“46. The creation of pro-Eritrean YPFDJ groups outside of Eritrea should be seen as part of the regime’s strategy of ensuring that the diaspora continues to pay the diaspora tax and other levies which ensure the regime’s survival. These groups police the diaspora and report all forms of dissidence to Embassy officials who in turn report individuals to Asmara. 47. YPFDJ groups are organised, funded and directed from Asmara. 48. Eritrea has been successful in mobilising ‘youth’ in the diaspora because many are not well integrated into their host societies and because the regime conflates patriotism with support for the ruling government. 49. Cultural festivals are a central part of the way that the Eritrean regime attempts to secure public support and finance. These festivals are tightly organised by senior party officials, and no expense is spared in bringing supporters to the festivals and/or to co-opt and using actors and magicians to generate political support for the regime. 50. A high profile ‘defector’ such as the Claimant would be at particular risk because he is seen as a defector and opponent of the regime. His defection in Italy is already well known among Eritreans and an opposition political organisation has directly linked him with the opposition by using his photo. 51. The Claimant was clearly co-opted by the Ministry of Defence – he would not have been able to refuse the order – and the evidence is that all the money generated from his music was used by the regime to create support for it among the diaspora. 52. Pro-Eritrean supporters have, since at least 2001, become increasingly violent towards those who (thought to) oppose the regime; and pro-government supporters have increasingly sought to attack and intimidate individuals – both Eritrean and European – who are critical of the regime. 53. While evidence about ‘Eri Blood’ is limited, it appears that they are drawn from the YPFDJ and that they operate openly in Italy and Denmark. I have not been able to find any evidence that they operate in the UK or elsewhere in Europe (though branches of the YPDFJ do operate throughout Europe). To the best of my knowledge, Eri Blood does not operate in the United Kingdom. 54. I conclude that there is evidence that the Claimant would be at risk if he were to be returned to Italy to make an asylum application.”
“From what I have observed and from the conversations that I have with at least a few Eritrean justice seekers and activists in Italy, the voice of the Eritrean opposition against the Eritrean government in Italy is almost non-existent. In Italy, there is no protection for people like [the claimant]. The security is very loose. I have been informed by victims and Eritrean activists in that there have been many incidents, clashes and attacks by pro-Eritrean government to opposing young former conscripts who have defected and landed in Italy through the Mediterranean Sea. Some of the incidents were reported to the police, but there was not proper investigation and no measures were taken against the perpetrators. Most of those who were attacked severely were forced to leave and some others who do not agree with the Eritrean government’s policy live in fear. Based on the experiences of others, Eritrean activists in Italy, and my own experience of lobbying the Italian authorities at the European Union, and the Human Rights Council, the Italian authorities or the police will not provide protection to people like [the claimant]. It should be noted also that the Italian government is the only government in Europe that has close diplomatic and business ties with the Eritrean government.”
“Where the applicant is in possession of a valid visa, the Member State which issued the visa shall be responsible for examining the application for international protection…”
“By way of derogation from Article 3(1), each Member State may decide to examine an application for international protection lodged with it by a third country national or a stateless person, even if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this regulation.”
“Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the application procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that member state, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in chapter 3 in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible.”
“(1) This paragraph applies for the purposes of the determination by any person, tribunal or court whether a person who has made or a human rights claim may be removed – (a) from the United Kingdom, and (b) to a state of which he is not a national or citizen. (2) A State to which this part applies shall be treated, in so far as relevant to the question mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), as a place – (a) where a person’s life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, (b) from which a person will not be sent to another State in contravention of his convention rights, and (c) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise than in accordance with the refugee convention.” (a) from the United Kingdom, and (b) to a state of which he is not a national or citizen. (a) where a person’s life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, (b) from which a person will not be sent to another State in contravention of his convention rights, and (c) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise than in accordance with the refugee convention.”
“(1) This paragraph applies where the Secretary of State certifies that- (a) it is proposed to remove a person to a State to which this Part applies, and (b) in the Secretary of State’s opinion the person is not a national citizen of the State. (3) The person may not bring an immigration appeal from within the United Kingdom in reliance on – (a) an asylum claim which asserts that to remove the person to a specified State to which this Part applies would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention… (4) The person may not bring an immigration appeal within the United Kingdom in reliance on a human rights claim to which this sub-paragraph applies if the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is clearly unfounded; and the Secretary of State shall certify a human rights claim to which this sub-paragraph applies unless satisfied that the claim is no clearly unfounded.” (a) it is proposed to remove a person to a State to which this Part applies, and (b) in the Secretary of State’s opinion the person is not a national citizen of the State. (3) The person may not bring an immigration appeal from within the United Kingdom in reliance on – (a) an asylum claim which asserts that to remove the person to a specified State to which this Part applies would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention… (4) The person may not bring an immigration appeal within the United Kingdom in reliance on a human rights claim to which this sub-paragraph applies if the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is clearly unfounded; and the Secretary of State shall certify a human rights claim to which this sub-paragraph applies unless satisfied that the claim is no clearly unfounded.”
“If there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person is someone who in respect of whom directions may given under any of paragraphs 8 to 10A or 12 to 14, that person may be detained under the authority of an immigration officer pending– (a) a decision whether or not to give such directions; (b) his removal in pursuant of such directions.”
“1. Member states shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason of he or she is subject to the procedure established by this Regulation. 2. When there is a significant risk of absconding the member states may detain the person concerned to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this Regulation, on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively. 3. Detention shall be for as short a period as possible and shall be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this Regulation is carried out…”
“practical realities lie at the heart of the inquiry; evidence of what happens on the ground must be capable of rebutting the presumption if it shows sufficiently clearly that there is a real risk of article 3 treatment if there is an enforced return.”
“As regards the general guarantees governing detention, as well as detention conditions, where appropriate, member States should apply the provisions of Directive 2013/33/EU also to persons detained on the basis of this Regulation.”
“In my judgment there must be in force in the country in question a criminal law which makes the violent attacks by the persecutors punishable by sentences commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. The victims as a class must not be exempt from the protection of the law. There must be a reasonable willingness by the law enforcement agencies, that is to say the police and courts, to detect, prosecute and punish offenders. It must be remembered that inefficiency and incompetence is not the same as unwillingness, unless it is extreme and widespread. There may be many reasons why criminals are not brought to justice including lack of admissible evidence even where the best endeavours are made; they are not always convicted because of the high standard of proof required, and the desire to protect the rights of accused persons. Moreover, the existence of some policemen who are corrupt or sympathetic to the criminals, or some judges who are weak in the control of the court or in sentencing, does not mean that the State is unwilling to afford protection. It will require cogent evidence that the State which is able to afford protection is unwilling to do so, especially in the case of a democracy.”
“…we do not suggest that the Italian authorities are in general terms unable or unwilling to provide protection against criminal activities in Italy” (letter from Bindmans dated 12April 2016 page 5) Instead the argument is summarised thus: “We do however, argue, for all the reasons set out in our client’s previous grounds, that there is a real risk that, in the light of his unusually high profile, the particular notoriety of his defection from what was to be a major festive event, the likely level of antagonism towards him from pro-government organisations, the strength of the Eri-Blood movement in Italy, that this particular claimant will not be offered protection of the effectiveness required by law.”
“The Secretary of State will normally decline to examine the asylum application substantively if there is a safe third country to which the applicant can be sent. There are no grounds for departing from this practice in your case”
“Article 28 – Proper Construction 59. The Claimants argue there is, at its lowest, a presumption of liberty under the Dublin III Regulation where a person is subject to the transfer procedure. But the Claimants go much further. First, it is said that that presumption of liberty is governed by the fundamental EU law principles of necessity and proportionality. The principles of proportionality require minimum interference and individualised consideration of the need for a person's detention. These general principles, Mr Chirico argued, cannot stand alongside any assertion that “imminent removal directions give rise, automatically or through generalising presumption, to a necessity for detention”. 60. Second, and for present purposes of even greater significance, it is said that Article 28(2) has the effect that it is only when there is a significant risk of absconding, that Member States may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer, and then only on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportionate and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively. 61. Mr Chirico contended that, if that is right, these provisions very significantly reduce the grounds upon which detention may be justified in the Dublin III context. Detention, it is said, is not permitted on the sole ground that removal is imminent, or that there is a realistic prospect of removal. Domestic law, so far as it permits otherwise, is displaced. 62. The Defendant submits that Article 28 means what it says. Article 28(1) requires that Member States should not make provision to treat foreign nationals falling within the Dublin process as a distinct class that will always be detained on the basis that they are within the Dublin process as the sole detaining criterion. Article 28(1) effectively says “do not detain foreign nationals falling within the Dublin system solely because they fall within the Dublin system where they would not otherwise be detained under national law”. 63. The Defendant argued that the Claimants' submissions erroneously seek to do the complete converse – to require Member States to treat Dublin cases as a distinct class of case and to misapply national provisions so that detention can only be justified on a Dublin basis and so only where certain conditions apply. She says that the Claimants have conjured a “presumption of liberty” from a provision that concerns only the extent to which simply being within the Dublin process in itself can be used as a justification for detention. 64. In the course of argument at the March 2016 hearing I put to Mr Chirico what had been my reading of Article 28(1) when I first considered it, before I had had sight of the skeleton arguments in this case. I said that Article 28(1) appeared to me to mean that a Member State could not hold a person in detention simply because he was subject to the Dublin III procedures. Mr Chirico agreed. I suggested that that carried with it the implication that, if their detention was justified on other grounds under national law, Article 28 did not make that detention unlawful. Mr Chirico agreed that that might flow from Article 28(1) if read alone, but he said such an interpretation could not survive consideration of Article 28 (2). 65. I disagree. Further reflection has confirmed me in the view I expressed as to the natural reading of Article 28 (1). And if that is right, I fail to see how Article 28(2) has caused the radical transformation of English domestic law governing the removal of non-UK citizens for which Mr Chirico contends. Article 28(2), in my judgment, applies in the circumstances covered by Article 28(1), namely where the detention is solely for the purpose of a removal under Dublin and not when the detention is authorised under some free-standing domestic law provision. 66The Immigration Act 1971 provides that a person who does not have current valid leave to remain is subject to administrative removal. The Claimants fall into that category. As noted above, the 1971 Act gives powers of detention provided by paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2. That was the power exercised in the case of these Claimants. The fact that the Defendant then decided to employ the Dublin III provisions to effect removal to Bulgaria does not affect the legality of the detention. Article 28 governs and conditions the exercise of powers to detain when Dublin III is the source of the power to detain and remove; it does not abolish the pre-existing power under English domestic law to detain a non-UK citizen with no right to enter or remain in the UK pending their removal by whatever lawful means are available to the Defendant. 67. When Article 28(2) refers to “the person concerned”, it is referring to persons described in Article 28(1), namely a person held “ in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this Regulation”