“were not duly impartial on a matter of major political controversy and a major matter relating to current public policy, in breach of Rules 5.1, 5.11 and 5.12 of the Broadcasting Code.”
“Rule 5.1. News, in whatever form, must be reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality … Rule 5.11. In addition to the rules above, due impartiality must be preserved on matters of major political and industrial controversy and major matters relating to current public policy by the person providing a service … in each programme or in clearly linked and timely programmes. Rule 5.12 In dealing in matters of major political or industrial controversy and major matters relating to current public policy an appropriately wide range of significant views must be included and given due weight in each programme or in clearly linked and timely programmes …”
“1.11. Ofcom will consider all the circumstances of the case in the round in order to determine the appropriate and proportionate amount of any penalty. The central objective of imposing a penalty is deterrence. The amount of any penalty must be sufficient to ensure that it will act as an effective incentive to compliance, having regard to the seriousness of the infringement. Ofcom will have regard to the size and turnover of the regulated body when considering the deterrent effect of any penalty. 1.12. The factors taken into account in each case will vary, depending on what is relevant. Some examples of potentially relevant factors are: • The seriousness and duration of the contravention; • The degree of harm, whether actual or potential, caused by the contravention, including any increased cost incurred by consumers or other market participants; • Any gain (financial or otherwise) made by the regulated body in breach (or any connected body) as a result of the contravention; • Whether in all the circumstances appropriate steps had been taken by the regulated body to prevent the contravention; • The extent to which the contravention occurred deliberately or recklessly, including the extent to which senior management knew, or ought to have known, that a contravention was occurring or would occur; • Whether the contravention in question continued, or timely and effective steps were taken to end it, once the regulated body became aware of it; • Any steps taken for remedying the consequences of the contravention; • Whether the regulated body in breach has a history of contraventions (repeated contraventions may lead to significantly increased penalties); and • The extent to which the regulated body in breach has cooperated with our investigation. 1.13. When considering the degree of harm caused by the contravention and/or any gain made by the regulated body as a result of the contravention Ofcom may seek to quantify those amounts in appropriate cases but will not necessarily do so in all cases. 1.14. Ofcom will have regard to any relevant precedents set by previous cases, but may depart from them depending on the facts and the context of each case. We will not, however, regard the amounts of previously imposed penalties as placing upper thresholds on the amount of any penalty. 1.15. Ofcom will have regard to any representations made to us by the regulated body in breach. 1.16. Ofcom will ensure that the overall amount of the penalty is appropriate and proportionate to the contravention in respect of which it is imposed, taking into account the size and turnover of the regulated body. 1.17. Ofcom will ensure that the overall amount does not exceed the maximum penalty for the particular type of contravention. 1.18. Ofcom will have regard to the need for transparency in applying these guidelines, particularly as regards the weighting of the factors considered.”
“All businesses should operate in compliance with the law, taking into account any relevant guidelines where appropriate. As such, the central objective of imposing a penalty is deterrence. The level of the penalty must be sufficient to deter the business from contravening regulatory requirements, and to deter the wider industry from doing so.”
“For the reasons set out in these and our previous written representations, CGTN submits that it is wholly unnecessary for OFCOM to impose any statutory sanctions in this matter. This is particularly due to the facts that: 1. CGTN provides a transparently Chinese perspective, a view that often differs from, and provides an important alternative to the dominant mainstream Western media. This factor was particularly important in CGTN’s coverage of the violent protests in Hong Kong SAR where most of the western media focused overwhelmingly on the voices and claims of the protestors, to the exclusion of virtually all other views; 2. No harm was caused to the audience by these five programmes, not least because OFCOM commenced these investigations as a result of its own monitoring and OFCOM has not produced any evidence of harm to the audience; 3. CGTN faced exceptional practical challenges in covering this major, fast-moving story. 4. CGTN’s compliance procedures are adequate and significantly, OFCOM has not found that CGTN’s actions were deliberate or reckless; 5. CGTN has been broadcasting in the UK since 2003 with an almost clean record and currently no sanctions have been imposed against it (unlike other broadcasters); and 6. The precedent cases on which OFCOM relies are clearly distinguishable from the different facts and circumstances in CGTN’s case.”
“62. Secondly, in my judgment, the fact that there is a dominant media narrative that is different from the views expressed in RT's Programmes does not, by itself, override the special impartiality requirements that apply to programmes dealing with matters of political controversy and current public policy. Whilst it is true that Ofcom's Breach Decisions did not analyse the harm that might be caused to viewers by the failure to present opposing views, it did analyse in great detail how the issues were treated in each of the Programmes. As regulator, it was Ofcom's job to undertake that exercise and to evaluate whether action was needed in the interests of democratic society to protect the rights of others in the light of the degree of partiality in each Programme. The courts should give weight to Ofcom's assessment and only second guess its expertise where it has obviously gone wrong (compare Gaunt v United Kingdom(2016) 63 EHRR SE15 , para 61). Moreover, the analysis is not limited to the harm caused to viewers but extends to the harm indirectly caused to members of society generally by the provision of broadcast news and current affairs that lacks due impartiality.”
“… breaches of the due impartiality rules have the potential to cause harm to the specific audience of the broadcasts, and more generally, if programming of this nature was permitted on licensed radio and televised services, then at a wider societal level the balance of informed public debate and discussion on important matters of public concern is liable to become distorted. As also explained at paragraph 51 above, this could have damaging consequences for the democratic and societal objectives which the due impartiality regime is designed to promote, as well as the credibility of broadcast media as a trustworthy source of information on matters of public concern. Further, in order to impose a sanction in this case, OFCOM is not required to establish that actual harm had been caused to any particular viewers, rather it is important to determine whether there had been a potential for harm as a consequence of the breach. For the reasons already stated, it is our view that there was such a potential for harm.”
“Further, OFCOM considers that multiple breaches of due impartiality rules, which occur during a concentrated period of time, potentially aggravate the detriment to viewers. They have the effect of undermining public confidence in the impartiality of, and therefore trust in, broadcast news and current affairs, which the rules in Section Five of the Code are intended to safeguard.”
“… we considered that the Licensee’s compliance procedures had been inadequate to prevent multiple breaches of the due impartiality requirements in the Code within this relatively short period of time between 11 August and21 November 2019 . We considered this represented a serious and repeated failure on the part of the Licensee during this period to ensure due impartiality was preserved in relation to the matters of major political controversy and major matters of current public policy dealt with in the programmes. Although we have no evidence that the breaches were deliberate or reckless, such a serious failure in compliance ought to have been prevented by the Licensee’s compliance procedures and we were concerned about how such a failure has occurred. Given the Licensee’s compliance history … we were particularly concerned that these five breaches represented another compliance failure relating to the same subject matter and same due impartiality requirements of the Code.”
“… this sanction is appropriate and proportionate in the circumstance of this case and should send a clear message of deterrence, both to the Licensee and also to other broadcasters, against any future breaches of a similar nature.”
“If£125,000 was the proportionate level of penalty when it was designed to deter both [Star China] and the wider broadcasting community, it cannot still be necessary and proportionate for precisely the same financial penalty to be set when the first of these two deterrents objectives has fallen away.”
“71. An assessment of proportionality inevitably involves a value judgment at the stage at which a balance has to be struck between the importance of the objective pursued and the value of the right intruded upon. The principle does not however entitle the courts simply to substitute their own assessment for that of the decision-maker. … 72. The approach to proportionality adopted in our domestic case law under theHuman Rights Act 1998 has not generally mirrored that of the Strasbourg court. … The three-limb test set out by Lord Clyde in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing[1999] 1 AC 69 , 80 has been influential: “whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.” … The three criteria have however an affinity to those formulated by the Strasbourg court in cases concerned with the requirement under articles 8–11 that an interference with the protected right should be necessary in a democratic society (e.g. Jersild v Denmark(1994) 19 EHRR 1 , para 31), provided the third limb of the test is understood as permitting the primary decision-maker an area within which its judgment will be respected. 73. The de Freitas formulation has been applied by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court as a test of proportionality in a number of cases under the Human Rights Act. It was however observed in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2007] 2 AC 167 , para 19 that the formulation was derived from the judgment of Dickson CJ in R v Oakes[1986] 1 SCR 103 , and that a further element mentioned in that judgment was the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. That, it was said, was an aspect which should never be overlooked or discounted. … 74. The judgment of Dickson CJ in Oakes provides the clearest and most influential judicial analysis of proportionality within the common law tradition of legal reasoning. Its attraction as a heuristic tool is that, by breaking down an assessment of proportionality into distinct elements, it can clarify different aspects of such an assessment, and make value judgments more explicit. The approach adopted in Oakes can be summarised by saying that it is necessary to determine (1) whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right, (2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective, (3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective, and (4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure's effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter. The first three of these are the criteria listed by Lord Clyde in de Freitas, and the fourth reflects the additional observation made in Huang. I have formulated the fourth criterion in greater detail than Lord Sumption JSC, but there is no difference of substance. In essence, the question at step four is whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned measure. 75. In relation to the third of these criteria, Dickson CJ made clear in R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd[1986] 2 SCR 713 , 781–782 that the limitation of the protected right must be one that “it was reasonable for the legislature to impose”, and that the courts were “not called on to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise line”