“(1) Decisions of the Secretary of State and his inspectors in appeals against the refusal of planning permission are to be construed in a reasonably flexible way. Decision letters are written principally for parties who know what the issues between them are and what evidence and argument has been deployed on those issues. An inspector does not need to “rehearse every argument relating to each matter in every paragraph” (see the judgment of Forbes J. in Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 42 P. & C.R. 26, at p.28). ”
“i) Any party to a planning inquiry is entitled (a) to know the case which he has to meet and (b) to have a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence and make submissions in relation to that opposing case. ii) If there is procedural unfairness which materially prejudices a party to a planning inquiry that may be a good ground for quashing the Inspector's decision. iii) The 2000 Rules are designed to assist in achieving objective (i), avoiding pitfall (ii) and promoting efficiency. Nevertheless the Rules are not a complete code for achieving procedural fairness. iv) A rule 7 statement or a rule 16 statement identifies what the Inspector regards as the main issues at the time of his statement. Such a statement is likely to assist the parties, but it does not bind the Inspector to disregard evidence on other issues. Nor does it oblige him to give the parties regular updates about his thinking as the Inquiry proceeds. v) The Inspector will consider any significant issues raised by third parties, even if those issues are not in dispute between the main parties. The main parties should therefore deal with any such issues, unless and until the Inspector expressly states that they need not do so. vi) If a main party resiles from a matter agreed in the statement of common ground prepared pursuant to rule 15, the Inspector must give the other party a reasonable opportunity to deal with the new issue which has emerged.”
“44. Mr Auburn referred to the Inspector's obligation, whatever may or may not have been agreed between an Appellant and a local planning authority, to take account of representations made by third parties. I accept that an Inspector is bound to take into consideration arguments raised by third parties, but the imperative in the Rules requiring the principal parties to focus their attention on the issues that are in dispute would be wholly frustrated if Appellants and local planning authorities were unable to place any degree of reliance on matters that had been apparently resolved in a statement of agreed facts. It would be entirely unsatisfactory if, having agreed such matters, the principal parties to an inquiry would still have to prepare their evidence on the basis that the Inspector might wish to pursue a particular line of reasoning that departed from the agreed statement. While of course it is open to an Inspector to do so, whether of his or her own motion or in response to third party representations, if there is not to be a return to the "bad old days" where proofs were prepared to cover every conceivable eventuality, it is essential that inspectors recognise that if they do intend to depart from what is the agreed position between the principal parties, it may be necessary to accede to applications for adjournments to enable the parties to address the (now disputed) issue or issues properly by way of expert evidence. It may not be good enough to ask a witness who happens to be at the inquiry for his or her view. By definition, that witness may well not have the professional expertise which is relevant to the matter which has been agreed between the parties as set out in the statement of common ground. … 46. On the evidence before her, the Inspector, as I have indicated, was entitled to use her planning judgment and Mr Kimblin properly conceded that on that (inadequate) evidence she was entitled to reach the conclusions that she did. However, I accept his submission that if the statement was to be departed from on technical arboricultural grounds, then the applicant should have been given a reasonable opportunity to call the kind of arboricultural evidence that it would have called if it had known that this matter continued to be in issue prior to the inquiry. I say "continued to be in issue", because the only document in which the matter was placed in issue following the refusal notice was the proof of evidence of Ms Antrobus. The matter was in contention for a very brief period because that proof of evidence was overtaken either contemporaneously or shortly before or shortly afterwards by the statement of common ground.”
“It was not disputed in argument that a previous appeal decision is capable of being a material consideration. The proposition is in my judgment indisputable ... I do not suggest, and it would be wrong to do so, that like cases must be decided alike. An inspector must always exercise his own judgment. He is therefore free upon consideration to disagree with the judgment of another but before doing so he ought to have regard to the importance of consistency and to give his reasons for departure from the previous decision.”
“40.1. While a previous appeal decision is capable of being a material consideration when determining a planning application, it is not a principle of law that similar cases must always be decided alike. It is a matter for the inspector to exercise their own judgment on the question if it arises (North Wiltshire DC v SoS for the Environment [1992] 4 WLUK 171). 40.2. The weight to be attached to a previous appeal decision is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inspector as decision-maker. 40.3. If an inspector does disagree with the decision of another inspector on a similar appeal case, they ought to give their reasons for departure from the previous decision. These reasons can be short, for example in the case of disagreement on aesthetics.”
“41.1. The Court must approach the issue based on a straightforward down-to-earth reading of the decision letter without excessive legalism or exegetical sophistication. Decisions are to be construed in a reasonably flexible way and an inspector does not need to rehearse every argument relating to each matter in every paragraph. 41.2. The reasons for an appeal decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling one to understand why an appeal (or point within it) was decided as it was. Reasons can be briefly stated. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, but such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. 41.3. An applicant will only succeed if they can satisfy the Court that they have been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision (e.g., because they are genuinely unable to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission).”
“7.27. It is agreed that the development of this site could impact the setting of the adjacent heritage assets as referred to above, but that any harm arising would be less than substantial subject to appropriate siting and layout at reserved matters stage. 7.28. It is agreed that when weighed against the public benefits of the proposals as required by paragraph 202 of the NPPF, the less than substantial harm is outweighed. 7.29. In terms of archaeology it is agreed that the appeal site falls within an area of archaeological interest but that appropriately worded planning conditions can ensure a suitable programme of works to ensure any archaeological deposits or features that would be disturbed by the development proposals can be either preserved in situ, or where this cannot be achieved, adequately recorded in advance of their loss. 7.30. It is agreed that no objections to the application proposals were raised by either the Council’s own Design and Conservation Officer or the East Sussex County Council Archaeological Officer, subject to appropriately worded conditions. 7.31. The application is agreed to comply with the requirements of Policy CP11 of LLP1, and DM22 of LLP2.”
“Landscape 7.32. The site is not subject to any national or local landscape quality designations and is not for the purposes of paragraph 174 of the Framework a valued landscape. 7.33. The edge of the South Downs National Park is some 0.5km to the south at its very closest. 7.34. No objection is raised to the methodology followed in the preparation of the Landscape and Visual Impact Assessment (LVIA), nor is there any disagreement over the position and selection, direction and extent of the viewpoints which formed the basis of the visual impact assessment process. 7.35. The Council’s consultee on landscape matters (East Sussex County Council Landscape Architect) raised no objections to the application proposals, concluding that the proposals would have an acceptable impact on local landscape character and views. 7.36. Whilst the South Downs National Park Authority raised some concerns about the proposals they did not specifically raise an objection. 7.37 The provision of the Community Woodland whilst not proposed as mitigation for the impact of the development is agreed, over time, to improve outward views from the SDNPA and would enhance the localised landscape fabric and character.”
“The weight to be afforded to the policies most important for determining the appeal. The extent to which the appeal proposals conflict with the policies most important to their determination. The nature and extent of any harm arising from the appeal proposals; Whether the proposals would represent unacceptable impacts that would cause harm to the setting of the South Downs National Park and the character and appearance of the site and surrounding countryside area. Whether any adverse impacts of granting planning permission would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits of the appeal proposal, when assessed against the provisions of the NPPF taken as a whole.”
“21. I must also have regard to the fact that a large mixed use scheme has recently been granted outline planning permission on land at Broyle Gate Farm, which is located on the opposite side of Chamberlaines Lane. This means that the construction of the proposal before me would, in combination with the approved scheme at Broyle Gate Farm, would harmfully consolidate development on the southern side of Lewes Road and lead to the loss of the important green gap which presently contributes to the rural settings of Ringmer and Broyle Side. The resulting loss of this gap between the villages, which would be evident in views from the National Park, would add to the negative impact which the development would have upon the landscape and settlement pattern of this rural area.”
“This means that the construction of the proposal before me would, in combination with the approved scheme at Broyle Gate Farm, would harmfully consolidate development on the southern side of Lewes Road and lead to the loss of the important green gap which presently contributes to the rural settings of Ringmer and Broyle Side. The resulting loss of this gap between the villages, which would be evident in views from the National Park, would add to the negative impact which the development would have upon the landscape and settlement pattern of this rural area.”
“39. Policy 4.6 of the Ringmer Neighbourhood Plan refers to a community-managed woodland within the Parish which, it was argued at the hearing, had already been provided as part of an earlier development. I have however seen no substantive evidence which suggests that the proposed CWA would be managed by the Community. The CWA is presented by the appellant as an additional community benefit, above and beyond the policy requirements in respect of open space. It relates to a parcel of land which is clearly separate from the appeal site and, overall, I fail to see how this would be directly related to the development. Accordingly, the provision of the CWA would not meet the relevant tests.”