“[Policy SG1:] [Harrogate] will make provision for 390 new homes per annum (net annual average) in Harrogate District during the period 2004 to 2023. In doing so it will seek to ensure that (as an interim target) about 160 of this annual provision will be homes for local people at affordable prices and that 70% of these new homes are in new buildings or conversions on previously developed land… [Policy SG2:] Development or infill limits will be drawn around the settlements listed…to allow the sustainable growth and development of those settlements within the District that have the best access to jobs, shops and services… [Policy SG3:] Outside the development and infill limits of the settlements listed in policy SG2 of this Core Strategy, land will be classified as countryside and there will be strict control over new development in accordance with national and regional planning policy protecting the countryside and Green Belt…”
“…Those settlements (villages and hamlets) not listed in this policy [including Bickerton] have very few services and facilities and often no defined built up area. In accordance with national and regional planning policy regarding the promotion of more sustainable patterns of growth, the settlements should not accommodate new market housing apart from the suitable conversion of existing buildings…”
“…On balance, it is considered that there are no adverse impacts that would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits of this scheme. [Harrogate] can only demonstrate a 5.02 year supply of housing and this is not sufficiently above the 5 year supply that paragraph 11 of the NPPF can be ignored. Given this position and the proximity of nearby service settlements, officers consider the scheme should be approved. Recommendation: Approve subject to conditions.”
“9.8 [Harrogate’s] Housing and Economic Development Needs Assessment provides information on objectively assessed housing need. This document concludes that there is a requirement for 669 dwellings per annum to meet the needs of the district. 9.9 NPPF requires local planning authorities to identify and update annually a supply of specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide a minimum of 5 years’ worth of housing against their housing requirement with appropriate buffer. Where an authority cannot demonstrate a five year supply of housing land, policies relating to the supply of housing land are rendered out of date (NPPF, para.11(d), footnote 7). Instead, housing applications should be assessed under paragraph 11 of the NPPF and the presumption in favour of sustainable development, with permission granted unless policies of the NPPF provide a clear reason for refusing the development proposed or any adverse impacts would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits. 9.10 The July 2018 update has been completed. This shows that [Harrogate] has a 5.02 year supply, meaning that paragraph 11 of the NPPF is not automatically triggered on that particular basis. However, the supply position is marginal and it will be important to take steps to maintain it. 9.11 In order to maintain supply position, greenfield land outside the existing development limits will continue to be needed. This means that development limits are considered out of date and can be given no more than limited weight. Only limited weight can be attached to Core Strategy policies SG1, SG2 and SG3 as these were based on a housing target that is out of date. By virtue of this paragraph 11 of the NPPF is once again engaged. 9.12 In light of the benefits that would come from the delivery of new homes in maintaining the 5 year supply, applications will therefore need to be determined on a case-by-case basis, only refusing them where the planning harm significantly and demonstrably outweighs the benefits.”
“…10.2 In the absence of a five year housing land supply, planning permission should be approved for the proposal unless any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits of the development. 10.3 The scheme will provide 21 new homes to the District. [Harrogate] can only demonstrate a 5.02 year supply of housing and this is not sufficiently above the 5 year supply that paragraph 11 of the NPPF can be ignored. The consideration therefore is whether the site’s location is so unsustainable as to create significant harm… 10.5 The lack of sustainable transport choices in Bickerton is a negative aspect of allowing new houses here. However, the NPPF and High Court ruling state that in rural areas, approaches to transport modes should be flexible. It is therefore considered that the positive benefits of allowing the scheme outweigh the negative sustainability concerns...”
“Plans and decisions should apply a presumption in favour of sustainable development… For decision-taking this means: c) approving development proposals that accord with an up-todate development plan without delay; or d) where there are no relevant development plan policies, or the policies which are most important for determining the application are out-of-date 7, granting permission unless: …ii. any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole.”
“This includes, for applications involving the provision of housing, situations where the local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five year supply of deliverable housing sites (with the appropriate buffer, as set out in paragraph 73…”
“To determine the minimum number of homes needed, strategic policies should be informed by a local housing need assessment, conducted using the standard method in national planning guidance – unless exceptional circumstances justify an alternative approach which also reflects current and future demographic trends and market signals. In addition to the local housing need figure, any needs that cannot be met within neighbouring areas should also be taken into account in establishing the amount of housing to be planned for.”
“The policies in the previous Framework will apply for the purpose of examining plans, where those plans are submitted on or before24 January 2019 …”
“47. To boost significantly the supply of housing, local planning authorities should: - use their evidence base to ensure that their Local Plan meets the full, objectively assessed needs for market and affordable housing in the housing market area, as far as is consistent with the policies set out in this Framework, including identifying key sites which are critical to the delivery of the housing strategy over the plan period - identify and update annually a supply of specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide 5 years’ worth of housing against their housing requirements with an additional buffer of 5% (moved forward from later in the plan period) to ensure choice and competition in the market for land. Where there has been a record of persistent under delivery of housing, local planning authorities should increase the buffer to 20% (moved forward from later in the plan period) to provide a realistic prospect of achieving the planned supply and to ensure choice and competition in the market for land… 159. Local planning authorities should have a clear understanding of housing needs in their area. They should: - prepare a Strategic Housing Market Assessment to assess their full housing needs, working with neighbouring authorities where housing market areas cross administrative boundaries. The Strategic Housing Market Assessment should identify the scale and mix of housing and the range of tenures that the local population is likely to need over the plan period which: - meets household and population projections, taking account of migration and demographic change - addresses the need for all types of housing, including affordable housing and the needs of different groups in the community (such as, but not limited to, families with children, older people, people with disabilities, service families and people wishing to build their own homes) - caters for housing demand and the scale of housing supply necessary to meet this demand - prepare a Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment to establish realistic assumptions about the availability, suitability and the likely economic viability of land to meet the identified need for housing over the plan period.”
“I can confirm that I explained to members of the Planning Committee the importance of the weight that the officer had attached to the housing land supply situation in Harrogate Borough, DCLG’s position with regard [to] the adoption of the standard methodology and the fact that there was no update from officers reflecting this and the newly released ONS data. I went on to explain that the application of the standard methodology and the up-to-date population data resulted in a reduction to the annual housing need for [Harrogate] from its current 669 dwellings per annum to approximately 383 dwellings per annum and that this was highly material to the consideration of the application… I explained that I considered the lack of advice officers on both of these matters…amounted to incomplete information and consequently mis-advice.”
“…[F]rom my first-hand knowledge of the events that took place at [Harrogate’s] Planning Committee meeting on25 September 2018 I can make the following comments: Neither the planning officer nor anyone else provided any meaningful response to my point relating to the existence or effect of the publication of the 2016 ONS data and standard methodology. In fact the only response of any type given in relation to this matter was a tongue-in-cheek remark by one of the committee members to the effect that “it is refreshing to hear a planning consultant arguing that we have a larger than 5 year land supply”… The drop in minimum requirement from 669 dwellings per annum to 383 dwellings per annum which I explained to members of the Planning Committee…would clearly have a profound effect on the 5 year land supply situation… The difference in the minimum requirement figures alone would, to informed committee members and the attending planning officer, immediately indicate that the calculation of [the 5 Year Housing Land Supply] would be substantially altered…The effect of the application of the standard methodology and the 2016 ONS data is that [the 5 Year Housing Land Supply] would increase and therefore have an important effect on the consideration of the application… …Given that the only question I received related to existing bus services in the area I assumed that the matters I had raised were understood and would be taken into consideration in the committee’s determination of the application before it. It is now apparent, however, that, for whatever reason, no such consideration was in fact given.”
“As to [Harrogate’s] argument that the tilted balance is in any event engaged because Core Strategy policies SG1, SG2 and SG 3 are “based on a housing target that is out of date”, not only is such reasoning completely absent from both the Summary and the Planning Balance & Conclusion sections of the [Report], but it is obviously erroneous given the correct figure for [Harrogate’s] annual housing requirement (i.e. 383 dpa, rather than 669 dpa) at which level none of these 3 policies could possibly be considered to be out of date. This is because Policy SG1 requires provision for 390 new homes per annum and is predicated on land provision to this extent. Given that the actual level of housing need (based on the best and most up-to-date figures) is not more than 383, there is nothing at all to suggest that “in order to maintain the supply position, greenfield land outside the existing development limits will continue to be needed” or therefore that “this means that development limits are considered out of date…””
“The Council did not fail to have regard to any relevant material considerations, including the latest ONS figures…”
“17. It is clear that D did take into account the 2016-based projections, not least because Mr [Vendy] himself made submissions on them at the meeting…”
“18. The reality, however, is simply that neither the officer nor the Committee were persuaded that the [ONS data] justified a different decision. This was a matter of planning judgment entirely for them, subject only to Wednesbury reasonableness. C has not suggested that it was irrational for D to grant permission in the circumstances and nor could it reasonably do so given that: (a) The [ONS data] made no difference to whether there was a [5 Year Housing Land Supply]; (b) Nor did they alter the fact that policies SG1, SG2, and SG3 were based on a housing target that was out of date; (c) It follows that they also made no difference to the advice given regarding the application of NPPF 11, i.e. whilst the presumption in favour of sustainable development was not engaged on the basis of a shortfall in the [5 Year Housing Land Supply], it was engaged on the basis that the policies referred to above were out of date; (d) It follows further they also made no difference to the advice given on how the application should be determined, i.e. since the presumption was engaged, NPPF 11 required that permission should be approved unless D concluded that the harm it would cause were significantly outweigh the benefits…”
“The fact that no reasons were given in relation to the [ONS data] does not mean that they were not taken into account. On the contrary, it is inconceivable they were not, given that Mr Vendy specifically addressed them in his submissions at the meeting. However,…it was unnecessary for anything more to be said about them because they made no material difference to the advice given in the Report.”
“The law that applies to planning officers’ reports to committee is well established and clear. Such reports ought not to be read with undue rigour, but with reasonable benevolence, and bearing in mind that they are written for councillors with local knowledge: see the judgment of Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC in R (Morge) v. Hampshire County Council[2011] PTSR 337 , para.36 and the judgment of Sullivan J in R v. Mendip District Council, Ex p Fabre[2017] PTSR 1112 , 1120. The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of his report as a whole, the officer has significantly misled the members on a matter bearing upon their decision, and the error goes uncorrected before the decision is made. Minor mistakes may be excused. It is only if the advice is such as to misdirect the members in a serious way - for example, by failing to draw their attention to considerations material to their decision or bringing into account considerations that are immaterial, or misinforming them about relevant facts, or providing them with a false understanding of relevant planning policy - that the court will be able to conclude that their decision was rendered unlawful by the advice they were given: see the judgment of Sullivan LJ in R (Siraj) v. Kirklees Metropolitan Council [2011] JPL 571, para.19, citing the familiar passage in the judgment of Judge LJ in R v. Selby District Council, Ex p Oxton Farms[2017] PTSR 1103 . Unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise, it may reasonably be assumed that, if the members followed the officer’s recommendation, they did so on the basis of the advice that he or she gave: see the judgment of Lewison LJ in R (Palmer) v. Herefordshire Council[2017] 1 WLR 411 , para.7.”
“By virtue of this [(being a reference to the previous sentence which refers to policies SG1-3)] paragraph 11 of the NPPF is once again engaged”
“[Harrogate] can only demonstrate a 5.02 year supply of housing and this is not sufficiently above the 5 year supply that paragraph 11 of the NPPF can be ignored.”
“…I venture to suggest that from the authorities generally, and particularly those to which I have referred, one can deduce the following principles: (1) The expressions used in the authorities that the decisionmaker has failed to take into account a matter which is relevant…or that he has failed to take into consideration matters which he ought to take into account…have the same meaning. (2) The decision-maker ought to take into account a matter which might cause him to reach a different conclusion to that which he would reach if he did not take it into account. Such a matter is relevant to his decision-making process. By the verb “might”, I mean where there is a real possibility that he would reach a different conclusion if he did take that consideration into account. (3) If a matter is trivial or of small importance in relation to the particular decision, then it follows that if it were taken into account there would be a real possibility that it would make no difference to the decision and thus it is not a matter which the decision-maker ought to take into account. (4) …[T]here is clearly a distinction between matters which a decision-maker is obliged by statute to take into account and those where the obligation to take into account is to be implied from the nature of the decision and of the matter in question… (5) If the validity of the decision is challenged on the ground that the decision-maker failed to take into account a matter in the second category, it is for the judge to decide whether it was a matter which the decision-maker should have taken into account. (6) If the judge concludes that the matter was “fundamental tothe decision”, or that it is clear that there is a real possibilitythat the consideration of the matter would have made adifference to the decision, he is thus enabled to hold that thedecision was not validly made. But if the judge is uncertainwhether the matter would have had this effect or was of suchimportance in the decision-making process, then he does nothave before him the material necessary for him to conclude thatthe decision was invalid. (7) …Even if the judge has concluded that he could hold that the decision is invalid, in exceptional circumstances he is entitled nevertheless, in the exercise of his discretion, not to grant any relief”
“Issue (1): The relevant test for material considerations Before us, this issue was not controversial. The parties were agreed on the approach the court should take, which is already the subject of ample authority. Prominent in the case law is the decision of House of Lords in In re Findlay[1985] AC 318 , 333, 334. In that case there was no express statutory requirement for consultation, and it was impossible to imply any such requirement into the statute. But the “Wednesbury principle”…was invoked in support of a submission that no reasonable Home Secretary could have reasonably omitted to consult the Parole Board on the new policy in question. In his speech, at pp.333f-334b, Lord Scarman referred to two passages in the judgment of Cooke J in CREEDNZ Inc. v. Governor General[1981] 1 NZLR 172 , 183. The first passage was: “What has to be emphasised is that it is only when the statute expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required to be taken into account by the authority as a matter of legal obligation that the court holds a decision invalid on the ground now invoked. It is not enough that a consideration is one that may properly be taken into account, nor even that it is one which many people, including the court itself, would have taken into account if they had to make the decision.”
“[Cooke J] in a later passage [also on p.183], did recognise that in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the silence of the statute, “there will be some matters so obviously material to a decision on a particular project that anything short of direct consideration of them by the ministers…would not be in accordance with the intention of the Act’.”
“…it seems to me quite impossible to say that the unincorporated international obligation on the United Kingdom here was “so obviously material” to the coroner’s decision whether or not to resume this inquest that he was required to give it “direct consideration”… “Even, therefore, had the coroner recognised and felt able to satisfy the international law obligation upon the United Kingdom by reopening the inquest, I for my part would not hold his refusal to do so irrational or otherwise unlawful.”
“If, in the statute conferring the discretion there is to be found expressly or by implication matters which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard to, then in exercising the discretion it must have regard to those matters.”
“It seems, therefore, that it is not enough that, in the judge’s view, consideration of a particular matter might realistically have made a difference. Short of irrationality, the question is one of statutory construction. It is necessary to show that the matter was one which the statute expressly or impliedly (because “obviously material”) requires to be taken into account “as a matter of legal obligation”.”
“Public authorities are under no general common law duty to give reasons for their decisions; but it is well-established that fairness may in some circumstances require it, even in a statutory context in which no express duty is imposed (see R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Doody[1994] 1 AC 531 …). [In] Doody…a principal justification forimposing the duty was seen as the need to reveal any such erroras would entitle the court to intervene, and so make effectivethe right to challenge the decision by judicial review. Similarly, in the planning context, the Court of Appeal has held that a local planning authority generally is under no common law duty to give reasons for the grant of planning permission (R v. Aylesbury Vale District Council, Ex p Chaplin(1997) 76 P & CR 207 , 211–212, per Pill LJ). Although this general principle was reaffirmed recently in R (Oakley) v. South Cambridgeshire District Council[2017] 1 WLR 3765 , the court held that a duty did arise in the particular circumstances of that case: where thedevelopment would have a “significant and lasting impact onthe local community”, and involved a substantial departurefrom Green Belt and development plan policies, and where thecommittee had disagreed with its officers’ recommendations. Of the last point, Elias LJ (giving the leading judgment, with which Patten LJ agreed) said, at para.61: “The significance of that fact is not simply that it will often leave the reasoning obscure. In addition, the fact that thecommittee is disagreeing with a careful and clearrecommendation from a highly experienced officer on amatter of such potential significance to very many peoplesuggests that some explanation is required…the dictates of good administration and the need for transparency are particularly strong here, and they reinforce the justification for imposing the common law duty.” …Mr Cameron QC (for the Council) submitted that this decision should be “treated with care”, against the background of the Government’s decision in 2013 to abrogate the statutory duty to give reasons for grant of permission, planning law being a creature of statute…The factors identified by Elias LJ could arise in many cases, and lead to the common law duty becoming a general rule. He asked us to prefer the view of Lang J (R (Hawksworth Securities plc) v. Peterborough City Council[2016] EWHC 1870 (Admin) at [81]) that a common law duty to give reasons would arise only “exceptionally” and that “generally, the requirements of fairness will be met by public access to the material available to the decision-maker”
“Do make sure that if you are proposing, seconding or supporting a decision contrary to officer recommendations or the development plan that you clearly identify and understand the planning reasons leading to this conclusion/decision. These reasons must be given prior to the vote and be recorded. Be aware that you may have to justify the resulting decision by giving evidence in the event of any challenge.”…”
“When a local planning authority against the advice of its own professional advisers grants permission for a controversial development, what legal duty, if any, does it have to state the reasons for its decision, and in how much detail?...” “The significance of that fact is not simply that it will often leave the reasoning obscure. In addition, the fact that thecommittee is disagreeing with a careful and clearrecommendation from a highly experienced officer on amatter of such potential significance to very many peoplesuggests that some explanation is required…the dictates of good administration and the need for transparency are particularly strong here, and they reinforce the justification for imposing the common law duty.”
“…In examining the reasons given by a local planning authority for a decision, it is a reasonable inference that, in the absence of contrary evidence, they accepted the reasoning of an officer’s report, at all events where they follow the officer’s recommendation: R v. Mendip District Council, Ex p Fabre(2000) 80 P & CR 500 , 511 and R (Zurich Assurance Ltd. (trading as Threadneedle Property Investments)) v. North Lincolnshire Council[2012] EWHC 3708 at [15].”