“Grounds 3 and 4: a. Ms Jarvis advised that: (i) The lawfulness of the existing As Built Building was a main issue (paragraph 5.11). (ii) The building has not been built fully in accordance with the approved plans both externally and internally (paragraphs 5.24 and 5.28). (iii) The building is not materially different from the original permission (paragraph 5.28). (iv) At paragraph 5.38 Ms Jarvis considers whether it is expedient to take enforcement action. (v) At paragraph 5.40 Ms Jarvis states: “Whilst the building that has been erected is not in full accordance with the original permission, it is not fundamentally or materially different from that which was permitted as to justify taking enforcement action;” b. As stated at paragraph 145 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds (CSFG) the fact that the Council has decided not to issue an enforcement notice is not of itself a sufficient basis for a finding that the As Built Building was lawful. c. It is arguable that it is not clear from the report whether the conclusion was that the departure from the approved plans was not material, and therefore the building works had been carried out in accordance with planning permission, or whether the conclusion was that the works were not carried out in accordance with planning permission, but the departure from the approved plans was not so material as to justify taking enforcement action. d. On that basis it is arguable that the Defendant did not determine whether the As Built Building was lawful.” “Whilst the building that has been erected is not in full accordance with the original permission, it is not fundamentally or materially different from that which was permitted as to justify taking enforcement action;”
“3.1 There is a lengthy and complex planning history relating to the site and the adjoining land to the south. Between 1984 and 2001 a number of applications seeking permission for residential development were refused and dismissed on appeal, essentially on grounds that the site was beyond the built-up limits of the settlement and that the development, if permitted, would result in the intensification and extension of sporadic development which would have a detrimental effect on the character of the countryside and Area of Attractive Landscape (AAL).”
“84/00407/AV - ERECTION OF TWO DETACHED DWELLINGS – Refused 98/01956/AOP - SITE FOR 2 DWELLINGS – Refused 01/01335/APP - Erection of dwelling – Refused 10/00583/APP - Erection of single storey building for storage including tractors and farm machinery and provision of track to existing field access – Refused (allowed on appeal) 10/02003/APP - Erection of stable block – Refused 11/02132/APP - Erection of two detached dwellinghouses with associated access and landscaping. – Refused (dismissed at appeal) 11/02663/APP - Erection of one detached dwellinghouse with associated access and landscaping. – Refused 12/02532/APP - Erection of one detached dwellinghouse with associated access and landscaping. – Refused (dismissed on appeal) 13/02835/APP - Erection of one detached single storey dwelling – Refused 14/00455/APP - Erection of a three bedroom single storey dwelling and one detached garage. – Refused 15/02903/APP - Construction of partially underground Passivhaus with ground source heat, and construction of detached building with central archway (amendment to storage barn approved on appeal under ref. 10/00583/APP) to provide access, garaging and storage, with associated external parking and access. – Approved 16/03245/APP – Construction of a barn style single storey house with bedrooms in the roof space above and double garage attached. – Refused (dismissed at appeal) 17/03292/APP - Construction of partially underground Passivhaus with ground source heat and detached storage building with associated external parking and access (amendment to planning approval 15/02903/APP – Refused (dismissed at appeal) 10/A0583/DIS - Submission of details pursuant to Condition 3 (materials) and 4 (landscaping) relating to Planning Permission 10/00583/APP – Satisfies Requirements”
“The development proposed is theerection of a detached single storey building for general storage and for a tractor shed with secure storage for vintage farm machinery … Decision 1. I allow the appeal and grant planning permission for the erection of a detached single-storey building for general storage and for a tractor shed with secure storage for vintage farm machinery on vacant land known as ‘The Old Sandpit’, adjacent to Wayside, Oving Road, Whitchurch, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, HP22 4ER, in accordance with the terms of the application, Ref 10/00583/APP, dated23 March 2010 , subject to the following conditions: 1) The development hereby permitted shall begin not later than three years from the date of this decision. 2) The development hereby permitted shall be carried out in accordance with the following approved plan: 010/SG/001 3) No development shall take place until samples of the materials to be used in the construction of the external surfaces of the building hereby permitted have been submitted to and approved in writing by the local planning authority. Development shall be carried out in accordance with the approved details. 4) No development shall take place until full details of soft landscape works have been submitted to and approved in writing by the local planning authority and these works shall be carried out as approved. These details shall include planting plans; written specifications (including cultivation and other operations associated with plant and grass establishment); schedules of plants, noting species, plant sizes and proposed numbers/densities where appropriate; implementation programme. 5) If within a period of five years from the date of the planting of any tree that forms part of the approved planting scheme that tree, or any tree planted in replacement for it, is removed, uprooted or destroyed or dies, another tree of the same species and size as that originally planted shall be planted at the same place, unless the local planning authority gives its written approval to any variation. 6) The building hereby approved shall be used for storage purposes only and not for any other use.”
“The proposed building would be sited on the lower, northern part of the site and would take the form of a single-storey building with three interlinked storage bays, each with a large door. It would face north and would be served by a new access drive located alongside the eastern boundary of the site.”
“9. … the proposed building is intended for the storage of vintage farm machinery. There is no indication that the building would be used to support farming or other countryside-based enterprises … the building would be low and have the appearance of a barn or other similar farm storage building. … 11. On the basis of its restricted visibility, siting, and design as a farm-type storage building, I consider that the proposal would not harm the character of the landscape, and that it would conserve the specific nature of the open countryside around the appeal site. Furthermore, the position of the building at the rear of the site would enable the retention of the visual gap in the road frontage, which protects the countryside appearance of the surrounding area. It would not, therefore, conflict with policy RA.8 of the LP or advice in PPS7. 12. The appellant [ie the Interested Party] has indicated that he would be prepared to accepted conditions relating to maintenance of the screening hedgerow and the submission of a soft landscape scheme. I have attached conditions to this effect in order to enable the strengthening of the screening of the proposed building and to protect the character and appearance of the landscape. I have also attached conditions relating to approved plans and the use of the building because it is necessary that the development shall be carried out in accordance with the approved plans, and for the avoidance of doubt and in the interests of proper planning. Finally, I have attached a condition relating to materials to be used, in the interests of the visual amenities of the surrounding landscape.”
“2. In December 2010 permission was granted for a storage building at the site under application reference 10/00583/APP, prior to work starting in September 2012 a building control application was submitted to the Aylesbury Vale District Council Building Control Department and this was approved. 3. The site was cleared, and the foundations dug to the approved depth as agreed by the building control officer. Once approval was given concrete was ordered for delivery the following day. The concrete was poured and allowed to set. The next operation was the clearing of the oversite to expose a level surface to build off. 4. Following the completion of the foundations, further work on the building was paused until 2018 when work was restarted on site.”
“The re-use of an existing building that is of permanent and substantial construction and generally in keeping with the rural surroundings in the countryside will be permitted provided that all the following assessment criteria are met: … d. The redundant or disused status of the building has been demonstrated and the re-use of the building would enhance the immediate setting … h. The proposed re-use is of a scale that would not have an adverse impact on its surroundings or the viability of existing facilities or services in nearby settlements”
“5.28 It is concluded that whilst the ‘as built’ building is not in full accordance with the approved plans externally and internally, it can nevertheless still function and be used as was originally intended in accordance with its lawful use and as such it is not materially different from the original permission in either appearance or function/use.” e. At [5.39], where she said: “5.39 It is concluded that whilst it is agreed that the building has not been built in full accordance with the originally approved plans, no material harm has arisen nor is there any adverse impact on the amenity of the site or its surroundings such as to render the works unacceptable or in conflict with the development plan. Taking enforcement action would not be justified nor be in the public interest.”
“5.40. In the light of the above, it is concluded that: • The original permission was lawfully implemented through completion of foundations and the subsequent approval of discharge of conditions does not affect this position; • Whilst the building that has been erected is not in full accordance with the original permission, it is not fundamentally or materially different from that which was permitted as to justify taking enforcement action; and • The building was used for its lawful purpose following completion; 5.41. Therefore, it can be considered to be an ‘existing rural building’ for the purposes of policy C1 [of the VALP].”
“42. The principles on which the court will act when criticism is made of a planning officer's report to committee are well settled. To summarise the law as it stands: (1) The essential principles are as stated by the Court of Appeal in R. v Selby District Council, ex parte Oxton Farms [1997] EGCS 60 (see, in particular, the judgment of Judge L.J., as he then was). They have since been confirmed several times by this court, notably by Sullivan L.J. in R. (on the application of Siraj) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council[2010] EWCA Civ 1286 , at paragraph 19, and applied in many cases at first instance (see, for example, the judgment of Hickinbottom J., as he then was, in R. (on the application of Zurich Assurance Ltd., t/a Threadneedle Property Investments) v North Lincolnshire Council[2012] EWHC 3708 (Admin) , at paragraph 15). (2) The principles are not complicated. Planning officers' reports to committee are not to be read with undue rigour, but with reasonable benevolence, and bearing in mind that they are written for councillors with local knowledge (see the judgment of Baroness Hale of Richmond in R. (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire County Council[2011] UKSC 2 , at paragraph 36, and the judgment of Sullivan J., as he then was, in R. v Mendip District Council, ex parte Fabre (2000) 80 P. & C.R. 500, at p.509). Unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise, it may reasonably be assumed that, if the members followed the officer's recommendation, they did so on the basis of the advice that he or she gave (see the judgment of Lewison L.J. in Palmer v Herefordshire Council[2016] EWCA Civ 1061 , at paragraph 7). The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, the officer has materially misled the members on a matter bearing upon their decision, and the error has gone uncorrected before the decision was made. Minor or inconsequential errors may be excused. It is only if the advice in the officer's report is such as to misdirect the members in a material way – so that, but for the flawed advice it was given, the committee's decision would or might have been different – that the court will be able to conclude that the decision itself was rendered unlawful by that advice. (3) Where the line is drawn between an officer's advice that is significantly or seriously misleading – misleading in a material way – and advice that is misleading but not significantly so will always depend on the context and circumstances in which the advice was given, and on the possible consequences of it. There will be cases in which a planning officer has inadvertently led a committee astray by making some significant error of fact (see, for example R. (on the application of Loader) v Rother District Council[2016] EWCA Civ 795 ), or has plainly misdirected the members as to the meaning of a relevant policy (see, for example, Watermead Parish Council v Aylesbury Vale District Council[2017] EWCA Civ 152 ). There will be others where the officer has simply failed to deal with a matter on which the committee ought to receive explicit advice if the local planning authority is to be seen to have performed its decision-making duties in accordance with the law (see, for example, R. (on the application of Williams) v Powys County Council[2017] EWCA Civ 427 ). But unless there is some distinct and material defect in the officer's advice, the court will not interfere.”
“Whilst planning officers' reports should not be equated with inspectors' decision letters, it is well established that, in construing the latter, it has to be remembered that they are addressed to the parties who will be well aware of the issues that have been raised in the appeal. They are thus addressed to a knowledgeable readership and the adequacy of their reasoning must be considered against that background. That approach applies with particular force to a planning officer's report to a committee. Its purpose is not to decide the issue, but to inform the members of the relevant considerations relating to the application. It is not addressed to the world at large but to council members who, by virtue of that membership, may be expected to have substantial local and background knowledge. There would be no point in a planning officer's report setting out in great detail background material, for example, in respect of local topography, development planning policies or matters of planning history if the members were only too familiar with that material. Part of a planning officer's expert function in reporting to the committee must be to make an assessment of how much information needs to be included in his or her report in order to avoid burdening a busy committee with excessive and unnecessary detail.”
“(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, for the purposes of this Act development of land shall be taken to be initiated - (a) if the development consists of the carrying out of operations, at the time when those operations are begun; … (2) For the purposes of the provisions of this Part mentioned in subsection (3) development shall be taken to be begun on the earliest date on which any material operation comprised in the development begins to be carried out. (3) The provisions referred to in subsection (2) are sections 85(2), 86(6), 87(4), 91, 92 and 94.
“The Inspector, he submitted, ought to have focused on the extent to which what had been done complied with the approved drawings, bearing in mind how little, as the Inspector had correctly recognised, needed to be done in order to constitute a material operation. It did not matter, once sufficient had been done to start the development, that more had been done which might not comply with the approved drawings …”
“Once it was accepted that stripping had occurred on a substantial part of the land subject to the planning permission, the legal effect, if any, of that action was not defeated either by the fact that the stripping did not coincide with the boundary of the land granted planning permission or by the fact that stripping also occurred on land where planning permission had not been granted.”
“… [Counsel for Commercial Land] drew on those authorities to submit first, that very little needed to be done in order to constitute a material operation and second, that the existence of a difference between the approved plans and what was built, did not preclude reliance on what was being built if that was substantially usable in implementing the permitted development; excess of works did not prevent the part which accorded with the approved plans being effective to that end.”
“32.. The decision in Spackman shows that as a matter of law, differences between the approved plans and the operations relied upon, need not be fatal to the capability of the operations to be effective in commencing the development … 33. It is, in my judgment, necessary for an Inspector dealing with this sort of problem to consider not just the existence of differences between the plans and the operations relied on, but also to consider the significance of those differences. It is insufficient just to mark and measure the existence of differences …”
“35. … looking at what has been done as a whole and reaching a judgment as a matter of fact and degree upon that whole. It does not entail any artificial process of ignoring part of what has been done. I reach that view even where it is not contended that the works are different functionally from the planning permission which has been granted, or are ambivalent in nature and so not unequivocally referable to the planning permission in question”
“… [The inspector] considered the appellant's contention that the implementation of planning permission was achieved through the demolition of the existing structure on the site, the removal of the tanks and equipment, and the evacuation of trenches and that all this amounted to the commencement of the development. However, assessing the matter objectively, in accordance with Commercial Land, he concluded… that the works undertaken were so different from the permitted development that they did not constitute the commencement of the 2006 permission. That, in my judgment, was a perfectly permissible exercise of planning judgment.”
“43. In the present case the Inspector made clear (at para 36) that in his judgment there were numerous material differences between the "as built" scheme and the 2008 scheme such that he could not accept that the 2008 scheme has been implemented. Ms Dehon submits, and I accept, that the Inspector's conclusion that there was a sufficiently substantial difference cannot be characterised as irrational, and was a permissible exercise of his planning judgment. 44. In my judgment the Inspector, following Commercial Land, adopted the correct approach and his decision discloses no error of law. Accordingly the Claimant's contention that the 2008 permission was lawfully implemented fails. That being so it is not strictly necessary to consider the Condition 3 issue (see para 32 above), but out of respect for the careful submissions made by counsel I shall do so.”
“26. The scope of a planning permission depends on the terms of the document recording the grant. As with any legal document, its interpretation is a matter of law for the court. Recent decisions of this court have made it clear that planning permissions are to be interpreted according to the same general principles that apply in English law to the interpretation of any other document that has legal effect. The exercise is an objective one, concerned not with what the maker of the document subjectively intended or wanted to convey but with what a reasonable reader would understand the words used, considered in their particular context, to mean: see Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers[2016] 1WLR85 , paras 33–34 (Lord Hodge JSC) and para 53 (Lord Carnwath JSC); Lambeth London Borough Council v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government[2019] 1WLR4317 , paras 15–19.”
“(1) A local planning authority may make a change to any planning permission, or any permission in principle (granted following an application to the authority), relating to land in their area if they are satisfied that the change is not material. (2) In deciding whether a change is material, a local planning authority must have regard to the effect of the change, together with any previous changes made under this section, on the planning permission or permission in principle as originally granted.”
“69. … the continuing authority of a planning permission is not ‘dependent on exact compliance with the permission such that any departure from the permitted scheme, however minor, has the result that no further development is authorised unless and until exact compliance is achieved or the permission is varied’ the ‘presumption must be that a departure will have this effect only if it is material in the context of the scheme as a whole: see Lever Finance Ltd v Westminster (City) London Borough Council[1971] 1 QB 222 , 230. What is or is not material is plainly a matter of fact and degree. 70. There is no inconsistency here with section 96A of the 1990 Act (referred to at para 24 above). If the planning authority makes a change to a planning permission under section 96A because satisfied that the change is not material, this will have the benefit for the landowner that it can be certain that the altered pattern of development is indeed within the scope of the permission. It could not afterwards be said that there has been any departure at all from the scheme for which permission has been granted. If, on the other hand, the landowner alters the pattern of development in an immaterial way without first obtaining a variation under section 96A, it does not follow that the development must be treated as unauthorised by the original, unvaried permission. In such a case the landowner will simply be more exposed to possible arguments in later enforcement proceedings that the change was in fact material, which would then have to be decided by a planning inspector or a court. That has always been the position under the planning legislation, including before section 96A was added to give the facility to amend a permission.”
“In my opinion a planning permission covers work which is specified in the detailed plans and any immaterial variation therein. I do not use the words ‘de minimis’ because that would be misleading. It is obvious that, as the developer proceeds with the work, there will necessarily be variations from time to time. Things may arise which were not foreseen. It should not be necessary for the developers to go back to the planning committee for every immaterial variation. The permission covers any variation which is not material. But then the question arises: Who is to decide whether a variation is material or not? In practice it has been the planning officer. This is a sensible practice and I think we should affirm it.”
“43. The phrase ‘in accordance with’ in condition 6 means ‘in agreement or harmony with; in conformity to; according to’ (Oxford English Dictionary). The dictionary examples given show that a draftsman of a planning permission may go further by adding language so that, for example, the development must be carried out ‘exactly’ or ‘strictly’ in accordance with particular plans. The natural meaning of the phrase "in accordance with", taken by itself, does not connote that degree of conformity. The addition of such terms would not be tautologous. They would change the meaning of the phrase, certainly in the context of the document I have to construe. Deciding whether a development is in conformity or harmony with parameter plans may well involve matters of planning judgment and degree.”
“… can nevertheless still function and be used as was originally intended in accordance with its lawful use and as such it is not materially different from the original permission in either appearance or function/use.”
“5.12 In considering the first sentence of policy C1, whilst it is considered that in the light of the supporting documentation provided, the planning history and site inspections, the building can be concluded to be of ‘substantial and permanent construction’, the first issue to consider is whether the ‘as-built’ building can be considered to be ‘lawful’ and therefore an existing building for the purposes of policy C1.”
“5.13 The applicant contends that work originally started on the building in 2012 and this is corroborated by Building Control (BC) records that confirm that the footings were approved in September 2012. This has been confirmed in the statutory declaration latterly submitted to support the application. 5.14. It has been suggested that the initial works, i.e. the construction of the foundations cannot be taken to have properly implemented the permission given that no further work on the building was undertaken until 2019, a gap of some 7 years. However, there is no requirement for the construction of the building to be completed within a specific period and the applicant has explained that the delay in completing the building was due to pursuing alternative proposals for the site during which time the foundations ‘grassed over’.According to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 , “development is taken to be begun on the earliest date on which a material operation is carried out.”
“the objector maintains the position that the building has not been lawfully implemented nor has it been built in accordance with the approved plans or for its approved purpose – a materially different building has been built”
“It remains controversial between our client and your Council’s planning officers and enforcement team that they accepted that, despite the above conditions (3) and (4) not discharged until much later, the owner somehow lawfully implemented the 2010 Storage Building permission by digging a trench, in or about 2012, but which was then filled in during the period when the owner was seeking to gain permission for a house again. The above conditions were then not the subject of an application until July 2019 and were discharged by your Council well after construction had formally begun in May 2020 and wholly different materials to that which was shown on the approved conditioned plans has been used.”
“16. The starting-point is that development in breach of conditions is unlawful, and it follows that, if there is a condition that has to be fulfilled before development commences, and development commences without the condition being fulfilled, the development has been commenced unlawfully. This is 'the Whitley principle'. In those circumstances, if a question arises about whether the development commenced within the three-year period after the grant of permission, the work done in breach of the condition will not count, and the result may be that the permission expired before the commencement of any work authorised by the permission. 17. But that starting-point has to be applied in the context of the statutory regime as a whole, which draws a clear distinction in s 171A(1) of the 1990 Act between (a) carrying out development without planning permission and (b) failing to comply with a condition subject to which planning permission was granted. It follows that not every breach of condition can have the result that the development has been carried out without planning permission. 18. Nevertheless, when an authority has clearly made a condition requiring some further act before the commencement of work, there must be scope for saying that the intended function of the condition was to prevent the commencement of work (or render it unlawful) before the condition had been fulfilled. That will be the case if the condition 'goes to the heart of the planning permission': if it does, it is a condition going beyond the detail of a matter that is agreed in principle: it is, instead, something without which the authority would not be content to permit the development at all. 19. The question whether a condition ‘goes to the heart of the planning permission’ is not merely a matter of construing the grant of permission. The grant may give reasons why the condition is imposed; but those reasons cannot resolve the question by themselves. Rather, the question can be answered only by a fact-sensitive enquiry into the terms of the condition in the context of the permission, and the permission in its planning context. In other words, this question is a matter of planning judgment. It is not for the Court; it is for the Inspector; and unless the Inspector's decision on the issue is at fault in a Wednesbury sense, the Court will not intervene.”
“1. The appellant (Greyfort) owns land in Torquay which was the subject of a planning permission granted in 1974 for the development of 19 flats. Greyfort contends that access work carried out in January 1978 amounted to commencement of the development, with the consequence that the planning permission remains extant. An inspector held that the work was carried out in breach of a condition of the planning permission and could not therefore amount to commencement of the development authorised by the permission. That decision turned on the application of what, in planning parlance, is commonly called the Whitley principle (see Whitley & Sons v Secretary of State for Wales(1992) 64 P&CR 296 ), in relation to which Sullivan J (as he then was) made extensive observations in R (Hart Aggregates Ltd) v Hartlepool Borough Council[2005] EWHC 840 (Admin) .”
“41. … The fact is… that the Inspector was plainly in a better position than the court to assess the matter, not only because of his greater expertise in interpretation and assessment of plans of this sort but also because he is bound to have had a better feel for the overall context and the site itself, which he had visited. The court should therefore be very cautious about acceding to an invitation to conclude, on the basis of its own examination of the plans, that the Inspector fell into error in making the finding he did as to the importance of condition 4.”
“However, whilst the Inspector imposed a condition to require details of the materials to be used in the external construction of the building ‘in the interests of the visual amenities of the surrounding landscape’, there is no requirement that those materials should be brick. Furthermore, although another condition requires the development to be ‘carried out in accordance with the approved plan’ that plan does not specify the external materials. In the appeal decision the Inspector makes reference to it being a ‘farm-type storage building’ though the description only refers to it as a ‘building’. The use of timber boarding as opposed to brick is considered to be entirely in keeping with the original permission and typical of a ‘farm-type storage building’. However, whilst the Inspector imposed a condition to require details of the materials to be used in the external construction of the building ‘in the interests of the visual amenities of the surrounding landscape’, there had been no requirement that those materials should be brick.”
“The 2010 permission was granted ‘… in accordance with the terms of the Application’. So, it did not specifically incorporate the DAS. Equally, the application itself did not incorporate the DAS. When the application was made, the relevant provision relating to the submission of a DAS was article 4C of theTown and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 [SI 1995/419]. That provision required that certain planning applications be ‘accompanied by’ a DAS. It did not require that the DAS form part of the application. In the circumstances, there is no basis for assuming that the DAS formed part of the 2010 planning permission.”
“49. Central to the Claimant’s complaint is that the use of timber boarding as facing material is not permitted. As indicated in paragraphs 10 and 12 above, the use of that material was approved pursuant to a submission made under condition 3 in May 2020. That approval was not challenged (and the Claimant was aware of it). It is no longer open to anybody to question the lawfulness of that approval. 50. In consequence of the above, paragraphs 45 to 50 of the Claimant’s Skeleton Argument are misconceived. In the circumstances, it is unnecessary to comment on the Claimant’s assertion that the relevant DAS was part of the 2010 permission – but, for reference, the point is addressed at paragraph 22 of the Defendant’s detailed grounds.”
“It is concluded that whilst the ‘as built’ building is not in full accordance with the approved plans externally and internally, it can nevertheless still function and be used as was originally intended in accordance with its lawful use and as such it is not materially different from the original permission in either appearance or function/use.”
“Dealing with policy C1, whilst the appearance of the existing building and what is proposed are matters of planning judgement …”
“5.40. In the light of the above, it is concluded that: • The original permission was lawfully implemented through completion of foundations and the subsequent approval of discharge of conditions does not affect this position; • Whilst the building that has been erected is not in full accordance with the original permission, it is not fundamentally or materially different from that which was permitted as to justify taking enforcement action; and • The building was used for its lawful purpose following completion; 5.41. Therefore, it can be considered to be an ‘existing rural building’ for the purposes of policy C1.”