“I am very mindful of the expectation outlined in Regulations that injury pensions are reassessed. I have a duty to ensure that the use of public money is justified and necessary and this needs to be balanced with the recognition that these benefits were awarded following injury in the course of duty to the public. I am clear that Staffordshire Police will meet its legal commitments to honour injury benefit payments at a level to which each pensioner is entitled. The process is not a cost-saving exercise and will not be a factor in any force savings target required by the ongoing budgetary challenges. Neither does the Force have a predetermined aim to reduced bandings.”
“a person who ceases or has ceased to be a member of a police force and is permanently disabled as a result of an injury received without his own default in the execution of his duty…”
“(1) ...a reference in these Regulations to a person being permanently disabled is to be taken as a reference to that person being disabled at the time when the question arises for decision and to that disablement being at that time likely to be permanent.”
“(4) Subject to paragraph (5), disablement means inability, occasioned by infirmity of mind or body, to perform the ordinary duties of a member of the force…”
“Where it is necessary to determine the degree of a person's disablement it shall be determined by reference to the degree to which his earning capacity has been affected as a result of an injury received without his own default in the execution of his duty as a member of a police force…”
“42. The task, in my judgment, in assessing earning capacity is to assess what the interested party is capable of doing and thus capable of earning. It is not a labour market assessment, or an assessment of whether somebody would actually pay him to do what he is capable of doing, whether or not in competition with other workers.”
“51 .. First, the degree of disablement has to be assessed. This is assessed by the degree of loss of earning capacity. Second, it is necessary to determine the degree to which that loss is the result "of an injury received without his own default in the execution of his duty as a member of a police force." It is necessary, therefore, to discount the effect of any non−qualifying injury and any other cause whether classified as an injury or not.This could either be a non−duty injury, or an injury received through his own default, or some other cause. …what has to be disregarded is every factor which has affected the loss of earning capacity other than the duty injury”
“52…. The policy behind this requirement for apportionment is simple: an injury award should not be paid other than for injury received and earning capacity lost in the execution of the officer's duty…”
“30-Reference of medical questions (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the question whether a person is entitled to any, and if so what, awards under these Regulations shall be determined in the first instance by the police pension authority. (2) Subject to paragraph (3), where the police pension authority are considering whether a person is permanently disabled, they shall refer for decision to a duly qualified medical practitioner selected by them the following questions— (a) whether the person concerned is disabled; (b) whether the disablement is likely to be permanent, ….and, if they are further considering whether to grant an injury pension, shall so refer the following questions— (c) whether the disablement is the result of an injury received in the execution of duty, and (d) the degree of the person's disablement; and, if they are considering whether to revise an injury pension, shall so referquestion (d) above…. (emphasis added) (5) The police pension authority may decide to refer a question in paragraph (2) or, as the case may be, (3) or (4) to a board of duly qualified medical practitioners instead of to a single duly qualified medical practitioner, and in such a case references in this regulation, regulations 31 and 32 and paragraphs 5(1)(a) and (2) of Schedule 6 to a medical practitioner shall be construed as if they were references to such a board. (6) The decision of the selected medical practitioner on the question or questions referred to him under this regulation shall be expressed in the form of a report and shall, subject to regulations 31 and 32, be final. (emphasis added) (7) A copy of any such report shall be supplied to the person who is the subject of that report.” (a) whether the person concerned is disabled; (b) whether the disablement is likely to be permanent, (c) whether the disablement is the result of an injury received in the execution of duty, and (d) the degree of the person's disablement; and, if they are considering whether to revise an injury pension, shall so referquestion (d) above…. (emphasis added) (5) The police pension authority may decide to refer a question in paragraph (2) or, as the case may be, (3) or (4) to a board of duly qualified medical practitioners instead of to a single duly qualified medical practitioner, and in such a case references in this regulation, regulations 31 and 32 and paragraphs 5(1)(a) and (2) of Schedule 6 to a medical practitioner shall be construed as if they were references to such a board. (6) The decision of the selected medical practitioner on the question or questions referred to him under this regulation shall be expressed in the form of a report and shall, subject to regulations 31 and 32, be final. (emphasis added) (7) A copy of any such report shall be supplied to the person who is the subject of that report.”
“33 Refusal to be medically examined “If a question is referred to a medical authority under regulation 30, 31 or 32 and the person concerned wilfully or negligently fails to submit himself to suchmedical examination or to attend such interviews as the medical authority mayconsider necessary in order to enable him to make his decision, then— (a) if the question arises otherwise than on an appeal to a board of medical referees, the police pension authority may make their determination on suchevidence and medical advice as they in their discretion think necessary; (b) if the question arises on an appeal to a board of medical referees, the appeal shall be deemed to be withdrawn.”
“(1) An appeal shall not lie under regulation 34 or 35 against anything done by a police pension authority in the exercise of a power conferred by these Regulations which is expressly declared thereby to be a power which they are to exercise in their discretion.”
“37-Reassessment of injury pension (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, where an injury pension is payable under these Regulations, the police pension authority shall, at such intervalsas may be suitable, consider whether the degree of the pensioner'sdisablement has altered; and if after such consideration the police pension authority find that the degree of the pensioner's disablement has substantially altered, the pension shall be revised accordingly…”
“It is important from the point of view of disputes such as pension entitlement that a decision once made should be final if at all possible, and that is what is provided by these Regulations. But causation questions having been put aside, it is clearly fair both for the police force and for the community that someone who starts out on a pension on the basis of a certain medical condition should not continue to draw a pension, or any kind of benefit, which is no longer justified by reason of some improvement in his condition, or, of course, the reverse.”
“….it was not open to a selected medicalpractitioner or to the defendant appeal board, on a periodic review of an injury pension under regulation 37(1) of thePolice (Injury Benefit) Regulations 2006 , to reduce or increase a pension by virtue of a conclusion that the clinical basis of an earlier assessment of the pensioner’s degree of disablement had been wrong; that, on such a review, neither the medical practitioner nor the board was entitled to redetermine the merits of any earlier decision and their only duty was to decide whether there had been an alteration in the degree of disablement since the previous review or decision;”
“18 So much is surely confirmed by the terms of regulation 37(1), under which the police authority (via the SMP/board) are to consider whether the degree of the pensioner’s disablement has altered. The premise is that the earlier decision as to the degree of disablement is taken as a given; and the duty - the only duty - is to decide whether, since then, there has been a change: substantially altered, in the words of the regulation.”
“the degree of the [pensioner's] disablement”
“is not entitled to pre-empt the answers of the medical practitioner by coming to adverse conclusions as to fact, or law, in relation to the claim in order to avoid reference to the medical practitioner”
“Staffordshire Police Injury Awards - Implementation of Home Office Circular 46/2004. Agreement Between Staffordshire Police, NARPO and Police Federation. 1. Applies to all ex officers in receipt of injury awards prior to 0 1/01/08 2. All ex officers beyond State Retirement Age (SRA) at 01/01/08 to be protected for life at their current injury award level with annual increases 3. All ex officers are entitled to at least a Band 1 injury award for life. Staffordshire Police will guarantee a minimum award of£50 per month irrespective of any calculation (uprated annually by the appropriate inflation index) 4. All ex officers will be "paper reviewed" now and then again at SRA unless a review is requested by the ex-officer 5. All ex officers will retain their existing injury award band until SRA unless a review is requested by the ex-officer 6. Staffordshire Police will not recalculate injury awards using National Average Earnings as the comparator but will continue to use police pay 7. Staffordshire Police will accept as a cogent reason for not reducing to Band 1 at SRA the fact that an ex officer was not able to accrue the equivalent of a 30year pension. In such circumstances any reduction at SRA would only be to the equivalent of a 30-year pension plus a Band 1 injury award for the rank held at retirement. This will be increased in line with the appropriate inflation index 8. Ex officers in receipt of injury awards who completed sufficient service to receive the equivalent of a 30-year pension will be entitled to that pension plus a band l injury award at SRA. Increased annually by the appropriate inflation index 9. Those ex officers in receipt of a pension and an injury award that when added together falls below that of a full 30-year pension plus a band 1 injury award will retain their combined pension and injury award without reduction. Increased annually by the appropriate inflation index 10. Agreed protection arrangements will ensure that any reductions at SRA are phased to reflect the amount of such reductions and the time that the ex-officer has had to plan. There will be a minimum of 12 months’ notice before any reduction is implemented 11. Staffordshire Police will work with the Federation and NARPO to assist ex officers who might wish to put forward other cogent reasons for not reducing their injury awards on a case by case basis Within the bounds of statutory powers this agreement is a binding contract upon all signatories.”
“In May 2006 you will have received a letter from Superintendent Andy Franks who was, at that time, Head of HR. The letter was intended to give early notice of potential changes to the way in which your injury award would be calculated following the issuing of new guidance by the Home Office. I recognise that the content of that letter may have caused you some anxiety or distress - I apologise if this was the case. Staffordshire Police has been in close consultation with NARPO and the Police Federation to try and establish a fair and compassionate way of implementing the Home Office guidance (circular 46/2004).”
“Staffordshire Police recognised that its management of injury awards had not previously been in line with this Home Office guidance and consequently ex officers in receipt of injury awards would also have had expectations that were at odds with the guidance. Following extensive discussions with NARPO and the Police Federation an agreement has been reached (attached at Appendix A) which seeks to address Staffordshire Police's duty to comply with the Home Office advice but which also recognises the impact that any reduction in injury awards might have on individual ex officers. In your particular circumstances and having reviewed your injury award I ampleased to inform you that under the agreement your current injury awardbanding and pension are guaranteed for life. Staffordshire Police do not propose to review your injury award again unlessfollowing any significant changes in your condition, you request a review. I hope that the content of this letter is clear and that I have been able to allay any concerns that you may have had following the correspondence in May 2006”
“It was agreed at the Staffordshire Police Pension Board that I should write to you, in my capacity as Chair of the Pension Board. You receive an Injury Pension from Staffordshire Police and the Chief Constable has decided, in her capacity as Police Pension Authority, that injury pensions will be reviewed. This is in accordance with Regulation 37(1) of thePolice (Injury Benefit) Regulations 2006 .”
“This letter is just to inform you of the reassessment programme. Whilst I acknowledge this may cause you some anxiety, I regret that at this point in time I am unable to enter into correspondence with you about your personal circumstances. You will be written to again directly in due course when yourinjury pension comes up for review. The process is expected to take at least eighteen months, so it may be some time before you are written to again about this.”
“30 It was common ground that, before a statement or representation can be relied upon as giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it must be “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”: see R v Inland RevenueComrs, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd[1990] 1WLR1545 , 1569g–h, per Bingham LJ; R (Patel) v General Medical Council[2013] 1WLR2801 , para 40, per Lloyd Jones LJ. As Lloyd Jones LJ went on to say at para 44: “The question for consideration is how, on a fair reading of the statement, it would have been reasonably understood by those to whom it was made …”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
“the concept of ‘possessions’ in the first part of article 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as ‘property rights’, and thus as ‘possessions’ for the purposes of this provision.”
“…. (b) Article 1 of Protocol No.1 does not guarantee the right to acquire property. (c) An applicant can allege a violation of Art.1 of Protocol No.1 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his “possessions” within the meaning of this provision. “Possessions” can be either “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a “possession” within the meaning of Art.1 of Protocol No.1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition”
“…a first question that arises in this case is whether the applicants ever enjoyed a right to develop the land in question which could have been the subject of an interference. Like the Commission, the Court considers that this question must be answered in the affirmative. When Pine Valley purchased the site, it did so in reliance on thepermission which had been duly recorded in a public register kept for thepurpose and which it was perfectly entitled to assume was valid. That permissionamounted to a favourable decision as to the principle of the proposeddevelopment, which could not be re-opened by the planning authority. In these circumstances it would be unduly formalistic to hold that the Supreme Court's decision did not constitute an interference. Until it was rendered, the applicants had at least a legitimate expectation of being able to carry out their proposed development and this has to be regarded, for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as a component part of the property in question.”
“(1) A legitimate expectation relating to property may constitute a possession protected by article 1 at any rate if it can be regarded as a component of property protected by article 1….(2) A legitimate expectation for this purpose may arise notwithstanding the fact that it was beyond the powers of the public body which fostered the expectation to realise the expectation….(3) The legitimate expectation cannot entitle a party to realisation by the public body of the expectation which it is beyond the powers of the public body to realise, but may entitle him to other relief which it is within the powers of the public body to afford, e g the benevolent exercise of a discretion available to alleviate the injustice or payment of compensation. (4) But the fact that the expectation was founded on an ultra vires act or that the public body had no power to realise the expectation raised and the reason why in law it had no such power, e g the potential adverse effect on third parties, may be a reason, and indeed a strong reason, going to the justification for the interference and its proportionality.”
“The Court recalls that, according to the established case law of the Convention organs, “possessions” can be “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right” 101.At paragraph 35 the Court said that: “The Court considers, in the circumstances of this case, that the applicant must be regarded as having at least a legitimate expectation of exercising the option to renew and this may be regarded, for the purposes of Art.1 of Protocol No.1, asattached to the property rights granted to him ….under the lease.”
“the Court is of the view that West Dorset’s actions may be regarded as frustrating the applicant’s legitimate expectations under the lease and deprivinghim in part of the consideration which he gave in entering into the agreement. Whether it is regarded as interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the applicant’s possessions within the meaning of the first sentence of Art.1 or as a deprivation of possessions within the second sentence, the same principles apply…”
“….it is not suggested that in this case the applicant had any possibility to obtain some kind of compensation for the application of the rule in his case. The applicant not only had the expectation of deriving future return from his investment in the lease but, as was noted in the Court of Appeal, the option to renew had been an important part of the lease for a person undertaking building obligations and who otherwise would have had a limited period in which to recoup his expenditure.”
“the interference was plainly lawful, being in accordance with English law, pursued the legitimate aim of safeguarding the legal rights of the public over Hedsor Water and was proportionate in that it achieved a fair balance between the interests of the public and the interests of Mrs Rowland.” 110.Peter Gibson LJ explained, at paragraph 96, that: “It was inevitable that once the defendant was aware that it had made a mistake in allowing Hedsor Water to be treated as a private water, it, as the guardian of navigation in the Thames, should resile from its previous stance. Courts should be slow to fix a public authority permanently with the consequences of a mistake…, particularly when it would deprive the public of their rights. The defendant had no power to fulfil the expectation of Mrs Rowland, and it was bound to conclude that it should remove the misleading signs that Hedsor Water was private…”
“161 In this respect too, both the Pine Valley….and Stretch… cases were in my judgment very different cases to the present; and the distinction is not purely formalistic as Lord Lester suggests. In the Pine Valley case the minister's grant of outline planning permission was an official decision creating legal rights, formally recorded for public use; even in that situation, it was held that purchasers bore the risk that the right might be nullified. In the Stretch case the borough council was the other contracting party in an apparently straightforward commercial transaction, whereby the council granted an option for an additional term, a grant which must clearly and fundamentally have shaped the consideration obtained by the council from the other party. The council's inability in law to grant such an option pursuant to its own direct contractual undertaking led, not surprisingly, to the grant of relief to the other party to the contract.”
“I agree that Mrs Rowland's legitimate expectation should be seen as a possession within article 1 of the first Protocol. An intricate process of reasoning is required to reach this conclusion. But, as Peter Gibson LJ has explained, in para 96 above, this conclusion does not take Mrs Rowland very far. The Human Rights Convention does not enable Mrs Rowland to retain Hedsor Water as private, when to achieve this is beyond the statutory power of the respondents. They must not act so as to abuse their power, but I agree that they have not done so.”
“47. In the above cases the persons concerned were entitled to rely on the fact that the legal act on the basis of which they had incurred financial obligationswould not be retrospectively invalidated to their detriment. In this class of case the “legitimate expectation” is thus based on a reasonably justified reliance on alegal act which has a sound legal basis and which bears on property rights.”
“The case concerned claims for damages arising out of accidents to shipping allegedly caused by the negligence of Belgian pilots. Under the domestic rules of tort such claims came into existence as soon as the damage occurred. The Court classified the claims as “assets” attracting the protection of Art.1 of Protocol No.1. It then went on to note that, on the basis of a series of decisions of the Court of Cassation, the applicants could argue that they had a “legitimate expectation” that their claims deriving from the accidents in question would be determined in accordance with the general law of tort. 48. The Court did not expressly state that the “legitimate expectation” was a component of, or attached to, a property right as it had done in Pine Valley …and was to do in Stretch…. It was however implicit that no such expectation could come into play in the absence of an “asset” falling within the ambit of Art.1 of Protocol No.1, in this instance the claim in tort. The “legitimate expectation” identified in Pressos Compania was not in itself constitutive of a proprietary interest; it related to the way in which the claim qualifying as an “asset” would be treated under domestic law and in particular to reliance on the fact that the established case law of the national courts would continue to be applied in respect of damage which had already occurred.”
“51….On the contrary, the Court takes the view that where the proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim it may be regarded as an “asset” only where ithas a sufficient basis in national law, for example where there is settled case law of the domestic courts confirming it.”
“The concept of 'possessions' is not limited to 'existing possessions' but may also cover assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a reasonable and 'legitimate expectation' of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right…An expectation' is 'legitimate' if it is based oneither a legislative provision or a legal act bearing on the property interest inquestion (see Kopecký v Slovakia…. paras 45-52).”
“In order to enable· the review to be undertaken I enclose a Reassessment Questionnaire, Medical Consent Form and a prepaid envelope for your reply. A Frequently Asked Questions sheet and the Appendix “Factors which can affect the Selected Medical Practitioner's reassessment of the injury award” are also enclosed for your information. The details provided by you will be considered and only in cases where it is believed that there may be a substantial alteration in your circumstances will a formal assessment be arranged by the Selected Medical Practitioner. You will, of course, be notified of the outcome in due course.”
“Over the coming months we will refer Injury Benefit pensioners to our Selected Medical Practitioner (SMP). We will write to you asking that you complete the necessary consent forms for access to your medical records.” 135.There was then the following question and answer: “How will my Injury Benefit pension be reassessed? Your medical records will be requested from your doctor. These will be handled by our Occupational Health staff only and they will be sent together with the Review Questionnaire completed by you to the SMP. The SMP will review your file and assess whether there is any substantial alteration to your police injury disablement. The SMP may decide to interview you in person. Examinations usually take place at the SMP's consulting rooms….”
“Will my medical records be kept confidential? Yes. Although correspondence with you will be from the HR Support Team…all your medical records will only be seen by our [OH] staff and the SMP. Nonmedical staff will neither see nor have access to your medical records.” 138.Then there was this passage: “What if I refuse to take part in this process? When we write to you to request that you complete the Review Questionnaire plus the forms necessary for access to your medical records, you will be given 28 days to reply and return the forms. At the end of that 28 days your injury benefit pension may be suspended or reduced to Band 1 if we have had no satisfactory reply from you. You will be sent reminder letters at 21 days after our initial letter if we have not had your reply. If you fail to be medically examined, or to attend a medical interview, then the Police Pension Authority may make a final decision on the medical evidence and advice as is thought necessary.”
“Please note that if you do not attend the appointment, the SMP will conduct the review in your absence and will produce a report to the Police Pension Authority for consideration under Regulation 33…..In those circumstances, the Police Pension Authority may make his determination on such evidence and medical advice as he in his discretion thinks necessary. If you do attend but do not agree to the request made by the SMP, including the release of your GP records and the release of your report to the Police Pension Authority, Regulation 33 shall apply.”
“We do not consider that a former police officer brings themselves within Regulation 33 by attending an interview and then failing or refusing to answer all of the questions put by the SMP to the satisfaction of the SMP. Regulation 33 onlycomes into play if the former officer wilfully fails to attend the interview, not if theofficer attends, and yet fails to provide answers at the interview to the reasonablesatisfaction of the SMP.”
“Regulations 37 and 33 clearly imply the cooperation expected of a person who is the subject of a review. If it were not so, Regulation 33 would be unnecessary”. 157.The letter added: 150. Wright’s medical records is in breach of case law orArticle 8 of the ECHR . Indeed, disclosed GP medical documents are securely kept, with access only given to Occupational Health professionals and the SMP. The Force does not retain such GP records on file. Once the appeal period has expired, and it is known that an appeal has not been lodged. The confidentiality of Mr Wright’s health data is therefore preserved and respected.”
“We did not discuss his medical condition, and I do not have his permission to access his GP records. Therefore, I have not been able to conduct an assessment, and cannot produce a certificate.”
“I am not suggesting that those pensioners being reviewed should have to disclose the entirety of their medical history, but in my view, to assist the SMP (and ultimately the PPA) in reaching their decisions…. a certain amount of relevant medical information has to be made available. Without being fully informed and having all the necessary information, the PPA could make a decision which is of detriment to your clients. The ultimate aim of the review is to ensure that the appropriate pensions are being received.”
“…. Mr Wright attended the assessment but confirmed he was not willing to provide any medical information. This I confirmed effectively frustrated thereview process.…. (emphasis added) Opinion As Mr Wright does not consent to me obtaining information from his General Practitioner and or Specialists in order to allow me to make a determination as to whether there has been a substantial alteration in Mr Wright’s index disablement I am unable to provide any meaningful comment and it is therefore for the Police Authority to make a determination based on such evidence and advice as they consider appropriate.”
“I expressed my concern that I could not compare his present situation to his historic situation as he was not giving consent for access to any medical information either held by Staffordshire Police or his GP or other medical practitioners. He confirmed he did not wish to do this, apart from providing a letter from his GP, effectively confirming his condition and a statement from himself to state this had not changed.”
“Ms Baker confirmed she was willing to engage in the process but not to allow me to access any medical records, information or to provide consent for reports or copies of medical records and therefore I considered I could not undertake an assessment as instructed as I have no means of validating information. Ms Baker made it clear that she was not willing to engage in the process beyond attending and providing the limited, and in my opinion inadequate information, noted above. She specifically would not allow access to any medical records however focussed or limited in nature I am therefore unable to make a determination.”
“Mr Tucker was interviewed by Dr Nightingale, Selected Medical Practitioner on14 August 2018 . The SMP’s report to Staffordshire Police has not been released, as the SMP’s company IMASS has not received consent from Mr Tucker for its release. Dr Nightingale has verbally informed Occupational Health, however, that in her opinion, because Mr Tucker would not allow her access to any medical records,she is unable to make a decision as to whether there has been a substantialalteration in his disablement. It is therefore for the Police Pension Authority to make a determination based on such evidence and advice as he considers appropriate.”
“So that I can explain the next stages of the process in person and give you the opportunity to discuss it further. Of course, as the other injury pensioners will be present, I am not proposing to discuss individual cases.”
“Further to your appointment with the Selected Medical Practitioner… He has advised in a letter dated13 March 2018 that he has been unable to make a decision as to whether there has been a substantial alteration in your injury disablement. I am writing to inform you that in my capacity as Police Pension Authority, I have determined, in accordance with Regulation 33….that you have failed to submit yourself to such medical examination as the medical authority (the SMP) considered necessary in order to enable him to make a decision. Having carefully considered the matter, I have determined, therefore, that your injury pension be reduced from Band 3 to Band 2 with effect from13 March 2018 .”
“As Mr Wright has refused to give his consent to the release of relevant medical records, the SMP has been unable to complete a meaningful review of his injury disablement. Legal advice given by Joint Legal Services about this is that as a result of Dr Yarnley’s letter, Regulation 33 should now be applied by the Police Pension Authority.”
“he was therefore unable to make any meaningful comment or determination. 5. I determined that you failed to submit yourself to such medical examination or interview as the SMP considered necessary in order to enable him to make a decision and that, accordingly, I was able to make a determination as to whether there had been a substantial alteration in your degree of disablement on such evidence and medical advice as I thought necessary.”
“It is open to you to provide me in good faith with relevant and accurate information relating to your current condition and capacity for work, so that I can consider whether a reconsideration of this determination or a further review under Regulation 37 is justified. You may request a further review if you believe that there has been a substantial alteration in your disablement.”
“Although this requirement ensures that the applicant must provide the police authority with an opportunity to have him or her, examined and interviewed as necessary, it does not provide the authority with any express power to require thedisclosure of relevant documents and medical records. Although it is not suggested that a police authority should be given such a power, it is clear that refusal to comply with such a request will oblige the police authority or the SMP, as the case may be, to consider the case on the available facts, and it is also reasonable for them to conclude in such circumstances that the claimant has something to hide, which would damage his or her case.”
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations . . . everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
“….I would be prepared now to hold that cases where the award of services or benefits in kind is not an individual right of which the applicant can consider himself the holder, but is dependent upon a series of evaluative judgments by the provider as to whether the statutory criteria are satisfied and how the need for it ought to be met, do not engage article 6(1). In my opinion they do not give rise to ‘civil rights’ within the autonomous meaning that is given to that expression for the purposes of that article….”
“48. It is in the interests of the coherence of the Convention as a whole that the autonomous concept of “possessions” in Art.1 of Protocol No.1 should be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the concept of pecuniary rights under Art.6(1). It is moreover important to adopt an interpretation of Art.1 of Protocol No.1 which avoids inequalities of treatment based on distinctions which, at the present day, appear illogical or unsustainable.”
“the State intervention is not sufficient to establish that Article 6(1) is inapplicable; other considerations argue in favour of the applicability of Article 6(1) in the instant case. The most important of these lies in the fact that despite the public law features pointed out by the Government, the applicant was not only affected in her relations with the administrative authorities as such but also suffered an interference with her means of subsistence; she was claiming an individual economic right flowing from specific rules laid down in a federal statute. In sum, the Court sees no convincing reason to distinguish between Mrs. SchulerZgraggen's right to an invalidity pension and the rights to social insurance benefits asserted by Mrs. Feldbrugge and Mr. Deumeland.”
“The reference in that decision to ‘an individual, economic right flowing from specific rules’ in legislation reflects a thread running through the case law in this area. It is plain from the jurisprudence of the court that an important factor in the application of article 6(1) in disputes with public authorities in areas which in national law would normally be regarded as public law is the assertion by the applicant of what has been variously described as ‘an economic right’ or an ‘individual, economic right’ or a ‘purely economic right’.”
“73…. There is no right to any particular accommodation. The duty is to secure that accommodation is available. In my judgment, these factors together with the essentially public nature of the duty mean that the duty does not give rise to an individual economic right...,”
“79. It is therefore necessary for the Court to examine the whole of the legislative scheme in question, including the safeguards offered to individual claimants, in order to determine whether the procedure provided for resolution of disputes over the “civil rights and obligations” thereby created is compliant with art 6(1); including, in particular, for the purposes of the present case, whether the adjudicatory process by which the applicant’s “civil rights” were “determined”, taken as a whole, provided a due enquiry into the facts.”