“The Secretary of State may make rules for the regulation and management of prisons, remand centres, young offender institutions, secure training centres or secure colleges, and for the classification, treatment, employment, discipline and control of persons required to be detained therein.”
“(1) Prisoners shall be classified, in accordance with any directions of the Secretary of State, having regard to their age, temperament and record and with a view to maintaining good order and facilitating training and, in the case of convicted prisoners, of furthering the purpose of their training and treatment as provided by rule 3.”
“2. Before recommending the transfer of an ISP to open conditions, the Parole Board must consider: i. all information before it, including any written or oral evidence obtained by the Board; ii. the extent to which the ISP has made sufficient progress during the sentence in addressing and reducing risk to a level consistent with protecting the public from harm, in circumstances where the ISP in open conditions may be in the community, unsupervised, under licensed temporary release; iii. whether the following criteria are met: ◦ the prisoner is assessed as low risk of abscond; and ◦ a period in open conditions is considered essential to inform future decisions about release and to prepare for possible release on licence into the community. 3.The Parole Board must only recommend a move to open conditions where it is satisfied that the two criteria (as described at 2(iii)) are met.” i. all information before it, including any written or oral evidence obtained by the Board; ii. the extent to which the ISP has made sufficient progress during the sentence in addressing and reducing risk to a level consistent with protecting the public from harm, in circumstances where the ISP in open conditions may be in the community, unsupervised, under licensed temporary release; iii. whether the following criteria are met: ◦ the prisoner is assessed as low risk of abscond; and ◦ a period in open conditions is considered essential to inform future decisions about release and to prepare for possible release on licence into the community. 3.The Parole Board must only recommend a move to open conditions where it is satisfied that the two criteria (as described at 2(iii)) are met.”
“The prisoner is assessed as low risk of abscond The Panel are of the view that you are a low risk of abscond if you apply the skills you have been putting to use at HMP Whatton. Report writers state that the risk of abscond increases depending on how you are feeling and coping, and your impulsive behaviours. This is evidenced within the dossier: “On discussion with POM Mark Moore it was agreed that there would be concerns in relation to abscond should Mr Williams be moved to Open Conditions. However this would likely be on impulse rather than involve any pre-planning. For instance if Mr Williams was late and decided he then had nothing to lose or if he felt the need to push boundaries of the regime.” (OASys, Jan 2023, R9.1.1) “The professionals considered the abscond risk to be linked to how he felt he was coping. Ms Jaines said there was not an obvious abscond risk but if something went wrong for him he might act impulsively.” (Decision, 2.23) It is not evident to the Secretary of State that this constitutes a low risk of abscond. Bearing in mind you often present as impulsive and erratic, the risk of you not utilising skills learned becomes harder to manage. Therefore, in the Secretary of State’s view, this criteria is not met. There is a wholly persuasive case for transferring the ISP from closed to open conditions You require a level of structure and support that is not necessarily available in open conditions. There is recorded difficulties in you engaging in group environments, and you have a tendency to react impulsively and erratically to challenges, which indicates that you require a more structured level of support that could be better offered by a PIPE or Progression Regime. There are also questions around the level of abscond risk you are assessed to pose, which the Secretary of State is not satisfied equates to low risk. As such, the Secretary of State takes the view that there is not a wholly persuasive case for transferring you to open conditions.”
“In my judgment the key principles identifiable from the case-law are as follows: (1) Decision-Maker. The primary decision-maker is the SSJ (Hindawi §63; Stephens §22;Prison Act 1952 s.12(2) ). The Parole Board, in recommending transfer to open conditions, is giving advice ( 2003 Act s.239 (2)). (2) Legally Significant Advantage. The Parole Board, in giving advice to the SSJ, has legally significant institutional and due process advantages over the SSJ. These include expertise in assessing the risk posed by individual prisoners (Banfield §28(1); Kumar §6; Stephens §20); and the due process of an expert assessment, immunised from external pressures, operating like a court, sifting and analysing the evidence, with an oral hearing to make relevant findings (Hindawi §50; Green §32). These advantages can make it difficult for the SSJ to show that it is reasonable to take a different view ( Gilbert §92). (3) Required Weight. The SSJ is required to accord weight to the recommendation of the Parole Board and the weight required to be accorded depends on the matters in issue, the type of hearing before the Panel, the Panel's findings and the nature of the Panel's assessment (Hindawi §52; Kumar §7; Green §42i). (4) Reasonable Basis. Common law reasonableness is the controlling legal standard for deciding – in the context and circumstances of the case – whether the SSJ has accorded the required weight to the Panel's recommendation and assessment, by reference to the matters in issue, the type of hearing before the Panel, the Panel's findings and the nature of the Panel's assessment. The SSJ may reject the Parole Board's reasoned recommendation, provided only that doing so has a reasonable basis ("a rational basis") (Hindawi §§51-52, 73, 81; Gilbert §92; Kumar §7). There can be no substitution of the views of a civil servant for the views of the Parole Board without reasonable "justification" (Kumar §57). (5) Deficiency. The reasonable basis for rejection may lie in something having 'gone wrong' or 'come to light' which undermines the Panel's reasoned assessment. This idea of deficiency is not limited to a public law error ( Kumar §54); nor to errors of law or fact or additional evidence having come to light (Hindawi §§49, 51; John 76). Examples of deficiencies would be a Panel assessment: (a) running counter to professional views without a sufficient explanation (Kumar §56; Stephens §24; 2021 GPP Policy Framework §5.8.2[i]: §6 above); (b) based on demonstrably inaccurate information (GPP Policy Framework §5.8.2[ii]: §6 above); (c) failing to apply the correct test or address the correct criteria (Gilbert §§73-74; Stephens §§29, 32-36; Oakley §25); or (d) appearing to fly in the face of the evidence or the nature of the risks found by the Panel (Kumar §59). (6) Questions of Significant Advantage. The reasonable basis for rejection will require "very good reason" (Oakley §49-52) – or "clear, cogent and convincing reasons" ( Green §42ii) in respect of evaluative conclusions on questions where the Panel has a significant advantage over the SSJ. Examples of questions of significant advantage are a Panel assessment: (a) of credibility after oral evidence at a hearing (Hindawi §§96, 111; Oakley §47); (b) of any question of fact from evidence at a hearing (Oakley §52); or (c) of questions of expert evaluation of risk, such as professional diagnosis or professional prediction (Oakley §§48-49). There is no bright-line distinction excluding questions of evaluative assessment, about the nature and level of the risk and its manageability from falling within this category (see Oakley §§48-49, revisiting the discussion in John at §47). (7) Other Questions. For questions other than those of significant advantage, the reasonable basis for rejection will still always require "good reason", because the SSJ must always afford to the Parole Board's evaluative assessments "appropriate respect" (Hindawi §60; Oakley §50; Green §42iii). An example is the ultimate evaluative judgment, "undertaken against the background of the facts as found and the predictions as made by the Parole Board", which balances the interests of the prisoner against those of the public (Oakley §§49-50), as part of the question in Direction §7(a) (§12 above).”
“69. Ms Hirst submitted that the Board is an expert body in relation to prisoner risk, which is better placed than the Secretary of State to make judgments about such risk; and that since the Secretary of State is obliged to have regard to all relevant factors when deciding how to exercise his discretion, he is obliged to refer any case where prisoner risk may be in issue to the Board for its advice in relation to whether it should give a general recommendation for transfer to open conditions (or at the very least in respect of whether exceptional circumstances exist for the purposes of the absconder policy). 70. I do not agree with this analysis. There is no authority which supports it. The discretion enjoyed by the Secretary of State in relation to seeking advice from the Board under section 239(2) of the 2003 Act is to be contrasted with the obligation he has to refer cases to it periodically to consider applications for release on licence under section 28 of the 1997 Act. The 2003 Act confers a discretion on the Secretary of State whether to seek advice or not, and the fact that it refers to advice rather than mandatory directions (as in section 28) also underlines the discretion enjoyed by the Secretary of State in this regard: he is not bound to follow advice. Moreover, the Act does not even refer expressly to advice about transfer to open conditions, but only to advice about matters referred to the Board by the Secretary of State “with respect to any matter … which is to do with the early release or recall of prisoners.”
“26. … The [Secretary of State’s decision] letter is to be read “(1) fairly and in good faith and as a whole; (2) in a straightforward down-to-earth manner without excessive legalism or criticism; (3) as if by a well-informed reader who understands the principal controversial issues in the case” (per Lang J in Wokingham BC v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government[2019] EWHC 3158 (Admin) at [19]). … What is necessary is for the decision letter when read fairly and realistically to show why the Secretary of State has taken a different view from that of the Parole Board and for it to set out his reasoning in sufficient detail to show that there has been the requisite engagement with the Board’s assessment and that the resulting decision is rational. 27. Account is to be taken of the expertise of the Secretary of State’s own department (see per Jackson J in R (Banfield) v the Secretary of State for Justice[2007] EWHC 2605 (Admin) at [29]). That is an expertise in the assessment of risk but also in the management of risk in the context of the prison estate. 28. In many cases it will be possible for different persons rationally to take different views (sometimes radically different views) as to the same assessments. This will be particularly so in the case of assessments as to the level of future risk; as to the acceptability of a particular level of risk; and as to the appropriate way forward for a particular prisoner. These are matters of judgement and in many cases they will turn on the view taken as to the likelihood of a number of future events: a matter as to which there will very rarely if ever be a single unquestionably correct answer. It follows that in the relation to the same prisoner there can be both a recommendation from the Parole Board which is wholly rational and a decision to the contrary effect made by the Secretary of State which is also wholly rational. It is for that reason that it is necessary for the court to maintain a determined focus on the rationality or otherwise of the Secretary of State’s decision and to avoid being distracted by having regard to the rationality of the Parole Board’s recommendation (see per King J in R (Wilmot) v Secretary of State for Justice[2012] EWHC 3139 (Admin) at [47]). 29. The nature and quality of the reasoning exercise which the Secretary of State will have to undertake in order properly to engage with a recommendation of the Parole Board will depend on the nature and subject matter of the Parole Board assessment from which he is departing. It will be necessary to consider whether and to what extent the particular issue is one in respect of which the Parole Board is better-placed to make an assessment than the Secretary of State or in respect of which the Board had an opportunity not open to the Secretary of State. Such might be the case if the issue turns on some special expertise available to the Parole Board and not to the Secretary of State or if question is one of fact where the Board’s finding is the result of having addressed the matter at a hearing at which there was oral evidence. The point was made thus by Chamberlain J in R (Oakley) v Secretary of State for Justice[2022] EWHC 2602 (Admin) at [51]: “In my judgment, the correct approach is therefore as follows. When considering the lawfulness of a decision to depart from a recommendation of the Parole Board, it is important to identify with precision the conclusions or propositions with which the Secretary of State disagrees. It is not helpful to seek to classify these conclusions or propositions as “questions of fact” or “questions of assessment of risk”