“Bail accommodation is provided in the form of Initial Accommodation with shared facilities (followed by a move to dispersal accommodation within a couple of weeks), Standard Dispersal Accommodation which is self-contained to a greater or lesser degree, or Complex (bespoke) Bail Accommodation. Section 4 (1)(c) support can be refused by the Home Office where the cost of sourcing bespoke accommodation in any one case is considered too high, and such a refusal attracts a right of appeal to the Asylum Support Tribunal. If a detained applicant for Section 4 bail accommodation has been convicted of a criminal offence, at an early stage in the application process Home Office staff are required to determine the nature of the offence, make enquiries of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and IRC centre management, and then identify and allocate the appropriate type of Section 4 accommodation to be sourced. Health and access issues may also be considered by the Home Office at this stage”
“A.1.1 The Authority expects that the substantial majority of dispersals shall take place within 9 Working Days of the Provider receiving the relevant Accommodation Request. However, the Authority may give notice of less than 9 Working Days (see 2.8.1) ... A.1.4 The Provider must submit Accommodation Proposals to the Authority by the time required in the relevant Accommodation Request” (Home Office, 2012: 72) Since 2012, the Home Office has procured Section 4 accommodation, including Section 4 (1)(c ) bail accommodation, from three firms (G4S, Serco, and Clearel) under COMPASS35 contracts36.”
“14 Chapter 5 of the UKVI s.4 Policy contains instructions to the Section 4 Bail Team for dealing with applications for bail accommodation. An application form is required. These applicants may be asylum seekers (who could also apply under s.95), failed asylum seekers (who could also apply under s.4(2) and (3) ) or people who have never had an asylum application but are otherwise in detention under any provision of the Immigration Acts. There are three types of accommodation provided by the SSHD (acting through UKVI) under the UKVI s.4 Policy, and in this respect as in others the content of the Home Office s.4 Policy is very similar (often identical). The three types of accommodation are:- i) Initial Accommodation (IA), or Level 1 accommodation. This is usually hostel type accommodation which is short term. People stay in such accommodation while more suitable long term accommodation is found. This can be used for bail applicants, but is not suitable for offenders who present a high risk, as shown by a conviction for a violent, sexual or serious drug offence or a MAPPA category 1, 2 or 3, level 2 & 3 3 . This means that such people are handled outside the mainstream of the system. An early decision must be made that they are not suitable for Level 1 and whether Level 2 or 3 is appropriate. I will call this the “threshold decision.” ii) Standard Dispersal Accommodation, or Level 2 accommodation. This is longer term accommodation which is provided by third party contractors to the SSHD. It may be shared accommodation and may be unsuitable for people who present a particular level of risk. iii) Level 3 or Complex Bail Dispersal Accommodation. The UKVI s.4 Policy says that “in the rare event the applicant is assessed as being unsuitable for Standard Dispersal Accommodation Home Office case workers should assess whether Complex Bail Dispersal Accommodation is suitable”
“62. It seems right to start with a firm expression of the importance of the right to liberty, and to a speedy determination of the propriety of administrative detention by an impartial court.Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights identifies key principles of the common law in this regard. The common law history is outlined in A v. SSHD[2005] 2 AC 68 [36]. Lord Bingham there sets out the submission made by counsel for the claimants in that case but does so in a way which makes it clear that he accepts the common law origin of the fundamental importance of the right to personal freedom. This approach to Article 5 and Article 5.4 in particular is mandated by R (Osborn) v. Parole Board[2014] AC 1115 [57]-[63]. I start from the proposition that the claimants' right to liberty is a fundamental one which the courts will protect to ensure that any restrictions are lawful, proportionate and subject to judicial oversight. 63. This starting point affects a number of aspects of the case. The importance of the right requires proper protection by fair procedures and judicial oversight. Where detention has no defined duration its impact may be particularly damaging to the detainee. I was supplied with the Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons CM 9186 January 2016 by Stephen Shaw to illustrate this observation. In the case of immigration detention, the length of the detention is constrained always by Hardial Singh[8] principles which do not require a certain release date to be known at the start of the detention. The lawfulness of detention is determined when challenged on that basis by the High Court in judicial review proceedings, and in damages actions. There is, therefore, judicial oversight of detention. The present claims concern bail prior to the Hardial Singh end point which is an important safeguard against unnecessary detention”
“For the reasons that I have given the FTR are systemically unfair and unjust. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. The object of the SSHD in placing appeals in the fast track is the entirely laudable one of dealing with them quickly……….But the consequences for an asylum seeker of mistakes in the process are potentially disastrous. That is why section 22(4) of the 2007 Act recognises that justice and fairness should not be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency….It is too heavily weighted in favour of [speed and efficiency] and needs to be adjusted. Precisely how that is done is a matter for the Tribunal Procedure Committee and Parliament.” 82 The Fast Track Rules were rules for speedy determination of appeals and the court is very well placed to assess their fairness. That was a different kind of exercise from that which is involved in this case. The fairness of procedural rules is obviously justiciable, but the SSHD made a somewhat similar submission at [28] which was rejected. The court should respect the rule making process, but that must not be taken too far. The court guards its jurisdiction in cases involving liberty jealously. Where the lawfulness of a system is under consideration, the court will not seek to design a better system or to impose any targets on the executive. If the system is unlawful, the court will say so and leave it to the executive and Parliament to remedy the position: see as an example, the approach of Elias J in R (Mersin) v. SSHD [2000] INLR 511 at pages 3 and 4 when the judge rejected out of hand a submission that the court ought to supervise the remedial process. 83 On that basis the operation of a system of this kind is justiciable. 84 In relation to maladministration Mr. Tam relies on R (S) v. SSHD[2007] EWCA Civ 546 [39]-[41] per Carnwath LJ as he then was, and Moussaoui v. SSHD[2016] EWCA Civ 50 [21]-[26] per the Master of the Rolls. The court is concerned with illegality and not maladministration. 85 The s.4 bail system does not work for high risk offenders. The timescales set for herself by the SSHD (and included in the policies and COMPASS contracts) are routinely not met, and missed by substantial margins. Each of these delays builds on others to amount to lengthy inactivity. In itself that does not amount to illegality. It may simply be that the timescales are hopelessly optimistic for these difficult cases. A failure to meet these deadlines is not evidence of unlawfulness. I agree with Thirlwall J that ground 2 was not arguable. That ground sought to say that each time a deadline, or target, was not met this was unlawful delay” “For the reasons that I have given the FTR are systemically unfair and unjust. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. The object of the SSHD in placing appeals in the fast track is the entirely laudable one of dealing with them quickly……….But the consequences for an asylum seeker of mistakes in the process are potentially disastrous. That is why section 22(4) of the 2007 Act recognises that justice and fairness should not be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency….It is too heavily weighted in favour of [speed and efficiency] and needs to be adjusted. Precisely how that is done is a matter for the Tribunal Procedure Committee and Parliament.”
“95. There is also no easy way to determine in each case the point at which the processing of the s.4 application had gone on so long that it became unlawful. That is a fact specific decision of the kind required when considering whether any particular period of detention was unlawful under the Hardial Singh principles. The Court of Appeal in Fardous v. SSHD[2015] EWCA Civ 931 explained the nature of that kind of decision and made it clear that there are no rules of thumb by which an answer can be produced.”