List [link]. Confidential draft judgments are the subject of strict embargos with contempt sanctions. These obligations are essential to protect the integrity of the judicial process. This is explained at the top of page 1 of all draft judgments in a box. It is also explained in the published Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide [link] at 11.6.8. One of the barristers in the case, in discharging professional duties to the court, has alerted me to an email which suggests you hold a copy of an embargoed draft judgment and/or are aware of its contents. This gives rise to urgent and serious concerns, undermining the integrity of the court process. I am asking that you confirm as a matter of urgency that no step will be taken by you, and that you alert me to any step of which you are aware, in relation to the confidential embargoed judgment or its contents in this case. You can of course consult your in house legal team for any further advice on this matter. I record here that Mr Herd replied promptly (29.1.25 at 15:14) to “reassure the court that I am acutely conscious that nothing can be published or reported relating to His Honour’s draft ruling until this is made public by the court and/or delivered by His Honour tomorrow”. I record that there is no evidence that anything was disclosed in the public domain by any journalist ahead of the hand-down (as to which, see Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47 [2024] AC 983 at §157).

The Fourth Email (28.1.25)

[27]All of this leaves two aspects of this case to which I must return, because they have caused me particular concern. Such was my concern about them that I raised them directly with Mr Halpern KC in open court and offered his client (Ms Pearson) the opportunity to file a further witness statement, an opportunity which she took.[28]One of Ms Pearson’s breaches was sending her fourth email (28.1.25 at 15:13) to Pat Hurst of the Press Association, attaching the CEDJ: see §9i above. This action was after the telephone call with Mr Dodd and Ms Greenfield (around 11:21), at which Mr Dodd had made clear that the CEDJ could not be sent to journalists. Ms Pearson accepts that Mr Dodd had “made it clear on [the] earlier phone call that day that embargoed judgments should not be sent externally”. On this point, the Court Embargo had by now been clearly explained. In the light of that meeting, by 11:40 on 28.1.25 Ms Pearson was postponing an interview with Mr Scott. In her first witness statement, Ms Pearson explains the sending of her 15:13 email to Mr Hurst as follows. She had drafted the email to Mr Hurst during the morning of 28.1.25, but she was awaiting Ms Greenfield’s amended comments. Those comments were “sent back to me”. Ms Pearson amended the draft email “with Jill’s comments on paragraph 77 added”. She says “I failed to remove the attachment by mistake”. She adds that later “I had appreciated my mistake”.[29]I must record that I encountered real difficulties with that explanation. First, the text in the email, which was retained and sent, says:
“Attached, I know you understand, but have to add the line that this judgment is strictly embargoed until 10am on Thursday 30th, thanks”
. Secondly, the “comments on paragraph 77” said “Have a look at para 77 for a specific example”. The phrase “Have a look at para 77” was drawing attention to the CEDJ. It would make no sense without the attachment. Thirdly, there was a momentum. It was always intended by Ms Pearson that Mr Hurst would receive the CEDJ. He was listed in the email on 27.1.25 at 12:04 of journalists “I’d like to send the [CEDJ] confidentially to”. Others had received it already, on 27.1.25: Mr Morris (12:46); Mr McCann (13:05); and Mr Scott (13:07). Fourthly, there is the email Ms Pearson sent at 15:03 on 29.1.25. She had come out of her part of the call (29.1.25 14:37 to 14:44) with Mr Dodd, Ms Greenfield and Mr Richmond KC. She then sent 3 emails to retrieve the CEDJ from journalists. These were sent to Mr McCann of the BBC (29.1.25 at 15:00), Mr Morris of the Guardian (at 15:01) and Mr Hurst of the Press Association (at 15:03). This shows that Ms Pearson knew and understood that she had sent Mr Hurst the CEDJ. There is no explanation of what it is that happened – or could have happened – which meant she now “appreciated my mistake”. She does not say she had some reason to inspect her “sent-items” to notice that an email had a mistakenly included attachment.[30]I am not going to make a finding of fact here as to Ms Pearson’s knowledge on 28.1.25 at 15:13 – when pressing “send” on an email to Pat Hurst of the Press Association – that she was attaching the CEDJ. Whether she realised, or did not realise, would be best and most fairly determined with oral evidence. I have recorded my concern and the reasons for it. I have recorded the breach (§9i above) and shortcoming (§8ii above).

Internal Candour (29.1.25)

[31]This is the second of the two aspects of the case which have caused me particular concern. I have recorded this as a shortcoming. Knowing (on the afternoon of 29.1.25) that the Court was aware that the BBC had the CEDJ – and that Mr Dodd and Ms Greenfield were aware that the BBC and the Guardian had the CEDJ – Ms Pearson did not say that she had also sent it to ITV (Mr Scott) and the Press Association (Mr Hurst). The concern is as to whether Ms Pearson was asked to identify to whom she had sent the CEDJ, in response to which she identified the BBC (Mr McCann) and the Guardian (Mr Morris), and failed to disclose ITV (Mr Scott) and the Press Association (Mr Hurst).[32]The context is as follows. Mr Richmond KC later told the Court (30.1.24 at 00:23) that Ms Greenfield had “immediately instructed Ms Pearson” to “name each of the individuals who had been sent the judgment”. Mr Dodd and Ms Greenfield knew the previous day (28.1.25 at 11:21) that the Guardian (Mr Morris) had been sent the CEDJ. They knew (29.1.25 at 14:24) from the Court that the BBC (Mr Herd) had received the CEDJ. Ms Pearson was brought into the call with Mr Richmond KC (29.1.25 at 14:37). She did not say to them that she had also sent it to ITV (Mr Scott) and the Press Association (Mr Hurst). At 15:31 she emailed Ms Greenfield a redrafted apology. It was intended for me. It began:
“Dear Sir, I apologise unreservedly for sending out the embargoed judgment to two members of the press – Steven Morris at the Guardian and Phil McCann at the BBC”
. But at 15:03 she had emailed Mr Hurst (Press Association) to say:
“The judge is not happy that I have sent this out. It is my mistake. Could you therefore please send the judgment back to me immediately”
. And at 16:44 she emailed Mr Scott (ITV) to retrieve the CEDJ. At 18:49 she signed a witness statement incorporating the apology about sending the CEDJ “to two members of the press”. The apology and witness statement were never sent to me. Recognising that the Court needed a full and complete picture, Mr Dodd and Ms Greenfield say they were concerned that Ms Pearson was rushing. Ms Pearson’s response is that she “owned up to the errors which were discussed on that call” but “didn’t contradict that it was in fact more than two”. She says she was scared, intimidated, in a panic; and that subsequently she would have signed “pretty much … anything”.[33]I am not going to make a finding of fact here as to what questions Ms Pearson was asked and whether she knowingly gave a misleading answer. What happened, and what was her state of mind, would be best and most fairly determined with oral evidence. I have recorded my concern and the reasons for it. I have recorded the shortcoming (§8ii above). There is this additional point. Whatever the facts as to what was asked and said, and in what circumstances, it would not constitute a breach of the Court Embargo; nor could it constitute a contempt. The Court was not misled. The factually incorrect apology was not put forward. The factually incorrect witness statement was not lodged. They have been disclosed, properly and candidly, so that the Court has the full picture of what happened at Fieldfisher on the afternoon and early evening of 29.1.25.

The First Enquiry Function

[34]I started by describing the Court’s dual enquiry (§5 above). Everything I have said in this judgment so far discharges the Court’s first function: to enquire into the facts and circumstances, to decide whether there have been any breach or breaches of the Court Embargo, with what nature and in what circumstances. This judgment is now “a narrative judgment making clear what has gone wrong”.

The Second Enquiry Function

[35]I turn to the two questions posed by CPR 81.6(1):(i) whether “a contempt of court may have been committed”; and if so(ii) whether to proceed against the individual or individuals concerned in contempt proceedings.[36]My answer to question (i) is that I do think a contempt of court “may” have been committed, but only in the case of the breach which took place at 15:13 on 28.1.25, in the sending by Ms Pearson to Mr Hurst of the CEDJ, after being given the explanation of the Court Embargo by Mr Dodd at around 11:21 that day. My concerns are identified at §§28-29 above. I accept the submissions of Ms Evans KC and Ms Hadfield – supported by Mr Halpern KC – as to what would be needed in the present case to constitute a contempt. This would be criminal contempt: AG v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 [2021] 4 WLR 103 at §23. The breach of the Court Embargo would need to be “deliberate”, meaning that the individual would have needed to have been “well aware” that it was a breach: see Solicitor General v Cox [2016] EWHC 1241 (QB) [2016] 2 Cr App R 15 at §§69, 73; Crosland at §28; R (Clearsprings) v Swindon Magistrates’ Court [2024] EWHC 3245 (Admin) at §13. For “shortcomings” – not constituting breaches or contempt in the face of the court – there would need to be an intention to interfere with or impede the administration of justice: AG v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191, 218A-B. Of all the breaches and shortcomings in this case, the only one which “may” in my judgment constitute a contempt is the sending of the email at 15:13 on 28.1.25.[37]My answer to question (ii) is that I am not going to proceed by issuing a summons (CPR 81.6(3)). Nor am I going to refer the case to the Attorney General or Solicitor General. In answering this question, the Court takes into account the gravity of the alleged contempt, the importance of enforcing the Court Embargo, the circumstances in which the breach occurred, the other relevant facts, and the overriding objective: see Clearsprings [2024] EWHC 3245 (Admin) at §15. My reasons are as follows: i) The serious problem at the heart of this case lay in treating a Court Embargo like a Journalism Embargo. It has happened before (§§19-20 above). It was a serious error. Whatever went on at 15:13 on 28.1.25, the problem had originated out of a misapprehension. ii) Ms Pearson is not a lawyer. She does not have legal training. The firm knew this. She was not given clear instruction. Even Ms Greenfield – a Partner – did not fully understand the Court Embargo. And Ms Greenfield had responded (27.1.25 at 12:06) to a communicated plan for disclosure to journalists. That response did not ask Ms Pearson to stop or wait. Ms Pearson was open with Ms Greenfield about the key steps: the plan to send the CEDJ to journalists; the plan to send quotes; the plan to convene interviews; the plan to conduct marketing-preparation steps. Ms Pearson has fully cooperated with this process. I record, as a point in her favour, that it was Ms Pearson who volunteered the information that she had advised Mrs Leonard that it was permissible to speak to journalists. That was a contradiction of what Ms Greenfield had told the Leonard Family. But it is an incident which did not feature in Mrs Leonard’s witness statement (28.2.25) or in any document. It came from Ms Pearson herself (3.3.25). I also record that, in her second witness statement (25.3.25), Ms Pearson wisely took the opportunity to face up to gaps exposed at the hearing in her first witness statement. I found the second statement to have been more frank and forthcoming than was the first, on specific concerns about gaps in the narrative. The opportunity I offered was taken. iii) It is right to recognise the nature of a narrative judgment which makes clear what has gone wrong. There is a strong public interest in a full and fearless enquiry, with comprehensive and candid disclosure. The process is burdensome and exacting. The issuing of a public domain judgment like this one serves the public interest, recognises why all of this matters, and is a public record of breaches, shortcomings and concerns. It “is itself an adverse outcome”: R v Counihan [2024] EWCA Crim 799 at §36. The Court has received sincere and heartfelt apologies, expressions of remorse and embarrassment (as in Counihan at §35). I have received a helpful and relevant description of what it has been like, in human terms, to undergo this enquiry process. I accept all of this evidence. I accept the apologies. I can see no risk of repetition. iv) In the particular circumstances of this case, I think the right focus to adopt is on considerations of necessity and proportionality. I am satisfied, having issued this judgment, that further steps are neither necessary nor proportionate. The primary purpose of contempt proceedings – to secure compliance with the Court Embargo – stands achieved. The seriousness with which the Court treats these matters stands fully communicated and acknowledged. Any sanction would be likely to be a limited one. All of these are important considerations: see Wright v McCormack [2023] EWHC 1030 (KB) at §39. So far as the Court is concerned, this judgment is enough. The enquiry has been undertaken. Sufficient clarity has been achieved. Lessons will have been learned.

Cited in 1 later judgment