“when the vital question of risk is assessed there is a risk that separate reports…may give conflicting recommendations. [In serious cases] there will be one overarching Ministry of Justice view so that the Parole Board has a very clear steer”
“From 21 July HMPPS witnesses in oral hearings must no longer provide a view or recommendation about suitability for release or a move to open conditions, unless they have submitted a report with a recommendation before 14 July.”
“Do not provide a view or recommendation about suitability for release or a move to open conditions in the oral hearing…… Review the language guidance below to help you prepare.”
“What if a Parole Board panel member or solicitor / barrister asks me for my view on suitability for release during the oral hearing?” the response is: “The Parole Board is aware of these changes. It is very likely that Panel Members and the prisoner’s legal representative will ask you whether you assess the risk to be manageable in the community, whether your risk management plan is considered sufficient to protect the public, whether the prisoner is safe to be released or is suitable for transfer to open conditions. You cannot answer as it would constitute a view on suitability for release/open and instead should politely tell the Panel Members and/or the prisoner’s legal representative that your role is not to provide the Panel with a recommendation but rather your assessment of the prisoner’s risks. If this does happen, you may wish to speak to your line manager following the hearing.”
“There is no dispute as to the principles to apply when deciding this application for interim relief. In this case, the Claimant must first show a real prospect that at trial he will succeed in obtaining a permanent injunction, taking account of the fact that any decision to grant such relief would include consideration of the public interest. If the required real prospect exists, the next issue is whether or not the balance of convenience favours the grant of relief. As is ordinarily the case, the balance of convenience requires me to assess the prejudice that would arise if interim relief were wrongly granted, and weigh that against the prejudice that would arise were interim relief wrongly to be refused. At this stage too, the public interest is a relevant consideration: see generally Smith v Inner London Education Authority [1978]1 All ER 411 and R (Medical Justice) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2010] EWHC 1425 (Admin.) In this case the relevant public interest is that of the Secretary of State continuing to operate effective measures to safeguard public health in response to the risk presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. I also accept the submission made by the Secretary of State that since the relief sought would prevent operation of part of the 2020 Regulations, no question of granting interim relief would arise unless I am satisfied, to adopt the words of Goff LJ in R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame No. 2[1991] 1 AC 603 , that the "challenge is so firmly based as to justify" such a cause of action (see the speech of Goff LJ at page 674D). Thus, this application for interim relief will not succeed on the first American Cyanamid requirement unless the prospect that the substantive case will succeed is particularly strong.”
“The strength of the public interest in permitting a public authority’s decision to remain in force will depend on all the circumstances. Where interim relief is sought to prevent the enforcement of primary legislation, there is a strong public interest in allowing the public authority to continue to enforce an apparently authentic law pending the determination of the challenge. Where subordinate legislation or policy is challenged, the public interest weighing against interim relief may also be strong, albeit less so than where the target is primary legislation” to remain in force will depend on all the circumstances. Where interim relief is sought to prevent the enforcement of primary legislation, there is a strong public interest in allowing the public authority to continue to enforce an apparently authentic law pending the determination of the challenge. Where subordinate legislation or policy is challenged, the public interest weighing against interim relief may also be strong, albeit less so than where the target is primary legislation”