"7. Mr Alexander's primary application is for the order to be discharged altogether for reasons with which I will deal in a moment. 8. His secondary position is that if the court is not minded to discharge the order now, a time limit should be put on it. He points to the fact that if this were a civil restraint order, it would automatically be of finite duration, although he accepts that it may always be continued. 9. He also points to the fact that in one or two cases, civil proceedings orders have been made for finite periods. He mentioned one case where the order was one of 12 years duration. 10. It is I think unhelpful to seek to import into civil proceedings orders, practice derived from the regime for civil restraint orders. Orders under section 42 are available only on the application of the Attorney General and in specific circumstances. The judgments of the court make clear the reasons why the order was made in this case. 11. Civil restraint orders (general or extended) may be made of the court's own motion or upon application by a party, and unless an order to continue is made by the court, they lapse by effluxion of time ... ... 23. Mr Alexander brings his application on three grounds. 24. First that the order has been in place for 12 years, now nearly 13 and has been complied with. 25. Both of those statements are true, but they do not found an argument that there has been a change of circumstances, still less that there are entirely new circumstances. On the contrary, the demonstrate that the courts have acted as an effective filter on this litigation, in other words the order is achieving its purpose. 26. The effluxion of time and compliance with the order are relevant factors which the court will take into account in deciding whether to discharge the order, but they do not of themselves constitute new (still less entirely new) circumstances ... ... 30. In the course of his statement in support of his application, Mr Alexander says in terms that he accepts that the litigation he conducted in the years preceding the making of this order did constitute vexatious litigation within the meaning of the Act, and he accepts that it was misconceived and not conducted appropriately. He also says that he now has a more measured approach to litigation which is reflected in the fact that he has been successful in the majority of his requests and applications. However, it is incontrovertible that he continues to make ill-judged applications from time to time. …….I also note notwithstanding his acceptance that the litigation was vexatious, and that the judge refused his application for an injunction in 2016, he has sought to explain how the litigation came to pass and to give reasons for having made the application. This suggests to me that he continues to be of the view that he was right about those matters, although he accepts quite rightly the decision of the court ... ... 34. In my judgment, having considered the whole of the chronology up to and including today, I am satisfied that although there have been significant changes in Mr Alexander's approach, his judgment remains unreliable and leads him to pursuing hopeless points. 35. Turning to the third ground of the application which Mr Alexander describes as the unintended prejudicial effect of an order under section 42. Mr Alexander refers to the mere fact that being subject to a section 42 order meant that judges and opponents take against. 36. This is a rather generalised comment, but it seems to me (as it seemed to Lewison J), the fact is that every time he appears before a court, he does so with the permission of a High Court judge. This I think gives significant support to Mr Alexander, who is able to say that he has that permission and can develop his applications on the basis of it. 37. In any event, I cannot see that there is a prejudicial effect. It is certainly not a new circumstance; it is the inevitable consequence of the existence of the order. 38. In my judgment, there is no merit in any of the three grounds Mr Alexander has brought before us. I observe that the amount of judicial time that is spent and has been spent on Mr Alexander's applications over the years is very significant, and that is the burden that supervising judges shoulder, so as to ensure that the wider public and the courts generally are effectively protected from vexatious litigation. It also ensures beyond doubt that Mr Alexander has proper access to justice whenever that is appropriate. 39. It follow that I would refuse the application to discharge the order. For the same reasons, I would refuse the secondary position which is that there should be a specific time limit. Mr Alexander is not shut out from making a further application in due course, but it would not assist one jot were I to suggest that time limit now. 40. Any future application will be considered by the court on the basis of the facts at that time."
"Before leaving the present applications, I should add a comment about the fact that the orders which are made are orders unlimited in time in the case of both applicants. This a matter of which Mr Covey in particular complained, both in his written and oral submissions. In my judgment, the position is that the court always has a jurisdiction to vary orders which have been made in the light of entirely new circumstances. However, that the orders should be made in the first instance in cases of this sort, unlimited in period of time, is, in my judgment, fully justified. The fact that there are the orders prevents an applicant conducting litigation which is vexatious. If the order achieves that purpose, then it is a safeguard against which those who would be subject to the inconvenience of the litigation which would otherwise occur are entitled to be protected. They should not be put in a position where, because of the expiry of a limited period of time, they should be again exposed to unjustified litigation. I would therefore dismiss both these applications for permission to appeal."
"In my order of28 July 2022 , I refused Mr Alexander permission to apply to the Divisional Court because I considered he had not demonstrated there were entirely new circumstances justifying setting aside or variation of the CRO. I noted that he had made an application to the Divisional Court in 2016 with the permission of Arnold J, and the grounds on which he relied before the Divisional Court were broadly the same grounds as those he relied on before me. I noted however that I was nevertheless conscious that 19 years is a very long time for the CRO to remain in place and that Mr Alexander's application notice purported to identify factors which may support his contention, and it may be that he has in mind other matters that would support the contention that there has been a change of circumstances. For that reason, I indicated that Mr Alexander could attend in person at a shorter hearing to renew the application in the event that Mr Alexander is unable to attend a hearing on2 March 2023 . The principal point made by Mr Alexander at the hearing, was that he found the continued existence of the CRO (particularly as he reaches his later seventies) to be a considerable weight on him mentally. He felt that he was seen in a negative light by others who knew about the existence of the order. He wants an order that it is oppressive to be subject to the same restraint order for 20 years, particularly when any equivalent order today under the civil restraint order jurisdiction would be time limited, albeit subject to the possibility of extensions. I ask Mr Alexander what he would do if the restraint was lifted, and he said he would want to bring proceedings against the Royal Bank of Scotland, and I think the Official Receiver, in relation to events that happened in 1999. I pointed out to him that the almost inevitable consequence of doing so (given the obvious limitation issues involved) would be that he would cause costs to be incurred by third parties which would then be awarded against him. I further pointed out that this reinforced the point made by the Divisional Court in 2016, that the regime put in place by the CRO is working well and protecting not only others from unmeritorious applications made by him but also protecting him from the costs consequences of him doing so. Nevertheless, I have decided to grant him permission taking into account in particular three things. First, there is something to be said against an order limiting a person’s free access to the courts continuing for a period in excess of 20 years. Second, it is not for me to decide that question but only to decide whether the application is not an abuse, and that there are reasonable grounds for making the application. Third, it may be possible for the order to be varied as opposed to being discharged altogether, in a way which address Mr Alexander's principal concerns while protecting others (and him) in relation to specific matters or types of matters."