“…..every person born within the United Kingdom and Colonies after the commencement of this Act shall be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by birth.”
“Except as provided by the following provisions of this Schedule, any person who, on such date as may be specified in an order made by the Secretary of State - (a) in consequence of his connection with a territory designated by the order, possesses any such nationality or citizenship as may be specified by the order, whether he acquired that nationality or citizenship before that date or acquires it on that date, and (b) immediately before that date is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, shall on that date cease to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.” shall on that date cease to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.”
“For the purposes of paragraph 1 of the schedule to theAden, Perim and Kuria Muria Islands Act 1967 (which provides, subject to exceptions, for the loss, on such date as may be specified by order, of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies by a person possessing on that date such nationality or citizenship as is so specified by reason of his connection with a territory designated by the order) - (a) the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen shall be a designated territory; (b) in relation thereto the specified nationality shall be Southern Yemeni nationality, and; (c) in relation thereto the specified date shall be14th August 1968 .”
“The following expressions in this law shall have the following meanings... (b) ‘Republic’: the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen... (e) ‘Arab’: any person belonging to the Arab nation and holding the nationality of any Arab state.”
“The following shall be considered Southern Yemeni by birth... (b) any Arab born in the Republic, provided that one or both of his parents has resided in the Republic for at least five years.”
“31. What is striking about the present case is that, if the appellant could establish the facts as he alleges them to be, he would have a legal right to be a British citizen. The statutory provisions to which I have earlier referred confer on such a person the status of a British citizen automatically. There is no discretion vested in the Secretary of State. One notes a sharp contrast between those provisions, especially section 11(1) of the 1981 Act, and others in the same Act dealing with applications for naturalisation and registration as a British citizen, such as section 6(1) and section 6(2). In both the latter cases the statute requires the Secretary of State “to be satisfied” of certain matters before he may “if he thinks fit” grant a certificate of naturalisation. In those circumstances, the Secretary of State is in the position of making a decision or a determination. Yet the legislation confers no jurisdiction on the Secretary of State to determine in any authoritative way whether a person is a British citizen by virtue of section 11(1). He is simply not empowered to decide that issue. Nor is there any mechanism or process laid down by statute or regulation whereby he decides whether a person is entitled as of legal right to British citizenship under the 1981 Act. That is perhaps not surprising, because one is here dealing with whether or not that person has a legal right. The contrast is with such processes as registration or naturalisation, where the Secretary of State is empowered by section 41(1)(b) to make provision by means of regulations. ….. 33. Of course, the Secretary of State is very much involved in related matters, such as the issue of passports; and for that reason, as well as for obvious practical ones, it is sensible for any person asserting that he is entitled to the status of a British citizen to raise the matter first with the Home Office. But even on a passport application, the issue of whether a person is a British citizen is a matter of precedent fact where the courts, if there is a dispute, would be prepared to make a decision on the merits. 34. If, therefore, there is a dispute as to whether a person has the legal right under the 1981 Act to the status of a British citizen, that dispute is something which can be resolved in the courts. Such a person can bring proceedings for a declaration that he is entitled as of right under that Act to British citizenship… In determining that matter the court will itself resolve any issues of fact as well as any issues of law. This is not, in truth, judicial review of a decision taken by any administrative body or person, but the more conventional resolution of a dispute with which the courts are very familiar. That being so, the court would not afford to the Secretary of State any margin of appreciation or degree of deference where the resolution of issues of fact is concerned. It will find the facts for itself according to the evidence before it.”
“Whereas in English it is customary to stick to one spelling of a name, in Somali this is not necessarily the case. My own name, Martin, is spelt by some people with a ‘y’: Martyn. Given consistency of spelling in the UK I would never write my name with a ‘y’ and for official purposes such consistency is well established….This is not to say they are not the same name though. When spoken, there is no difference in pronunciation and the etymology of the name, whether written with ‘i’ or ‘y’ is the same. They are two ways of spelling the same name. Consistency of spelling is not something which has permeated Somali writing and written culture generally. The added complications of Anglicizing Somali-written names, the Romanization of Arabic names, Romanising the spelling of the name in an Arabic-speaking country, etc. can all lead to inconsistent spelling of Anglicizations.”
“The lack of importance of birthdays and dates of birth to most Somalis. 7. Dates of birth are usually not registered in Somali culture. Before the advent of colonialism and also during the colonial period, Somalis, most of whom reside in the countryside, were born “under the tree”
“32. Where the appellant has given a totally incredible account of the relevant facts, the tribunal must decide what weight to give to the lie, as well as to all the other evidence in the case, including the general evidence. Suppose, for example, that at the interview stage the appellant made an admission which, if true, would destroy his claim; and at the hearing before the AIT he withdraws the admission, saying that his answer at interview was wrongly recorded or that he misunderstood what he was being asked. If the AIT concludes that his evidence at the hearing on this point is dishonest, it is likely that his lies will assume great importance. They will almost certainly lead the tribunal to find that his original answers were true and dismiss his appeal. In other cases, the significance of an appellant's dishonest testimony may be less clear-cut. The AIT in the present case was rightly alive to the danger of falling into the trap of dismissing an appeal merely because the appellant had told lies. The dangers of that trap are well understood by judges who preside over criminal trials before juries. People lie for many reasons. In R v Lucas[1981] QB 720 , the Court of Appeal had to consider whether a statement containing a lie was capable of amounting to corroboration. At p 724F, Lord Lane CJ said: “To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly, it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly, the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family…” 33. Although the analogy is not exact, it is close enough for these words to be of relevance in the present context. So the significance of lies will vary from case to case. In some cases, the AIT may conclude that a lie is of no great consequence. In other cases, where the appellant tells lies on a central issue in the case, the AIT may conclude that they are of great significance. MA’s appeal was such a case. The central issue was whether MA had close connections with powerful actors in Mogadishu. The AIT found that he had not told the truth about his links with Mogadishu. It is in such a case that the general evidence about the country may become particularly important. It will be a matter for the AIT to decide whether the general evidence is sufficiently strong to counteract what we have called the negative pull of the appellant's lies.” “To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly, it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly, the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family…”