“415. I conclude that appeal 1 would be located in an unsustainable location and would not preserve the special qualities of the listed building. These matters are not outweighed by public benefits. As such it would not comply with Local Plan policies T14, CON 17 and CON 18 and national planning policy. For the reasons above I conclude that appeal 1 should be dismissed. 416. I conclude that subject to the imposition of conditions and obligations within the section 106 agreement, appeals 2 and 3 are acceptable proposals. They would provide appropriate sites for development, would preserve the listed buildings and RPG, would not have an adverse effect on ecological interests and would not give rise to an unacceptable risk to highway safety. They would be in accord with Local Plan policies GEN 1, GEN 2, GEN 3, GEN 4, NRM6, CON 12, CON 17, CON 18, T 14, T 15, T16 and national planning policy. I conclude that appeals 2 and 3 should be allowed. 417. Appeals 4, 5 and 6 would not provide appropriate sites for development being in an unsustainable location and resulting in isolated housing in the countryside. They would be harmful to the character and appearance of the area and would not preserve the special qualities of the listed buildings, their settings or the RPG. These matters are not outweighed by public benefits. They would not be in accord with policies GEN 1, GEN 3, GEN 4, T14, CON 12, CON 17 and national planning policy. 418. Appeals 7 - 1 4 and 16 would be located in an unsustainable location and it would not be in the interests of the heritage assets to find them a new use. They would not be in accord with Local Plan policy T 14. Appeals 8 - 1 4 and 16 fail on grounds (a) and (g) and the period for compliance will not be extended. 419. I conclude that appeals 15 and 17 - 33 succeed on ground (c) and no breach of planning control has occurred. 420. I have taken into account all other matters raised but none outweigh my conclusions.”
“78. To promote sustainable development in rural areas, housing should be located where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities. Planning policies should identify opportunities for villages to grow and thrive, especially where this will support local services. Where there are groups of smaller settlements, development in one village may support services in a village nearby. 79. Planning policies and decisions should avoid the development of isolated homes in the countryside unless one or more of the following circumstances apply:..”
“54. The Council's reasons for refusal in respect of appeals 1, 4, 5 and 6 relate to the alleged unsustainable location of the site by virtue of its remote position away from nearby settlements with services and facilities and in the case of appeal 7 through the provision of new isolated dwellings in the open countryside. Its reasons for taking enforcement action in appeals 8 - 33 include the creation of new dwellings in the open countryside which do not represent a sustainable form of development. The Council does not object to appeals 2 and 3 on these grounds. 58. In rural areas, to promote sustainable development housing should be located where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities. Isolated homes in the countryside should be avoided unless they are to serve one of identified special circumstances including where such development would represent the optimum viable use of a heritage asset or would be appropriate enabling development to secure the future of the heritage assets; or where the development would re-use redundant or disused buildings and enhance its immediate setting. 59. Although the development plan policies relating to settlement boundaries are out of date, there is no dispute between the parties that the site is located outside any settlement area and is not in the vicinity of the boundary of any settlement. It is in the countryside. 60. Nonetheless the appellant considers that the proposals would not result in isolated homes in the countryside under the meaning given in paragraph 79 of the Framework. I have taken into account the findings of Braintree which remain relevant to the revised Framework as the text in the revision remains essentially the same. It was held in the judgement that the word isolated should be given its ordinary objective meaning of "far away from other places, buildings or people; remote". A distinction was also made in the judgement between "rural communities", "settlements" and "villages" on the one hand and "countryside" on the other. At the Court of Appeal it was agreed that the Framework does not define a community, settlement or village or that a settlement or development boundary must have been fixed in an adopted or emerging local plan. It was held that it should not necessarily have any services or public transport within easy reach. Whether in any particular case a group of dwellings constitutes a settlement or a village for the purposes of the policy will be a matter of fact and planning judgement for the decision maker. 61. In the cases before me, whilst I acknowledge that the site contains existing buildings, it is evidently not a rural community, settlement or village but rather a discrete group of buildings used in the past for a specific purpose as a residential institution centred on a historic house. It is remote from other settlements and villages and surrounded by open countryside. In my assessment residential development in this location would result in new isolated housing in the countryside… 88. The Framework should be read as a whole and seeks to direct development to locations which are or can be made sustainable, where services are accessible and where the natural environment is protected. I do not consider that the various measures proposed are of such weight to outweigh the conclusion the site is in an inappropriate location in the countryside for new residential development, divorced from services and facilities. Appeals 4, 5, 6 and 7 would result in isolated homes in the countryside. Whilst the travel plan and proposals for electric charging points would potentially provide some choice of travel, given the lack of facilities within walking distance of the site, the distance to the bus stops and the unattractive nature of the road network to walk and cycle, the site's location is not one that is or can be made sustainable. The developments would not enhance or maintain the vitality of the local communities or result in strong and vibrant rural communities. I conclude that the site would not be an appropriate and sustainable location for housing) development in Appeals 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 - 33… 377. I have considered the merit of all appeals 8-33 in my overall decisions above. Whilst my findings in respect of appeals 15 and 17 - 33 are not applicable as these appeals succeed under ground (c), my findings on the merits of appeals 8-14 and 16 can equally be applied under ground (a). As set out above, I have found that these appeals would result in isolated homes in the countryside in an unsustainable location. I do not find that the re-use these buildings as dwellings would be in the interests of the heritage assets given the harm that all the parties agree results from their presence.”
“29. Secondly, the policy explicitly concerns the location of new housing development. The first sentence of para.55 tells authorities where housing should be "located". The location is "where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities". The concept of the "vitality" of such a community is wide, and undefined. The example given in the second sentence of para.55— "development in one village" that "may support services in a village nearby"—does not limit the notion of "vitality" to a consideration of "services" alone. But it does show that the policy sees a possible benefit of developing housing in a rural settlement with no, or relatively few, services of its own. The third sentence of the paragraph enjoins authorities to avoid "new isolated homes in the countryside". This is a distinction between places. The contrast is explicitly and simply a geographical one. Taken in the context of the preceding two sentences, it simply differentiates between the development of housing within a settlement—or "village" - and new dwellings that would be "isolated" in the sense of being separate or remote from a settlement. Under the policy, as a general principle, the aim of promoting "sustainable development in rural areas" will be achieved by locating new dwellings within settlements and by avoiding "new isolated homes in the countryside". The examples of "special circumstances" given in the policy illustrate particular circumstances in which granting planning permission for an isolated dwelling in the countryside may be desirable or acceptable. But what is perfectly plain is that, under this policy, the concept of concentrating additional housing within settlements is seen as generally more likely to be consistent with the promotion of "sustainable development in rural areas" than building isolated dwellings elsewhere in the countryside. In short, settlements are the preferred location for new housing development in rural areas. That, in effect, is what the policy says. 30. Thirdly, the adjective "isolated", which was the focus of argument before us, is itself generally used to describe a location. It is not an unfamiliar word. It is commonly used in everyday English. Derived originally from the Latin word "insula", meaning an "island", it carries the ordinary sense of something that is"... [placed] or standing apart or alone: detached or separate from other things or persons; unconnected with anything else; solitary" (The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition)… 31. In my view, in its particular context in para.55 of the NPPF, the word "isolated" in the phrase "isolated homes in the countryside" simply connotes a dwelling that is physically separate or remote from a settlement. Whether a proposed new dwelling is or is not "isolated" in this sense is a matter of fact and planning judgment for the decision-maker in the particular circumstances of the case in hand. 32. What constitutes a settlement for these purposes is also left undefined in the NPPF. The NPPF contains no definitions of a "community", a "settlement", or a "village". There is no specified minimum number of dwellings, or population. It is not said that a settlement or development boundary must have been fixed in an adopted or emerging local plan, or that only the land and buildings within that settlement or development boundary will constitute the settlement. In my view a settlement would not necessarily exclude a hamlet or a cluster of dwellings, without, for example, a shop or post office of its own, or a school or community hall or a public house nearby, or public transport within easy reach. Whether, in a particular case, a group of dwellings constitutes a settlement or a “village”, for the purposes of the policy will again be a matter of fact and planning judgment for the decision-maker. In the second sentence of para.55 the policy acknowledges that development in one village may support “services" in another. It does not stipulate that, to be a “village” a settlement must have any "services" of its own, let alone "services" of any specific kind.”
“Local planning authority should avoid new isolated homes in the countryside unless there are special circumstances…”
“Planning policies and decisions should encourage the effective use of land by re-using land that has been previously developed (brownfield land) provided that it is not of high environmental value.”
“The proposed development would result in the provision of new isolated dwellings in the open countryside and does not represent a sustainable form of development. The proposal is contrary to the objectives of Policy RUR2 of the Hart District Local Plan (as saved) and the NPPF.”
“The proposed development is a significant major residential development in the countryside in an unsustainable location which is remote from nearby settlements with services and facilities. The quantum and scale of development proposed is unjustified as enabling or cross subsidy development in this rural landscape, it is therefore contrary to the provisions of policies GEN3 and RUR 1 - 3 of the HDLPR and the Core Principles of the NPPF.”
“During the Inquiry it was evident that there was some uncertainty and inconsistency as to the benefits being offered for each proposal. At my request a list of the benefits being put forward for each proposal was tabled and it is on this basis that I have determined the appeals. However, much of the heritage evidence before the Inquiry was given prior to this document being provided. The National Trust provided a written response to the documentand the parties agreed that rather than recalling witnesses it would be appropriate for me to consider all the evidence on harm and benefits and reach my own judgement on the balance to be reached. It is on that basis that I have reached my decisions.”
“… The authorities confirm that in a context such as this, a relevant competent authority is entitled to place considerable weight on the opinion of Natural England, as the expert national agency with responsibility for oversight of nature conservation, and ought to do so (absent good reason why not)…”
“The applicant contends that Historic England’s opposition to all of the appeals was unreasonable given the concessions given by its witnesses under cross examination. I have acknowledged in my decisions that there was some uncertainty and inconsistency as to the benefits being offered for each proposal with the final list of benefits being provided after much of the heritage evidence was given. This led me to agree that it would be appropriate for me to consider all the evidence of harm and benefits and reach my own judgment.…”
“If there is only one viable use, that use is the optimum viable use. If there is a range of alternative economically viable uses, the optimum viable use is the one likely to cause the least harm to the significance of the asset, not just through necessary initial changes, but also as a result of subsequent wear and tear and likely future changes. The optimum viable use may not necessarily be the most economically viable one. Nor need it be the original use. However, if from a conservation point of view there is no real difference between alternative economically viable uses, then the choice of use is a decision for the owner, subject of course to obtaining any necessary consents.”
“Local planning authorities should assess whether the benefits of a proposal for enabling development, which would otherwise conflict with planning policies but which would secure the future conservation of a heritage asset, outweigh the dis-benefits of the parting from those policies.”
“224. Turning to whether appeal 4 would provide the optimum viable use, it is the only scheme before me that seeks to provide the restoration of the RPG and the wider setting of the mansion. 225. I have been provided with a considerable amount of information about the financial viability of the scheme and heard evidence on the same at the Inquiry. I note that the appellant claims that this is the minimum amount of development that can be provided for viability reasons. However, as I have set out above, the approach to providing this amount of development and that is the subject of this appeal, would be harmful. There is nothing before me to persuade me that an alternative design and approach to the development could not be provided that would not have the resulting harm to the RPG and setting of the listed buildings and still provide the public benefits. As such, irrespective of the respective views of the viability of appeal 4, I have nocompelling evidence before me that appeal 4 represents the optimum viable use of the site. 234. As appeal 5 would only go ahead with appeal 4, my conclusions in relation to the optimum viable use of the site in respect of appeal 4 are as relevant to appeal 5 and I do not repeat them here.”
“248. Nonetheless, the appellant has stated that in the event that I find that the individual proposals do not meet planning policy that consideration should be given to the proposals as enabling development for both the mansion and RPG. In this respect, the Framework states that an assessment should be carried out as to whether the benefits of a proposal for enabling development, which would otherwise conflict with planning policies, would secure the future conservation of the heritage asset, and thus outweigh the disbenefits of departing from those policies. 249. Historic England has published advice on enabling development. Whilst this precedes the revised Framework, given that the content of the revised Framework is similar to its predecessors the advice remains relevant and I have taken [it] into account. 250. Historic England's advice includes a policy on enabling development. This requires, amongst other things, that enabling development that would secure the future of a significant place, but contravene other planning policy objectives, should be unacceptable unless, amongst other things, it will not materially harm the heritage values of the place or its setting, it avoids detrimental fragmentation of the place and it is demonstrated that the amount of enabling development is the minimum necessary to secure the future of the place and its form minimises harm to other public interests. 251. I have found that appeals 2 and 3 would not be harmful to the heritage assets and are acceptable developments in heritage terms. Appeal 2, on the evidence before me, would result in a viable new use for the mansion if sold to an individual to repair and convert. Appeals 5 and 6 which provide additional funding for the mansion, conflict with planning policies as set out elsewhere in my decisions. In light of my findings in respect of appeal 2, funding from these developments would not be required to secure the future of the mansion. This, taken with the harm that they would cause to the heritage value of the RPG and setting of the mansion, leads me to conclude that there is no case for enabling development resulting from appeals 5 and 6, or indeed any development intended to bring the mansion back into use. 252. The onlyproposal before me for the restoration of the RPG is appeal 4 and I have found that this would contravene planning policies as set out elsewhere. It would result in greater harm to the heritage assets than the retention of the existing buildings. It is not therefore an acceptable form of enabling development as it would further harm the heritage value of the RPG and the setting of the mansion. As I have set out above, whilst I acknowledge the appellant's view that the proposals represent the minimum amount of development required to achieve the benefits, I am not persuaded that there is not another less harmful residential scheme that could be provided with the same benefits to the RPG. In this respect Historic England's advice is that the onus in on the applicant to justify an assertion that a particular form of development is the least damaging way of achieving what may be a common objective. I am not persuaded that appeal 4 would be the least damaging; indeed I find it would cause greater damage to the status quo. As such I do not find that appeal 4 would result in acceptable enabling development. 253. Appeals 7 – 33 offer no benefits to the heritage assets and as such cannotreasonably be considered enabling development. 254. I conclude that the proposals are not an acceptable form of enabling development and would not secure the future conservation of the heritage assets. Therefore the disbenefits of departing from planning policies are not outweighed by the benefits of enabling development.”
“… There may well be cases where the degree of harm which would result from a proposal is such that it is decided that the benefits which the proposal would bring must await a new scheme with an improved design. The decision-maker may properly and lawfully reach that conclusion in appropriate cases. Conversely, there may also be cases where the degree of harm is not judged to be so great that it warrants rejecting the proposal and sending the developer away, on the basis that he will come up with an improved scheme. There may well be disadvantages from the public standpoint in terms of delay and uncertainty in rejection of the current proposal. Certainly there is nothing inherently illogical or unlawful in the decision-maker concluding that the scheme is acceptable, even though a yet better scheme could be devised. Into which of these two categories a proposed development falls is a matter of planning judgment for the decision maker only to be impugned on the usual Wednesbury grounds.”
“69.. I do not doubt the correctness of what was said by Lindblom J, as he then was, in the context of heritage harm in .. Forge Field Society v Sevenoaks [2015] JPL 22 when he said this: “if there is a need for development of the kind proposed, which in this case there was, but the development would cause harm to heritage assets, which in this case it would, the possibility of the development being undertaken on an alternative site on which that harm can be avoided altogether will add force to the statutory presumption in favour of preservation. Indeed, the presumption itself implies the need for suitably rigorous assessment of potential alternatives.” 70. Whilst that observation was made in the context of harm to heritage assets and the need to consider alternative sites, I accept that there is a need to consider alternative, less harmful uses of the same site when evaluating a proposal that would cause harm to a heritage asset… However the way in which that evaluation may be carried out will vary from case to case…” “if there is a need for development of the kind proposed, which in this case there was, but the development would cause harm to heritage assets, which in this case it would, the possibility of the development being undertaken on an alternative site on which that harm can be avoided altogether will add force to the statutory presumption in favour of preservation. Indeed, the presumption itself implies the need for suitably rigorous assessment of potential alternatives.”
“.. As Jackson LJ said in Hopkins, the Inspector is not required to give the parties regular updates about his thinking. Indeed he may not have reached any conclusion at all on a particular issue before the end of the Inquiry. Nor is the Inspector required to give advance notice that he proposes to reject one party’s evidence in favour of another party. The decision letter is the appropriate place for the inspector to explain why he has reached the factual conclusions that he has.”
“In this case it is considered that the public benefits that accrue from this scheme are manifest and manifold: 1. The continued active use of Bramshill substantially mitigates risk of harm or loss of the heritage assets by bringing activity, security and surveillance onto the site to mitigate risks associated with theft, vandalism and neglect. 2. The active use of the dwellings supports the substantial investment that City & Country are making to better understand the significance of the heritage assets and the natural environment. 3. The active use of parts of Bramshill assists, to a small extent, in reducing the conservation deficit thereby minimising the eventual amount of development that will be required to find a long term sustainable future for the asset. The current application simply proposes the continuation of a use which has been in operation for over 50 years associated with the Police Training College. Hart District Council will be aware of ongoing discussions in respect of the wider development and enhancement of the Bramshill Estate which would secure significant heritage benefits linked with a combination of refurbishment and new build proposals. This application for the independent use of the dwellings would not prejudice the longer term proposals; to the contrary it will generate a limited amount of revenue to assist with the conservation deficit assessment which is currently taking place. 4. There is no material change to the use of the buildings - the proposed independent C3 use will replicate the current lawful C3 use which is ancillary to the principal C2 use. 5. The active use of what are currently empty houses will contribute to the housing stock in the local area and will therefore be a direct public benefit, in line with policy outlined at paragraph 51 of the NPPF and the Hart Housing Strategy.”
“In considering whether to grant planning permission… for development which affects a listed building or its setting, the local planning authority or… Secretary of State shall have special regard to the desirability of preserving the building or its setting or any features of special architectural or historic interest which it possesses.”
"the clear thrust of the reports to the planning committee and the views of specialist officers that underlay and were summarised in those reports, was that if mitigation measures were put in place there would be no adverse effects on the setting of the listed building. I would accept Mr Reed's submission for the Council that where proposed development would affect a listed building or its settings in different ways, some positive and some negative, the decision maker may legitimately conclude that although each of the effects has an impact, taken together there is no overall adverse effect on the listed building or its setting". 125. In my assessment the judgement does not necessarily bring me to a conclusion that an internal heritage balance should be carried out in the manner that the appellant advocates. The case clearly involved a wholly different context and set of circumstances and the conclusions relating to harm were based on avoidance through mitigation measures rather than any assessment of whether the benefits of the development outweighed any harm. However, the judgement clearly does reinforce that a balancing exercise needs to be carried out but it does not direct the decision maker to only one method by which that should be done. 126. I note the cases that have been drawn to my attention, some of which do follow the approach advocated by the appellant and some do not. These are clearly cases where alternative approaches have been taken based on the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, irrespective of these decisions, the statutory duty to preserve the building should be given considerable importance and weight when the decision maker carries out the balancing exercise, consistent with the Barnwell Manor judgement. 127. The cases before me are complex with multiple works involved. Some of the benefits to the assets are not proposed with the individual developments themselves but are put forward as a part of other developments subject to separate decisions. In this context, I have adopted a straightforward application of paragraphs 190 and 193-196 of the Framework. I have firstly identified the significance of the assets. I have then assessed whether each development proposal would, of its own doing, lead to substantial or less than/ substantial harm to that significance. Subsequent to making this assessment of harm, I have then considered whether this harm is outweighed by the public benefits of the individual proposal and provided in other proposals subject to other decisions. Paragraph 20 of the Planning Practice Guidance "
“86. Mr Parkinson's argument focuses on but one part of one aspect of s66: the less than substantial harm to the setting of the listed building from the development on the playing field. The section is different in scope from HE3 and brings in HE1, as well. Lewison LJ in Palmerat [29] made the point that the section requires an overall view of the effect on the listed building itself its features and its setting. I do not think that giving considerable weight to the desirability of achieving the statutory duty requires separate views to be reached on each part, and then the beneficial parts to be put to one side where there is some harm, however relatively unimportant. It would be an irrational thought process, not sanctioned by statutory wording, to require significant weight to be given to the benefit, and significant weight to the harm, without the two being brought into a single balance under the statute, and then requiring only significant weight to be given to the harm. It is difficult, however, to avoid concluding that that is what Mr Parkinson's argument amounts to. There was in reality no overall harm to which the strong presumption could apply or to which considerable weight could be given as a matter of statutory duty. 87. That is not to say that the harm becomes irrelevant; it is simply that the statutory duty can be complied with, in line with the jurisprudence, even if there is some harm to a setting, if it is not as significant as the benefit to the building and its setting, as was obviously the case here. Quite the reverse; considerable weight has to be given to the overall benefits.”
“Whilst the Framework sets out a clear balancing exercise to be undertaken and which is absent in the relevant development plan policies, the statutory requirement of the Listed Building and Conservation Areas Act [ie s66] relates to the special regard the decision maker should have to the desirability of preserving the building, its setting or its special features. Whilst I find policies CON 11 – CON 18 to lack the balancing requirement of the Framework, they contain the statutory requirement. Given this, I find that the policies should be given significant weight.”
“(b) the development would represent the optimal viable use of a heritage asset or would be appropriate enabling development to secure the future of heritage assets; (c) the development would re-use redundant or disused buildings and enhance its immediate setting;”
“As I have concluded elsewhere in these decisions, I am not persuaded that appeals 4, 5 and 6 represent the optimal viable use of a heritage asset or provide appropriate enabling development to secure the future of the heritage asset. As such these proposals do not fall under the special circumstances allowed by paragraph 79.”
“Whilst I acknowledge that appeals 7 and 8-33 reuse disused buildings they do not include an enhancement to the immediate setting within the individual proposals. These are only secured through the wider proposals in other appeals and which would in any case either remove or alter the subject buildings. As such they failed to be considered as a special circumstance under paragraph 79.”
“244. No objection has been raised to appeals 7-33 heritage grounds. Given that these appeals relate to the use of existing buildings and no material change is proposed to the buildings or their surroundings I have no reason to disagree. However it is pertinent to note that all of the buildings in these appeals are proposed to be demolished or altered as part of appeal 4. In this respect, the appellant’s case is that these buildings are harmful to the RPG and setting of the Mansion. 245. I agree that these buildings are harmful to the RPG and setting of the Mansion. As such it cannot be in the interests of the heritage assets to find them a new use. I find this way is against allowing appeals 7-33. The proposal would not be in accord with Local Plan policies CON 12 and CON 17 and national planning policy.”
“82. However, I have no evidence as to how likely these particular measures would be to reduce the use of the private car. In my assessment whilst they would provide some choice this would be limited and having regard to the factors above, I do not find that the proposals would offer a genuine choice of transport modes as required by national and local policies. 83. The Framework recognises that a choice of transport modes can help to reduce congestion and emissions. I have found above that this choice is not available for the proposed developments. Nonetheless, the appellant considers that the developments would represent an improvement in greenhouse gas emissions in comparison to the site's previous use. 84. The appellant contends that due to the nature of the trips that were undertaken in association with the previous use (and that could still be undertaken) it is relevant to sustainability to consider how the proposals would result in a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions due to the nature of the trips in the extant and proposed uses. I was not provided with evidence of the comparative greenhouse emissions of the previous and proposed uses. I was provided with information on trip rates by both main parties although the appellant acknowledges that it is not possible to define the ultimate origin and destination of trips from the former use. The appellant instead relies on the national and international nature of the former use that is alleged to have resulted in far greater emissions arising from trip lengths and international flights. 85. The Council claims that the proposals would result in more trips than the former use. This is largely due to the residential nature of the police college which did not generate regular trips off site. The Council did not provide information on trip lengths. I reach no conclusion on whether the existing or proposed uses would generate greater trip numbers as these do not assist inconcluding on the relative greenhouse gas emissions arising from each as this would depend on distance and type. In addition it is likely that residents would travel abroad for holidays. 86. The offer of electric charging points to facilitate the use of electric cars would have the potential to assist in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, this would be reliant on individual occupants purchasing such cars and I have no evidence before me as to the likelihood or extent of this and the associated effect on greenhouse gas emissions. 87. As such I am unable to conclude that greenhouse gas emissions would be less with the appeal schemes before me as I do not have sufficient information before me. However, even if I did reach such a conclusion, this one factor would not lead me to a conclusion that the schemes would overall comprise sustainable development due to the isolated location of the site and the lack of genuine alternative transport modes. 88. The Framework should be read as a whole and seeks to direct development to locations which are or can be made sustainable, where services are accessible and where the natural environment is protected. I do not consider that the various measures proposed are of such weight to outweigh the conclusion that the site is in an inappropriate location in the countryside for new residential development, divorced from services and facilities. Appeals 4, 5, 6 and 7 - 33 would result in isolated homes in the countryside. Whilst the travel plan and proposals for electric charging points would potentially provide some choice of travel, given the lack of facilities within walking distance of the site, the distance to the bus stops and the unattractive nature of the road network to walk and cycle, the site's location is not one that is or can be made sustainable. The developments would not enhance or maintain the vitality of the local communities or result in strong and vibrant rural communities. I conclude that the site would not be an appropriate and sustainable location for housing development in Appeals 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 - 33.”
“.. Significant development should be focused on locations which are or can be made sustainable, through limiting the need to travel and offering a genuine choice of transport modes. This can help to reduce congestion and emissions and improve air quality and public health. However, opportunities to maximise sustainable transport solutions will vary between urban and rural areas and this should be taken into account in both plan-making and decision-making.”
“the presumption in favour of sustainable development does not apply where a development requiring appropriate assessment, because of its potential impact on a habitats site, is being planned or determined.”
“I note that since the Inquiry the Government has issued a technical consultation on an update to the revised Framework. This relates to a potential amendment to paragraph 177 that would state that the presumption in favour of sustainable development would apply where an appropriate assessment concludes that they would be no adverse effect from the plan or project on the integrity of the habitats site. This reflects the appellant’s view that it was not the intent of the policy to disapply the tilted balance where an appropriate assessment concludes that there would be no adverse effect on the integrity of the protected site. Whilst I acknowledge the consultation, at the time of writing, the amendment had not been adopted and as such I give it little weight. Notwithstanding, it is not been determinative in these cases given my conclusions in relation to the effect of the development on the historic assets as set out below and which do dis- apply the tilted balance.”