“[1] The Court has to decide whether the licence of the appellant, Jacek Pawlowski, was properly revoked after his arrest and charge on a count of drunk-in-charge. [2] Furthermore, the Court is asked to decide whether the revocation is right now, in the light of events subsequent to the issue of the initial revocation. [3] We believe that action was appropriate after the arrest and charge, but that revocation was not the appropriate action. Suspension, whatever its limitations, would have been the appropriate action. [4] In the light of the guidelines, which indicate that even a relatively serious conviction would be no bar to a Private Hire driver retaining his licence, we note that the appellant has no convictions, and neither has he come to the attention of the licensing department in the past. We conclude that the revocation is not now appropriate and, on the balance of probabilities, allow the appeal.”
“69. … I would note that in my view section 61 does not confer only a discretion. In my view, it includes an element what may be called the exercise of a judgment in particular in subsection (1)(b) which requires there to be any other reasonable cause. It was common ground before me, in substance, for present purposes, that means whether a person continues to be a fit and proper person to hold a driver’s licence. 70. As I have said, that is not a pure exercise of discretion, it is rather an exercise which calls for judgment to be performed on whether the statutory question has been answered in favour of or against the relevant driver. 71. That is a threshold question before which the exercise of discretion does not exist. Even once the threshold question has been answered against a driver, there still exists in the local authority a discretion. Section 61 provides that in those circumstances a council may, not that it must, suspend or revoke a licence. So at that stage of the process discretion does come into it. That discretion of course must be exercised lawfully according to well-known principles of public law.”
“100. The claimant [i.e. Mr Morrissey] submitted that in any event, quite apart from his other arguments what happened in this case was that on5th July 2011 the defendant decided to suspend his licence rather than to revoke it. It was submitted, as it were, that the defendant authority was therefore ‘functus officio’. It was submitted there is no power of interim suspension in section 61 of the 1976 Act. 101. I would accept those argument on behalf of the claimant Mr Morrissey, in this case. 102. Returning to the language of section 61, I remind myself that this was not a case in which any attempt was made to activate the suspension of the licence to have immediate effect pursuant to the interest of public safety basis in subsection (2B). The notice sent to Mr Morrissey did not purport to invoke that provision or to make the suspension immediately effective. 103. In my judgment, the way in which the concept of suspension is used by Parliament is section 61 of the 1976 Act is not, as it were, to create a power of interim suspension, it is rather after a considered determination in other words a final decision on whether a ground for either revocation, or suspension of a licence is made out, for there to be either revocation or, as a lesser sanction, a sanction of suspension. 104. By way of analogy, one can envisage for example in a professional context a solicitor or a barrister can be disciplined on grounds of his conduct. The relevant disciplinary body may conclude that even if the misconduct has been established, that the appropriate sanction should be something less than complete revocation of the practising certificate for the relevant lawyer. It may be, for example, a suspension for a period of 1 year, will constitute sufficient sanction in the interests of the public. 105. It is in that sense, in my judgment, that Parliament uses the concept of suspension in section 61 of the 1976 Act. It does not use, as it were, to create an interim power, before a reasoned determination has been made, that the grounds in subsection (1A) or (1B) have been made out. It is not, as it were, a protective or holding power. It is a power of final suspension, as an alternative to a power of final revocation. For those reasons I accept that aspect of Mr Morrissey’s claim for judicial review also.”
“During the hearing we heard from both parties on the issue of the council’s decision to revoke the applicant’s private hire licence with immediate effect rather than to suspend it. Whilst our decision was not based upon the appropriateness or otherwise of the council’s decision to revoke the applicant’s licence before the hearing of the criminal charges and whether the council misdirected itself as to the options open to it at that point, we did make observations on this issue in our reasons.”
“If the individual is the subject of an outstanding charge or summons their application can continue to be processed, but the application will need to be reviewed at the conclusion of proceedings. Where information is received through the Notifiable Occupations Scheme or otherwise, officers will use their delegated powers as appropriate. This may include suspending the licence if the licence holder has been charged with a relevant offence, pending a review once the outcome of the case is known.”
“In my judgment it must accept the policy and apply it as if it was standing in the shoes of the Council considering the application. Neither the Magistrates Court nor the Crown Court is the right place to challenge the policy. The remedy, if it is alleged that a policy has been unlawfully established, is an application to the Administrative Court for judicial review. In formulating a policy the council no doubt first consult various interested parties and then take into account all the various relevant considerations.”
“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
“5(c) In relation to costs, we found that the sum of£1800 sought by the Applicant was just and reasonable and that it was in the interests of justice to make an award in that sum in his favour. 6 In relation to the question of costs, Mr Saville on behalf of Reigate and Banstead Borough Council drew our attention to Perrin v Westminster Magistrates’ Court[2002] EWCA Crim 747 [it is suggested that this is a mistaken reference to the Perinpanathan case] and the factors to be considered by the court when deciding whether to make an order for costs against a regulatory authority. Mr Ellis on behalf of the applicant argued that as a consequence of the council’s decision to revoke the applicant’s private hire licence the applicant had suffered financial hardship. In reaching our decision we took account of the fact that the council’s decision to revoke the applicant’s licence meant that the only recourse available to him was to appeal to an independent tribunal. We found that this chain of events had put the applicant in some financial difficulty as he was unable to work between October 2015 and February 2016. We acknowledge that we did not give detailed reasons on this point.”