“ 1. The proposal would constitute an over intensive development of the site, by reason of the number of dwellings, the inadequacy of the car parking provision, the amenity of future residents, the loss of existing vegetation and the inadequate replacement landscaping proposed. It would therefore be contrary to Policy CS 15 and CS 17 of the Dartford Core Strategy 2011, Policies B1, B3 and T23 of the adopted Dartford Local Plan 1995, and the Council’s Parking Standards………2012. 2. By virtue of the walking distances to public transport and other community facilities and the impact on landscaping and biodiversity, the proposal to develop this windfall site is contrary to the criteria set down in Policy CS10 of the Dartford Core Strategy 2011.”
“Main Issues 3. Several Statements of Common Ground (SOCG), with Dartford Council, with Kent County Council and with the Council of the London Borough of Bexleyreduce the areas of contention. Not all parties subscribe to all the SOCGs. Third parties in particular continue to pursue issues of highway safety. There remain six main issues. They are; • Whether the site would be a sustainable location for development and the effects of the proposal on; • Biodiversity • The character and appearance of the area • The living conditions of existing residents of Waterstone Park and of potential future residents of the appeal scheme • Highway safety and on • Housing Land Supply” • Whether the site would be a sustainable location for development and the effects of the proposal on; • Biodiversity • The character and appearance of the area • The living conditions of existing residents of Waterstone Park and of potential future residents of the appeal scheme • Highway safety and on • Housing Land Supply”
“Housing Land Supply 66. Although the Council had the opportunity to set an alternative, locally derived housing target in its Core Strategy, it chose to perpetuate that set by the now abolished South East Plan, which is derived from the requirements and needs of a wider area. It is unchanged by the absence of requests from neighbouring authorities to assist in providing for their objectively assessed needs under the duty to cooperate. Unusually, therefore, the Dartford Core Strategy sets a capacity-based housing target in terms of “up to” a maximum of 17,300 between 2006 and 2026, rather than a local needs-based target of a minimum which is to be exceeded but it is a target, nonetheless. In this respect, my view is consistent with that taken in the “Knockhall Road” decision (APP/T2215/A/13/2203710), to which I was referred. 67. It does not follow that anything less than the maximum satisfies the target; the wider justificatory and explanatory text of the Core Strategy makes it clear that the words “up to” are included because analysis suggests uncertainty in respect of environmental outcomes and the capacity of infrastructure and services to address growth should forecasts indicate that this level of delivery is likely to be exceeded. Nevertheless, the Core Strategy itself only includes a trigger for management action to remedy any shortfall in delivery if forecasts indicate delivery is falling below local housing need levels of 11,700 homes. 68. Paragraphs 47 and 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework do not make that distinction, advising that relevant policies for the supply of housing should not be considered up-to-date if the local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable housing sites against their housing requirements. Although the NPPF policy is that housing targets should meet full objectively assessed needs, there is nothing to preclude housing targets being set at a higher level, as is the case in Dartford. 69. From evidence given at the Inquiry it is quite clear that although the Council has granted planning permissions for nearly sufficient housing to meet all its local housing needs even though it is only about half-way through the plan period, those permissions are on sites which will be built out in periods extending long beyond the timescale of the Core Strategy. Nevertheless, in terms of specific deliverable sites, the Council continues to claim that it has identified sufficient land to meet both its trigger point for management action and its Core Strategy target for the next five years. 70. Its Core Strategy target is phased, with target delivery rates peaking in the third of a four-phase delivery period. Previous shortfalls are addressed on the Liverpool method over the whole period of the plan rather than the first five years because the target is not a needs-based figure. This method is also applied to its five years housing target calculation and no “buffer” is applied, resulting in a five-year target of up to 6450. Although the appellant argues for a different basis of calculation, the accuracy of this figure is confirmed in evidence. I have no quarrel with the use of the Liverpool method, for the reasons given by the Council. 71. The Council’s intervention trigger point of 4040 is calculated on a different basis, because it is a needs-based figure, using the Sedgefield method for addressing shortfalls and adding a 5% buffer. Shortfalls in delivery were not considered persistent at the time of the Knockhall Road decision. Although shortfalls have persisted for two further years, completion rates have picked up somewhat and there has been a step-change in the annual target, so I am not convinced that a verdict of persistent underdelivery is yet justified. 72. The Council’s record in forecasting its delivery against target is poor, as demonstrated by the appellant’s uncontroverted evidence. For that reason, I do not accept the Council’s prediction that delivery rates will increase to double or treble those of the recent past. I am more persuaded by the appellant’s evidence that possible delivery in the next five years is 6172. Even that represents a doubling of recent delivery rates and so I do not disagree with the appellant’s description of it as hugely ambitious. Nevertheless, the appellant accepts that it is realistic and I have no reason to disagree. 73. Even that hugely ambitious expectation of delivery fails to meet the Core Strategy target for the next five years. It follows that, in line with national policy expressed in the NPPF, I should not regard the Council’s policies for the supply of housing as being up to date. Paradoxically, that would include Core Strategy policy CS10 (4) for the assessment of windfall sites with which I have found this appeal proposal to comply but, in practice, the outcome is the same because NPPF paragraph 14 advises that where relevant policies are out of date, permission should be granted unless any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in the Framework, taken as a whole. I have previously noted that policy CS10 (4) of the Dartford Core Strategy can be seen to align closely with the NPPF. 74. Both the appellant and the Council produce tables showing recent housing delivery; the appellant against the Core Strategy target, the Council against the trigger for management action. At nine-twentieths of the way through the plan period, delivery shows a 32% shortfall against the Core Strategy target and an 18% shortfall compared with the Council’s trigger for management action. Whichever way it is looked at, management action is needed to increase delivery. 75. Paragraph 3.21 of the Council’s Core Strategy advises that an element of supply from windfall sites can enable early delivery of housing and increase flexibility. That is a measure of the beneficial effects on housing land supply which this proposal would have. 76. Affordable housing is proposed comprising a total of 16 units. That represents 29% of the dwellings proposed. It would be marginally below the 30% required by Core Strategy policy CS19 but the Council does not contest the shortfall. As its provision is a policy requirement, its inclusion in the Unilateral Undertaking would be CIL compliant. 77. I conclude that the shortfall of affordable housing provision would be marginal and not such as to justify dismissing the appeal. The effect of the proposal on the supply of housing overall would be beneficial. The proposal would therefore accord with Core Strategy policy CS10 which provides for housing development.”
“Conclusions and conditions 78. The overall planning balance would be as follows. As a greenfield site, the land would not be of the preferred type for development but its loss would not be greatly significant. It would be in the right place, supported by infrastructure. The balanced and sustainable pattern of land use and transport sought by policy CS11 and the third of the Core Strategy’s key principles would be maintained. The balance of ecological effect would be marginally positive. So would its landscape effects. The living conditions it would provide would be acceptable. It would not have an unacceptable effect on highway safety. Its benefits in terms of housing provision would be unqualified at a time when management action to increase delivery rates is called for. 79. The appeal proposal would therefore perform the three roles of a sustainable development. I conclude that the adverse impacts of granting permission would not significantly or demonstrably outweigh the benefits when assessed against the policies of the Framework taken as a whole; indeed, rather the reverse and so, the appeal should be allowed.”
“42 The NPPF is a policy document. It ought not to be treated as if it had the force of statute. It does not, and could not, displace the statutory "presumption in favour of the development plan", as Lord Hope described it in City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1447 at 1450B-G). Under section 70(2) of the 1990 Act and section 38(6) of the 2004 Act, government policy in the NPPF is a material consideration external to the development plan. Policies in the NPPF, including those relating to the "presumption in favour of sustainable development", do not modify the statutory framework for the making of decisions on applications for planning permission. They operate within that framework – as the NPPF itself acknowledges, for example, in paragraph 12 (see paragraph 12 above). It is for the decision-maker to decide what weight should be given to NPPF policies in so far as they are relevant to the proposal. Because this is government policy, it is likely always to merit significant weight. But the court will not intervene unless the weight given to it by the decision-maker can be said to be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. 43 When determining an application for planning permission for housing development the decision-maker will have to consider, in the usual way, whether or not the proposal accords with the relevant provisions of the development plan. If it does, the question will be whether other material considerations, including relevant policies in the NPPF, indicate that planning permission should not be granted. If the proposal does not accord with the relevant provisions of the plan, it will be necessary to consider whether other material considerations, including relevant policies in the NPPF, nevertheless indicate that planning permission should be granted.”