“(3) The Secretary of State must— (a) obtain an independent assessment of the proposal, and (b) have regard to that assessment and to the material provided to the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (2) in deciding whether to make an order under section 4A in response to the proposal.” (a) obtain an independent assessment of the proposal, and (b) have regard to that assessment and to the material provided to the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (2) in deciding whether to make an order under section 4A in response to the proposal.”
“(6) In this Schedule "relevant local authority" , in relation to a section 4A proposal, means a local authority— (a) whose area is the same as, or contains all of, the area of the fire and rescue authority proposed to be created by the order, or (b) all or part of whose area falls within the area of that fire and rescue authority.” (a) whose area is the same as, or contains all of, the area of the fire and rescue authority proposed to be created by the order, or (b) all or part of whose area falls within the area of that fire and rescue authority.”
“The Local Business Case Our main conclusions arising from our review of these critical success factors are…CSF 5 Reduces cost of effective governance…On balance we would concur that the estimated economic benefits are not an unreasonable estimate of the reduction in costs that could be achieved (my emphasis). The 3Es 5.5 We have set out broad conclusions in relation to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in Section 4 above (4.79-4.89). In summary: • Economy has received little attention in the LBC (the Local Business case) and there is an absence ofquantified benefits in relation to any reduced costs of inputs. (emphasis added) • All of the savings in the LBC arise from efficiency, primarily in relation to the optimal utilisation of capital assets (CSF 1) but also in relation to the avoidance of costs under the Governance model (CSF 5). Whilst it appears the efficiency savings generated by the different options are closer than implied by the LBC (due to the issues surrounding methodology), the proposed Governance model does deliver some additional efficiency gains. • Given the current and planned levels of collaboration, all of the options have potential in relation to effectiveness but, in our view, the Governance model does appear to provide for a faster pace of collaboration which has the potential to deliver greater effectiveness, although this cannot be quantified. 5.6 Taking the 3Es together we have concluded that, on balance and subject to all the caveats listed in this report, a move to the Governance Model would be in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 5.7 Having reached that conclusion, we would add that the LBC presents no overwhelming case for the Governance model and that most of the proposed changes could be achieved under the other three options, subject to the willingness of all stakeholders to work together. Public Safety 5.8 This independent assessment has not identified any issues on which comment is required under the terms of our reference.”
“The 3Es… 5.18 We have set out broad conclusions in relation to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in above (5.15.15). In summary, in our view: • The potential savings identified in the LBC that can beattributed to economy have been significantlyoverstated by inclusion of an existing Police-Police collaboration project and the additional savings that might result from inclusion of the two Fire Services in West Mercia Police’s current plans require further substantiation. (Emphasis added) • Whilst there are significant issues regarding the savings identified in the LBC attributable to efficiency, it does appear that the proposals made in the LBC in relation to adoption of the Governance model would yield some degree of efficiency savings • In relation to effectiveness, is likely that the Governance model could have a positive impact on the pace of collaboration. However, careful consideration is required to match scale and pace to risk. 5.19 We have been asked to comment specifically on the “proposed transition costs”
“With a strong track record of PCC-led collaboration in the local area; the modest but achievable savings as a direct result of a change of governance…officials agree that the Cambridgeshire case is in the interests of the statutory tests”
“The Governance model does appear to present some opportunities for economy”
“to consider these savings are sufficient to cover the costs of implementation and provide some additional savings so as to conclude that there would be benefits to both economy and efficiency as a result of a transfer of governance. Do you agree?”
“The noble Lords, Lord Harris and Lord Rosser rightly ask why the duty applies when the collaboration agreement would be in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness rather than both. Collaboration can lead to service improvements through either increased efficiency or increased effectiveness. Consequently, it should not be a precondition of a collaboration agreement that it should improve both. If an initiative would improve the quality of the service but not save any money, for example, we would still want the emergency services to give effect to that project.”
“In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase. We have been warned again and again that it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for the words of the statute.”
“Rules of statutory construction have a valuable role when the meaning of a statutory provision is doubtful, but none where, as here, the meaning is plain. Purposive construction cannot be relied on to create an offence which Parliament has not created. Nor should the House adopt an untenable construction of the subsection simply because courts in other jurisdictions are shown to have adopted such a construction of rather similar provisions.”
“65. That suggestion might have force if ascertaining the intention of Parliament involved a sociological inquiry into what was actually in the minds of individual legislators. However, that would be to mistake the nature of the interpreter's task. When courts identify the intention of Parliament, they do so assuming Parliament to be a rational and informed body pursuing the identifiable purposes of the legislation it enacts in a coherent and principled manner. That assumption shows appropriate respect for Parliament, enables Parliament most effectively to achieve its purposes and promotes the integrity of the law. In essence, the courts interpret the language of a statute or statutory instrument as having the meaning which best explains why a rational and informed legislature would have acted as Parliament has. Attributing to Parliament an error or oversight is therefore an interpretation to be adopted only as a last resort.”
“For words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content are derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use "context" in its widest sense, which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern the statute was intended to remedy.”
“The truth is that the appellants in four cases (the respondents in the third) contend for the proper and exact meaning of the word. The respondents (the appellants in the third case) seek to apply the loose and inexact meaning. For the preference urged by the latter, their counsel adduced as their chief reason that the object of this Act is derating, and that in order to further that object, and bring about as much derating as possible, this meaning of the word should be accepted. We cannot think that this is an adequate reason. Another argument was hinted at, though the various counsel had not the hardihood to advance it - namely, that in the use of any language by the Legislature one should expect the loose and inexact, rather than the correct and exact. It is true that one who spends much time in this Court might be tempted in his haste to make some such assertion. But if he allowed cynicism to be tempered with sympathy for the harassed Parliamentary draftsman, he would reflect that it is only in regard to phrases of doubtful import that this Court is called upon to apply a toilsome scrutiny. … It ought to be the rule, and we are glad to think that it is the rule, that words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly, and not loosely and inexactly. Upon those who assert that that rule has been broken the burden of establishing their proposition lies heavily. And they can discharge it only by pointing to something in the context which goes to show that the loose and inexact meaning must be preferred.”
“(i) There is a presumption that where the same words are used more than once in an Act they have the same meaning; and (ii) There is a presumption that where different words are used in an Act they have different meanings” “(i) There is a presumption that where the same words are used more than once in an Act they have the same meaning; and (ii) There is a presumption that where different words are used in an Act they have different meanings”
“a Bill is not there to inform, to explain, to entertain or to perform any of the other usual functions of literature. A Bill's sole reason for existence is to change the law. The resulting Act is the law. A consequence of this unique function is that a Bill cannot set about communicating with the reader in the same way that other forms of writing do. It cannot use the same range of tools. In particular, it cannot repeat important points simply to emphasise their importance, or safely explain itself by restating a proposition in different words. To do so would risk creating doubts and ambiguities that would fuel litigation. As a result, legislation speaks in a monotone and its language is compressed.”
“The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it enacted the statute. Every statute other than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court’s task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament’s purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment.”
“The general duty of the GLC. is stated, in section 1, as being to develop and encourage measures which will promote the provision of “integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and service for Greater London”
“…Part II of this Act, containing sections 4-15 is headed “The London Transport Executive.”
“5 (1) Subject always to the requirements of section 7(3) of this Act, it shall be the general duty of the executive to exercise and perform their functions, in accordance with principles from time to time laid down or approved by the council, in such manner as, in conjunction with the railways board and the bus company, and with due regard to efficiency, economy andsafety of operation, to provide or secure the provision of such public passenger transport services as best meet the needs for the time being of Greater London.”
“Bromley in their turn relied upon the requirement that in providing public passenger transport services the L.T.E. should have “due regard to efficiency, economy, and safety of operation.” “Economy” in this context, it was suggested, meant that the L.T.E. was to do its best to cover the expenses of its operation by the fares it charged to passengers. That is to say, that it must maximise the income generated from the operation of its undertakings at least to the extent necessary to avoid an operating loss and to build up a general reserve. For my part, I am unable to accept that in the context of section 5(1) “economy” bears this meaning. In my view, which is in respectful disagreement with some of your Lordships, the words “of operation” apply to “efficiency” and “economy” as well as to “safety.”
“So far, the executive would appear to be in no different position than were Birmingham Corporation in Prescott[1955] Ch 210 so that the principle of that case would apply it. The word “economy” in section 5(1) goes some distance to reinforce that view. It is not, in my opinion, to be read as linked to the words “of operation” though I think if of little importance whether it is or not. It conveys the idea of carefuluse of resources, so as to get the best out of them. The resources of the executive include the revenue producing capacity of its undertaking, and thus support is lent to the concept of running the undertaking on ordinary business principles.”
“…it is … telling that none of the decision-makers in this case have felt able to put before the court any witness statements to support the contention that they would have granted outline planning permission for the development even if they had appreciated that it was in breach of the Local Plan. In the absence of submissions and evidence from the Council, I simply do not know whether the decision-makers on the Planning Board would say there were material considerations which might have caused them to think it right to depart from the Local Plan and if so what those considerations were.”