“S. 2 Responsibility for ensuring the provision of probation services (1) It is the function of the Secretary of State to ensure that sufficient provision is made throughout England and Wales– (a) for the probation purposes; (b) for enabling functions conferred by any enactment (whenever passed or made) on providers of probation services, or on officers of a provider of probation services, to be performed; and (c) for the performance of any function of the Secretary of State under any enactment (whenever passed or made) which is expressed to be a function to which this paragraph applies; and any provision which the Secretary of State considers should be made for a purpose mentioned above is referred to in this Part as “probation provision”. (2) The Secretary of State shall discharge his function under subsection (1) in relation to any probation provision by making and carrying out arrangements under section 3. (3) The Secretary of State must have regard to the aims mentioned in subsection (4) in the exercise of his functions under subsections (1) and (2) (so far as they may be exercised for any of the probation purposes). (4) Those aims are– (a) the protection of the public; (b) the reduction of re-offending; (c) the proper punishment of offenders; (d) ensuring offenders' awareness of the effects of crime on the victims of crimes and the public; and (e) the rehabilitation of offenders. (5) The Secretary of State is not required by subsections (1) and (2) to take any action in relation to the making of provision for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1) if it appears to him that appropriate provision is being or will be made by any person acting otherwise than in pursuance of arrangements under section 3.”
“Release at the direction of Parole Board 32ZB Release at direction of Parole Board: timing (1) This section applies where the Parole Board directs the release of a life prisoner under section 28 or 32. (2) The Secretary of State must give effect to the direction of the Parole Board as soon as is reasonably practicable in all the circumstances including, in particular, the need to make arrangements in connection with any conditions that are to be included in the life prisoner's licence under this Chapter.” the Parole Board as soon as is reasonably practicable in all the circumstances including, in particular, the need to make arrangements in connection with any conditions that are to be included in the life prisoner's licence under this Chapter.” [37]. This section came into force on28th June 2022 , by virtue of reg. 5 of thePolice, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Commencement No1 and Transitional Provision) Regulations 2022/520 which triggered S.139 of the Police, Crime, sentencing andCourts Act 2022 , which inserted S.32ZB into the CSA 1997. It is this section which applies to prisoners serving an IPP. [38]. So from28th June 2022 under S.32ZB the SSJ’s duty to release was clearly not immediate. It was qualified. The qualification being that release was required “as soon as is reasonably practicable in all the circumstances including, in particular, the need to make arrangements in connection with any conditions that are to be included” [39]. There were no reported cases put before me on the interpretation of the words “as soon as reasonably practicable” in this Act. [40]. What then was the law on the required timing of the Claimant’s release before the introduction of S.32ZB? This was considered by Whipple J. in R (Bowen and Stanton) v Secretary of State for Justice[2016] EWHC 2057 (Admin) , and subsequently on appeal by Sir Terence Etherton MR, McCombe LJ and Ryder LJ reported at[2017] EWCA civ 2181 . [41]. Bowen was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder with a 14 year minimum term. He was 64 years old at the date of the hearing. The 14 year minimum term had expired in 2011 and after a move to an open prison the offender managers contacted Mandeville House a supplier of Approved Premises in 2014 and were told that a space would become available in January 2015. In November 2014 the Parole Board directed his release to Mandeville House specifically alongside other conditions. It took 69 days for a bed to become available at Mandeville House in January 2015 as predicted. [42]. Stanton, who was 41 years old at the time of the judicial review proceedings, had been sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection in 2010 for wounding with intent to cause harm. The specified tariff was three years. That expired in 2013. After a move to an open prison in 2014 the Parole Board directed his release in March of 2015. In advance of the Parole Board hearing the offender managers contacted Mandeville House asking for a place and they responded informing the managers that a place would become available in late July 2015. The delay between the Parole Board's direction to release Mr Stanton, subject to a condition that he resided in Mandeville House, and him actually being released was 118 days. [43]. The Claimants brought judicial review proceedings on three grounds: breach of Section 28 of the CSA 1997; unlawful detention contrary toArticle 5 ECHR and breach of the Defendant’s public law duty to provide sufficient approved accommodation premises to house released prisoners. [44]. Whipple J. ruled that on the proper interpretation of S.28 of the CSA 1997 the law did not require the SSJ to release a prisoner immediately on receiving a Parole Board decision directing his release subject to various conditions. [45]. Whipple J. considered the Court of Appeal ruling on the mandatory nature of a direction by the Parole Board in R (Girling) v Parole Board[2007] QB 783 , where Sir Anthony Clarke MR stated at para. 15: “15. The starting point is that the role of the board, when deciding whether or not to direct the release of a prisoner, is judicial. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR explained in Ex p Watson[1996] 1 WLR 906 , 916 E – F , the Secretary of State is a party to the review procedure, whereas the board is the decision-maker. Submissions are made to the board on behalf of the Secretary of State which are often directly opposed to those made on behalf of the prisoner. Where the board directs release, the effect of section 28(5) of the 1997 Act is that the Secretary of State must release the prisoner.He has no discretion. As we understand it, this was accepted on all sides before the judge, in our opinion correctly.” whether or not to direct the release of a prisoner, is judicial. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR explained in Ex p Watson[1996] 1 WLR 906 , 916 E – F , the Secretary of State is a party to the review procedure, whereas the board is the decision-maker. Submissions are made to the board on behalf of the Secretary of State which are often directly opposed to those made on behalf of the prisoner. Where the board directs release, the effect of section 28(5) of the 1997 Act is that the Secretary of State must release the prisoner.He has no discretion. As we understand it, this was accepted on all sides before the judge, in our opinion correctly.” [46]. In addition Whipple J. considered the ruling of Sales LJ in R (John Gilbert) v Secretary of State for Justice[2015] EWCA Civ 802 at para 57: “…In any event, the Board has an overriding statutory duty under Article 5 and section 28 of the 1997 Act to direct release of a prisoner if satisfied that the risk criterion set out in that provision has been satisfied, and nothing in paragraph 1 of the Directions could detract from that.” [47]. Those rulings were put into their true light by the practical force of the judgment of Langstaff J. in R (Elson) v Greater Manchester Probation Trust[2011] EWHC 3692 (Admin) where, faced with submission that immediate release was required following a Parole Board’s decision, he ruled as follows, at para. 23: “[23] …s 28 of the 1997 Act cannot sensibly be interpreted to provide that as soon as a Parole Board takes a decision in which it directs release, albeit under conditions or at some future time, the Secretary of State is under a duty there and then and thereby to ensure that that release takes place forthwith. That would give no effect to the provisions of s.31; it would not recognise the difference in language between s.28 and s.32; it would in my view simply have been beyond the contemplation of Parliament that the alternative, which would need to have been in place (for) immediate release to be effected, would operate in an impractical way – as Ms Davies points out, if it were to be the case that it was anticipated that a Parole Board might make a direction which was conditional as to time or circumstance, that (so far as a circumstance such as accommodation in a hostel was concerned) the hostel would have to be held available just in case the Board at its hearing might decide that particular prisoner under review was to be released, even though it equally might not. Supervision arrangements would have to be made in anticipation of a possible outcome; appointments with psychiatrists and the like would have to be in place – all of which would be on a provisional basis which, given that the decision lies in the power of the Parole Board which has not yet considered it, might or might not be given effect to. I cannot sensibly construe s.28 in such a way that it would have that effect.”
“41. It comes from domestic public law, which requires the Secretary of State, as a public body, to operate a proper system, to act reasonably and to apply its own published policy to those within the contemplation of that policy, see R (Kaiyam) v Justice Secretary[2015] AC 1344 at [41] (Lord Mance and Lord Hughes JJSC) where the Court identified the following “ordinary” public law duties owed by the Justice Secretary: “… As a matter of domestic public law, complaint may be made in respect of any systemic failure, any failure to make reasonable provision for an individual prisoner so egregious as to satisfy the Wednesbury standard of unreasonableness [see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn[1948] 1 KB 223 ] or any failure to apply established policy.”
“83 In general terms, it seems to me that the decision as to whether any particular period prior to release of a life/IPP prisoner, with a residence condition, is unreasonable or not, will depend entirely on the facts of the particular case, unless it appears that national unavailability of Approved Premises placements has had a genuinely adverse effect on an individual prisoner. The “national” question is, of course, ground (5) to which I will come, although, as I recognise above, the point arises as one of the factors affecting the reasonableness or otherwise of any specific waiting period.” particular period prior to release of a life/IPP prisoner, with a residence condition, is unreasonable or not, will depend entirely on the facts of the particular case, unless it appears that national unavailability of Approved Premises placements has had a genuinely adverse effect on an individual prisoner. The “national” question is, of course, ground (5) to which I will come, although, as I recognise above, the point arises as one of the factors affecting the reasonableness or otherwise of any specific waiting period.”
“41. The question whether an adverse inference may be drawn from the absence of a witness is sometimes treated as a matter governed by legal criteria, for which the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324 is often cited as authority. Without intending to disparage the sensible statements made in that case, I think there is a risk of making overly legal and technical what really is or ought to be just a matter of ordinary rationality. So far as possible, tribunals should be free to draw, or to decline to draw, inferences from the facts of the case before them using their common sense without the need to consult law books when doing so. Whether any positive significance should be attached to the fact that a person has not given evidence depends entirely on the context and particular circumstances. Relevant considerations will naturally include such matters as whether the witness was available to give evidence, what relevant evidence it is reasonable to expect that the witness would have been able to give, what other relevant evidence there was bearing on the point(s) on which the witness could potentially have given relevant evidence, and the significance of those points in the context of the case as a whole. All these matters are inter-related and how these and any other relevant considerations should be assessed cannot be encapsulated in a set of legal rules.” [58]. Further in R (DAS) v SSHD[2014] EWCA civ 45 , Beatson LJ in the Court of Appeal stated at para. 80: “The judge stated the correct position clearly. He observed[2013] EWHC 682 at [21]: “Where a Secretary of State fails to put before the court witness statements to explain the decision-making process and the reasoning underlying a decision they take a substantial risk. In general litigation where a party elects not to call available witnesses to give evidence on a relevant matter, the court may draw inferences of fact against that party … The basis for drawing adverse inferences of fact against the Secretary of State in judicial review proceedings will be particularly strong, because in such proceedings the Secretary of State is subject to the stringent and well-known obligation owed to the court by a public authority facing a challenge to its decision, [in the words of Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental Organisations v Department of the Environment [2004] Env LR 761 , para 86] ‘to co-operate and to make candid disclosure, by way of affidavit, of the relevant facts and (so far as they are not apparent from contemporaneous documents which have been disclosed) the reasoning behind the decision challenged in the judicial review proceedings’.” “Where a Secretary of State fails to put before the court witness statements to explain the decision-making process and the reasoning underlying a decision they take a substantial risk. In general litigation where a party elects not to call available witnesses to give evidence on a relevant matter, the court may draw inferences of fact against that party … The basis for drawing adverse inferences of fact against the Secretary of State in judicial review proceedings will be particularly strong, because in such proceedings the Secretary of State is subject to the stringent and well-known obligation owed to the court by a public authority facing a challenge to its decision, [in the words of Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental Organisations v Department of the Environment [2004] Env LR 761 , para 86] ‘to co-operate and to make candid disclosure, by way of affidavit, of the relevant facts and (so far as they are not apparent from contemporaneous documents which have been disclosed) the reasoning behind the decision challenged in the judicial review proceedings’.” [59]. An example of a Court drawing such adverse inferences is found in R (Quark Fishing) v SSFCA[2002] EWCA civ 1409 at para. 53 where Laws LJ stated: “If the court has not been given a true and comprehensive account, but has to tease the truth out of late [disclosure], it may be appropriate to draw inferences against the Secretary of State upon points that remain obscure.”
“As the executive he can only act in pursuance of the powers given to him by law. In accordance with British jurisprudence no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice.”
“Secondly, there is the problem of proof. The initial burden is upon the applicant. At what stage, if at all, is it transferred to the respondent? And, if it is transferred, what is the standard of proof he has to meet? It is clear from the passages cited from Lord Atkin's opinions in Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 and Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria [1931] A.C. 662 that in cases where the exercise of executive discretion interferes with liberty or property rights he saw the burden of justifying the legality of the decision as being upon the executive. Once the applicant has shown a prima facie case, this is the law. It was so recognised by Lord Parker C.J. in Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Ahsan [1969] 2 Q.B. 222 , and by Lord Denning M.R. in the Court of Appeal in Reg. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex parte Azam [1974] A.C. 18 , 32. And, I would add, it is not possible to construesection 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act 1816 , as meaning anything different.”
“4.8 accordingly and in all the circumstances the panel is satisfied Mr Newson does meet the legal test for release and that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that he remain confined. It therefore directs Mr Newson's release from custody on the proposed RMP.”
“a number of new care providers had been identified and would be approached – including Breakthrucare”. [94]. The “new” providers were not listed. [95]. Thereafter no evidence has been provided to the Court about any activity by the probation services or the PPCS from 6th May to24th May 2022 . [96]. On the 24th of May 2022 a professionals’ meeting took place (a later email discloses this). No notes of that meeting have been produced to this Court and nobody from the Defendant’s organisations informed the Claimant or the Claimant’s solicitors in advance or in arrears of that professionals meeting or the outcome thereof or the content thereof. The PPCS were not informed either. [97]. Miss Goodrham, in her witness statement, asserts that after the update received from the probation service by the PPCS on the 6th of May 2022 the PPCS attempted to contact the probation service by phone calls and e-mails on the 10th, 14th and 20th of June but such attempts failed. No explanation was provided as to why the chaser emails were not started for 4 weeks. [98]. On the 23rd of June 2022 an e-mail was received by PPCS from the probation service advising that adult social care were “continuing to work together to identify accommodation to meet the Claimant’s needs and that release was not possible at this time.”
“However on1st August 2022 PPCS were notified of a significant update by the probation service, namely that a provisional placement had been agreed with break through care and a final decision imminent.” [116]. This is a significant event in my judgment. The first people who should have been told about it were the Claimant and his lawyers. However, there is no evidence that the Claimant was told on the 1st, or the 2nd, or the 3rd or the 4th of August. [117]. On5th August 2022 an incident occurred in the Claimant’s cell at prison. I was provided with a “Notice of Report” from HMP Whatton dated 7.8.2022. In that it was asserted that at 16.43 in cell A3-102 the Claimant was self harming by cutting his right arm which a shard of broken porcelain mug when SO Turner asked him to stop and hand it over. It would appear that at least up to that point the facts are agreed by the Claimant. The report details went on to say that the Claimant then stabbed SO Turner in the hand causing severe bleeding which required attendance at hospital for treatment. The case was sent to the adjudication officer and various adjudication hearings took place. The first was on the 8th of August and the second was on the 23rd of September. It appears that the adjudicator referred the matter to the police due to the seriousness of the charge. [118]. I have read the representations provided on behalf of the Claimant for the adjudication which were provided by his solicitor, Kathryn Reece-Thomas and are undated. They make it quite clear that the Claimant had suffered hugely as a result of the failure of the Defendant to institute the RMP required by the Parole Board back in February 2022. It was asserted that (1) the Claimant had felt suicidal due to the delay and uncertainty; (2) the Claimant had committed many acts of deliberate self harm during the delay period; (3) the Claimant had not been provided with any clear information on key achievements towards release by the probation services during the period; (4) his COM had changed several times during the delay; (5) he was anxious and worried. [119]. The Claimant’s lawyer relied on a Justice Select Committee report on prisoners who had been sentenced to IPPs which set out the emotional and mental deterioration and high levels of self harm and suicide in such prisoners. The Claimant’s lawyer produced data showing that in 2020 a total of 2066 self harm incidents were recorded for IPP prisoners. [120]. As to the alleged assault event itself the Claimant’s lawyers submitted that the Claimant’s version was that he was asked to stop self harming and refused and as a result SO Turner grabbed his hand and was injured in the process. No body cam (video) had been worn by SO Turner during the event and the Claimant’s lawyer raised the HMPPS guidance which suggested that any officer who was going to use force should turn on his body cam. The Claimant’s lawyer also suggested there was some camera footage of the time directly following the incident during which SO Turner can clearly be heard stating the event was “an accident”. [121]. The police closed the investigation in early September of 2022. I have no evidence as to what happened in relation to the adjudication. [122]. My findings of fact about what happened after the 5th of August now follow. [123]. On the 8th of August 2022 HMPPS emailed the Claimant’s solicitors and various of the Defendant’s staff informing them of the incident on the 5th of August. In that e-mail it was alleged that the Claimant stabbed a member of staff. It was also alleged that the officer suffered a “dislocated jaw” but in relation to this they added the words “it is unclear however whether this is the same officer or another.”
“28A. Setting aside final decisions (1) The Board may set aside a final decision made under rule 19(1)(a) or (b), 21(7) or 25(1)— (a) on application by a party; or (b) on initiation by the Board chair. (2) An application or initiation under paragraph (1)(a) or (b) must be considered on the papers by a decision maker. (3) A final decision may be set aside under paragraph (1) by a decision maker if— (a) it is in the interests of justice to do so; and (b) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (4) are satisfied. (4) The conditions are— (a) the decision maker is satisfied that a direction given by the Board for, or a decision made by it not to direct, the release of a prisoner would not have been given or made but for an error of law or fact; (b) the decision maker is satisfied that a direction given by the Board for the release of a prisoner would not have been given if— (i) information that was not available to the Board when the direction was given had been so available, or (ii) a change in circumstances relating to the prisoner that occurred after the direction was given, had occurred before it was given. (5) An application or initiation to set aside a decision under paragraph (1)(a) or (b) must be made— (a) within 21 days of the decision; or (b) if the application or initiation relies on a condition in paragraph (4)(b), before the prisoner is released. (6) Where an application is made under paragraph (1)(a)— (a) the party who made the application must serve the application and any representations in support upon the Board and the other party; (b) the Secretary of State must serve all relevant information and reports upon the Board and the other party; and (c) the other party may make any representations in reply, and those representations must be provided to the Board and the party who made the application within 7 days of service of the application. (7) Where an initiation is made under paragraph (1)(b)— (a) the Board must notify both parties of the initiation by the Board chair and serve any reasons in support of the initiation upon the parties; (b) the Secretary of State must serve all relevant information and reports upon the Board and the other party; and (c) the parties may make any representations in reply, and those representations must be provided to the Board and the other party within 7 days of service of the initiation. (8) Where the decision maker directs that a final decision should be set aside, they must also direct that the case should be— (a) decided again on the papers by the previous panel or a new panel appointed under rule 5(1), or (b) decided again at an oral hearing by the previous panel or a new panel appointed under rule 5(2). (9) The decision of the decision maker under paragraph (3) must include the reasons for that decision. (10) Any requirement on the Secretary of State to give effect to a Parole Board direction to release a prisoner under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the 1997 Act or Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the 2003 Act, is suspended when an application is made under paragraph (1)(a) or (b), pending the decision under paragraph (3).” (a) it is in the interests of justice to do so; and (b) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (4) are satisfied. (a) the decision maker is satisfied that a direction given by the Board for, or a decision made by it not to direct, the release of a prisoner would not have been given or made but for an error of law or fact; (b) the decision maker is satisfied that a direction given by the Board for the release of a prisoner would not have been given if— (a) within 21 days of the decision; or (b) if the application or initiation relies on a condition in paragraph (4)(b), before the prisoner is released. (a) the party who made the application must serve the application and any representations in support upon the Board and the other party; (b) the Secretary of State must serve all relevant information and reports upon the Board and the other party; and (c) the other party may make any representations in reply, and those representations must be provided to the Board and the party who made the application within 7 days of service of the application. (a) the Board must notify both parties of the initiation by the Board chair and serve any reasons in support of the initiation upon the parties; (b) the Secretary of State must serve all relevant information and reports upon the Board and the other party; and (c) the parties may make any representations in reply, and those representations must be provided to the Board and the other party within 7 days of service of the initiation. [145]. It is sub paragraph 10 which was the sting in the tail for the Claimant. The release decision is suspended pending the application to set aside. This must have been a hammer blow to the Claimant if he was told about it. I have no evidence about whether he was. [146]. Despite this application the Defendant was actually still working to accommodate the Claimant throughout October 2022 and this issue fell away at the hearing when the Defendant withdrew the application to set aside and agreed to undertake to release the Claimant by16 November 2022 to be accommodated at Langley House Trust. Applying the law to the facts [147]. It is clear from the Court of Appeal judgment in Bowen and Stanton that each case is fact specific in relation to the reasonableness of the time frame for release after a Parole Board decision which had conditions attached to it. Factors [148]. When considering the issue of the reasonableness of the timeframe of the Defendant’s past actions in relation to securing the Claimant’s release from prison by arranging supervised accommodation and support all of the circumstances are relevant. [149]. I asked the parties’ counsel to assist the Court with the provision of an agreed list of factors. The following were the agreed factors: (1) The length and nature of the Claimant’s sentence. (2) The Claimant’s mental and physical health. (3) The availability of suitable supported accommodation. (4) The staff available and the changes in staff responsible for the Claimant’s case. (5) The steps taken or not taken to progress the case. (6) Whether any delay was caused by the Defendant’s fault or culpability. (7) The decisions taken relating to withdrawal of any accommodation offered. [150]. To those agreed factors, in my judgment, the following factors should be added: (8) The existence and effectiveness of the Defendant’s system and policies for gathering, quality assessing, listing, securing and providing supported accommodation and the requisite supervision and support. (9) The Claimant’s personal and family circumstances and their geographical location. (10) The complexity of the conditions applied to the direction to release by the Parole Board. [151]. I consider some of these ten factors to be relevant to the reasonableness of the Defendant’s actions because they were expressly considered by Whipple J. in Bowen and Stanton cited above. In addition others of these factors are relevant because they directly affect the work which the Defendant has to do to fulfil the SSJ’s duty to arrange safe release in accordance with the Parole Board’s direction. [152]. Before I analyse the factors sequentially to determine the reasonableness of the Defendant’s actions a few overarching matters arise. [153]. In a simple case where no conditions were imposed by the Parole Board the duty to release will require quick release held back only by paperwork and administration. [154]. In the most complicated cases the amount of work required to be done by the SSJ to set up the Risk Management Plan may be substantial. Release will foreseeably be more delayed. Availability of Supported Accommodation [155]. Three “new” supported accommodation suppliers were identified by the Defendant or those reporting to the Defendant during the 7 month period from25 March 2022 (when Ridgeview withdrew) to the date of the hearing: Breakthrucare, Hegarty Housing and Langley House Trust. The use of the term “new” is instructive. If they had been on a Defendant compiled list in February 2022 they would not be new, they would be established and known providers. [156]. I take judicial notice of the fact that Langley House was not a “new” supplier. It was the relevant accommodation supplier in R (Taylor) v SSJ[2015] EWHC 3245 (Admin) , a case on delay argued on different grounds for a physically disabled prisoner where there were funding issues between the SSJ and the social services. [157]. No evidence was put before this Court to show that there was an inadequate supply of supported accommodation for the Claimant. So I make no such finding. Therefore I infer that the supply of supported accommodation available to the Defendant was adequate during the delay period. System for satisfying the Parole Board’s conditions [158]. The Defendant provided no evidence that the Defendant had a list of adequate quality controlled suppliers of supported accommodation and support services or that the Defendant sub-contracted that function to another who had such a list. I infer and find as a fact that the Defendant had no such list. [159]. In the absence of any evidence from the Defendant that the SSJ had a written system or policy for satisfying the Parole Board’s conditions for the Claimant’s release I infer and find as a fact that the SSJ had no such system. On the evidence before me the approach appears to have been ad hoc and left to the individual COM or local arm of the Defendant’s service with no guiding system or policy. [160]. The PPCS chased the COM and the probation service from time to time but allowed weeks or months to go by before a response was received. The chasing was intermittent and patchy. I find as a fact that the chasing by the PPCS was ineffective and in-substantial and their supervision of the process was inadequate. [161]. When responses were received from the probation service or the COMs which were insubstantial or blocking the PPCS did not escalate the case to higher management and did not dig into the detail of what was actually being done. They just accepted blocking responses to the effect that efforts were ongoing and let time pass by. [162]. As to the system operated by KJM and which ever other COMs were allocated to the Claimant’s case, no evidence has been provided by KJM or the probation service or adult Social Care as to what that system was. What was actually done to find supported accommodation [163]. I have made findings of fact as to what occurred above on the evidence put before me. [164]. The Defendant has not produced evidence showing that the SSJ kept in contact effectively and substantially with Ridgeview before or after the Parole Board decision. The assertion by the Defendant that the accommodation was withdrawn because the landlord of Eton Street had gone abroad and before he left had stopped communicating gives rise to the question: “what quality control systems were in place to filter out unreliable accommodation suppliers before the Parole Board hearing?”