‘The detail of the advice is complex and impossible to summarise here for the purpose of this witness statement. However, what is clear is that we obtained detailed advice on our business model, and specific tax elements of that model, over a period of time from professional advisers including Leading Counsel. This was because we wished to ensure that our business model was fully compliant with all applicable tax legislation.’
"The first set of access conditions is fulfilled if – a) there are reasonable grounds for believing – i) that an indictable offence has been committed; ii) that there is material which consists of special procedure material or includes special procedure material and does not also include excluded material on premises specified in the application…; iii) that the material is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and iv) the material is likely to be relevant evidence; b) other methods of obtaining the material – i) have been tried without success; or ii) have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail; and c) it is in the public interest, having regard – i) to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the material is obtained; and ii) to the circumstances under which the person in possession of the material holds it, - that the material should be produced or that access to it should be given."
"In considering whether the requirements of paragraph 2 have been met, the investigator is obviously not in a position to know for certain what the outcome of any request for voluntary disclosure of documents might be. Nor, in the context of an application for a warrant under paragraph 12, can the investigator know for sure whether a production or access order under paragraph 4 might have been sufficient to secure the documents. Therefore, paragraph 2 cannot, consistently with the purpose of the statute, be read literally: whether a less intrusive measure would, or would not, be "bound to fail" must in the end be a matter of judgment for the investigator based on his or her knowledge of the investigation so far and the evidence available. It must, in our judgement, be understood to mean that the investigator believes on the basis of the evidence that there is no lesser measure available which is likely to be effective in securing the relevant documents. Plainly, the investigator must have cogent grounds for his belief. In the context of an application for a warrant, where no notice will be given in advance of execution, the belief is likely to be based on the investigator's suspicion that the relevant material will be disposed of or hidden if advance warning is given, and for that reason, any lesser measure (which would mean that the target is put on notice of the investigation) would be an ineffective means of pursuing the investigation. But, as is clearly stated in S, F and L at [62 to 64] and [95 to 97], a bare assertion of such a belief is insufficient if the basis of that belief is not adequately explained in a focussed application dealing with the actual facts of the case. If the investigator has explained the reasons for so suspecting, in terms that are reasonable and compelling, he or she will have fulfilled the requirement in paragraph 2."
"The question for the court, in judicial review proceedings, is whether the information that is alleged should have been given to the magistrate might reasonably have led him to refuse to issue the warrant."
‘For the most part, the material sought is expected to be in the control of the individuals under investigation. James FOULSHAM ([address]) It is believed that FOULSHAM would not fully or truthfully comply with a request for the material either voluntarily or under a Production Order. While he has not previously provided false information to HMRC, he is believed to be one of the key conspirators in the fraud. Operation Salmon is an investigation in to one such iteration of a fraud of this nature. FOULSHAM, is believed to have played a central role in the perpetration of similar frauds previously. He demonstrates a pattern of evasive behaviour towards HMRC in so far that when the department opens enquiries into companies to which he is associated, those companies are subsequently dissolved with little to no engagement. Further, James FOULSHAM is believed to have received in excess of£1m in disguised ‘Multiple Payments’ and as such is believed to be one of the main beneficiaries of the fraud. It is believed that he has used the criminal property from the fraud to fund a lavish lifestyle. Therefore, it is considered likely that he would take every step to preclude HMRC’s effort to secure evidence which could be used against him in the future trial and/or confiscation hearing, in an attempt to maintain the lifestyle to which he has become accustomed. It is also considered that FOULSHAM has knowingly failed to properly declare his income to HMRC. While he has declared substantial amounts in respect of income from the Sigma entities, he has failed to declare any income in respect of Backoffice. It is believed this failure to declare income is a deliberate measure to distance himself from the criminal property and demonstrates a proclivity to fail to comply with HMRC. Further, as per current Sentencing Council guidelines for Cheating the Public Revenue, where the offending is£50 million or more and individuals have a leading role where the offending is part of a group activity, where the fraud is conducted over a sustained period or committed in a sophisticated way, the sentencing range is between 10-17 years custody. Therefore, HMRC believe that the likelihood of receiving a full and transparent response from FOULSHAM is bound to fail, whether material be requested on a consensual basis or under the judicial authority of a Production Order. Jonathan TIPPER ([addresses]) The points made above in respect of FOULSHAM also stand for Jonathan TIPPER. However, TIPPER also attended a meeting with civil officers as part of the enquiry into Abacus. While it was [X] who corresponded with and provided material to HMRC in respect of the enquiry, it is believed, given TIPPER’s role as Director of Abacus, and thus his presumed authority over [X] that he would have had knowledge of the material provided. That material is believed to be false in so far as it included purchase ledger entries and purchase invoices in respect of Sourcing Companies which HMRC believe are not real trading entities and which have been created by the criminal group purely to perpetrate the fraud. This further demonstrates the belief that people would not fully and truthfully comply with the request for material on either a voluntary basis or under the judicial authority of a production order. Andrew CLEARY ([addresses]) The points made above in respect of FOULSHAM also stand for Andrew CLEARY. However, CLEARY was also named as the Accountant for Smart Labour and Vitazec and liaised with the liquidators in respect of both companies. It is believed the material provided to the liquidators by both Smart Labour and Vitazec was false, namely in so far as the purchase ledgers included Sourcing Companies which HMRC believe are not real trading entities. CLEARY could argue that [Y] and [Z], as the respective Directors and shareholders of these companies, were responsible for providing the information to him and that he was just a conduit to pass this information to the liquidators. However, HMRC believe CLEARY played a key role in the Backoffice fraud, acting as Financial Controller, and thus would have full knowledge of the true supply chain within the Backoffice model and thus would know that the material provided was false. … Nicola CLEARY, Danielle FOULSHAM and … With regards Nicola CLEARY, Danielle FOULSHAM and …, whilst they may have access to some of the materials sought by virtue of living with persons or being related to persons who hold the said material, none of these actually have a position of official authority by which to supply the material. As such they would be required to seek permission from one of the individuals above in order to provide any material requested by HMRC… It is also considered, given their family ties to key suspects within the fraud that they would have motivation to conceal evidence which may implicate their spouse/relative in the fraud. Some of the material sought may be held by other third parties, though it is not known how much of the material sought is so held. These third parties all have potentially close business relationships to the suspects. For example, the accountants of Backoffice, Pegasus and Verso Pay, namely Dains LLP and Four Oaks Accounting and Taxation Services Limited, both have longstanding ties to the suspects. It is also not known how close the business relationships are between the Employment Agencies and the suspect companies. As such, any approach to these third parties for material, whether on a consensual basis or under a Production Order would significantly increase the risk of alerting the suspects as to the investigation into them. This would provide the suspects with the opportunity to destroy or conceal evidence, influence witnesses and collude with one another. The material therefore cannot be obtained by any other, less intrusive means. Further, as this fraud is a suspected conspiracy, it will be important to establish both the role and level of knowledge of each suspect. Therefore, precisely where material is found during the searches will be of great significance as it will provide evidence of who was in control of what aspect of the fraud. Although, post-intervention, additional material will be sought under Production Orders from third parties (such as Dains LLP, as well as Employment Agencies believed to outsource labour and payroll to the Backoffice model), however the obtaining of such material will not carry the same significance in highlighting which suspect had knowledge of a particular document and what role that suspect played within the fraud.’
‘(7) Duty of Disclosure.See also the declaration in box (8). Is there anything of which you are aware that might reasonably be considered capable of undermining any of the grounds of this application, or which for some other reason might affect the court’s decision? For example, you must disclose anything that could be said to raise doubts about the credibility or reliability of information you have received, and explain why you have decided that that information can be relied upon despite that. You must disclose also whether the premises have been searched before, and with what outcome, and whether there is any unusual feature of the investigation or of any potential prosecution. The court will not necessarily refuse to issue a warrant where you disclose something that tends to undermine the grounds of the application, but if you do not disclose something that might affect the court’s decision then that could make any warrant ineffective. A due diligence report ……………………………... suggests that representatives of Abacus (this would likely be FOULSHAM and TIPPER in their capacity as company directors) sought tax advice from Mazars LLP regarding the structure of their model. This, on the face of it, might indicate that they have not knowingly evaded their tax liabilities. Given they have sought professional advice, it is also possible that they believe the structure to be aggressive tax avoidance, as opposed to evasion. However, the model for which it is believed they have sought advice would only stand chance of legitimacy if the Sourcing Companies and Micro Employers weren’t a sham and weren’t all controlled by the same individuals. It is therefore believed that advice has been sought purely to give an air of legitimacy and that they have knowingly implemented a fraudulent variant of their own model. It is of note that not all analysis work carried out to date in respect of banking material obtained is complete and this work remains ongoing. However, as this work is completed, it is not expected that this will materially alter HMRC’s view of either the nature of the fraud or the scale on which it is believed to have been committed. Constratum’s bank statements show that they have paid approximately£1.5 million of VAT on behalf of some of the Sourcing Companies listed in Athena’s September 2018 VAT audit report. However, this has not been deducted from the estimate of VAT evaded. This is because there is no business reason why Constratum would pay the VAT liability of what are purportedly unconnected companies. Even if the£1.5 million was accounted for, the fraud would still be significant, exceeding£85 million . Checks show that the suspects in this application have no previous criminal convictions and therefore are deemed to be of good character …………………………….... However, the fact an individual has not previously been convicted of an offence does not mean they will not participate in criminal activity. James FOULSHAM and TIPPER both engage Smith and Williamson as their agent in respect of their affairs. [Five named individuals], Athena and Constratum all engage, or have engaged, Adderley, Hill & Co Ltd in respect of their personal or company tax affairs. Equally, [two named individuals], Verso Pay and Pegasus engage Four Oaks taxation and Accounting Services Ltd as their agent for their respective personal and company tax affairs. Backoffice engage Dains LLP in respect of their (Corporation) tax affairs. It could be argued that the aforementioned individuals and entities have used agents and, therefore, sought professional advice with regards to their financial affairs. However, the fact that an individual or company engages an agent to act on their behalf, does not negate their personal or corporate legal liability to declare their taxable income. Further, save for Nicola CLEARY, all suspects have declared income via Self-Assessment tax returns demonstrating some inclination towards compliance with the tax regime. James FOULSHAM and TIPPER both declared capital gains in excess of£4 million for the 2017/2018 tax year. This suggests some compliance with the tax system and the apparent income would go some way, though not fully, to explaining how they have purchased luxury vehicles and property. However, the information provided in respect of the capital gain conflicts other information held by HMRC. Furthermore, even if the capital gain claim is genuine, it does not negate the fact they have taken deliberate steps to avoid VAT due to HMRC. Williams Associates Ltd is known to receive consultancy fees from Twenty Four Seven Recruitment Services Ltd into a Gibraltar based bank account. Backoffice have paid in excess of£34.7 million to that same bank account within the period of this fraud. At present, it is not known whether there is a legitimate business purpose behind these payments or whether the individuals within the criminal group are the ultimate beneficiaries of the monies paid out. Representatives of Abacus, Smart Labour, Vitazec and Athena have previously complied with requests for material made by HMRC as part of civil enquiries and as such may appear to be cooperative with HMRC enquiries. However, following analysis of the accounting records and bank statements provided, these are believed to be fraudulent, featuring what are believed to be false inputs in respect of sham Sourcing Companies. As such, I believe that to request material from them directly would only result in further false information being supplied. Some of the suspects of this application have not previously been asked to provide material to HMRC. It is therefore unknown if they would comply or not. However, this investigation regards a criminal group who are believed to have conspired to defraud the UK Treasury and, as such, it is deemed unlikely that they would fully and truthfully comply with any request for the material sought, especially given that fellow conspirators have previously provided what is believed to be falsified material under civil enquiries. Further, despite HMRC receiving responses to civil enquiries, this matter is now being dealt with criminally, as such, the seriousness and the likely implications are considerably higher, and the likelihood of a full and transparent response is considered far less likely. Further, even if an individual was willing to provide the material requested, there is a very high risk that any request made would lead to the tipping off of all the other members of the group concerning the criminal investigation into each.’
‘10(e) …It is important to note that some of the suspects have provided some material to HMRC during previous civil enquiries. The applications explain why, in each case, HMRC considers that a request for voluntary production or a Production Order would fail to obtain the material sought, despite the good character and professional standing of the suspects; and extent to which some of them have previously produced material to HMRC. In assessing this the Court may be assisted by having regard to the case of Hart and Others v HMRC[2017] EWHC 3091 (Admin) , especially the passage from [56]. The Court will of course give the claims that a search warrant is necessary, and a production order would not suffice, close scrutiny. The applications for the various warrants do not necessarily stand and fall together, it is open to the court to grant warrants in respect of some premises and refuse warrants in respect of others. 11 it is further submitted that the further condition required by paragraph 12(a)(ii) is fulfilled in that the condition in paragraph 14(d) is made good: that service of notice of an application for an order under paragraph 4 above may seriously prejudice the investigation: this is for reasons set out in the table at the end of the applications. This requirement is linked to (e) above, yet a distinct requirement.’
‘In a case in which no production order has been made, complete either (c) or (d) as appropriate: (c) If the material is identified in box (2)(a), why do you believe that it would not be appropriate to make a production order for any one or more of the following reasons? Tick to indicate which. (i) it is not practicable to communicate with any person against from the production order could be made. (ii) it is not practicable to communicate with any person who would be required to comply with an order to grant entry to the premises. (iii) the investigation might be seriously prejudiced unless an appropriate person is able to secure immediate access to the material. Please see the application for the search warrants under section 9 PACE in Operation Salmon, in particular at sections 2(c), 3(c) and the table of premises at the end of that application.’
‘Is there anything of which you are aware that might reasonably be considered capable of undermining any of the grounds of this application, or which for some other reason might affect the court’s decision?’
‘303N Release of detained property (1) This section applies while any property is detained under section 303K or 303L. (2) A magistrates' court or (in Scotland) the sheriff may direct the release of the whole or any part of the property if the following condition is met. (3) The condition is that the court or sheriff is satisfied, on an application by the person from whom the property was seized, that the conditions in section 303K or 303L (as the case may be) for the detention of the property are no longer met in relation to the property to be released. (4) A relevant officer or (in Scotland) a procurator fiscal may, after notifying the magistrates' court, sheriff or justice under whose order property is being detained, release the whole or any part of it if satisfied that the detention of the property to be released is no longer justified.’
‘49. The Claimants accept that this head of challenge may be unsustainable, but, given the other challenges, and the uncertainty presently surrounding this particular aspect of the overall case, seek to keep this head of challenge alive unless and until disclosure and/or service of documents renders it impossible to proceed with it.’