“ …. there came a time – precise date and time which may well not matter – when CJ met MV personally at Nottingham railway station. RN [MV’s sister] had set the meeting up on his behalf but what matters is that it took place and what was said between them not exactly when which of course MV did not note or keep records about …. When they met CJ told MV that he would pay her£15K not to go to court and to disappear….”
“…In interview, Rachel Nally [MV’s sister] states she travelled back from Skegness on Thursday 1st June and can remember meeting people in a Coventry club that night. Her cell site has yet to be received so her movements cannot be corroborated at this time other than by John POWER. However the movements of JONES on the two days in question are known and he could not have met with Maria on Thurs 1st June. There is a window on Friday 2nd between 1424hrs and 1801hrs when he could have travelled to Nottingham, but he could not have left Coventry until 1424hrs and Maria says the meeting had taken place and she had travelled back to Burton by 3-4pm, having been in Nottingham for an hour to an hour and a half. Most crucially, at no time during those two days does Maria Vervoort’s phone cell-site in Nottingham, During the available window on the Friday she continues to cell-site in Derby/Burton area. During the build up to the first meeting 29/05.06, there is phone traffic between Rachel and Vervoort and similar traffic before the two meet on Sat 3rd June. There is no contact at all for Friday 2nd June, unusual if they were meeting. Conrad Jones has vehemently maintained he has not been to Nottingham and has demanded CCTV be scrutinised to verify his claim. Unfortunately due to Vervoort’s initial confusion over dates the CCTV for the wrong dates was seized. There are some other factors of her evidence about the second meeting which I will not bother with here but which would be of interest if picked up by the defence. In conclusion, there is nothing to corroborate the second meeting and plenty to cast doubt on it. Vervoort could be mistaken about the date and/or place, but despite having been asked about it again she maintains the allegation. She may have met Conrad during the first meeting but if that is so why doesn’t she say that? It is difficult to question her about it again without appearing to be disbelieving of her. I would like my concerns to be passed to Counsel so that they are fully aware of the strength or otherwise of the case.”
“As far as the meeting at Nottingham railway is concerned, the Crown accepts that Conrad Jones did not go to Nottingham on1 June 2006 . On2 June 2006 , Conrad Jones is known to have been in Coventry until 14:25 when he was driving a blue BMW. He is known to have been in Coventry at 18:00 when he was driving a blue BMW. His whereabouts between those times is not known.”
“… We do not accept that this was a peripheral issue in the context of the case against the appellant. On the contrary, it was central both to the witness’s credibility on the issue of intimidation by the appellant and to the particulars of activity by the appellant on which the prosecution relied against him….”
“Charge 2 Statement of Offence Professional misconduct contrary to paragraph 301(a)(ii) and pursuant to paragraph 901.7 of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (8th edition) (“the Code of Conduct”). Particulars of Offence Timothy Raggatt QC, a barrister, engaged in conduct which was prejudicial to the administration of justice in that Mr Raggatt, when instructed as leading prosecution counsel in the prosecution of Mr Conrad Jones: i. decided (together with others in the prosecution team); and/or ii. advised the Crown Prosecution Service, both prior to and during Mr Jones’ trial in August 2007 not to make: a. a PII (Public Interest Immunity) application in relation to surveillance material relating to events and Mr Jones’ location on 1 and2 June 2006 ; and/or b. an admission in relation to that surveillance material to the effect of that eventually made by the prosecution on27 June 2013 .”
“Charge 5 Statement of Offence Professional misconduct contrary to paragraph 302 and pursuant to paragraph 901.7 of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (8th edition) (“the Code of Conduct”). Particulars of Offence Timothy Raggatt QC, a barrister, failed to assist the Court in the administration of justice in that Mr Raggatt (on behalf of the prosecution): i. stated to the Court at the trial of Mr Conrad Jones in August 2007 that a meeting could have taken place in Nottingham between Mr Jones and Ms Maria Vervoot on2 June 2006 between 1.30pm and 3pm; and/or ii. refused to concede that such a meeting could not have taken place at that time. In fact, Mr Raggatt knew, or ought to have known, the prosecution had in its possession surveillance material which showed Mr Jones was in Coventry on2 June 2006 until 2.25pm and therefore, given it is approximately 53 miles between Nottingham and Coventry, the meeting could not have taken place in Nottingham on2 June 2006 between 1.30pm and 3pm.”
“… the concerns I had raised appear to have been considered in some depth over those three conferences. … Having refreshed my memory from these partial notes, [of the conferences] I recall Mr Raggatt advising that the material did not need to be disclosed, or a PII application made, at that stage because at that time the prosecution case did not rest on the meeting having taken place at a particular time, and there was time for Jones to have got to Nottingham and back between the surveillance sightings. He advised that the position should be reviewed if MV gave a particular time for the meeting in her evidence at trial…. I see that the concerns I raised [in the email of21 September 2006 ] were considered in conference after my email was sent. Although Mr Raggatt took a different view to me over whether the surveillance material might undermine the prosecution or assist the defence, clearly the issue was addressed and I do not recall Angela Trotter or any of the other lawyers present disagreeing with Mr Raggatt’s advice that the issue should be kept under review.”
“19. Having read all of these entries I recall that we discussed the surveillance material. I was concerned because some of this material supported the prosecution case and cast doubt on alibis that had been put forward by the defendants, I can't recall if this was specific to Jones or the other Mallard suspects. We also discussed the timings of Jones movements (as shown by the surveillance material) against Vervoot's account and whether the surveillance material could undermine or assist. Mr. Raggatt's view was that the way the indictment and prosecution case was to be put, Conrad Jones has been leading events aimed at disrupting the investigation and prosecution of murder; this has not required him to be at any specific location to prove the offence, but the situation would be kept under review. 20. I think that it was during this conference that we also discussed the question of whether to make a PII application with regards to the surveillance material; however as the view was that the surveillance material was not being relied upon by the prosecution as evidence and did not undermine the prosecution or assist the defence then a PII application was not necessary at that time, but the situation should be kept under review. 21. I can also state that my recollection is that all present including John Davies and Angela Trotter from CPS and Sally Hancox were satisfied with the advice that was being provided by Mr Raggatt and to my knowledge they did not raise any objections or concerns. John Davies as the lead CPS lawyer is a very experienced and capable lawyer in my view, fair and thoughtful, based on my previous dealings with him on various serious cases. Like me he is not someone who would sit in awe of a QC and not raise concerns if he disagreed with the advice being given. He was very much a leader in the prosecution team and if he had had any reservations about the advice I have absolutely no doubt that he would have voiced them, as would I.”
“Duty to disclose The Prosecutor’s initial duty to disclose is set out in theCriminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, section 3 . The prosecutor must - disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused. For the purposes of this section prosecution material is material - which is in the prosecutor's possession and came into his possession in connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused. Material must not be disclosed under this section to the extent that the court, on an application by the prosecutor, concludes it is not in the public interest to disclose it and orders accordingly. The Prosecutor’s Continuing Duty to Disclose is set out in theCriminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, section 7A . It provides as follows: After the prosecutor has complied with section 3 or purported to comply with it, and before the accused is acquitted or convicted or the prosecutor decides not to proceed with the case concerned. The prosecutor must keep under review the question whether at any given time (and, in particular, following the giving of a defence statement) there is prosecution material which - might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, which has not been disclosed to the accused. If at any time, there is any such material the prosecutor must disclose it to the accused as soon as is reasonably practicable. For the purposes of this section prosecution material is material - which is in the prosecutor's possession and came into his possession in connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused. Material must not be disclosed under this section to the extent that the court, on an application by the prosecutor, concludes it is not in the public interest to disclose it and orders accordingly.”
“With the benefit of hindsight no one can doubt that DS Ashton was absolutely right to raise the matter in the way he did. It also seems very clear that if the surveillance material did preclude the meeting having taken place on the1 June 2006 and provided only a very narrow window on the 2 June, that material should have been disclosed because it both undermined the prosecution case and assisted the defence case. Having regard to the sensitive nature of the surveillance material, Mr Raggatt should have advised the prosecution to proceed with a PII application and it seems likely that if he had done so at that application the Judge might well have ordered an admission to be made in relation to the surveillance material to the effect of that eventually made by the prosecution on the27 June 2013 . We bear in mind of course the witness statements of DS Ashton are hearsay evidence. However, these statements are accompanied by a contemporaneous email which is, without doubt, highly significant.”
“Mr Raggatt QC has clearly made a decision not to make the PII application at this time. His duty was to either disclose the material or to make a PII application as soon as reasonably practicable. There was of course a possibility of a review in the future of the surveillance material but that does not preclude a decision as to how to proceed at that time. We are satisfied so that we are sure that this issue was not simply forgotten thereafter – during those lengthy proceedings – and then in the Court of Appeal. Mr Raggatt QC did not advise that the surveillance material should be disclosed, nor did he make a PII application. That non-disclosure may never have come to light but for the developments that took place after Conrad Jones’ release from custody.”
“…I was and am still always mindful of my duty to the defence and to the Court. I believe the partial notes which have been produced show that I gave very careful consideration to this issue over a number of conferences, and that the issue was more complex than summarised in the email of21 September 2006 from DS Neil Ashton upon the which the BSB relies and indeed those matters develop significantly from that date, with some material disclosed and other material obtained or clarified by the police and considered further. Clearly the picture developed, not only because it was discussed with other police officers in conference but because the surveillance material was reviewed and revised by the police as part of its presentation to me, with the police expressing their view in conference. It seems clear from these partial notes that I must have considered that the issue of a possible PII application in respect of this material should be kept under review, in the light of any evidence that MV might ultimately give at Jones’s trial. I have no recollection of how or the extent to which that position was kept under review and I have no recollection of any PII application or hearing(s) which followed. My solicitors have actively sought evidence and disclosure on this topic, and I do not understand why the BSB has not. Although the picture is incomplete and my memory far from clear, I think the material shown to me at that time did not appear, in my professional judgment, materially to undermine the prosecution case to the degree necessary to render it disclosable in all the circumstances. MV’s witness statements were not precise as to all potentially relevant times and dates. The police had tried to get her to be specific, naturally and perhaps because they wanted to look for CCTV evidence of the alleged meeting, but she appeared to be unable to ascribe a definite time or date. … The covert material appeared to allow time in the afternoon of2 June 2006 for Jones to have got from his home in Coventry to Nottingham and back (in whomsoever’s car), between 2.24pm and 6.01pm – 3½ hours). I believe this is reflected in the notes of what police said at the two December 2006 conferences: “There is still a gap on the Friday afternoon”, “Don’t think it undermines our case” and “could be anywhere”….”
“Respondent’s Evidence We have carefully considered the response of the Respondent to each of the points. He accepted that he was familiar with the obligations to disclose, and that counsel has to ensure that the prosecution comply with that duty. The Respondent accepted that disclosure or the PII application must be made as soon as reasonably practicable. The Respondent accepted now that the surveillance material was almost certainly disclosable. He accepted that, looking back, the material should have been disclosed. The passage in the CA judgment was put to him, namely: “He (Mr Raggatt QC) took the view that since the witness was imprecise in her recollection of the date and time of the meeting between herself, Rachel Nally and the appellant [Conrad Jones] the surveillance material was not relevant”
“... the fact that Conrad Jones was under surveillance at the time of his original trial was known to the Prosecution team but, in the light of MVs evidence and her fluidity in terms of timings, it was the considered view of all concerned that this material did not ultimately assist the defence or undermine the prosecution case so as to allow for its disclosure. That is a decision that was entirely appropriately taken in the circumstances and given the fact that he was under surveillance in circumstances which were clearly not disclosable in any event, the overall picture was such that a public interest immunity hearing was neither necessary nor justified by the material available which was, it is submitted obviously, not sufficiently powerful to warrant its disclosure”
“I don’t think I ever got to a final position. The decision was ‘for the time being’ because of various competing factors. The most important was the timing of that disclosure because of the sensitive circumstances in which the disclosure had to be managed. The circumstances were sensitive because of the ongoing operation which was highly sensitive. The decision to postpone a decision may have been influenced by the ongoing operation. I was given the impression that lives could be endangered if a wrong step was taken which affected the ongoing operation. That is the impression I now have based on the material we now have, which is obviously incomplete. He later added that this was a “reconstruction and speculation at best”
“A premature application would be folly because there may not have been a complete picture. It may impact on all sorts of things, of which the ongoing operation is only one”
“... the fact that Conrad Jones was under surveillance at the time of his original trial was known to the Prosecution team but, in the light of MVs evidence and her fluidity in terms of timings, it was the considered view of all concerned that this material did not ultimately assist the defence or undermine the prosecution case so as to allow for its disclosure. That is a decision that was entirely appropriately taken in the circumstances and given the fact that he was under surveillance in circumstances which were clearly not disclosable in any event, the overall picture was such that a public interest immunity hearing was neither necessary nor justified by the material available which was, it is submitted obviously, not sufficiently powerful to warrant its disclosure”. “I don’t think I ever got to a final position. The decision was ‘for the time being’ because of various competing factors. The most important was the timing of that disclosure because of the sensitive circumstances in which the disclosure had to be managed. The circumstances were sensitive because of the ongoing operation which was highly sensitive. The decision to postpone a decision may have been influenced by the ongoing operation. I was given the impression that lives could be endangered if a wrong step was taken which affected the ongoing operation. That is the impression I now have based on the material we now have, which is obviously incomplete. He later added that this was a “reconstruction and speculation at best”
“Charge 2 We have concluded that charge 2 is proved. From the entire course of conduct of Mr Raggatt QC, which includes justifications for non-disclosure and failure to disclose or make a PII application throughout, we conclude that Mr Raggatt QC decided not to make a PII application in relation to the surveillance material relating to events and Conrad Jones’s location on the 1 and2 June 2006 . There is no other conclusion that we could arrive at which is consistent with this long course of conduct. It follows that we are sure, consistent with the burden and standard of proof required inrelation to charge 2 which is subject to the criminal burden and standard that charge 2 is proved, not only in respect of the advice given but also the decision which we are sure he made. … Charge 5 We have found Charge 5 proved to the criminal burden and standard on the basis that Mr Raggatt QC ought to have had the surveillance evidence in mind because he clearly had a duty to review the decision not to disclose the surveillance material and not to make a PII application in respect of it. Mr Raggatt QC had also indicated that he would review his decision. … Mr Raggatt QC therefore refused to concede that there was not sufficient time for the telephone 991 to travel from Nottingham between the two telephone calls at 1:30pm and just after 3pm respectively. He also refused to concede that the meeting could not have taken place between those times in Nottingham. We have taken into account the evidence that Mr Raggatt QC has given about that, and we accept that at that time he would not have been thinking about the surveillance material. However, we have come to the conclusion so that we are sure of it that at that time he ought to have known of the fact the prosecution had in its possession surveillance material which showed that Conrad Jones was in Coventry on 2 June until 2:25pm, and therefore given that it is approximately 53 miles between Nottingham and Coventry, the meeting could not have taken place in Nottingham on 2 June between 1:30pm and 3pm.”
“Much of the delay relates to the extent of [the appellant’s] requests for disclosure/evidence, over the extent of the waiver of privilege sought and granted. Overall in the extensive correspondence, there seems little focus, in particular from [the appellant’s] solicitors, on the actual primary and narrow issue of [the appellant’s] state of knowledge of the existence of the surveillance material… Whilst there are in fact points to be made about the speed (or otherwise) of the BSB investigation, in my judgement having regard to the correspondence it seems that much of the delay is as a result of the unreasonably wide range of the material being sought by [the appellant’s] solicitors and the consequential unreasonably wide ‘general waiver’ requested of the CPS and [the police] on what is inevitably a sensitive area of materials.”
“TR [the appellant] – will review after her evidence. …. No need for PII at this time. Review after evidence in chief…”
“Nevertheless, we are quite clear that the interventions, taken together, were far more than they should have been. In the system of trial which we have evolved in this country, the judge sits to hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society at large, as happens, we believe, in some foreign countries. Even in England, however, a judge is not a mere umpire to answer the question ‘How’s that?’ His object, above all, is to find out the truth, and to do justice according to law; and in the daily pursuit of it the advocate plays an honourable and necessary role. Was it not Lord Eldon L.C. who said in a notable passage that ‘truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question’?: see Ex parte Lloyd (1822) Mont 70, 72n. And Lord Greene M.R. who explained that justice is best done by a judge who holds the balance between the contending parties without himself taking part in their disputations? If a judge, said Lord Greene, should himself conduct the examination of witnesses, ‘he, so to speak, descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of conflict’: see Yuill v Yuill [1945] P. 15, 20; 61 T.L.R. 176; [1945] 1 All E.R. 183.”
“[t]he greater the frequency of the interventions, the greater the risk; and where the interventions take the form of lengthy interrogation of the witnesses, the risk becomes a serious one.”
“THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Forgive me, Mr. Campbell, if this is a point you were coming to… MR CAMPBELL: Please carry on. THE CHAIRMAN: The point is that [Counsel for Mr. Jones] was clearly competent and able, has got so far by using the phone evidence and, of course, the witness then says, ‘I did not have the phone on the day’ but he can still establish the gaps…He has got so far. If he had available to him surveillance evidence that shows that Mr. Jones was still in Coventry at 2.24, an hour's drive would take him to 3.24, with a witness who was saying she was back in Burton between three and four, is it not inconceivable that he would not have used it? MR RAGGATT: It is very likely that he would, yes, I agree. I do not quarrel with that at all. In my supplemental statement I hope I made clear that I do not quarrel with that at all. THE CHAIRMAN: The trial would have looked very different because it would have featured in the summing-up, inevitably? MR RAGGATT: Yes. If it had all been disclosed it would also, I think, have led to cross-examination of Conrad Jones about a false alibi and that might have been disastrous for Conrad Jones if we are in the business of speculating. That is speculation. I do not quarrel with the fundamental proposition that you have asked. But, of course, July 2007 was quite a long time after the events of late 2006, as I am sure -- as is obvious. THE CHAIRMAN: The point that is really troubling me, because I am concerned about it and it is something that the Panel will have to consider carefully and conscientiously, is that the history of the case points to the inevitable conclusion that this disclosure was not made? MR RAGGATT: I do not believe that I have quarrelled with that. Indeed I think I have said it in terms in my supplemental witness statement, that that is a conclusion which you might well come to. If you do, well, that is a matter, of course, for the Panel. I am simply saying that in 2022 my memory is such that it is non-existent. But, yes, of course, I do not know one way or the other and I do not want to engage in a form of guesswork. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it is not something that you would be expected to remember now. Of course, I understand that. However, I refer to the history of the matters, in other words the history as it builds up, including the Court of Appeal, what happened there, what happens in cross-examination, what happens in summing-up. It is just, ‘inconceivable’ is the word that this disclosure was made because short of everyone involved being (indistinct), which does not appear to have been the case, these matters would have loomed large, would have been referred to again and again? MR RAGGATT: All I think I have ever said is that the decision in 2006 was a sustainable decision. By the time of the third trial matters should have been disclosed. I can see that one might have come to a very different view. But on the basis there was no disclosure made, what I assert, I hope as powerfully as I can, is that that was an innocent error. It was not in any way malign or deliberate or any such thing. If that happened then it was a mistake…”
“THE CHAIRMAN: Can I interrupt, forgive me again. I want to hear these matters because it may help our discussions later on. MR RAGGATT: Yes, of course. THE CHAIRMAN: Malign and so on are not the words I would use. Say there is a conflict of interest and let me put one possibility to you, here is a witness who is a very significant witness also in as murder case (indistinct) MR RAGGATT: The murder case was over ---- THE CHAIRMAN: Maybe it was but it is still due to go to the Court of Appeal and so on and ---- MR RAGGATT: (Indistinct) her evidence in the murder case, such as I remember it, did not relate to Conrad Jones and was supported, as I remember, it is a long, long time ago, by a cell site and phone messages that confirmed the things she said. THE CHAIRMAN: However, when her credibility was later called into question some convictions were quashed? MR RAGGATT: I did not conduct that appeal. THE CHAIRMAN: No, I am not saying you did. What I am saying is in the position that you were, that you are relying on this witness in another case as well, would it not have been simpler to take it all to the judge and say, ‘There you are judge, you are not saddled with my potential conflict (indistinct) worries maybe about the witness, may be about the other operations, events, operation, which was ongoing and was sensitive and where there may have been people at risk, there you are judge you are not saddled with all of that, you decide, you tell me’. Why not do that? MR RAGGATT: I wish we had. I wish we had. It got lost somehow, I do not know how or why. That is why I hope with frankness and I hope with integrity I acknowledge that a mistake has occurred. But with respect, there is all the difference in the world between acknowledging that a mistake has occurred and attributing to me some sort of oblique reasoning or approach. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, oblique, malign, all those words we can put on one side?”
“THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, you are misunderstanding what I am doing. What I am doing, I feel, is fairer because if it is something that we might raise amongst ourselves or that I might raise with my colleagues in due course, however the case is put, it is fairer for me to get Mr. Raggatt's reaction to it now by way of a question than not to. I can (indistinct) not applicable, but it is fairer to put it to him and not least because also you will bear in mind that if, in due course, there is a result one way or the other and reasons are given, it is much fairer to have put a process of reason to a respondent than not have done so. In fact I take the view that I am almost duty-bound to make sure that various potential criticisms are put, whether by Mr. Campbell on behalf of the BSB or on behalf of the Panel by me. It is much fairer and probably the duty to do so rather than sit tight, wait for the final decision to be made and then express opinions which were never put and then you would complain about that.”
“But Mr McPherson - I am sorry to interrupt you - this is a case where in some ways it is blindingly obvious. If you are accusing someone of being in a particular place at a particular time and you know that you have material which shows that he was not there, that he was elsewhere - particularly if it is an alibi case - it is blindingly obvious.”
“THE CHAIRMAN: If you stood up in court and made an allegation and knew at the time that that allegation could not be right, then presumably you have decided to do that. MR McPHERSON: No, that is not what charged. I am seriously troubled at this stage that you are not having regard to the charges and appear to be forming in your own mind that this is a tribunal--- THE CHAIRMAN: I will in due course of course apply my mind strictly to the charges. But what I am challenging you on is the principles of plain ordinary justice. And the reason why I am challenging you about that is that Charge 2 - which the BSB say is the main charge - is about prejudicing the administration of justice. MR McPHERSON: We will come to the law on that. THE CHAIRMAN: The role of a prosecution counsel is to be a minister of justice. If something is unjust and unfair, then you ought to know it in your bones if you are an advocate in criminal courts prosecuting. But you take a more precise literal approach to the words, and I appreciate that is what you are here to do. MR McPHERSON: Can I say, I do not take a precise literal approach, I take the legal approach. And this case is not about what is right in someone’s bones. This case is about whether or not the BSB has proved what is charged. And the charge that--- THE CHAIRMAN: Is it about fairness and justice? Or not about that at all? MR McPHERSON: So fairness and justice for Mr Raggatt, absolutely. THE CHAIRMAN: No. Fairness and justice for Mr Jones. MR McPHERSON: No, it is not. THE CHAIRMAN: It is not? MR McPHERSON: That was the court of -- oh, my Lord. Sir, please do not write down that as an answer. THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I am. You have just said it is not about fairness and justice to Mr Jones. I am writing that down. MR McPHERSON: This case is not about finding Mr Raggatt guilty just because Mr Jones had an unfair trial…”
“THE CHAIRMAN: You do not actually need to be talking in terms of professional misconduct if it is unfair and unjust to allege against someone that he was in a particular place and you know that he was not. You would not do it. MR McPHERSON: No, no, no. Sir, I think you and I are at cross-purposes. You appear to have formed the view that the test [for professional misconduct] is irrelevant because Mr Raggatt knew that someone was at a particular time when he could not have been. THE CHAIRMAN: I would not put it like that. It seems to me the test would be obvious to anyone who knows what justice means and knows what being a minister of justice means. MR McPHERSON: Okay. Well, I--- THE CHAIRMAN: And it means that you do not accuse a person of being in place A if you know that he is in place B. MR McPHERSON: Well, that is not what this case is about. This case is about whether or not Mr Raggatt’s views on disclosure at a particular point in time were or were not worthy of a finding of breach of professional misconduct. THE CHAIRMAN: This case is about the administration of justice. This case is about -- he is charged with doing an act which prejudiced the administration of justice. MR McPHERSON: He is. THE CHAIRMAN: And if what he did was unjust and unfair, that is Charge 2. MR McPHERSON: No, it is not. We will come back to that. But the reason it is not, in a nutshell, is because you are not looking at what Mr Raggatt did.”
“There was of course a possibility of a review in the future of the surveillance material but that does not preclude a decision as to how to proceed at that time.”
“(i) decided … and/or (ii) advised the Crown Prosecution Service both prior to and during Mr Jones’ trial in August 2007 not to make: a PII … application … and/or an admission in relation to the surveillance material ….” both prior to and during Mr Jones’ trial in August 2007 not to make: a PII … application … and/or an admission in relation to the surveillance material ….”
“A barrister…must not: (a) engage in conduct whether in pursuit of his profession or otherwise which is: (i) dishonest or otherwise discreditable to a barrister; (ii) prejudicial to the administration of justice; or (iii) likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute.”
“Not time, on any showing, I suggest, for your phone, if it was in your possession, to have gone to Nottingham, had a fifteen to twenty minute meeting and returned, assuming that you got the train immediately going to and coming back from Nottingham.”
“In fairness to the witness, it ought to be sorted out, and perhaps I could mention a matter briefly to you as well. ”
“A moment or two ago my learned friend put a proposition to the witness in relation to [the phone with number ending] 991 that the witness might be thought to acknowledge. Even if she is actually acknowledging it because she understands it fully, which I beg to doubt, the fact is we don’t accept that it’s a valid proposition. The proposition concerns the following: a gap in time on 2nd June between just after half-past-one and just after three o’clock when 991 neither makes nor receives any call or message of any description. The proposition was that there wasn’t time then for 991 to travel to or from Nottingham. I don’t accept that that’s a valid proposition for a number of reasons. There’s absolutely no evidence about what the train times were on that given day, that I am aware of, and I think no means of checking it. Secondly, the cell site material in relation to the particular cell itself gives no indication of its coverage and the extent of its coverage, or where within the coverage radius that might have been, even if it was. And that is of course on the assumption that the phone was in the exclusive possession of Miss Vervoort that day, but that’s another matter altogether. I don’t want the witness to be thought to be acknowledging something which I would respectfully submit is frankly based upon highly doubtful supposition, and I think that ought to be made clear to her at some point.”
“JUDGE ORME: Your case is that there was no second meeting full stop? MR. BENSON: Absolutely.”
“A suspension is a public protection sanction that should only be imposed where there is ongoing risk to the public, which includes clients and/or professional colleagues…”
“2.2 The purposes of applying sanctions for professional misconduct are to: i. Protect the public and consumers of legal services. ii. Maintain public confidence and trust in the profession and the enforcement system. iii. Maintain and promote high standards of behaviour and performance at the Bar, and iv. Act as a deterrent to the individual barrister or regulated entity, as well as the wider profession, from engaging in the misconduct subject to sanction. 2.3 The purposes above are non-hierarchical and any or all may apply in a particular case. Sanctions under a regulatory enforcement regime should not be imposed to punish. It may be that the impact of a sanction will have a punitive effect, but panels must ensure that any sanctions are only imposed to meet the purposes listed above.”
“1.4 It must be stressed the Guidance is just that, it is not intended to fetter panels’ discretion to impose sanctions that are appropriate and proportionate in the individual circumstances of a case. Panels must exercise their own judgement when deciding on the sanctions to impose and give reasons in all cases for doing so.”
“i. Determine the appropriate applicable Misconduct Group for the proved misconduct as set out in Part 2. ii. Determine the seriousness of the misconduct by reference to culpability and harm factors. iii. Determine the indicative sanction level for the proved misconduct. iv. Apply aggravating and mitigating factors. v. Consider the totality principle and determine the final sanction(s); and vi. Provide written reasons for the sanctioning decision.”
“1.5 It should also be stressed that the factors to be considered when determining the appropriate sanctions in relation to culpability and harm and aggravating and mitigating factors (see Part 3, Annex 2), are not exhaustive. It would be impossible to list all factors that might be relevant in any individual case. Therefore, the absence of reference to a particular factor in this Guidance should not be taken as an indication that it cannot, or should not, be taken into account. Panels should use their judgement, and record in the written reasons all factors that have been considered when reaching the decision on sanction.”