“Domain 1” -Knowledge Skills and Performance a. Maintaining Professional Performance; b. Assessment; c. Clinical Management; d. Operative/Technical Skills; e. Record keeping; “Domain 2” a. Maintaining Professional Performance; b. Assessment; c. Clinical Management; d. Operative/Technical Skills; e. Record keeping; 12. Safety and Quality (not graded) “Domain 3” - Communication, partnership and Teamwork and “Domain 4”
“A Knowledge Test made up of single best answer questions. The questions are chosen to reflect, as closely as possible, the work the doctor actually does in practice, they can also be tailored to the doctor’s grade and any areas of specialisation. Each question has a list of possible answers and the doctor is asked to choose which answer they consider to be the single best answer. A time limit will be given. An OSCE (Objective Structured Clinical Examination) during which the doctor is presented with scenarios chosen to reflect their background and experience. The scenarios are designed to test the doctor’s practical skills, clinical method, and interpersonal skills. Each scenario is set up in a different room or at a different ‘station’ and is designed to last approximately seven minutes. The test can use medical models and equipment and role players as both patients and colleagues.”
“On an appeal from a determination by the GMC whatever label is given to the section 40 test, it is plain from the authorities that the court must have in mind and give such weight as is appropriate in the circumstances to the following factors. (i) The body from whom the appeal lies is a specialist tribunal whose understanding of what the medical profession expects of its members in matters of medical practice deserve respect. (ii) The tribunal had the benefit, which the court normally does not, of hearing and seeing the witnesses on both sides. (iii) The questions of primary and secondary fact and the overall value judgment to be made by the tribunal, especially the last, are akin to jury questions to which there may reasonably be different answers.”
“i) ... A court will allow an appeal underCPR Part 52.21 (3) if it is 'wrong' or 'unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court'. ... iii) The court will correct material errors of fact and of law: see Fatnani at paragraph 20. Any appeal court must however be extremely cautious about upsetting a conclusion of primary fact, particularly where the findings depend upon the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, who the Tribunal, unlike the appellate court, has had the advantage of seeing and hearing (see Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group (Practice Note)[2002] EWCA Civ 1642 ;[2003] 1 WLR 577 , at paragraphs 15 to 17, cited with approval in Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd[2007] UKHL 23 ,[2007] 1 WLR 1325 at paragraph 46, and Southall at paragraph 47). iv) When the question is what inferences are to be drawn from specific facts, an appellate court is under less of a disadvantage. The court may draw any inferences of fact which it considers are justified on the evidence: seeCPR Part 52.11 (4) . v) In regulatory proceedings the appellate court will not have the professional expertise of the Tribunal of fact. As a consequence, the appellate court will approach Tribunal determinations about whether conduct is serious misconduct or impairs a person's fitness to practise, and what is necessary to maintain public confidence and proper standards in the profession and sanctions, with diffidence: see Fatnani at paragraph 16; and Khan v General Pharmaceutical Council[2016] UKSC 64 ;[2017] 1 WLR 169 , at paragraph 36. ... vii) Matters of mitigation are likely to be of considerably less significance in regulatory proceedings than to a court imposing retributive justice, because the overarching concern of the professional regulator is the protection of the public.”
“quite satisfied that there were no sinister implications.”
“in a manner that was open and transparent.”
“25. The Tribunal heard evidence that a full performance assessment usually includes third party interviews, observation of clinical practice and examination of a doctor’s clinical records. It heard that it was not possible to carry out these exercises in this case because the doctors invited to take part in the third-party assessment either did not agree to take part in the process or did not respond. It was not possible to examine Dr Aliu’s records or observe him in practice, because he had not practised since August 2017. The Tribunal heard that the Assessors increased the number of OSCE stations from 10 to 14 to ensure that the assessment included a fair sample of Dr Aliu’s work.”
“The law does not require disciplinary allegations to be proved with “audio” or “video” evidence. The Tribunal properly based its findings on the oral and documentary evidence before it. The standard of proof was the balance of probabilities (seeGeneral Medical Council (Fitness to Practise) Rules 2004 , r. 34(12)). There is no requirement that a performance assessment must always include a site visit or a records review. It is a matter of discretion for the Assessors to decide the appropriate instruments of assessment in each case. There was no site visit or records review here because the Registrant had not practiced since 2017. The assessors increased the number of OSCE stations to ensure that the assessment included a sufficient sample of the Registrant’s work.”
“86. The Tribunal found that even though Dr Aliu showed some basic knowledge of how to manage an acutely unwell surgical patient his overall management of such patients was poor, which could lead to adverse clinical outcomes including mortality in real life situations. … 96. Dr Aliu said that he had inserted a number of chest drains during his career. He had not inserted one into a real patient since 2003 but had been on a refresher course in 2014 and received a certificate. 97. The Tribunal found Dr Aliu’s account to be both confused and confusing. It came to the conclusion that Dr Aliu had little understanding of how to insert the chest drain, how he should have dealt with the trocar and how he should have clamped the tube. The Tribunal found that he tried to justify his technique and complained that he did not have adequate equipment. The Tribunal also found that he did not appreciate the potentially serious consequences of his actions in real life situations.”
“The Tribunal found that the results of some of the OSCE scenarios included in the performance assessment were of particular concern that could put patients at risk in a real-life situation. The Tribunal was particularly concerned by the following examples. a) During a trauma assessment OSCE scenario (No 3) Dr Aliu attempted to move a patient with suspected spinal injury. This could have resulted in permanent disability. b) During a testicular torsion OSCE scenario (No 6) Dr Aliu failed to diagnose testicular torsion in a timely fashion which would have led to delayed treatment and subsequent loss of the affected testicle. c) At OSCE station 8 Dr Aliu inserted a chest drain in a way that was potentially dangerous to patient safety and fell far below the standard expected of a surgical registrar. d) During a post-operative small bowel anastomotic leak assessment and management OSCE scenario (No 10) Dr Aliu failed to understand that the patient might need more fluids to mitigate the risk of becoming hypotensive. e) At OSCE station 14, Dr Aliu failed to follow the principles of basic life support. His technique would put a patient at risk of death.”
“91. Further, the Medical Assessors told the Tribunal that they were so concerned about Dr Aliu’s performance that they felt duty bound to immediately inform the GMC to protect the public. They reported their concerns in the following terms: “Not only were his skills lacking … his understanding of the procedure was very poor. The potential risks posed to patients led the assessors to write an interim report to the GMC Fitness to Practise Department suggesting that Dr Aliu should not be allowed to undertake interventional procedures without direct supervision.” 92. They also noted that: “In inserting a chest drain into a MEDmeat station, his [Dr Aliu] practise was dangerous and risked serious injury and potential loss of life if it was a real-life situation. The team felt he also lacked insight into his failings and the fact that what he was doing was very dangerous.” “Not only were his skills lacking … his understanding of the procedure was very poor. The potential risks posed to patients led the assessors to write an interim report to the GMC Fitness to Practise Department suggesting that Dr Aliu should not be allowed to undertake interventional procedures without direct supervision.” “In inserting a chest drain into a MEDmeat station, his [Dr Aliu] practise was dangerous and risked serious injury and potential loss of life if it was a real-life situation. The team felt he also lacked insight into his failings and the fact that what he was doing was very dangerous.”
“Although the team assessed Dr Aliu as a junior registrar, when forming their opinion, they considered whether he could work at a more junior level. Dr Aliu was: • unable to correctly fill out a discharge summary • unable to prescribe or transcribe simple drug doses • unable to perform BLS safely and effectively • unable to communicate appropriately with patients • unable to assess and perform basic resuscitation on an acutely unwell patient The above are all competencies the team would expect of someone who had just graduated from medical school at the beginning of foundation year 1 and as such it is the team’s opinion that Dr Aliu should not practice as a doctor. Importantly his lack of insight into his own ability could compromise patient safety if he were practising at any level. Dr Aliu’s comprehension of basic questions, both from the assessment team and from patients, was poor and his responses were often either unrelated to the question or inadequate. The team were concerned that there was either a language or cognitive component to this lack of understanding.”
“Having completed his assessment on the previous day Dr Aliu was asked about the level that he felt confident practising at. He said that he would feel confident working at the level of a specialist registrar, years 3-5 (SI1-20, SI2- 21, SI2-23). Given that the assessors had felt it necessary to produce an interim report for the GMC documenting serious concerns about Dr Aliu performing interventional procedures, they noted that the doctor’s comments represented severe lack of insight into his own abilities.”
“The decision to direct erasure was not disproportionate having regard to the extent of the Registrant’s deficiencies and his complete lack of insight. The fact that the Registrant was the subject of an interim suspension order cannot be a reason for imposing a lesser sanction in circumstances where erasure was deemed necessary in the public interest. The considerations that apply when imposing an interim order are not the same as those that apply when imposing a substantive sanction after factual allegations have been proved and a doctor’s fitness to practise has been found to be impaired. Whilst the interim suspension may have prevented the Registrant from having direct clinical involvement with patients, it cannot explain his failure to accept any of the assessment findings or his lack of insight into the need for remediation. The suspension would not have prevented the Registrant from engaging in reflection, attending courses, seeking a mentor, shadowing a colleague, or undertaking any similar activities.”