“The state pension is therefore correctly described as a contributory social security benefit. A claimant can only be entitled to the state pension if sufficient contributions have been made through the NI system…”
“Whatever solutions are adopted, the Government is clear that it would not be right to continue with unequal pension ages for men and women. There have been immense social and economic changes since these ages were set at their present levels over half a century ago. These changes include the greater willingness of women of all ages and marital status to work, and the spread of part time working. At the same time pensioners generally have been living longer, and have gradually become better off through the development of occupational pensions. To have differing pension ages now is increasingly out of line with developments in the equal treatment of men and women in the employment field, including in occupational pension schemes.”
“The difference in state pension ages — 60 for women and 65 for men — is the last glaring inequality in our treatment of men and women. It is outdated and unfair. The government is committed to act during this Parliament to remove this inequality. It is essential to do so to provide a clear framework within which occupational pension schemes can comply with the European Court ruling requiring them to equalise their benefits to men and women. The new state pension age will be 65 for both men and women. To give women and employers ample time to prepare for this, it will not even start until 2010. Women’s pension age will then be raised gradually to reach 65 by 2020. So no women currently aged 44 or over will be affected by the change. Those currently between 38 and 43 will receive their pension at ages between 60 and 65. Only those currently 38 or under will have to wait until 65. It is right to equalise at the current men’s pension age of 65 for four reasons. First, women are increasingly playing an equal role to men in the economy. They make up nearly half of all those in employment and rightly expect to be entitled to retain their jobs for as long as men. The measures we spell out in this White Paper will enhance the future pension entitlement of many women who take a number of years out of work to care for children, and of low earners. Second, people are living longer and healthier lives. The number of pensioners is set to grow by almost a half, to over 15 million towards the middle of the next century. At present there are 3.3 people of working age to support each person over pension age. If pension ages were unchanged that ratio would have fallen to 2.2 to one by 2030. A common pension age of 65 will mean that there will be a more sustainable ratio of 2.7 people of working age for every pensioner. Expenditure on state pensions is set to double in real terms to some£60 billion by 2025. A common state pension age of 65 will save some£5 billion from that total and would strike a fair balance between generations. Third, the trend throughout the industrial world is towards higher pension ages. The large majority of our trading partners in the European Community, North America, Scandinavia and Australasia, have — or are moving towards — pension ages of 65 or higher. An equal state pension age of 65 is therefore important to help Britain maintain its international competitiveness. Fourth, the trend in occupational pension schemes is towards equalising normal pension age at 65. A state pension age of 65 offers a sensible match with this increasingly important form of provision. These proposals represent a fair balance between the needs of future generations of pensioners and workers, whilst protecting the position of millions of women who are still a very long way from pension age. They provide a fair and sustainable basis for the state pension in the next century.”
“reforms … aimed at women and providing an earnings boost for low earners and a free entry to the system for carers with young children and for carers for people with disabilities. The aspiration was to make S2P [the new State Second Pension] flat rate (and more redistributive) in due course”
“Life expectancy is increasing rapidly and will continue to do so. This is good news. But combined with a forecast low birth rate this will produce a near doubling in the percentage of the population aged 65 years and over between now and 2050, with further increases thereafter. The baby boom has delayed the effect of underlying long-term trends, but will now produce 30 years of very rapid increases in the dependency ratio. We must now make adjustments to public policy and/or individual behaviour which ideally should have been started in the last 2030 years. Faced with the increasing proportion of the population aged over 65, society and individuals must choose between four options. Either: (i) pensioners will become poorer relative to the rest of society; or (ii) taxes/National Insurance contributions devoted to pensions must rise; or (iii) savings must rise; or (iv) average retirement ages must rise. But the first option (poorer pensioners) appears unattractive; and there are significant barriers to solving the problem through any one of the other three options alone. Some mix of higher taxes/National Insurance contributions, higher savings and later average retirement is required.”
“in the long-term [SPA will] need to rise broadly with increases in life expectancy so that each generation spends a roughly similar proportion of adult life contributing to and receiving a state pension.”
“Where national rules fall within the scope of Community Law, which is the case with para.14(3) of the TzBfG, as amended by the Law of 2002, as being a measure implementing Directive 1999/70 … and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the Court must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with such a principle (Rodriguez Caballero (C- 442/00): [2002] E.C.R. I-11915 at [30] – [32]).”
“24. Lastly, it should be added that, in order for it to be possible for the general principle prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of age to be applicable to a situation such as that before the referring court, that situation must also fall within the scope of the prohibition of discrimination laid down by Directive 2000/78.”
“2. For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer. …”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
“In so far as the applicants further complained about discrimination on grounds of age alleging that earlier generations of pensioners received considerably higher pensions than they themselves would on reaching pension age, the Court notes that the applicants have not established that their own situation is comparable to that of earlier pensioners. In this respect, it has to be taken into account that the State must be in a position to adapt the pension system to the change of socio-economic circumstances. Accordingly, the applicant cannot claim equal treatment ‘in time’.”
“70. Furthermore, no discrimination is disclosed as a result of a particular date being chosen for the commencement of a new legislative regime and differential treatment arising out of a legislative change is not discriminatory where it has a reasonable and objective justification in the interests of the good administration of justice. …”
“In this regard, it has noted that the use of a cut-off date creating a difference in treatment is an inevitable consequence of introducing new systems which replace previous and outdated schemes. However, the choice of such a cut-off date when introducing new regimes falls within the wide margin of appreciation afforded to a State when reforming its policies (see Amato Gauci v Malta (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 25 at [71]).”
“The principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on ground of sex either directly, or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status, in particular as concerns: … the calculation of benefits, including increases due in respect of a spouse and for dependants and the conditions governing the duration and retention of entitlement to benefits.”
“1. This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to exclude from its scope: (a) the determination of pensionable age for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions and the possible consequences thereof for other benefits;”
“(b) ‘indirect discrimination’: where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary;”
“art 7(I)(a) of Council Directive (EEC) 79/7 … is to be interpreted as authorising the determination of a statutory pensionable age which differs according to sex for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions and also forms of discrimination such as those described by the national court which are necessarily linked to that difference.”
“185. In this connection, when considering the definition and scope of discrimination against women, in addition to the more general meaning of discrimination as determined in its case law, the Court has to have regard to the provisions of more specialised legal instruments and the decisions of international legal bodies on the question of violence against women. 186. In that context, CEDAW defines discrimination against women under art.1 as: “[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” 187. The CEDAW Committee has reiterated that violence against women, including domestic violence is a form of discrimination against women.” “[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”
“25. Direct discrimination expressly requires a causal link between the less favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination does not. Instead it requires a causal link between the PCP and the particular disadvantage suffered by the group and the individual. The reason for this is that the prohibition of direct discrimination aims to achieve equality of treatment. Indirect discrimination assumes equality of treatment – the PCP [provision, criterion or practice] is applied indiscriminately to all – but aims to achieve a level playing field, where people sharing a particular protected characteristic are not subjected to requirements which many of them cannot meet but which cannot be shown to be justified. The prohibition of indirect discrimination thus aims to achieve equality of results in the absence of such justification. It is dealing with hidden barriers which are not easy to anticipate or to spot”
“The DWP has assumed that your State Retirement pension will be payable when you reach the age of 65 Years. If you have any queries you should contact the DWP on 0845 3000 168. A leaflet is available giving more information about your State Pension statement at www.thepensionservice.gov.uk/pdf/cpf/cpf5jun05.pdf.”
“I have very little understanding of the pension system. Until recently I understood that my pension age was 60 and my husband’s was 65. My husband took care of all financial matters during our marriage and he was the primary breadwinner. I first became aware of the change to the state pension age for women in 2015 when I overheard a conversation on the Metrolink travelling into work. I was stunned as I had heard nothing about it before and had received no letter from the DWP informing me of this change. I was working at Manchester City Council at the time. I mentioned the conversation to my colleagues within a couple of weeks of overhearing it. The majority were not aware. I went online and googled the changes and stumbled upon the Back to 60 Facebook page.”
“19. Getting people to think that pensions are important can be very difficult. Many may be ignorant of, or indifferent to, pension provision. For young people, retirement is too far away. Traditionally many women have relied on their partners to provide the majority of pension income in old age. For many nearing retirement, there is a feeling of “too little too late”
“… adopted for this review were outlined in the White Paper ‘The single-tier pension: a simple foundation for saving’, published in January 2013, which set out the framework for considering changes to State Pension age in the future, as follows: • It should be based on maintaining a given proportion of adult life in receipt of State Pension, • It should take into account the latest demographic data available and be informed by wider factors that could be taken into account when setting State Pension age; and • It should seek to provide a minimum of 10 years’ notice for individuals affected by changes to State Pension age.” • It should be based on maintaining a given proportion of adult life in receipt of State Pension, • It should take into account the latest demographic data available and be informed by wider factors that could be taken into account when setting State Pension age; and • It should seek to provide a minimum of 10 years’ notice for individuals affected by changes to State Pension age.”
“…founded in concerns over the accuracy of the address data held by government at the time about its citizens.”
“this could be due to media discussion and publicity around the anticipated rise in SPA which could have caused confusion as to when these changes will take place and the particular time period which the questions were asking about.”
“No one has a vested right to continuance of the law as it stood in the past.”
“very powerful reasons of principle against the existence of any such obligation. The process of enacting primary legislation and the fact of it when enacted are public. Parliamentary debate and the legislative process itself provides such notification. The asserted obligation would be entirely impractical …. If this part of the Claimants’ case were right, it would logically follow that every Act substantially affecting members of the public would require some further act of personal notification by a Minister.”
“43. The real obstacle which I think stands in the appellants' way is the difficulty of propounding a principle which reconciles fairness to an adversely affected class with the principles of public administration that are also part of the common law. These are not based on administrative convenience or potential embarrassment. They arise from the separation of powers and the entitlement of executive government to formulate and reformulate policy, albeit subject to such constraints as the law places upon the process and the product. One set of such constraints in modern public law are the doctrines of legitimate expectation, both procedural and substantive. Some have been touched on above – for example the requirements of candour and open-mindedness where either law or established practice calls for consultation. The duty to give reasons is another area in which there has been marked growth. It is not unthinkable that the common law could recognise a general duty of consultation in relation to proposed measures which are going to adversely affect an identifiable interest group or sector of society. 44. But what are its implications? The appellants have not been able to propose any limit to the generality of the duty. Their case must hold good for all such measures, of which the state at national and local level introduces certainly hundreds, possibly thousands, every year. If made good, such a duty would bring a host of litigable issues in its train: is the measure one which is actually going to injure particular interests sufficiently for fairness to require consultation? If so, who is entitled to be consulted? Are there interests which ought not to be consulted? How is the exercise to be publicised and conducted? Are the questions fairly framed? Have the responses been conscientiously taken into account? The consequent industry of legal challenges would generate in its turn defensive forms of public administration. All of this, I accept, will have to be lived with if the obligation exists; but it is at least a reason for being cautious. 45. The proposed duty is, as I have said, not unthinkable – indeed many people might consider it very desirable - but thinking about it makes it rapidly plain that if it is to be introduced it should be by Parliament and not by the courts. Parliament has the option, which the courts do not have, of extending and configuring an obligation to consult function by function. It can also abandon or modify obligations to consult which experience shows to be unnecessary or unworkable and extend those which seem to work well. The courts, which act on larger principles, can do none of these things. … 47. For all these reasons I am not prepared to hold that there was at common law an obligation to consult those affected or their representatives before introducing the material changes to the Immigration Rules. I do not seek to elevate this to a general rule that fairness can never require consultation as a condition of the exercise of a statutory function; but in the present context it seems to me that a duty to consult would require a specificity which the courts, concerned as they are with developing principles, cannot furnish without assuming the role of a legislator. We would have, for example, to determine whether the duty contended for under s.3 of the 1971 Act arises before or after the formation of the policy prompting the rule-change; whether consultation is to be obligatory or discretionary; whether it is to take the form of a limited approach or a public exercise; whether the identity of the consultees should be prescribed or left to the Secretary of State; if the former, who they should be; if the latter, according to what criteria, if any, they should be chosen; and so forth. It is only if BAPIO could show that it would be entitled to be consulted whatever scheme was chosen that it might be able to overcome these obstacles. But, while I readily recognise the strength of its claim to be heard as the main representative of the cohort most directly and adversely affected, I do not think it can make out such a case. It is not inconceivable, for example, that a prescribed scheme, however controversially, would name the BMA as a sole consultee, relying on the s.71 exercise to reveal any unjustifiable disparate racial or national impact. We simply cannot know.”
“62. From these authorities it can be deduced that where a clear and unambiguous undertaking has been made, the authority giving the undertaking will not be allowed to depart from it unless it is shown that it is fair to do so. The court is the arbiter of fairness in this context. And a matter sounding on the question of fairness is whether the alteration in policy frustrates any reliance which the person or group has placed on it. This is quite different, in my opinion, from saying that it is a prerequisite of a substantive legitimate expectation claim that the person relying on it must show that he or she has suffered a detriment. 63. In this case, it was argued for the respondent that it was incumbent on Mrs Finucane to show that she had suffered a detriment. That argument simply does not avail in this instance, since the question of detriment can only arise, if it arises at all, in the context of a substantive legitimate expectation. Here the promise made did not partake of a substantive benefit to a limited class of individuals (as, for instance, in Ex p Coughlan); it was a policy statement about procedure, made not just to Mrs Finucane but to the world at large. 64. The onus of establishing that a sufficiently clear and unambiguous promise or undertaking, sufficient to give rise to a legitimate expectation, is cast on the party claiming it - see, for instance, In re Loreto Grammar School’s Application for Judicial Review [2012] NICA 1; [2013] NI 41, para 42 et seq. In Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago[2012] 1 AC 1 , para 37, Lord Dyson said: “The initial burden lies on an applicant to prove the legitimacy of his expectation. This means that in a claim based on a promise, the applicant must prove the promise and that it was clear and unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification. If he wishes to reinforce his case by saying that he relied on the promise to his detriment, then obviously he must prove that too.”” “The initial burden lies on an applicant to prove the legitimacy of his expectation. This means that in a claim based on a promise, the applicant must prove the promise and that it was clear and unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification. If he wishes to reinforce his case by saying that he relied on the promise to his detriment, then obviously he must prove that too.””