“I am satisfied that the greatest possible care has been taken by prosecuting counsel and those working with him to fulfil their prosecution responsibilities and to decide whether any further evidence should be offered in the case. I am also satisfied that consultation has taken place with the appropriate senior members of the Crown Prosecution Service. Nonetheless, this case has a long history and this retrial has ended prematurely and unexpectedly. It is in these circumstances that I have decided to take the unusual course of directing that the case papers should be forwarded to you to give consideration to the commencement of an investigation into what has occurred in relation to the prosecution of the case and its sudden end.”
“As you acknowledged in your letter, prosecutors act independently of me and therefore it is an unusual step for a case to be referred to me. … Self-evidently something went seriously wrong in this case. … Notwithstanding the independence of the CPS, as the minister accountable for its work, it is right that where significant concerns are raised, I should consider whether a separate review of the case is needed. I have seen a detailed report about what happened in the conspiracy to murder case from Paul Greaney QC on behalf of the CPS. The CPS has also identified a number of training and policy issues which will be addressed as a result of what happened in this case to ensure that similar issues do not arise in other cases. I am satisfied that both prosecution counsel and the CPS have taken what happened in this case very seriously and changes to CPS procedures have been introduced as a result. I have written to the Home Secretary so that she can consider whether any further review needs to be conducted of the police actions or procedures. … Having considered the factors set out above, I have concluded that there is no need for me to ask for a separate review of these cases.”
“Cases that collapse or are stayed and convictions that are quashed because of serious deficiencies in disclosure are fair neither to the complainant and the defendant nor to the public and they undermine confidence in the administration of criminal justice.”
“Functions of the Director (1) The Director shall discharge his functions under this or any other enactment under the superintendence of the Attorney General.”
“Superintendence of casework 4(d)1. As set out at the opening of this section, the Attorney General will have no involvement in the vast majority of cases. And as set out at 2.4 above, the Attorney General is responsible for safeguarding the independence of prosecutors taking decisions whether or not to prosecute in individual cases. 4(d)2. The Attorney General’s responsibilities for superintendence and accountability to Parliament mean that he or she, acting in the wider public interest, needs occasionally to engage with a Director about a case because it: • is particularly sensitive; and/or • has implications for prosecution or criminal justice policy or practice; and/or • reveals some systemic issues for the framework of the law, or the operation of the criminal justice system. 4(d)3. In these circumstances the Attorney General will be alerted to a case by the Director at the earliest opportunity, or may call for information about a case, or will discuss the case with the Director. The Director will keep the Attorney General informed as significant developments occur. The Attorney General may express any concerns. The decision in these cases remains the Director’s. 4(d)4.
“30. It is common ground in these proceedings that the Director is a public official appointed by the Crown but independent of it. He is entrusted by Parliament with discretionary powers to investigate suspected offences which reasonably appear to him to involve serious or complex fraud and to prosecute in such cases. These are powers given to him by Parliament as head of an independent, professional service who is subject only to the superintendence of the Attorney General. There is an obvious analogy with the position of the Director of Public Prosecutions. It is accepted that the decisions of the Director are not immune from review by the courts, but authority makes plain that only in highly exceptional cases will the court disturb the decisions of an independent prosecutor and investigator: R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex p C[1995] 1 Cr App R 136 , 141; R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex p Manning[2001] QB 330 , para 23; R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office[2007] QB 727 , paras 63–64; Mohit v Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius[2006] 1 WLR 3343 , paras 17 and 21 citing and endorsing a passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Fiji in Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions[2003] 4 LRC 712 , 735–736; Sharma v Brown-Antoine[2007] 1 WLR 780 , para 14(1)-(6). The House was not referred to any case in which a challenge had been made to a decision not to prosecute or investigate on public interest grounds. 31. The reasons why the courts are very slow to interfere are well understood. They are, first, that the powers in question are entrusted to the officers identified, and to no one else. No other authority may exercise these powers or make the judgments on which such exercise must depend. Secondly, the courts have recognised (as it was described in the cited passage from Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions) “the polycentric character of official decision-making in such matters including policy and public interest considerations which are not susceptible of judicial review because it is within neither the constitutional function nor the practical competence of the courts to assess their merits.”
“10. It was the Defendant’s view that a further review at that stage was not required because (a) the fundamental reason for the failure of the Prosecution did not relate to the actions of those coming within the Defendant’s superintendence function (b) Paul Greaney QC had addressed all the issues requiring consideration and (c) in addition to the Paul Greaney QC review there had been the additional investigation/review by a Detective Chief Inspector and Ben Campbell. In addition, given the content of Paul Greaney QC’s documentation, there was no need to consider the recordings of the PII hearings before Globe J. However, the Defendant did not raise his concerns in writing with the Secretary of State for the Home Department. … 15. Second, the Defendant has considered whether any additional reasons can be given for his decision. I am authorised by the Defendant to confirm that the documentation reveals that the collapse of the retrial was not due to the actions of Prosecution counsel or of the Reviewing Lawyer but was a failure of the disclosure process on the part of the investigators. It was in those circumstances that the decision was made by the Defendant that there was no need for further review. The issues that had caused the collapse of the case were therefore not those covered by the Defendant’s superintendence function and it was in those circumstances that the Defendant wrote to the Secretary of State for the Home Department.”