“(1) The Adjudicator may investigate whether a pub-owning business has failed to comply with the Pubs Code if the Adjudicator has reasonable grounds to suspect that— (a) the business has failed to comply with the PubsCode, or (b) the business has failed to follow a recommendation made under section 56. (2) The Adjudicator may not carry out an investigation until the guidance required by section 61(1) has been published.”
“(1) Following an investigation, the Adjudicator must— (a) publish a report on the outcome of the investigation, and (b) consider whether to use any of the enforcementpowers mentioned in section 55. (2) An investigation report must, in particular, specify— (a) any findings that the Adjudicator has made, (b) any action that the Adjudicator has taken or proposes to take, and (c) the reasons for the findings and any action taken or proposed. (3) An investigation report need not identify the pub-owning business concerned. (4) If a pub-owning business is identified in a report, thebusiness must have been given a reasonable opportunity to comment on a draft of the report before publication.”
“(1) If, as a result of an investigation, the Adjudicator is satisfied that a pub-owning business has failed to complywith the Pubs Code, or has failed to follow a recommendation made under section 56, the Adjudicator may take one or more of the following enforcement measures— (a) make recommendations; (b) require information to be published; (c) impose financial penalties. …”
“(1) If the Adjudicator chooses to enforce through imposingfinancial penalties, that means imposing a penalty on the pub-owning business of an amount not exceeding the permitted maximum (see subsection (6)). (2) The financial penalty is imposed by giving the pubowning business written notice specifying— (a) the grounds for imposing the penalty, (b) the amount of the penalty, (c) the period within which it must be paid, and (d) how it must be paid. (3) The pub-owning business may appeal to the High Courtagainst— (a) the imposition of a financial penalty, or(b) its amount. (4) Financial penalties under this section are recoverable by the Adjudicator as a debt. (5) Financial penalties received by the Adjudicator must be paid into the Consolidated Fund. (6) The Secretary of State must make regulations— (a) specifying the permitted maximum, or (b) specifying how the permitted maximum is to be determined.”
“6.1 The PCA is mindful that a financial penalty is one of the most punitive forms of enforcement and should be imposed where other enforcement measures alone are inadequate. 6.2 Star's breaches of the Code were particularly serious because they frustrated the core Code principles of fair and lawful dealing in relation to tied pub tenants, and that tied pub tenants should be no worse off than if they were not subject to any tie. 6.3 The MRO process is the critical route by which the "no worse" off principle can be delivered, and by which tied pub tenants can instigate meaningful negotiations with pub owning businesses in respect of their tied and free of tie options. The process is dependent upon compliant MRO proposals forming the foundation upon which fair negotiations between tied pub tenants and POBs can occur. The offer of non-compliant MRO terms compromises that foundation and undermines the effective working of Code.
“6.6 When considering the scale of any Code breaches, the PCA will take into account not only actual harm caused, but also any harm the breach was capable of causing. When assessing impact on tenants, the PCA will assess both the number of tenants or groups of tenants that were or could have been affected, and the extent of the impact on individual tenants or groups of tenants. … 6.8 One of the PCA's main concerns from the evidence she reviewed has been the deterrent effect of Star’s proposed stocking terms. An unreasonable stocking term allows the POB to distort the negotiating process, by impeding the ability of the tenant to have a commercially viable free of tie tenancy or to use the MRO offer to negotiate fairer tied terms at rent review, and creating a disincentive to tenants who are considering exercising their statutory right to MRO. This frustrates Parliament's intention to create a viable alternative to the tied option. 6.9 It is not possible to determine definitively the reason why any of Star's tenants chose to withdraw from the MRO process, or why others may have settled on the tied terms that they did or decided not to pursue the option altogether. Star's use of standard approaches across its whole tied estate was bound to give rise to breaches in individual cases, and this was therefore foreseeable. ThePCA received documentary evidence from Star of itsinteractions with individual tenants in negotiations andarbitration proceedings, supported by accounts from awide range of tenants who had requested MRO,demonstrating that tenants perceived detrimental impactsfrom Star's stocking terms. The PCA is satisfied that Star's proposed terms served as a structural barrier to MRO.”
“the findings in the Investigation Report (replicated at paragraph 6.3(..)) of the Penalty Notice) … were unsupported by the evidence, for the reasons set out in paragraphs …. of[the Appeal Skeleton]. The PCA therefore acted unreasonably or unlawfully or erred in fact in reaching those findings”
“…the PCA’s investigation was procedurally unfair in that the PCA failed to give Star an opportunity to make representations on enforcement measures, in particular, on whether a financial penalty should be imposed or its amount, before such penalty was imposed, contrary to section 54 of the 2015 Act or alternatively, contrary to common law requirements of fairness or the procedural requirements of Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. As a result of this serious procedural irregularity, Star was deprived of the opportunity to persuade the PCA not to impose a penalty or to impose a penalty of a lower amount.”
“(2) The first consideration is the need to exclude from disclosure (so far as practicable) any information whosedisclosure the authority thinks is contrary to the publicinterest. (3) The second consideration is the need to exclude from disclosure (so far as practicable)— (a) commercial information whose disclosure the authority thinks might significantly harm the legitimate business interests of the undertaking to which it relates, or (b) information relating to the private affairs of an individual whose disclosure the authority thinks might significantly harm the individual’s interests. (4) The third consideration is the extent to which the disclosure of the information mentioned in subsection (3)(a) or (b) is necessary for the purpose for which the authority is permitted to make the disclosure.”
“It was important to extend assurances of anonymity to TPTs and third parties in respect of information provided in the course of the investigation into the Appellant. If this had not been done there was considered to be a serious risk that the Appellant’s tenants would be inhibited in coming forward to provide information in an open and honest manner which could potentially be critical of the Appellant. As the landlord of the relevant premises, the Appellant is in the stronger commercial position and its tenants may be concerned about potentially being subjected to detrimental treatment if they were identifiable as having provided such information to the PCA. Outside of this investigation, my Office also receives communications from tenants direct, and from industry bodies representing tenants, who express concerns or request my assistance but are concerned not to be identifiable to the POB. As a regulator tasked with enforcing the Pubs Code, it is imperative that those whom the Pubs Code is designed to protect trust that the PCA will keep their identities confidential when they come forward with information about potential breaches of the Code. Otherwise, there is a risk to the ability of the PCA to regulate effectively, including a risk to future investigations and receipt of regulatory intelligence.”
“it is very important that I retain the trust and confidence of all stakeholders. If that trust were to be broken by the Appellant either obtaining the identities of the tenants or the means to identify them… then I fear that my statutory duties of investigation (including of complaints received from tenants) would be compromised”
“Whether, in an appeal under section 58(3) of the 2015 Act, Star may appeal against the imposition of a financial penalty or its amount on the basis that findings in the investigation report published under section 54, which are relied upon as grounds for the imposition of the penalty, or taken into account when calculating the amount of the penalty, were unfair, unjustified, incorrect and/or do not justify the imposition of a penalty.”