“(c) …. the worker’s activities involve the need for continuity of service or production, as may be the case in relation to [various industries and activities]”
“had clearly found that there had been no requirement that the Claimants sign a workforce agreement/other opt-out and could [sic] be no challenge to the dismissal of the claims under section 45A(1)(c). … The Employment Tribunal had found that what the Respondent proposed did not give rise to a contravention of the [Regulations] … [and] had found that the Claimants had not proposed to forego a right (to rest breaks) under the [Regulations] before the Respondent had decided to impose the detriments complained of.”
“The fire and rescue national framework for England says that ‘Fire and rescue authorities need to assess all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect their communities… However this must be within the budget that is available to, and set, by the Fire Authority taking into account Government Grants, Business Rate retention and Council Tax contributions. In order to mitigate the risks that our IRMP identifies, within the financial envelope that we describe at the start of this letter, CPC will continue to be one of the duty systems that are employed so as to continue to provide the most equitable emergency response to the people of South Yorkshire.”
“In such proceedings, there are no formal pleadings and it will frequently be difficult if not impossible to identify a particular issue which the ‘first’ application will have decided. Moreover, we do not think that there is in proceedings brought under Order 53 any true lis between the Crown, in whose name the proceedings are brought (and we venture a reservation about whether or not issue estoppel could operate against the Crown), and the respondent or between the ex parte applicant and the respondent. Further, we doubt whether a decision in such proceedings, in the sense necessary for issue estoppel to operate, is a final decision: the nature of the relief, in many cases, leaves open reconsideration by the statutory or other tribunal of the matter in dispute. We respectfully adopt a passage from Professor Wade's treatise on Administrative Law, 5th ed. (1982), p. 246 where he writes: ‘in these procedures the court ‘is not finally determining the validity of the tribunal's order as between the parties themselves' but ‘is merely deciding whether there has been a plain excess of jurisdiction or not.’ They are a special class of remedies designed to maintain due [process] in the legal system, nominally at the suit of the Crown, and they may well fall outside the ambit of the ordinary doctrine of res judicata. But the court may refuse to entertain questions which were or could have been litigated in earlier proceedings, when this would be an abuse of legal process; and in the case of habeas corpus there is a statutory bar against repeated applications made on the same grounds.’” ‘in these procedures the court ‘is not finally determining the validity of the tribunal's order as between the parties themselves' but ‘is merely deciding whether there has been a plain excess of jurisdiction or not.’ They are a special class of remedies designed to maintain due [process] in the legal system, nominally at the suit of the Crown, and they may well fall outside the ambit of the ordinary doctrine of res judicata. But the court may refuse to entertain questions which were or could have been litigated in earlier proceedings, when this would be an abuse of legal process; and in the case of habeas corpus there is a statutory bar against repeated applications made on the same grounds.’”
“Although not necessary for my decision I also incline to the view that the Divisional Court was right to hold that the doctrine of issue estoppel cannot be relied on in applications for judicial review, although the court has an inherent jurisdiction as a matter of discretion in the interests of finality not to allow a particular issue which has already been litigated to be re-opened. This depends upon the special nature of judicial review under R.S.C., Ord. 53 which makes it different both from ordinary civil litigation inter partes and from criminal proceedings. Like the Divisional Court, I adopt the passage from Professor Wade's Administrative Law, 5th ed. (1982), p. 246, set out in the judgment of the Divisional Court at p. 539.”
“My provisional view is that there is no jurisdictional (in the narrow sense of the word) boundary to the power of the Court to grant declaratory relief in this context: the jurisdiction of the Court underCPR Part 40.20 to grant declaratory relief in unrestricted. The restrictions on the power are discretionary. ….”
“should not, automatically, ignore the adverse consequence of an order for judicial review on a large number of council tenants who did not themselves cause or contribute to the non-compliance. It is in this context that the fact that Mr Walters' application is not supported by any, or any significant group of other tenants, becomes relevant. We have no difficulty in agreeing that the exercise of the court's discretion does not depend on whether it will attract popular support. If Mr Walters' rights have been breached the unpopularity of granting relief to him will not deter the court from granting it. However when there are other genuine interests which will be adversely affected, the court is not prevented from analysing precisely the rights of which a single or a few individuals have been deprived, and their consequent loss (in whatever form it takes) and the consequences of upholding their rights contrary to the interests of many others. As the grant of judicial review may have substantial adverse consequences for a large number of blameless individuals beyond the applicant himself, in an appropriate case, of which this is one, the exercise of discretion permits account to be taken of these conflicting interests.”