‘As a result of the information that your client has provided which includes information about his support, role and involvement for an organisation that regularly committed international crimes or other abuses, I am refusing your client’s application for nationality on the grounds that sufficient evidence has not been provided to satisfy the requirement to demonstrate good character’
‘The lawfulness and reasonableness of the Respondent’s decision to deny the Claimant naturalisation on grounds of good character arising from his employment as a serving police/intelligence officer in the Serbian Security Services in Kosovo prior to 1999’
‘I cannot return to Kosovo because I fear being killed by individuals who work for the KLA in Kosovo….’ ii). para. 3: Those people who want to harm me believe I have links to Serbian officials even though since September 1999 when the Kosovan police service came into being as a Kosovan authority (separate from Serbian service) I have worked for the Kosovan Police Service. You see before this time I was working for the Serbian intelligence services (part of the police) in Kosovo. All Albanians who worked for that service were in fear of the KLA. They feared the KLA because since the early 1990s in Kosovo, more than 95% of the Albanian people left the official institutions of Kosovo…However I and some Albanian colleagues who did remain were in fear. KLA wanted Kosovo to be independent and weren’t happy about the Serbs being in Kosovo. The KLA members wanted to gain independence by fighting the official bodies that were running Kosovo. The KLA targeted those of us that were Albanians and still working for the Serbian intelligence services because they believed we were loyal to Serbian people and that we were giving them information’ iii). para. 15: ‘I believe the Serbians also suspect me and do not trust me. You see at the beginning of 1997 while I was working for the Serbian Intelligence service, I saw that Serbians were putting a lot of pressure on Albanians. There were many ethnic conflicts. I was working for the Serbians and felt very fearful and stressed. I had a fear about working against my own people. I went on sick leave for stress. I went to see a psychologist. I have provided to my solicitor documents about my medical condition. In fact I waspretending I was ill so I didn’t have to work for the Serbians. I didn’t work for 8 months. Then the following year in 1998 my son accidently shot himself when handling a gun. He was in hospital. I used this excuse again not to work. I didn’t work for 7 months during 1998. However as soon as the war was over in 1999, the Serbians asked 7 of my Albanian colleagues to return to Serbia with them to continue working for the Serbian Intelligence service. They didn’t ask me. I believe this is because they didn’t see me as loyal or trust me. Instead I began working for the new Kosovan Police Service. Why would a man with mental problems start working again? I am sure the Serbians are therefore suspect of me as too loyal to Kosovo and Albanians.’ i). paragraph 4: ‘the Serbians are specifically suspicious of me as an individual because of my precarious work history with them .When they really needed me during a period in which the KLA went underground (1997), I let them down. I pretended I was ill. You see from 1993 to about 1996 I worked in the town of Podujevo. 40 kilometres from Pristina in Kosovo. During that time I was an inspector for the Serbian Intelligence Service. I was an advisor which is a very high rank - higher than captain. In this as role I was an expert in tapping telephone calls. That was my speciality. I was especially good because I could speak Serbian and Albanian and I could recognise accents and languages – I could tell who was calling from where, so I was very good at this because I listened to all this information from all groups [I] had access to a lot of information. People began to suspect that because I had access to this information that I was in fact acting as a double agent, providing the relevant information to the opposite group. ii). paragraph 5: ‘I suppose I can see why I am suspected of being a double agent. I know that my intelligence work for the Serbian authorities was used to target KLA supporters (including targeted assassinations by Serbian security forces) as this was the work which the Serbian intelligence services was doing at that time. I had to write down what I was listening to conversations between KLA members. I was giving names writing the subject of their conversations, etc…; iii). paragraph 6: It was the stress of these accusations and suspicions that caused me to find an excuse to claim I had mental health problems to go on sick leave. Of course the Serbians were not happy about this. It was in 1997 that the KLA went under ground and the Serbian intelligence service was especially busy and had a lot of work and had a lot of work. They needed me more than ever. However because of the stress I went in sick leave. It was during this critical period that I failed them. Then after the war when in 1999 the Kosovo Police Service was formed I immediately joined up. I am sure that the Serbians are now suspicious that I joined the KPS when I was supposed to be mentally ill. There were very stringent tests to join the KPS which I’m sure the Serbians were aware of. I passed these tests and was clearly mentally healthy, so I’m sure the Serbians are wondering why I claimed to be ill. I believe that the Serbians looked back and realized that it was possible that all the previous investigations that hadn’t gone aswell as they’d hoped weren’t successful because I had tipped off the KLA (which of course I wasn’t). iv). paragraph 7 ‘…The new Serbian authorities are very much against anything to do with the old Serbian regime run by Milošević. Anyone associated with that old regime is being targeted. During my time with the Serbian intelligence service I worked for both Jovica Stanišić and Sreten Lukić people who are now on trial for their role with the former Serbian regime…I met them a few times when they visited us in Pristina to check up on us… Stanišić was the chief of the intelligence staff selected by Milošević. 7C.The Standish expert report produced for the Claimant before the AIT 15. Mr Standish was a senior research fellow, tutor at Durham University specialising in Balkan studies, and an editor of Jane’s Intelligence Digest. He put forward an impressive curriculum vitae as a regional expert specialising in former communist countries including Serbia and Kosovo. In addition he was a journalist specialising in the same region and since July 2000 had been the editor of a publication (Jane’s Intelligence Digest) providing extensive coverage of the military and political situation throughout the Balkan region. He had made a number of visits to Serbia and Kosovo since 1992 meeting and conducting interviews with a wide range of local residents – Albanian, Roma and Serb – as well as government officials and specialists working for the UN and NGOs. 16. Mr Standish had access to the appeal documents of the Claimant including his witness statements and asylum interview records. His observations and expressions of opinion included the following: i) at paragraph 10 he noted the contents of the Claimant’s statement at paragraph 3 that those like himself who remained working for Serbian regime throughout the 1990s when almost other ethnic Albanians had left their posts in the early 1990s were ‘targeted’ by the KLA; ii) at paragraph 23: ‘The appellant also states that he is aware that his intelligence work for the Serbian authorities was used by the Serbian security forces to target supporters of the KLA. He points out this included targeted assassinations carried out by the Serbian authorities …’ iii) at paragraph 24 he noted the fuller account of the Claimant’s motives for taking sick leave in 1997 and the Claimant’s concern that his ‘recovery’ enabling him to join the KPS in 1999 ‘may lead the Serbian authorities to suspect he was tipping off the KLA which he denies having done’; iv) at paragraph 25 he noted the Claimant’s account that he was associated with senior members of the Milošević regime, particularly Jovica Stanišić (director of the state Security Division) and Sreten Lukić (Minister for State Security) whom he had met in a professional capacity during their visits to Pristina and whom the Claimant confirmed were facing trial for their activities. v) at paragraph 34 he noted that after Kosovo’s political autonomy had been suppressed by the Serbian regime headed by Milošević in 1989-90, the vast majority of ethnic Albanians were dismissed from state employment and the small proportion of individuals who remained in post which included the Claimant were required to sign a personal oath of allegiance to the Serbian state; vi) at paragraph 35 he refers to the Claimant’s evidence ‘that he played a key role in Serbian intelligence operations in Kosovo prior to the withdrawal of Serbian forces in June 1999. In particular he was responsible for telephone intercepts and the monitoring of members of the KLA. His evidence is that this information was used by the Serbian forces to target KLA members and supporters for assassination’ vii) at paragraph 36: he refers to the Claimant’s claim that his name, position and role in the Serbian intelligence service during the Milošević era had been made public owing to testimony in open court during the Milošević trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Hague and recites the evidence given by an ICTY prosecution witness known as K6 under cross examination by Milošević, naming the Claimant as involved in the gathering of information which was used to plan assassinations. viii) at paragraph 36 he comments on the significance of this evidence given at the ICTY trial of Milošević in these terms: ‘...the link between the intelligence gathered by the Appellant in his capacity as an intelligence officer in the Serbian security service and subsequent assassinations is made explicit. Although K6 does not accuse the Appellant of responsibility for killings, his evidence does reveal the extent of the Appellant’s involvement in the Serbian intelligence operation in Kosovo’; ix) at paragraph 40 he observes further that: ‘In addition, the context in which this evidence was raised leaves little room for doubt that the Appellant played an integral role in the gathering of intelligence that was subsequently used by the Milošević regime to murder its political opponents in Kosovo. Although K6 stresses that the Appellant was not personally involved in the actual assassinations in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians who served in such positions during the Milošević era must in my opinion be regarded as being at risk from former members of the KLA – to whom that would be regarded as traitors - as well as other members of the ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo. In my view ethnic Albanians might well feel justified in targeting the Appellant, particularly those whose family members served with the KLA and were killed by Serbian forces, or whose family members were murdered prior to June 1999. This is likely to account for a very significant number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo’
‘if on an application for naturalisation as a British citizen made by a person of full age and capacity, the Secretary of State is satisfied the applicant fulfils the requirements of schedule 1 for naturalisation as a citizen under this subsection, he may, if he thinks fit, grant to him a certificate of naturalisation as such as a citizen’
‘…the requirements for naturalisation as a British citizen under section 6(1) are, in the case of any person who applies for it ….
‘The parties are in agreement that the Secretary of State enjoys a significant measure of appreciation in assessing for herself the requisite standard of good character in the factual context of the application under consideration. In…ex parte Fayed[2000] EWCA Civ 253 , [2001] Imm AR 134 at paragraph 41 Nourse LJ (with whom in this respect Kennedy and Rix LJJ agreed) observed that the concept of good character was incapable of being defined against a single standard to which all could subscribe. A decision of the Secretary of State could be based on a higher standard of good character than that which might be adopted by another decision maker acting reasonably. Parliament had assigned a minister of the Crown the task of making the judgment whether a person was of good character and it was for the minister to adopt the requisite standard of good character subject only to a requirement of reasonableness’
‘Naturalisation is at the discretion of the Home Secretary. Undersection 6 of the British Nationality Act 1981 , he may grant a certificate of naturalisation to a person of full age and capacity if he is satisfied that the person meets the requirements set out in schedule 1 to the Act. He can refuse to grant a certificate to a person who meets these requirements, but he cannot grant a certificate to a person who does not meet them’
‘In considering the exercise of discretion it is important to look at their case as a whole. We need to be sure, before we agree to waive requirement, that the applicants are of good character and have genuinely thrown in their lot with this country. The points which need to be considered are set out n the Annexes to this Chapter’
‘ … (b) They have been involved in or associated with war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, terrorism or other actions that are considered not to be conducive to the public good.’
‘7.1 the information about an applicant will be considered against information from reputable sources on war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country concerned and where relevant on the groups in which the applicant had been involved. Where these sources provide sufficient evidence to support the view that the applicant’s activities or involvement constitute responsibility for, or close association, with war crimes or crimes against humanity, the application should be refused’
‘In some cases information may reveal that a person known or suspected of criminal activity but for various reasons has neither been charged nor convicted. The decision maker will take into account the nature of the information and the reliability of the source. Where there is firm and convincing information to suggest that a person is a knowing and active participant in serious crime (e.g. drug trafficking), the application will be normally refused. However the decision maker will not rely on old reports about suspicions’
‘51. In general, individual responsibility, and therefore the basis for exclusion arises where the individual committed or made a substantial contribution to, the criminal act, in the knowledge that his or her act or omission would facilitate the criminal conduct’
‘29….Naturalisation and asylum are different things, involving the conferment of different rights and the imposition of different obligations on the applicant, and different rights and obligations on the part of the host state or country of nationality. The grant of asylum does not involve any obligation to grant naturalisation. 30. Furthermore, the questions that arise for decision under the two contexts are different, though similar. In relation to asylum, it is whether ‘there are serious reasons’ for considering that the respondent has committed ‘a crime against peace, a war crime’ and so on. In JS v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2011] AC 184 [2010] UKSC 15 , a case which, like the present, concerned a former member of the LTTE, Lord Brown JSC said at paragraph 38: ‘put simply, I would hold an accused disqualified under Article 1F if there are serious reasons for considering him voluntarily to have contributed in a significant way to the organisation’s ability to pursue its purpose of committing war crimes, aware that his assistance will in fact further that purpose’
‘the SSHD would not be acing irrationally if he took the view that a person who had been a member – particularly if a voluntary and significant member, of an organisation that had engaged, as the LTTE had done, in many war crimes – was not a member of good character’
‘The respondent was twice involved in battles in the aftermath of which the LTTE murdered prisoners of war. It is not in doubt that the murder of prisoners of war is a war crime. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the respondent, if not involved in war crimes, in the sense of personally carrying out such murders, was associated with such crimes…The respondent was certainly actively involved in an organisation that carried out acts of terrorism…The conduct of the respondent as a member of the LTTE…constituted sufficient reason for her not to be satisfied that he was of good character. In my judgment, the Secretary of State’s decision did not depart from the Nationality Instructions…’
‘As Ms Lambert for the Secretary of State emphasised, the War Crimes Guidance and the Secretary of State’s decision in this case do not suggest that membership of or support for the LTTE for any period of time will always mean that an applicant for naturalisation will be regarded as not being of “good character” for the purposes of the 1981 Act. The question in each case will be whether there has been a sufficient level of support given to the LTTE, with awareness that it used war crimes and crimes against humanity as a material part of its mode of operation, as to raise serious doubts about the commitment of the applicant to respect the values of British society’
‘if the activities of an individual cast ‘serious doubt’ on their character’; that such serious doubt would be cast if ‘they have been involved in or associated with war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against humanity or genocide’; that in ascertaining whether it was appropriate to refuse an application for involvement in war crimes etc…consideration would be given to ‘evidence directly or indirectly linking the applicant with these crimes’ and that in determining the significance of these links consideration would be given to such factors as ‘the role of the applicant, the length of membership, and/or his seniority’
‘When (the Claimant) believed his own life was at stake he says he did take steps to suspend active service. However there is evidence that (the Claimant) did not deliberately seek to leave the service but was suffering from a mental illness that prevented him continuing in active service for the time being. It seems he continued to receive sick pay after ceasing active service at this time indicating that he was still considered to be a loyal supporter and not someone who had sought to disassociate themselves from the service or voiced disapproval or anything than active loyalty required to maintain that position. In all the circumstances, to the extent that it is claimed that (the Claimant) going sick was a deliberate act, it is considered that this was an act motivated by self preservation rather than an act of disassociation’
‘…It is noted that Mr Bolton was not an associate of (the Claimant) in the time to which the issues concerning his activities for the Serbian Intelligence Service relate. Mr Bolton arrived in Kosovo in 1999 which post dates the Claimant’s work for the Intelligence Service. It is therefore considered that (he) is unable to provide first hand evidence in relation to (the Claimant’s) activities prior to 1999…It is Mr Bolton’s evidence therefore that (the Claimant) was not involved in war crimes as he was not personally aware of it. It should be noted that the Secretary of State has not accused (the Claimant) of personally undertaking executions, torture or any of the other activities that may be described as ‘war crimes’
‘In any event in this case the serious doubts are founded on undisputed facts so cannot be dismissed as plainly groundless. The Claimant cannot deny his voluntary long service for Serbian Intelligence that he accepts directly facilitated the extrajudicial killings and abuses by state actors. The Claimant does not dispute that he was named in testimony in the context trials for crimes against humanity and that he worked in association with the notorious Akran. He may seek to explain away his involvement or make a claim to ‘economic’ or other ‘duress’ but that does not demonstrate that it is irrational to raise doubt on the established facts.’