“There have been no issues at the hostel, he has engaged with staff and complied with the rules. He has also had contact with probation on all his release to the hostel.”
“The Panel concluded that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that you remain confined in custody. The panel assessed that your risk of causing serious harm in the community could now be managed and therefore directs your release. As an indeterminate sentence prisoner, you will appreciate that the date for this will be determined by the Secretary of State. You will also appreciate that the panel’s decision remains a provisional one, subject to the ‘reconsideration mechanism’ (which is explained at the foot of this letter)…”
“The Panel has decided to direct your release. Subject to there being no adverse developments, you will be released, at a date determined by the SofS, once all necessary arrangements have been made…”
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”
“28.— Duty to release certain life prisoners. (1A) This section applies to a life prisoner in respect of whom a minimum term order has been made; and any reference in this section to the relevant part of such a prisoner's sentence is a reference to the part of the sentence specified in the order. … (5) As soon as (a) a life prisoner to whom this section applies has served the relevant part of his sentence, (b) the Parole Board has directed his release under this section, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence. (6) The Parole Board shall not give a direction under subsection (5) above with respect to a life prisoner to whom this section applies unless— (a) the Secretary of State has referred the prisoner's case to the Board; and (b) the Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. … (8A) In this section “minimum term order” means an order under— (a) subsection (2) ofsection 82A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (determination of minimum term in respect of life sentence that is not fixed by law), or (b) subsection (2) ofsection 269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (determination of minimum term in respect of mandatory life sentence).”
“Duration and conditions of licences “(3) The Secretary of State must not include a condition in a life prisoner's licence on release, insert a condition in such a licence or vary or cancel a condition of such a licence except— (a) in accordance with recommendations of the Parole Board, or (b) where required to do so by an order undersection 62A of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (compulsory electronic monitoring conditions).”
“Meaning of ‘the probation purposes’ “(1) In this Part ‘the probation purposes’ means the purposes of providing for— (a) courts to be given assistance in determining the appropriate sentences to pass, and making other decisions, in respect of persons charged with or convicted of offences; (b) the giving of assistance to persons determining whether conditional cautions should be given and which conditions to attach to conditional cautions; (c) the supervision and rehabilitation of persons charged with or convicted of offences; (d) the giving of assistance to persons remanded on bail; (e) the supervision and rehabilitation of persons to whom conditional cautions are given; (f) the giving of information to victims of persons charged with or convicted of offences.
“Responsibility for ensuring the provision of probation services “(1) It is the function of the Secretary of State to ensure that sufficient provision is made throughout England and Wales — (a) for the probation purposes; (b) for enabling functions conferred by any enactment (whenever passed or made) on providers of probation services, or on officers of a provider of probation services, to be performed; and (c) for the performance of any function of the Secretary of State under any enactment (whenever passed or made) which is expressed to be a function to which this paragraph applies; and any provision which the Secretary of State considers should be made for a purpose mentioned above is referred to in this Part as ‘probation provision’ . “(2) The Secretary of State shall discharge his function under subsection (1) in relation to any probation provision by making and carrying out arrangements under section 3. “(3) The Secretary of State must have regard to the aims mentioned in subsection (4) in the exercise of his functions under subsections (1) and (2) (so far as they may be exercised for any of the probation purposes). “(4) Those aims are— (a) the protection of the public; (b) the reduction of re-offending; (c) the proper punishment of offenders; (d) ensuring offenders’ awareness of the effects of crime on the victims of crimes and the public; and (e) the rehabilitation of offenders. “(5) The Secretary of State is not required by subsections (1) and (2) to take any action in relation to the making of provision for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1) if it appears to him that appropriate provision is being or will be made by any person acting otherwise than in pursuance of arrangements under section 3 …”
“The 2007 Act refers to “Approved Premises”
“[51] The passage from Langstaff J's judgment in Elson's case was this: “ section 28 of the 1997 Act cannot sensibly be interpreted to provide that as soon as a Parole Board takes a decision in which it directs release, albeit under conditions or at some future time, the Secretary of State is under a duty there and then and thereby to ensure that that release takes place forthwith. That would give no effect to the provisions of section 31; it would not recognise the difference in language between section 28 and section 32; it would in my view simply have been beyond the contemplation of Parliament that the alternative, which would need to have been in place immediate release to be effected, would operate in an impractical way—as Ms Davies points out, if it were to be the case that it was anticipated that a Parole Board might make a direction which was conditional as to time or circumstance, that (so far as a circumstance such as accommodation in a hostel was concerned) the hostel would have to be held available just in case the Board at its hearing might decide that particular prisoner under review was to be released, even though it equally might not. Supervision arrangements would have to be made in anticipation of a possible outcome; appointments with psychiatrists and the like would have to be in place—all of which would be on a provisional basis which, given that the decision lies in the power of the Parole Board which has not yet considered it, might or might not be given effect to. I cannot sensibly construe section 28 in such a way that it would have that effect.” [52] I agree with Langstaff J and the judge that Parliament cannot have intended the section to work in a way that would have the impracticable results that flow from the construction which Mr Rule would have us adopt. Of course, prior planning is made by the offender manager to see when a place at Approved Premises would be available, as happened here. It enables the panel to know that, if it directs release to Approved Premises, the release can be safely achieved with the relevant risk management precautions in place. However, to my mind, an intention to require immediate release at a time before such precautions are known to be available is not something that one should readily attribute to Parliament. As Langstaff J also pointed out, if a prisoner is released on condition of residence at a place which is not available to him it would have the result that he would have to be brought back to prison immediately the condition was broken on the first day out of custody. Such a result can hardly have been intended.” “ section 28 of the 1997 Act cannot sensibly be interpreted to provide that as soon as a Parole Board takes a decision in which it directs release, albeit under conditions or at some future time, the Secretary of State is under a duty there and then and thereby to ensure that that release takes place forthwith. That would give no effect to the provisions of section 31; it would not recognise the difference in language between section 28 and section 32; it would in my view simply have been beyond the contemplation of Parliament that the alternative, which would need to have been in place immediate release to be effected, would operate in an impractical way—as Ms Davies points out, if it were to be the case that it was anticipated that a Parole Board might make a direction which was conditional as to time or circumstance, that (so far as a circumstance such as accommodation in a hostel was concerned) the hostel would have to be held available just in case the Board at its hearing might decide that particular prisoner under review was to be released, even though it equally might not. Supervision arrangements would have to be made in anticipation of a possible outcome; appointments with psychiatrists and the like would have to be in place—all of which would be on a provisional basis which, given that the decision lies in the power of the Parole Board which has not yet considered it, might or might not be given effect to. I cannot sensibly construe section 28 in such a way that it would have that effect.”
“[41] … The Secretary of State plainly is under an obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Parole Board's specified conditions are met within a reasonable time after the Parole Board has directed release. That obligation does not come from s 28 read with s 31 of the 1997 Act, nor does it come from s 2 of the 2007 Act, which I will address in greater detail below as part of Issue 3. It comes from domestic public law, which requires the Secretary of State, as a public body, to operate a proper system, to act reasonably and to apply its own published policy to those within the contemplation of that policy, see R (Kaiyam) v Justice Secretary[2015] AC 1344 at [41] (Lord Mance and Lord Hughes JJSC) where the Court identified the following "ordinary" public law duties owed by the Justice Secretary: "… As a matter of domestic public law, complaint may be made in respect of any systemic failure, any failure to make reasonable provision for an individual prisoner so egregious as to satisfy the Wednesbury standard of unreasonableness [see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn[1948] 1 KB 223 ] or any failure to apply established policy." [42] These duties provide the safeguard for any life prisoner who believes that his continued detention, pending a placement at an AP, is excessive or unreasonable.”
“[46] The real point for Mr Stanton is the four-month delay: was it excessive? In answer, I note two things. First, as a matter of context, Mr Stanton was subject to an "indeterminate" sentence for public protection. He had no right to release at any date certain following conviction. His only expectation was that he would be released if he could demonstrate that his continued detention was no longer necessary for public protection. He knew (or should have known) that any direction for release might be subject to a residence condition, fulfilment of which would depend on a suitable placement being found. That is what happened; that was in line with his reasonable expectations. Secondly, on the facts, his release could only have been secured earlier by sending him to a different AP, because Mandeville House was full. But Mr Stanton wanted to be in the Cardiff area, which was undoubtedly the best place for him given his family and community ties, and that was what the Parole Board had specified, even knowing there would be a delay of around 4 months. Overall, and if this matter is part of Mr Stanton's case, I conclude that his detention until23 July 2015 was reasonable, while accepting that this case falls closer to the line.”
“[25] …section 2 does not create a duty to provide any particular assistance to any individual. The section is framed in general terms. It refers to the “function” of the Secretary of State, which is a word that connotes a general responsibility rather than any specific duty. It is, moreover, clear from its wording that the section is dealing with the overall sufficiency of the provision made for the probation purposes in England and Wales and not with whether or what specific provision should be made in any particular case for the benefit of any particular individual. [27] …under the 2007 Act the question whether “sufficient” provision has been made throughout England and Wales for the probation purposes is a matter for the Secretary of State to determine, subject only to ordinary principles of judicial review. Under the 2007 Act it is for the Secretary of State to decide what provision ought to be made for any of the probation purposes (as expressly reflected in the definition of “probation provision” in section 2(1) and in the wording of section 3(1) of the Act). It must by the same token be for the Secretary of State to decide what provision is sufficient. That question necessarily involves judgments about how the various probation purposes can most effectively be furthered using the resources available. It is neither within the expertise nor part of the constitutional function of courts to make judgments of that nature. They are for the executive branch of government to make.”
“[77] … There may be strains on the system, and in some cases there may be delays in finding a suitable placement (as suggested by the witness evidence by the various solicitors), but I am not persuaded that those problems represent any form of systemic failure. [78] That is the answer however the duty is put. Certainly, there is no demonstrated breach of the high level s 2 duty. But even if a wider James public law duty to make such provision did exist, there is still no compelling evidence of breach: the evidence relating to the availability of APs is a world away from the evidence about the deficiencies in the provision of courses and other services examined in James and related cases. [79] There is no insufficiency in the provision of APs such as to amount to a breach of duty, however that duty is framed. I am willing to accept that there are shortcomings at an individual level within the system. That much is plain… But that does not reveal any breach of duty under s 2 of the 2007 or even on the assumption that a James duty does apply.”
“it was not the executive determining when detention should end in these cases. The detention would end when, in accordance with the Board’s judicial decision, the claimants could be released consistently with the protection of the public.”
“Looking at ground (2), the claimants were being detained under the original sentences. The Board decided judicially the conditions upon which it would be safe to release the claimants. Without the conditions, there would have been no release. Untilthose conditions could be achieved, therefore, (provided thatthat was within a reasonable timeframe) there could be nobreach in the relevant “chain of causation”.”
“[28] It is essential to bear in mind the realism and flexibility of the European court's approach. As Lord Mance and Lord Hughes JJSC noted [in Kaiyam], failings in the prison system which arise due to a lack of resources and facilities cannot always be redressed at the drop of a hat, whatever order a court may make… the court said in terms in the James case that it would be unrealistic, and too rigid an approach, to expect the authorities to ensure that relevant treatment or facilities were made available immediately... [29] The high threshold for establishing a violation of article 5 on this basis was also emphasised by Lord Mance and Lord Hughes JJSC. As they observed at para 60, article 5 does not create an obligation to maximise the coursework or other provision made to the prisoner, nor does it entitle the court to substitute, with hindsight, its own view of the quality of the management of a prisoner and to characterise as arbitrary detention any case which it concludes might have been better managed. … … [45] Emphasis should…be placed on the high threshold which has to be surmounted in order to establish a violation of the obligation. As the European court stated in Kaiyam v United Kingdom 62 EHRR SE13, at para 70, cases in which a violation is found will be rare… That is consistent with the statement in R (Sturnham) v Parole Board[2013] 2 AC 254 , para 13, that “a violation of article 5.1 of the Convention … would require exceptional circumstances warranting the conclusion that the prisoner's continued detention had become arbitrary”
“… in assessing whether the place and conditions of detention are appropriate, it would be unrealistic, and too rigid an approach, to expect the authorities to ensure that relevant treatment or facilities be available immediately: for reasons linked to the efficient management of public funds, a certain friction between available and required treatment and facilities is inevitable and must be regarded as acceptable. Accordingly, a reasonable balance must be struck between the competing interests involved. In striking this balance, particular weight should be given to the applicant’s right to liberty, bearing in mind that a significant delay in access to treatment is likely to result in a prolongation of the detention. In the Brand case itself, the Court found that even a delay of six months in the admission of the applicant to a custodial clinic could not be regarded as acceptable in the absence of evidence of an exceptional and unforeseen situation on the part of the authorities.”
“[62] …the Court, in the circumstances of the present case, cannot accept the applicant’s argument that the failure to admit him to a custodial clinic on10 October 1994 rendered his detention after that date automatically unlawful under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. [63] In this connection, the Court considers in the first place that – given the difference between a prison sentence, which has a punitive character, and a TBS order, which is of a non-punitive nature – it cannot, as such, be regarded as contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention to commence the procedure for selecting the most appropriate custodial clinic (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above) only after the TBS order has taken effect.” [64] The Court further considers that, once this selection procedure has been completed, it would be unrealistic and too rigid an approach to expect the authorities to ensure that a place is immediately available in the selected custodial clinic. It agrees with the domestic courts that, for reasons linked to the efficient management of public funds, a certain friction between available and required capacity in custodial clinics is inevitable and must be regarded as acceptable.”
“By their first argument, the Claimants contend that the Parole Board’s direction breaks the chain of causation between the conviction and the continued detention, because continued detention ceased to be necessary once the Parole Board had directed release, and at that moment the causal connection between the conviction and detention was broken. This argument is closely linked to the construction of s 28 which I have already dealt with. I have concluded that s 28 envisages detention continuing up to the point that an AP becomes available. That puts paid to the Claimants’ first argument. There is no break in the chain of causation if detention is continued while waiting for a place at an AP.”
“The Board decided judicially the conditions upon which it would be safe to release the claimants. Without the conditions, there would have been no release. Until those conditions could be achieved, therefore, (provided that that was within a reasonable timeframe) there could be no breach in the relevant “chain of causation”.”