“19.1 The Tribunal reviewed all the material before it and considered the submissions made by Mr Scott and Ms Heley with great care. 19.2 The Tribunal had due regard to Mr Sa’id’s rights to a fair trial and to respect for his private and family life under, respectively, Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR. 19.3 The Tribunal applied the civil standard of proof, as it was required to do. The burden of proof lay with the Applicant. 19.4 The Applicant had relied entirely on hearsay documentary evidence and the submissions of its counsel. It had not called any witnesses. 19.5 The report of the Applicant’s Forensic Investigation Officer (FOI) had not been supported by a statement of truth by the FOI and it had been annexed as an exhibit to the Rule 12 Statement, which in turn had been signed off (with an incorrect version of the declaration which had been corrected subsequently) by a solicitor with no direct knowledge of the case. The FOI had not given sworn evidence and by failing to give oral evidence had deprived the Respondent of the opportunity to cross examine him. It was significant in this regard given that Mr Sa’id had said that the FOI had viewed 7 other files and raised no concern with Mr Sa’id’s AML checking system. 19.6 Whilst the Tribunal found the factual matrix proved to the required standard, it did not find the Respondent’s failure on the two transaction was of a degree which brought the failure within the ambit of professional misconduct as a breach of the relevant Principles and Codes of Conduct and therefore the Applicant had not proved its case in that regard to the required standard. 19.7 It was clear that Mr Sa’id recognised his system let him down on the two transactions as it did not identify the presence of a PEP. He accepted that had the PEP been identified the risk would have been marked at a higher level. 19.8 This was entirely regrettable, however, Mr Sa’id was not in a position of having no system at all or indeed that his system should be considered inadequate based on a single failure. 19.9 The Tribunal found that the AML regime is based on assessment of risk and that there is scope for professional judgment. Mr Sa’id had carried out CDD and proceeded in an otherwise cautious manner relying on his knowledge of his clients and the source of their substantial wealth, accrued over 20 years of business in which. He therefore did not ‘fly blind’ into a situation where he was oblivious the risk. 19.10 The Tribunal considered that issues relating to money laundering must be treated with utmost seriousness for reasons of preventing crime and the encouragement of terrorism, however, this case revealed an element of the ‘counsel of perfection’ on the Applicant’s part. The Tribunal recognised that Mr Sa’id had taken steps to strengthen and improve his AML systems. 19.11 The Tribunal dismissed all the allegations.”
“SRA Principles These are mandatory Principles which apply to all. You must: ….. 6. behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you and in the provision of legal services; 7. comply with your legal and regulatory obligations and deal with your regulators and ombudsmen in an open, timely and co-operative manner; 8. run your business or carry out your role in the business effectively and in accordance with proper governance and sound financial and risk management principles.”
“You comply with legislation applicable to your business, including anti money laundering and data protection legislation”
“33.— Obligation to apply enhanced customer due diligence (1) A relevant person must apply enhanced customer due diligence measures and enhanced ongoing monitoring, in addition to the customer due diligence measures required under regulation 28 and, if applicable, regulation 29, to manage and mitigate the risks arising— (a) in any case identified as one where there is a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing— (i) by the relevant person under regulation 18(1)… (b) in any business relationship with a person established in a high-risk third country or in relation to any relevant transaction where either of the parties to the transaction is established in a high-risk third country ; …… (f) in any case where— (i) a transaction is complex or unusually large, (ii) there is an unusual pattern of transactions, or (iii) the transaction or transactions have no apparent economic or legal purpose, and (g) in any other case which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. …… (4) The enhanced customer due diligence measures taken by a relevant person for the purpose of paragraph (1)(f) must include— (a) as far as reasonably possible, examining the background and purpose of the transaction, and (b) increasing the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship in which the transaction is made to determine whether that transaction or that relationship appear to be suspicious. (5) Depending on the requirements of the case, the enhanced customer due diligence measures required under paragraph (1) may also include, among other things— (a) seeking additional independent, reliable sources to verify information provided or made available to the relevant person; (b) taking additional measures to understand better the background, ownership and financial situation of the customer, and other parties to the transaction; (c) taking further steps to be satisfied that the transaction is consistent with the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; (d) increasing the monitoring of the business relationship, including greater scrutiny of transactions. (6) When assessing whether there is a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in a particular situation, and the extent of the measures which should be taken to manage and mitigate that risk, relevant persons must take account of risk factors including, among other things—……”
“35.— Enhanced customer due diligence: politically exposed persons (1) A relevant person must have in place appropriate risk-management systems and procedures to determine whether a customer or the beneficial owner of a customer is— (a) a politically exposed person (a “PEP”); or (b) a family member or a known close associate of a PEP, and to manage the enhanced risks arising from the relevant person's business relationship or transactions with such a customer...” …… (3) If a relevant person has determined that a customer or a potential customer is a PEP, or a family member or known close associate of a PEP, the relevant person must assess— (a) the level of risk associated with that customer, and (b) the extent of the enhanced customer due diligence measures to be applied in relation to that customer. …… (4) In assessing the extent of the enhanced customer due diligence measures to be taken in relation to any particular person (which may differ from case to case), a relevant person— (a) must take account of any relevant information made available to the relevant person under regulations 17(9) and 47; and (b) may take into account any guidance which has been— (i) issued by the FCA; or (ii) issued by any other supervisory authority or appropriate body and approved by the Treasury. (5) A relevant person who proposes to have or to continue a business relationship with a PEP or a family member of a known close associate of a PEP must in addition to the measures required by regulation 33 (a) … (b) take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds which are involved…and (c) where the business relationship is entered into conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship with that person. ……. (12) In this regulation— (a) “politically exposed person” or “PEP” means an individual who is entrusted with prominent public functions, other than as a middle-ranking or more junior official; (b) “family member” of a politically exposed person includes— (i) a spouse or civil partner of the PEP; (ii) children of the PEP and the spouses or civil partners of the PEP's children; (iii) parents of the PEP; (c) “known close associate” of a PEP means— (i) an individual known to have joint beneficial ownership of a legal entity or a legal arrangement or any other close business relations with a PEP; (ii) an individual who has sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or a legal arrangement which is known to have been set up for the benefit of a PEP.”
“16.48 Amongst other steps Mr Said should have carried out the following Enhanced Due Diligence: • Taken steps to identify the ultimate client and beneficial owner. • Made further enquiries to establish the source of wealth of the ultimate client and beneficial owner and source of funds for the transaction. • Asked for documentary evidence to support the explanations he had as to the source of funds including documents relating to the sale of property in Iraq. • Obtained adequate explanations and supporting documentation as to the reasons for the structure of the transaction including the involvement of the Minister’s brother and a particular company involved. • Made further enquiries and obtained an explanation of and supporting documentation in relation to the involvement of a particular company involved. • Other than the Veriphy result for the Minister’s son dated13 October 2017 , conducted further enquiries to confirm the PEP status of the Minister and his brother.”
“It is not true that we have taken a different view to the SRA as to the seriousness of the breaches, in our view, there have not been any breaches… The SRA has not proved, to the requisite standard required, that there have been any breaches. It is not that we have taken a different view of the seriousness of the breaches, the view on the record is that there have been no breaches.”
“For the avoidance of doubt, the Respondent acknowledges – and has always acknowledged - that there were additional steps he could have taken in relation to due diligence. The Tribunal is however, reminded that due diligence measures are inherently a matter of professional judgment and there is no definition of “adequacy”
“1. The SRA relies upon the judgment of Knowles J. in SRA v Williams which was handed down on31/08/2023 , after the Tribunal’s decision, made on25/08/2023 , to refuse anonymisation. It asserts that Legal Professional Privilege is an absolute right. 2. Knowles J. based his judgment on dicta in three cases which predate theHuman Rights Act 1998 - Anderson v Bank of British Columbia(1876) 2 Ch D 644 , R v Derby Magistrates' Court ex parte B[1996] AC 487 and Balabel and another v Air India[1988] Ch 317 . 3. The dicta, set out below, of Lord Hobhouse in the seminal case of Medcalf v Mardell[2022] 3 WLR 172 does not appear to have been referred to him. 4. In Medcalf v Mardell Lord Hobhouse observed, at paragraph 60, “It may be that, as in the context of Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the privilege may not always be absolute and a balancing exercise may sometimes be necessary. (Campbell v UK (13590/88) 15 EHRR 137 and Foxley v UK (33274/96) 31 EHRR 25). 5. At paragraph 23-04 of Phipson on Evidence it is stated “Articles 6 and 8 thus both protect confidential communications between lawyers and clients but privilege is not to be regarded under the HRA as an absolute right. Thus, in Niemietz v Germany 30 [1992 16 EHRR 97] the ECtHR held that a search of a lawyer’s office was a breach of art.8 rights but took into account all the circumstances and in particular the broad terms of the warrant and lack of procedural safeguards, holding that the search impinged on professional confidence to an extent that was in the circumstances disproportionate. The court has recognised that in appropriate cases interference with privileged communications may be justified. In General Mediterranean Holdings v Patel[1999] EWHC 832 Toulson J held that the then current version ofCPR r.48.7 (3) was ultra vires because there was no express statutory authority to override the fundamental right of legal professional privilege. The case related to the CPR power to override privilege in wasted costs matters. His conclusion as a matter of English domestic law (the decision in fact predated the coming onto force of the HRA) was unexceptionable and those drafting the CPR withdrew the rule shortly thereafter.” 6. It is unclear whether Knowles J. had his attention drawn to the duty of the Tribunal under theHuman Rights Act 1998 . It is notable that his judgment is devoid of any mention of theHuman Rights Act 1998 or the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 7. The Tribunal has a duty undersection 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to act in a way which is compatible with a Convention right. Convention rights include Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 8. The Tribunal weighed in the balance the rights of all those who might be affected by an anonymisation order, including the press and the public, in the context of Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention. 9. In the circumstances of this case, it considered that the rights of the press and public in relation to Article 10 prevailed. 10. The facts of this case differ from those in Williams. This case concerns issues of considerable national and international interest. 11. It would be difficult for members of the public and the press to follow the judgment, if anonymisation were to be ordered to the extent requested by the SRA. 12. Moreover, it is unclear whether the “jigsaw puzzle” argument advanced by the SRA in this case (but not in Williams) justifies the extension of the principle of legal professional privilege to the naming of the nation state in question. 13. It is also notable that Knowles J. only had the benefit of hearing arguments from one side - the SRA. The other parties did not appear at the hearing and made no submissions. 14. Whilst it is correct that AB/X v Ministry of Justice:[2023] EWHC 1920 (KB) does not refer expressly to Legal Professional Privilege, it is authority for the view that only in the most exceptional circumstances should there be a departure from the principle of open justice. That judgment is contemporaneous with Williams and, no doubt, for that reason, was not before Knowles J. 15. There is no evidence that the clients in question in this case have asserted legal professional privilege and it is unclear whether this has been asserted only by the SRA. The SRA has stated only that they have consulted the Respondent. There is no mention of any consultation with the clients. 16. Finally, the SRA is incorrect in stating “there were no members of the public or press at the hearing and, therefore, anonymity and LPP was effectively preserved.”
“What’s in a name? ‘A lot’, the press would answer”
“What’s in a name? ‘A lot’, the press would answer.”