“It is too early to know where he would be imprisoned for prevention purposes should such be the case. In practice, the prisons of Caen or Le Mans are used for preventive incarcerations” and that “No commitment [can] be taken as to the place of [the Appellant’s] possible incarceration, regardless of the stage of the procedure.”
“In practice, it should be noted that for the jurisdiction of Argentan, the prison of Le Mans is generally used. The Public Prosecutor in Argentan shall duly entreat the Remand and Freedom Judge in that it would be preferable to observe this allocation priority. Such appeal should be easy to accept in light of the reason already mentioned.”
“The density for all institutions – 114.6 on1 January 2015 – has no great significance as the indicator varies a great deal according to the type of institution: 92.2 for detention centres and detention centre quarters, 79.6 for long-stay prisons and long-stay prison quarters, 71.4 for institutions for minors, whilst for remand prisons and remand prison wings the average density was 132.7. Additionally this average by type of institution includes variations within each category: - Of the 88 sentencing institutions, only 8 had a density higher than 100, including 3 detention centre wings in overseas territories and 4 day parole centres (2) and centres for reduced sentences (2) in Ile-d-France. In Metropolitan France this over-occupation concerned 469 detainees, i.e. 2.3% of detainees placed in sentencing institutions. - Of the 135 remand prisons and remand prison wings, 26 had a density lower than or equal to 100 and 108 had a density greater than 100, of which 35 had a density higher than 150. Four remand prisons and remand prison wings exceeded 200, i.e. a population of detainees more than double the number of operational places (two in Metropolitan France and two overseas). Over-occupation of prison institutions is therefore limited to remand prisons by application of numerus clausus to sentencing institutions which are a little below declared operating capacity. For remand prisons, the increase in operational capacity (+2,008 places between1 January 2005 and1 January 2015 ) was less than that of the number of detainees (+3,742) and density is therefore higher in 2015 than in 2005.”
“41. Information Received in Respect of Prison Conditions within the French Prison Estate: Mr Hall places considerable reliance on the CPT report dated7th April 2017 which arises from a visit to France between 15th and27th November 2015 . The report is critical of the state of the French penal estate. It raises and deals with the issue of overcrowding within French prisons and the adverse effects that this has on the general running of their penal institutions. 42. The defence has also produced the 2015 Annual Report of the French Controller General (Prison Ombudsman) which also makes a number of critical comments on the (then) state of the French prison estate. It expresses concerns that ‘commitments made after the first visits were either partially upheld, or not at all’. 43. Mr Hall has also placed into evidence the French Ministry of Justice Prison Population Statistics dated1st June 2017 . This demonstrates that a number of prisons in the French prison estate are operating at well over their stated capacity. 44. The French authorities say that they are not able to definitively confirm which prison Mr Grant would be taken to either before trial or after any conviction. The most likely options appear to be either Caen or Le Mans prisons, both of which are said to be operating well over their stated capacity levels.”
“… a prisoner ‘in isolation’ receives exercise of 2½ hours spread over ‘two half days’. It adds that although work and training courses are over-subscribed, ‘The amount of educational classes, sports and social & cultural activities generally comply with the actual number of applications’.”
“I wish to inform you that prisoners are preferably sent to Le Mans prison, the establishment in Caen being left for residual purposes.”
“6. … the type of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption and establish a breach was made clear by the Luxembourg Court – a significant volume of reports from the Council of Europe, the UNHCR and NGOs about the conditions for asylum seekers…”
“59. … the CPT Report relied upon by the requested person: (i) Relates to a visit to certain French prisons (but not those situated in Caen or Le Mans) back in November 2015. (ii) States that detainees usually receive 3 sq m of personal space each. Furthermore she adds that there have not been any pilot decisions from the ECHR in respect of French prisons. Additionally there has been no finding of the High Court that extradition to France would breach Article 3 by reason of the prison conditions that exist within the French prison estate.”
“48. I recognise the force of the presumption of compliance by a member state, and the requirement for ‘something approaching international consensus’, in the language of the court in Owda quoted above. However, it appears to me that it is hard to apply a ‘presumption’ in the face of the lucid test set out in Muršić.”
“25 The court went on to emphasise that “a strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3m 2 in multi-occupancy accommodation” (para 124): the “strong presumption” test should operate as a weighty but not irrebuttable presumption of a violation of article 3. This in particular means that in the circumstances, the cumulative conditions of detention may rebut that presumption. It will, of course, be difficult to rebut it in the context of flagrant or prolonged lack of personal space below 3m2 (para 125). When it has been established that a detainee disposes of less than 3m2 of floor surface, then it: “remains for the respondent government to demonstrate convincingly that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space. The cumulative effect of those conditions should inform the court’s decision …” (para 126). Further, the court noted: “in the light of its post-Ananyev case law, that normally only short, occasional and minor reductions in the required personal space will be such as to rebut the strong presumption of a violation of article 3” (para 130). 26 In a critical passage, the court went onto say, at para 138: ‘The strong presumption of a violation of article 3 will normally be capable of being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met: (1) the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3m2 are short, occasional and minor (see para 130 above): (2) such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities (see para 133 above); (3) the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (see para 134 above).’” ‘The strong presumption of a violation of article 3 will normally be capable of being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met: (1) the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3m2 are short, occasional and minor (see para 130 above): (2) such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities (see para 133 above); (3) the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (see para 134 above).’”
“90. The art 3 test in the context of extradition is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the person extradited would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by reason of the prison conditions upon his return and (if convicted) during any imprisonment. To make a conclusion based on this test the court has to examine the present and prospective position as best it can on the materials now available. In “prison condition” cases the factual position is unlikely to be static. There may be new evidence about the conditions in a country generally or a particular prison where the position has already been considered by a court. The view of any court, even the ECtHR, on prison conditions in a country or a particular prison at any time is only definitive at the time that the view is expressed. If cogent evidence is adduced which demonstrates that the view a court took previously about prison conditions generally or in a particular prison can no longer be maintained, then the court must review again the evidence about the relevant prison conditions. Evidence is unlikely to be treated as cogent unless it demonstrates something approaching an international consensus that the position has changed. To adopt a lower threshold would introduce an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in the area. But, an obvious example where the test may well be satisfied is where the Strasbourg or Luxembourg courts have held a Contracting or Member State to be in breach of its art 3 obligations regarding prison conditions, has required that remedial measures be undertaken, which have then been implemented and upon which the Committee of Ministers or the ECtHR have then indicated views.”
“15. In Aranyosi, the CJEU decided that the consequence of the execution of an EAW must not be that the requested person will, if returned, suffer inhuman or degrading treatment. At [88] – [89], [91] – [92], [95] and [98] the CJEU set out the procedure that must be followed where the judicial authority of a member state is in possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals detained in the state that has issued the EAW. Stage 1 of the procedure involves determining whether there is such a risk by assessing objective, reliable, specific, and properly updated evidence. I deal further with the the type of evidence and what assessment is required at [50] – [51] below. A finding of such a risk cannot lead, in itself, to a refusal to execute the EAW. Where such a risk is identified, the court is required to proceed to stage 2. Stage 2 requires the executing judicial authority to make a specific assessment of whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk. To that end it must request the issuing authority to provide as a matter of urgency all necessary supplementary information on the conditions in which it is envisaged that the individual concerned will be detained. Stage 3 deals with the position after the information is provided. If in the light of that, and of any other available information, the executing authority finds that, for the individual concerned, there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, execution of the warrant must be postponed but cannot be abandoned.”