“13. Conditions for making of references. (1) A reference of a conviction … shall not be made under any of sections 9 to 12B unless— (a) the Commission consider that there is a real possibility that the conviction … would not be upheld were the reference to be made, (b) the Commission so consider— (i) in the case of a conviction … because of an argument … not raised in the proceedings which led to it or on any appeal or application for leave to appeal against it…” (a) the Commission consider that there is a real possibility that the conviction … would not be upheld were the reference to be made, (b) the Commission so consider— (i) in the case of a conviction … because of an argument … not raised in the proceedings which led to it or on any appeal or application for leave to appeal against it…”
“Thus the Commission's power to refer under section 9 is exercisable only if it considers that if the reference were made there would be a real possibility that the conviction would not be upheld by the Court of Appeal. The exercise of the power to refer accordingly depends on the judgment of the Commission, and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that this is a judgment entrusted to the Commission and to no one else. Save in exceptional circumstances, the judgment must be made by the Commission, in a conviction case, on the ground of an argument or evidence which has not been before the Court before, whether at trial, on application for leave to appeal or on appeal. In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, the Commission cannot therefore invite the Court to review issues or evidence upon which there has already been a ruling. Resort to the Commission must ordinarily follow and not precede resort to the Court of Appeal.”
“The ‘real possibility’ test prescribed in section 13(1)(a) of the 1995 Act as the threshold which the Commission must judge to be crossed before a conviction may be referred to the Court of Appeal is imprecise but plainly denotes a contingency which, in the Commission's judgment, is more than an outside chance or a bare possibility, but which may be less than a probability or a likelihood or a racing certainty. The Commission must judge that there is at least a reasonable prospect of a conviction, if referred, not being upheld. The threshold test is carefully chosen: if the Commission were almost automatically to refer all but the most obviously threadbare cases, its function would be mechanical rather than judgmental and the Court of Appeal would be burdened with a mass of hopeless appeals; if, on the other hand, the Commission were not to refer any case unless it judged the applicant's prospect of success on appeal to be assured, the cases of some deserving applicants would not be referred to the Court and the beneficial object which the Commission was established to achieve would be to that extent defeated. The Commission is entrusted with the power and the duty to judge which cases cross the threshold and which do not.”
“65. The question is not straightforward. First, as already seen, the exercise of the power to refer, including its predictive element, is a matter for the judgment of the CCRC, not the Court – and is not to be usurped by the Court. Secondly, the CCRC has a discretion not to refer, even when the threshold conditions are satisfied. Thirdly, in many cases (perhaps most but I do not know) the issue for the CCRC will not give rise to ‘bright-line’ decisions on substantive criminal law at all; for instance, cases where a reference is sought on grounds of fresh evidence or an alleged failure to give proper disclosure. Fourthly, questions of some awkwardness could arise as to the role of this Court and that of the CACD were this Court purportedly to decide unsettled issues of substantive criminal law definitively for itself. All of this points towards the Court being slow to intervene where the CCRC has taken a tenable and not irrational view, whatever the Court's own view might be. That said, I would be unwilling to say that there could not be cases where the CCRC's decision was vitiated by an error of substantive law – though it may well be that in such a case the matter could simply be disposed of by the conclusion (ex hypothesi readily arrived at) that the CCRC's decision was not tenable.”
“14. … It is important that this court does not fall into the trap of forming a view as to how the Court of Appeal would react and then concluding that this is what the Commission should necessarily have concluded, since this would be to usurp the Commission’s function. Decisions of the Commission cannot be quashed merely because a court on a judicial review might have or indeed would have come to a different view of the significance of the material or the prospects of success.”
“CP: The forensic evidence, when properly and fully understood, is more strongly suggestive that CP’s symptoms were indicative of thrush, which is not sexually transmitted, than was presented to the jury.” “TOR: New information about TOR’s history and personality presents a picture of her that is significantly different to the picture that was presented to the jury. This new information undermines the credibility of certain aspects of TOR’s evidence.”
“A. First of all what I do is examine the outer genital area which is called the vulva, there was general tenderness, there was an area of intense redness and also the surface was irregular, that was on the left side of the vestibule so this is the area within the labia… A. … tenderness is something that is difficult to assess so by itself I would not place any particular relevance on that in a forensic context… Q. …Can you explain to us please about the tenderness? A. This is something that the patient tells you. As far as the examination findings what I saw when I examined this patient was intense redness and also irregular surface which in the areas of those two findings coincided, they were in the same area so on the left side and also behind the vaginal opening. …redness can have many, many causes, it can be associated with rubbing or scratching, it can be associated with irritation such as due to bubble baths, due to tight clothing – due to infection and also it can be due to trauma. In this case the irregular surface in the same area indicates that there was some superficial damage of what we call the mucosa, it is like the skin but it does not have the same protective layer on the external aspect so my feeling was that this was due to some sort of rubbing or trauma though how it was caused it is not possible to be more specific than that. Q. So in this case it is not possible to be more specific, what about sexual intercourse or penetration by a finger or something like that? A. Certainly I mean it has been well documented in the medical literature and in my forensic and clinical experience that sexual intercourse both consensual and non-consensual produces redness and contact or rubbing with a finger or indeed any object can produce similar findings and it is not possible to distinguish what caused it. Typically with sexual intercourse the redness is located in the area behind the vagina, if there is redness or trauma that is where it is usually found. Q. And it was there in this case? A. It was non-symmetrical in that it was only confined to the left side. Q. Is there any significance of that? A. Well I think if you have a medical condition relating to redness, irritation it will tend to be generalised so you will see it on both sides and this was, you know – I have described this as intense redness so it was a very obvious finding.”
“Q. …I think you said … ‘redness can have many causes, it can be associated with rubbing, scratching, irritation due to bubble bath or something like that, tight clothing, trauma’. Is that correct? A. Yes that is right. Q. And you were asked specifically in relation to what you saw and you said how it was caused is simply not possible to say? A. That is correct. Q. …could sexual intercourse have caused it and you said yes it could? A. And I think to clarify it, it would not necessarily need to be penetration of the vagina it could be just attempted penetration. Q. It could be penetration, it could be attempted penetration, it could be rubbing with a finger? A. Yes. Q. Or attempted penetration of the finger? A. Yes. Q. Or it could be any of the other causes that you described which I read out to you a few minutes ago? A. Yes.”
“…I think my last answer might have been misleading because I have only been asked about the redness and the findings were not only redness but also irregularities which in my opinion was due to very superficial damage of the same area and as I said before this was not generalised it was localised just to the left side and behind the vagina and for that reason my opinion is this is most likely due to trauma, albeit very minor rather than due to irritation which would be more likely to cause generalised redness.”
“Q. …The point you made is that if somebody is suffering from a medical condition then it tends to be generalised … is that right? A. That is correct. Q. And so what you are saying is that what you saw was not generalised, it was localised? A. Yes. Q. And therefore if the general proposition is accepted then the infection caused redness hence it was a generalised but this is not what you saw? A. That is correct. Q. …as a general proposition you say a medical condition tends to be generalised, yes? A. It depends on the medical condition, if you are talking about skin and vulval conditions there is a variety, some are generalised, some are localised, it depends on what the pathology is. Q. And so when you said if you have a medical condition it tends to be generalised that must be viewed in that context? A. I think my wording was if it is irritation due to a medical condition that would be generalised. Q. …in terms of what you said about it was not possible to say how it was caused – a variety of things could cause it and we went through those? A. My opinion is this is due to superficial damage due to rubbing or other minor trauma.”
“A. I would very rarely exclude something 100 percent but I think that trauma by localised rubbing would be the most likely cause and I do not think that rubbing by clothing was likely.”
“Regarding the evidence given by Dr. Gray in respect of the redness observed in the vagina of CP. I have in particular considered Dr. Gray’s evidence that in her opinion the redness was not borne out of a ‘medical condition’ because it was seen, on the occasion of1st July 2002 , on one side of the vagina. This statement is wrong and is misleading. Any redness due to a medical condition that affects the surface of the skin or mucosa normally starts on one side and then spreads.”
“With regards to my instructions and based on the materials that I have so far been supplied with, I am of the following opinion: (1) The localised genital redness and soreness described by Dr. Gray and later the subject matter of investigation by Dr. Sarmadjeva are wholly consistent and diagnostic of a thrush infection being present in [CP]’s genitalia. (2) That the evidence given by Dr. Gray at trial to the effect that it was her opinion the redness was not borne out of a ‘medical condition’ because on the occasion of its being viewed it was one sided, is both wrong and misleading. (3) Any redness due to a medical condition that affects the surface of the skin or mucosa normally starts on one side and then spreads. The description contained in the notes of Dr. Sarmadjeva of2nd July 2002 accompanied by the information provided to her, are wholly in keeping with thrush. Further it is self-evident that the microscopy tests performed on that day revealed that [CP] had a picture of full blown thrush on2nd July 2002 .”
“The fact that Mr Lyons chose not to give evidence is bound to feature prominently in the Commission’s application of the statutory ‘real possibility’ test. Mr Lyons did not present his own account to the jury or expose his own credibility to crossexamination. …this is not a strong position from which to mount ‘further and better’ challenges to the credibility of CP and TOR, who were both cross-examined extensively (at two trials) by counsel for Mr Lyons. The Commission takes the view that new evidence or argument would have to be particularly compelling, against this background, for it to establish a real possibility of a successful appeal against conviction.”
“(1) For the purposes of an appeal ... under this Part of the Act the Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice – ... (c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies. ... (2) The Court of Appeal shall, in considering whether to receive any evidence, have regard in particular to— (a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief; (b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.” ... (c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies. ... (a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief; (b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.”