ZV, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWHC 3562 (Admin)

[2020] EWHC 3562 (Admin)

Date Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 21 st December 2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Before

MR JUSTICE FORDHAM- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Between

The Queen on the application ofClaimant

ZVClaimant

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOMEDefendant

DEPARTMENTDefendant

The Queen on the application of

ZV Claimant

SECRETARY OF STATE for HOME Defendant

DEPARTMENT

Raza Halim (instructed by Duncan Lewis) for Claimant

Nicholas Ostrowski (instructed by Government Legal Department) for Defendant

Hearing Hearing date: 21.12.20

Judgment as delivered in open court at the hearing

Approved Judgment

I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.

.............................

THE HON. MR JUSTICE FORDHAM

Note: This judgment was produced for parties, approved by the Judge, after using voicerecognition software during an ex tempore judgment in a Coronavirus remote hearing.

Introduction

[1]This is an interim relief application in the context of judicial review proceedings, in which the defendant applied on 15 December 2020 to discharge an Order made by Cheema-Grubb J on 11 December 2020. The claimant has for some 10 days been accommodated in a London hotel by the defendant pursuant to that Order. The case has had a cooperative dynamism which has meant that the issues have progressively narrowed. The questions before me today concern what is to happen next to the claimant, in particular(a) so far as accommodation is concerned and

(b) in relation to travel costs.

Mode of hearing

[2]The mode of hearing was a remote hearing by Microsoft Teams. Counsel were satisfied, as am I, that the interests of their clients were not prejudiced. The open justice principle was secured. The case and its start time were published in the cause list. So was an email address usable by any member of the press or public who wished to observe this public hearing. I am satisfied that the mode of hearing was necessary, appropriate and proportionate. This is day two of the new Tier 4 in London and many other places. A remote hearing eliminated any risk to any person, whether associated with the parties or a member of the press or public, from having to travel to a court room or be present in one.

The claimant’s accommodation position

[3]The claimant is currently accommodated in “initial” accommodation at the hotel. Everybody agrees that she will need, shortly (but consistently with the realities of the pandemic), to be relocated into what I will call “stage two” accommodation: that is accommodation at a specified address pursuant to paragraph 9 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016.

My decision in substance

[4]I have already indicated to the parties, having heard submissions today, what I have decided in substance to do. I will come back at the end of this ruling, with their assistance, to the precise terms of my Order. I have decided:(1) to continue interim relief in this case;

(2) to ensure that the claimant is not relocated outside London pending a further hearing to take place on 13 January 2021 (suitable for a Deputy High Court Judge);

(3) to make clear that – in addition to an £8 per week ‘subsistence’ payment – travel costs will need to be provided in relation to four matters which need to be treated as necessary;

(4) not at this stage to order that stage two accommodation will necessarily need to be in London;

(5) nor to leave the claimant in limbo for an extended period in hotel accommodation. The period between now and the further hearing on 13 January 2021 is to enable the parties to prepare concrete evidence on the geographical implications for the claimant of stage two accommodation and to seek to resolve the position by agreement if they can. If anything remains contentious, then the Court – in a more informed position than I am today – will be able to resolve the disputed issue or issues at that further hearing. What that Court decides, insofar as interim relief is concerned, including on matters that I am provisionally dealing with today, will be entirely a matter for that Court. I will however explain the circumstances, and give the reasons as to why I have concluded that the ‘balance of justice’ is most suitably and appropriately addressed today by the making of an Order in the substantive terms which I have just outlined.

The claimant’s position, as described in the claim

[5]The claimant’s grounds for judicial review start from this position. The claimant is a victim of trafficking and has been formally recognised as such by a conclusive grounds decision dated 29 June 2018. She is a highly vulnerable individual as a consequence of her trafficking and ill-treatment in Lithuania and the United Kingdom. She was trafficked into prostitution for 8 years, subject to enforced heroin use, gangraped and re-trafficked and subjected to ill-treatment throughout by her trafficker. She has attempted suicide. (I interpose that an anonymity order has been made in this case and continues.) The grounds for judicial review go on to identify that the claimant “has been assessed to be ‘a psychiatrically unwell woman … suffering from significant symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder with psychotic symptoms and additional post-traumatic traits’, and has developed a drug addiction”.

Cheema-Grubb J’s order for interim relief

[6]The case came before Cheema-Grubb J on the evening of Friday 11 December 2020. She made the Order requiring the defendant to “accommodate the claimant forthwith”. Cheema-Grubb J described the position as it stood before her as follows: that the claimant was “in danger of street homelessness”; that she is “vulnerable” and “has been accepted to be a victim of trafficking”; and that it was “appropriate to make the interim order over the weekend” and then allow the Secretary of State to respond. The focus at that stage, understandably, was on getting a roof over the claimant’s head in circumstances where as the Judge recorded that, on the evidence, she was facing street homelessness and was vulnerable. The backcloth was that the Secretary of State on 8 December 2020 had refused the claimant “support” under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (making reference to sections 98 and 95); and the claimant was being said to be threatened with street homelessness, in circumstances where she could no longer continue to stay at the residence of a “friend”.

What happened next

[7]On Monday 14 December 2020 the claim for judicial review was filed. It focused on why it was said to be unlawful for the Secretary of State to have refused support under the asylum-related provisions of the 1999 Act. It invoked

Article 3 of the ECHR

, as scheduled to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the well-known case of Limbuela

[2005] UKHL 66

. The Secretary of State applied, on Tuesday 15 December 2020, to vary Cheema-Grubb J’s Order and requested a ‘return date’ hearing for that application. That was in circumstances where Cheema-Grubb J had herself ordered(a) a return date and

(b) liberty to the Secretary of State to apply on 24 hours notice to vary or discharge the Order. The Secretary of State, on Friday 18 December 2020, then filed two documents. The first was a response to interim relief, which CheemaGrubb J had directed. The second was a skeleton argument. The Secretary of State’s position was that she had now communicated (or was now communicating) her ‘agreement to provide accommodation’ but to do so under Schedule 10 of the 2016 Act. In those circumstances, her position was that the application for interim relief had become “academic”.

Today

[8]The question of interim relief had, by Friday 18 December 2020, been fixed for today’s hearing at 2pm before me. A lot of things have happened today, Monday 21 December 2020. One of them was that the claimant’s team recognised that, at least for the purposes of interim relief, “accommodation” as had been ordered by CheemaGrubb J could, in principle, be provided under Schedule 10 to the 2016 Act by means of stage two accommodation (after “initial” accommodation in an hotel). That recognition, however, left a number of associated issues which the claimant’s team contended required resolution. One of those concerned ‘subsistence’ payments. Another related to travel and travel expenses. There was also a concern raised as to whether the stage two accommodation could properly be outside London. The contention on behalf of the claimant was that it could not, properly and consistently with her human rights, be provided outside London in the circumstances of this case.

[9]By the time of the hearing before me, the question of the ‘subsistence’ payments had been resolved. The Secretary of State confirmed by an email from Counsel that, alongside the claimant being in “full board hostel or hotel” accommodation, she would “receive £8 per week to go towards her essential living needs with food and other essentials provided in-kind”. That was what was being sought by the claimant solicitors, leaving aside the question of travel costs. Mr Ostrowski submitted that that email explanation, on its face, would cover not only initial accommodation in an hotel but would in principle also apply to full-board stage two accommodation, but he recognised that the language was capable of giving rise to an ambiguity. I make clear, for the purposes of interim relief and today, that I am quite satisfied that it is necessary for these ‘subsistence’ payments (£8 per week) to be available, and to continue, whether the claimant is in hotel accommodation or in stage two accommodation. Thus, were the Secretary of State to decide promptly – following this hearing – to move the claimant into stage two accommodation in London (which is what the claimant’s representatives advocate and which would be the only stage two accommodation consistent with the Order I am making today, so far as the period between now and 13 January 2021 is concerned), the subsistence payments will need to continue.

Stage two accommodation: where and when?

[10]The two concerns which arise, in particular, in relation to stage two accommodation are concerns about ‘where’ and concerns about ‘when’. The claimant’s position is that the ‘where’ must be ‘in London’; and that the ‘when’ should be ‘as soon as possible’. The Secretary of State’s position is that the ‘where’ need not be, and will not (unless ordered by the Court) be, in London: that there will be no unlawfulness in stage two accommodation being outside London. So far as concerns ‘when’, the Secretary of State’s position is that there are practical considerations, made more difficult given the pandemic and current restrictions, and that it may be that stage two accommodation could not be identified for ‘a number of weeks’ even were it outside London. The submission is made by Mr Ostrowski that accommodation outside London is easier, or can be taken to be easier, and cheaper for the Secretary of State to source than accommodation in London.

Travel costs and four suggested ‘needs’

[11]So far as the travel expenses are concerned, the claimant’s position before this Court today is that there are four matters which arise:(a) which require to be treated as ‘needs’ in her case;

(b) which call for travel expenses to be provided; and

(c) which cannot be regarded as encompassed within the £8 per week subsistence. The Secretary of State today resists any interim order which would encompass any duty to recognise those matters as ‘needs’ for the purposes of providing any additional payment beyond the £8 per week subsistence. The picture in relation to all four matters is an extremely recent one. The claimant’s solicitors have written a letter dated today which refers to the four matters to which I will shortly turn and which is accompanied by a letter, also dated today, from the a London NHS Foundation Trust.

[12]I referred earlier to what I called the cooperative dynamism of this case. I have explained how the focus has changed over time. I have explained how ‘a roof over her head’ was the anxious concern, understandably, on Friday 11 December 2020. There are, in my judgment, two other points that need to be borne closely in mind when considering the evolution of what is put forward on the claimant’s behalf in this case. The first point is that the claimant’s case was always squarely based on the contention that the Secretary of State was statutorily obliged to address needs pursuant to the 1999 Act. One of the implications of that claim was that 1999 Act provision includes not only “accommodation” but also appropriate “support”. In relation to accommodation on immigration bail the parties referred to the Home Office guidance dated 16 November 2020 and the reference to accommodation and provision for “daily living needs”. Alongside that, it is necessary always to remember the overlay provided by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the duty imposed on public authorities, including the Secretary of State, in a human rights context. It is unsurprising in my judgment that the focus should have evolved, in the context of the present case, particularly in circumstances where the Secretary of State was putting forward an alternative (bail accommodation), which the claimant was able to accept – albeit with an accompanying qualification regarding the need for “support” – for the purposes of interim relief provision.

How the claimant’s solicitors acted

[13]The second point which, in my judgment, it is worth always having in mind in the present case is this. This is a case where the Secretary of State refused support on 8 December 2020 and the claimant’s solicitors have been seeking, at all stages thereafter, to do their utmost to secure protection for the interests of a vulnerable client. It may be that what I am about to describe is common on the part of those solicitors who represent clients within the realms of immigration and asylum work. I cannot, speaking for myself, remember having encountered it before. When their client was facing what they described as destitution and street homelessness earlier this month, and remembering that they are legal aid solicitors operating at the ‘coalface’ of immigration and asylum work, the claimant’s solicitors – out of their own pocket – paid for the claimant to be accommodated in an hotel, rather than see her on the street and destitute. That action was recorded in Cheema-Grubb J’s reasons for her Order on 11 December 2020. That the claimant’s solicitors acted commendably barely needs saying. But I have no hesitation, nevertheless, in saying it. What they have done, then and thereafter, on behalf of their client needs always, in my judgment, to be viewed with recognition that they have been seeking properly and proactively to promote and protect her legitimate interests.

Accessing daily-supervised medication from the pharmacist

[14]The four suggested ‘needs’ that are referred to in the very recent letters, dated today (21 December 2020) and placed before this Court today, are as follows. First, there is the fact that the claimant collects medication daily from a chemist. As the letter from the NHS Trust explains, the “taking of th[at] medication is supervised by the chemist to ensure it is taken correctly”. I have no doubt in the light of the nature of that medication – related as it is to treatment in the context of drug addiction or previous drug addiction – that the claimant has a “need” to access medication, on a daily basis, in a way that is properly supervised. I have no doubt, on the evidence before me, that that “need” can be fulfilled by being able to visit daily that chemist. The letter goes on to describe how the NHS Trust “key worker”, at the most recent monthly session on 18 December 2020 (the same day as the Secretary of State’s response documents to this claim for interim relief) had learnt that the claimant “had been unable to go to the chemist”, which was “because of a lack of funds”, “so that her prescription had expired”. The letter explains that “prescriptions for [the drug] methadone are only valid for three days to avoid the risk of decreased tolerance and overdosing”. The letter goes on to explain how “our doctor working that day” (ie. 18 December 2020 at the Trust) had been “alarmed by the gravity of [the claimant]’s current situation” and had “recommended” communication to the claimant’s solicitors “about the seriousness posed by [the claimant] not being able to readily access treatment”. Being able to travel to a suitable pharmacist on a daily basis who is able to supervise access to the appropriate medication is the first of the four matters which, I am quite satisfied, must be treated by the Secretary of State as a “need”, and a need for appropriate travel expense, beyond the subsistence payment.

Attending keyworker sessions

[15]The second matter referred to in the recent material is the monthly session with the keyworker themselves. I accept Mr Ostrowski’s characterisation that these are described as “monthly keyworkers sessions” with the NHS Trust. On the face of it, it may be that the next monthly session will be around the middle of January 2021. I do not know whether it will be before or after 13 January 2021. Nor do I know whether the NHS Trust may consider it necessary to make other arrangements, possibly for an earlier session or possibly for an online session using technology which might, in the claimant’s case, involve expense for her. Those sessions are described as sessions which have been ongoing and which have addressed “substance misuse history”. On the face of it, being able to attend sessions arranged by and with the keyworker is the second area which, in my judgment, and for the purposes of interim relief today, clearly requires in the interests of justice to be recognised as a “need” to be covered so far as expense is concerned beyond the subsistence payment.

Attending hospital

[16]The third topic concerns referral to a hospital. Today’s letter describes it as having recently come to the attention of the NHS Foundation Trust that the claimant has tested “positive for Hepatitis C”. She is described as having been “referred” by the Trust “to [a named London] Hospital’s specialist service so she can begin treatment”. In my judgment, that is the third area where it is clearly necessary that the claimant be identified as having a present “need”, including a need for any expenses in being able to travel to meet appointments being covered.

Provision beyond subsistence

[17]I am entirely unpersuaded that these “needs” for travel expense can in any way be taken to be covered by the £8 per week subsistence payment. I make clear that, at least in the interim, these needs where they arise must be addressed by provision outside and beyond that weekly subsistence payment.

Being able to visit a supportive friend

[18]The fourth topic arises from the solicitors’ letter dated today, rather than from the Trust’s letter. Having referred to the need for travel costs to attend the chemist daily to obtain the Methadone, and for the monthly appointments with the keyworker, the solicitors’ letter goes on to describe what is called the claimant’s need to make “occasional visits to her friend who provides important ongoing emotional support”. Mr Ostrowski submitted that to “enjoy” (as he put it) time with a friend in the current circumstances was something that could, at its highest, be put as a “need” arising only on, say, a “fortnightly basis”, for the purposes of approaching interim relief. Mr Halim, for the claimant, submitted as follows: that it is quite impossible and inappropriate to seek to quantify, by means of incidence, the nature of this “need”. I have no hesitation, for the purposes of interim relief, in preferring the characterisation of Mr Halim. I cannot begin to assess (by quantifying an appropriate frequency) what the implications, in reality, are for the claimant – given her vulnerabilities – of the ongoing ability to be able to visit and see the friend who is said to provide the “important ongoing emotional support”.

[19]Amid the stringent Tier 4 restrictions, applicable to people in London, and many places beyond, is the recognition that it can be appropriate – and that it is perfectly lawful – for an individual to be able to meet a friend, in a public outdoor space. I am not prepared to countenance, in the interim period of this claim for judicial review, this prospect: the claimant being left, in the circumstances of the current Tier 4 pandemic lockdown, unable to visit her friend when she really needs to be able to do so, because she is unable to afford it due to the limits of the support that has been provided to her. The starting point is that these visits are described as “occasional”. But, if and insofar as she has a genuine emotional need to visit her friend, in my judgment that is not something she should be unable to do for want of provision of the travel expenses to cover it.

A protective approach

[20]As I put to Counsel during the hearing this afternoon in this case, one of the real concerns that arises in a case such as the present is the prospect of some important need of a vulnerable individual ‘falling between the cracks’. In my judgment, it is necessary to ensure that the interim position is secured in a way which is fully protective and proactive, in relation to all four of the “needs” which are identified in the materials before the Court.

Stage two accommodation: when?

[21]So far as concerns stage two accommodation and when that will take place, I am quite satisfied that the Order that strikes the appropriate balance is the one that leaves the Secretary of State able until 13 January 2021 to do one of two things. The first is to continue to provide the accommodation in the current hotel where the claimant is accommodated, and not to proceed to stage two accommodation until the Secretary of State has taken, if she wishes to take it, the opportunity to contest at the hearing on 13 January 2021 whether stage two accommodation should be in London or outside London. The second thing that it is open to the Secretary of State to do, consistently with my Order today, is to get on and move the claimant into stage two accommodation but to do so within London. Whichever course she takes she must provide the travel expenses to cover the four matters which I have described. Mr Halim in his submissions recognised that there could be real difficulties on the part of the Secretary of State in being able to source speedily stage two accommodation within London. He submitted that the answer to that was that the claimant was ‘quite prepared to wait if there was a problem’. He urged, however, that the claimant should not be required to wait for a period of ‘several weeks’: that, he submitted, was ‘too long’. In my judgment the return date of 13 January 2021 and resolution then of any remaining outstanding and disputed issue will not visit on the claimant, in all the circumstances, the prospect of remaining in an hotel for a period which is ‘too long’.

Why only a short-term Order today?

[22]In that regard, and in relation to all of these matters, I now need to turn to the question why I was not prepared, at the hearing today, to deal on a more long-term and durable basis with the interim position. That includes, in particular, why I was not prepared to make a ruling today as to whether or not the balance of justice requires that the claimant be within London for stage two accommodation purposes. The answer to that is that, in my judgment, this Court today does not have the clarity that it needs – on both sides of the case – to be able to say, with confidence for any enduring period, what the position should be so far as concerns stage two accommodation and geography (the ‘where’ question). Nor, in my judgment, does this court today have a fully concrete and evidenced picture in relation to the four matters to which I have referred for the purposes of making today an interim order which would persist beyond the short-term (ie. between today and 13 January 2021).

[23]I emphasise I am not criticising the claimants’ representatives when I say that the letters before the Court today, dealing with the four matters to which I have referred, were letters written today and produced today. I am concerned as to whether that places the Secretary of State in an unfairly disadvantaged position. I am concerned to limit the effect for now of the Order that I have made. Mr Halim, fairly and rightly, recognises that the claim documents filed in this case on Monday 14 December 2020 did not give detail in relation to the four matters which I have described and the travel expense needs of the claimant. Mr Halim rightly points out that a compelling picture, on the face of it, is now given by the letter of the NHS Trust. That letter states:

“for both her substance misuse and treatment for Hepatitis C to work it is imperative that [the claimant] remains in the borough … and is provided with the financial resources to be able to attend regular appointments including being able to visit a chemist on a daily basis. [The claimant] is making good progress and we strongly believe that it is a benefit to [her] to remain in substance misuse treatment whilst receiving treatment for her Hepatitis C…”

That is, on the face of it, compelling and quite sufficient for the purposes of the Order that I am making today. However, the evidence is very recent and the claimant should, in my judgment, now be given an opportunity to provide further evidence in relation to the four matters I have described, and any other matter which is said to be relevant to the geographical question of ‘where’ stage two accommodation should be and the temporal question of ‘when’ (how soon) stage two accommodation must be provided. There is, as it seems to me, a difference between saying that ‘if she is being accommodated elsewhere in London the claimant needs to be able to have travel expenses to cover her continuing keyworker sessions or hospital treatment or to access the medication which has been identified as needed by her’. There is a difference between that and saying, which may not necessarily follow, that such arrangements could not be replicated elsewhere in the United Kingdom. It is obvious, in my judgment, that serious questions arise as to whether it could be, but more importantly how it would be, replicated elsewhere in the UK; and as to what assurance exists that could satisfy the Court and allay the understandable concerns and anxieties, to say the least, that the claimant herself would have.

[24]So far as concerns the friend and the “need” for ongoing emotional support, that is a matter which arises solely from the very recent solicitors’ letter (dated today). Again, I mean no criticism when I say that, at the moment, there is not before the Court detailed evidence from and on behalf of the claimant, explaining: the nature of that relationship and its history; what it means to her, and would mean to her, to be relocated in stage two accommodation which would remove the ability to be able to be in contact with that supportive friend. I am quite satisfied: that the claimant should be given a further opportunity to adduce further evidence in relation to all these matters; and that in fairness to the Secretary of State it would not be right today to make a more enduring order than the one I have identified. In particular, I am not prepared today to order that stage two accommodation in this case must necessarily be provided inside London. There is a strong case on the materials before the Court that it will need to be, but the claimant should have a further opportunity to adduce evidence, and the Secretary of State should have more time to be able to consider it and respond to it. That, then, is the position so far as concerns the claimant’s side of the picture.

[25]Turning to the Secretary of State’s side of the picture, and again making clear that no criticism is intended of anyone, this Court does not have before it today a concrete explanation of what precisely is envisaged and what reassurance can be given as to how the claimant would be dealt with in accommodation outside London, and in a transfer to accommodation outside London, in a way consistent with her needs and vulnerabilities. Given the timing of the letters dated and provided today, it is hardly surprising that this Court has been unable to be placed in that more informed position. I am not, however, prepared to deal with stage two accommodation – in or out of London – or the more enduring order as to travel expenses in relation to the claimant’s “needs”, in circumstances where the Court does not have that concrete and clear picture. A metaphor that has struck me as appropriate is one in which the carpet is removed: but only in circumstances where there is the assurance of a secure and protective underlay, which the Court can see will protect against any important “need” then (as I put it earlier) ‘falling between the cracks’.

Conclusion

[26]It was in all those circumstances, and for all those reasons, that I arrived at the conclusion in this case: (i) that there is a triable issue in the judicial review claim, about which (given the positions taken by the parties) it has not been necessary to say any more; and (2) that the ‘balance of justice’ in this case, and the correct and appropriate balance for this Court to strike at this stage, involves the protection I have identified. That means the certainty and continuity for the claimant which it will provide, through to a period which in a few weeks’ time (on 13 January 2021) will allow a judge, in a far more informed position, to be able to assess the implications and the appropriate course in this case so far as concerns continuation of interim relief on all these matters.

Resolution by agreement?

[27]I witnessed during the day today, and into the hearing this afternoon, the way in which issues in this case have narrowed. That is to the credit of both sides and their legal representatives. It may very well be that a hearing on 13 January 2021 in this case will, in the event, not be necessary. It has become obvious at this afternoon’s hearing what, on the face of it, the relevant “needs” in this case are. It will be a matter for the parties to consider, on an ongoing basis, their positions. If and insofar as there remains any disputed point or issue, then that can be resolved at the hearing I am directing to take place on 13 January 2021. So far as concerns the ongoing steps in the judicial review proceedings, those have been the subject of discussion and liaison between the parties and I will embody in my Order any further directions that are appropriate. Having heard from Counsel as to the details of the order I will include it as a final paragraph within this approved written judgment.

Costs

[28]So far as concerns costs, Mr Halim submits that the claimant has at this hearing ‘substantially achieved what she claimed’ and that ‘she should have the costs of today’. Mr Ostrowski submits that the appropriate course is to ‘reserve’ the costs to the judge hearing the matter on 13 January 2021. I am satisfied that the latter course is the appropriate one. In the end, what the hearing today was about were the further associated matters that had not been resolved. Those matters were properly pursued, but the detail in relation to them was given only in correspondence that was written today and provided today. I am not prepared at this late hour (now 6:15pm) on the last day of term Monday 21 December 2020 to go into detail as to the archaeology of the application for interim relief and the costs associated with it. I am quite satisfied that the just course is for costs, including the costs of today, to be considered by the judge on the next occasion. At that hearing, the judge will be able to see what position the Secretary of State has taken and maintained in relation to interim relief. That is likely to cast very significant light on the justice so far as the costs of today are concerned. If, for example, the Secretary of State continues to maintain the resistance of interim relief, on matters that were put forward belatedly in correspondence today, then in those circumstances it will be obvious that today’s costs would have been incurred in any event (had the letters been written earlier) and in those circumstances it is likely that the claimant will be in a compelling position so far as those costs are concerned, should the judge find in favour of the claimant in relation to interim relief. I do not propose, in the circumstances, to say any more about costs other than that I am reserving them. So: costs reserved.

Order

[29]I made the following

Order

UPON the Defendant granting the Claimant bail under Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 by decision dated 17 December 2020 AND UPON the Defendant agreeing through her response to the Claimant’s application for interim relief dated 18 December 2020 to provide or arrange for the provision of accommodation for the Claimant at a specified address pursuant to paragraph 9 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 (“Stage Two Accommodation”) AND UPON the Defendant having on 11 December 2020 and thereafter provided accommodation at the [named London] Hotel AND UPON the Defendant agreeing by email received at 14:02 on 21 December 2020, to provide £8 in cash per week to the Claimant AND UPON the Court having given an ex tempore judgment a written version of which will be made available IT IS ORDERED that: 1. Until further Order, the Defendant, whether(a) by continuation of the Existing Accommodation or

(b) by Stage Two Accommodation is to accommodate the Claimant at an address in London. 2. Until further Order, the Defendant is to make provision for travel and other expenses which will enable the Claimant to: (1) Attend a pharmacist who dispenses and supervises her medication, on a daily basis whether her existing pharmacist in [a named London location] or a suitably qualified pharmacist elsewhere. (2) Attend appointments with her key worker on a monthly basis whether online or in person. (3) Attend appointments at the [named London] Hospital. (4) Visit the friend described in the Claimant’s solicitors’ letter dated 21 December 2020. 3. There shall be a further hearing of interim relief in this case on 13 January 2021, with a time estimate 3 hours, suitable for a Deputy High Court Judge. 4. The Claimant do file and serve on the Defendant, evidence as to interim relief, by 4pm on Wednesday 6 January 2021. 5. The Defendant do file and serve on the Claimant, any reply to the Claimant’s evidence and any proposal for the Claimant’s future accommodation and provision of financial support, by 4pm on Monday 11 January 2021. 6. The Claimant, if so minded, do apply to amend her grounds of claim by 4pm on 29 January 2021. 7. The Defendant do file her Summary Grounds of Defence by 4pm on 19 February 2021, after which the matter is to go before a Judge to determine permission on the papers thereafter. 8. Costs reserved.