“Before NHS England came into being, Primary Care Trusts also had a system where they authorised IFRs. For some PCTs the IFR system was also used for a quite different purpose, in addition to [authorising treatment on grounds of patient specific clinical exceptionality]. It was possible, either in the absence of a policy for treatment or any established contracted providers for care, or for treatments that are high cost, to institute an ‘Individual prior approval’ process, whereby rather than billing for all patients treated on a monthly basis, each request to treat with standard care is authorised one by one. It is important to understand that NHS England’s IFR process has never been used for the additional function of an individual prior approval process to manage expenditure for routinely commissioned care, as our policies make clear. It is important that the historical IFR system and the current NHS England system are not conflated.”
“1.1. This policy applies to any patient who is in circumstances where the NHS CB is the responsible commissioner for NHS care for that person or needs medical treatment where the NHS CB is the responsible commissioner for the provision of that medical treatment as part of NHS care to that person. 1.2. Clinicians, on behalf of their patients, are entitled to make a request (an “individual funding request”) to the NHS CB for treatment that is not normally commissioned by the NHS CB under defined conditions: The request does not constitute a request for a service development; AND The patient is suffering from a medical condition for which the NHS CB has commissioning responsibility and a commissioning position and the patient’s particular clinical circumstances falls outside the criteria set out in an existing commissioning policy for funding the requested treatment OR The patient is suitable to enter a clinical trial which requires individual explicit funding by the NHS CB as opposed to being part of a group of such trial patients OR The patient has a rare clinical circumstance, thus rendering it impossible to carry out clinical trials, and for whom the clinician wishes to use an existing treatment on an experimental basis.”
“Since NHS England's establishment and operation of the policy, data I have reviewed shows that fewer than 5 treatments per week across the entire country and the entire£14 billion specialised commission portfolio take place as a result of an IFR application.”
“Regulations may impose requirements on the National Health Service Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups for the purpose of securing that, in commissioning health care services for the purposes of the NHS, they - (a) adhere to good practice in relation to procurement; (b) protect and promote the right of patients to make choices with respect to treatment or other health care services provided for the purposes of the NHS; (c) do not engage in anti-competitive behaviour which is against the interests of people who use such services.”
“(1) For the purpose of taking a decision referred to in paragraph (2), a relevant body must establish and apply transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria. (2) The decisions are— (a) determining which providers qualify to be included on a list from which a patient is offered a choice of provider in respect of first outpatient appointment with a consultant or a member of a consultant’s team, (b) determining which providers qualify to be included on a list from which a patient is otherwise offered a choice of provider, (c) determining which providers to enter into a framework agreement with, and (d) selecting providers to bid for potential future contracts to provide health care services for the purposes of the NHS ….”
“The body corporate known as the Independent Regulator of NHS Foundation Trusts— (a) is to continue to exist, and (b) is to be known as Monitor.”
“(1) The main duty of Monitor in exercising its functions is to protect and promote the interests of people who use health care services by promoting provision of health care services which - (a) is economic, efficient and effective, and (b) maintains or improves the quality of the services. (2) In carrying out its main duty, Monitor must have regard to the likely future demand for health care services. (3) Monitor must exercise its functions with a view to preventing anti-competitive behaviour in the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS which is against the interests of people who use such services ….”
“13. (1) Monitor may investigate a complaint received by it that a relevant body has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by regulations 2 to 12, or by regulations 39, 42 or 43 of the 2012 Regulations (choice of health service provider). (2) Monitor may on its own initiative investigate whether a relevant body has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by regulation 10. (3) Monitor may not investigate a matter which is raised by a complaint under paragraph (1) where the person making the complaint has brought an action under thePublic Contracts Regulations 2006 in relation to that matter. (4) A relevant body must provide Monitor with such information in its possession as Monitor may specify for the purposes of an investigation carried out by virtue of paragraph (1) or (2). (5) The power of Monitor under paragraph (4) includes— (a) power to require the relevant body to provide an explanation of such information as it provides, and (b) in relation to information kept by means of a computer, power to require the information in legible form. 14. (1) Monitor may declare that an arrangement for the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS is ineffective. (2) Monitor may only make a declaration under paragraph (1) where it is satisfied that— (a) in relation to that arrangement, a relevant body has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by regulation 2, 3(1) to (4), 4(2) and (3), 5 to 8 or 10(1), and (b) the failure is sufficiently serious. (3) Monitor may declare that a term or condition of an arrangement for the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS is ineffective where is it satisfied that— (a) in relation to that term or condition, a relevant body has failed to comply with regulation 10(2), and (b) the failure is sufficiently serious. (4) On a declaration being made under paragraph (3), the term or condition is void; but that does not affect— (a) the validity of anything done pursuant to the term or condition, (b) any right acquired or liability incurred under the term or condition, or (c) any proceedings or remedy in respect of such a right or liability. 15. (1) Monitor may direct a relevant body— (a) to put in place measures for the purpose of preventing failures to comply with a requirement imposed by regulations 2 to 12, or by regulations 39, 42 or 43 of the 2012 Regulations; (b) to put in place measures for the purpose of mitigating the effect of such failures; (c) to vary or withdraw an invitation to tender for the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS to prevent or remedy a failure to comply with a requirement imposed by regulations 2 to 8 and 10; (d) to vary an arrangement for the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS made in consequence of putting the provision of services out to tender to remedy a failure to comply with a requirement imposed by regulations 2 to 8; (e) to vary an arrangement for the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS to remedy a failure to comply with regulation 10; (f) to otherwise remedy a failure to comply with a requirement referred to in sub-paragraph (a). (2) Monitor may not direct a relevant body under paragraph (1) to hold a competitive tender for a contract for the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS.”
“The application was considered on15 November 2012 by the Individual Funding Request (IFR) for NHS East London and the City, which considers cases of patients who are registered with GPs in City, Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets. The IFR Panel considers, on an individual basis, those treatments and procedures that are not routinely NHS funded or for which prior approval needs to be sought. The panel is comprised of a director of public health, local GPs, medicines management lead and a commissioner. The IFR panel assesses the effectives of the treatment, grounds for exceptionality, as well as equality considerations in relation to previous decisions made by the sector and implications for the funding of other similar patients in the future. The panel clarified that the London Specialised Commissioning Group commission on behalf of London PCTs against the criteria set out in their guidance document (Advice to London Primary Care Trust Services Specification: Radiosurgery and Radiotherapy, endorsed May 2010) and there is a potential inequity if this is not applied consistently across all gamma knife providers. The panel agreed therefore that all three cases should be funded on clinical grounds as there is sufficient information to demonstrate that the London SCG criteria are met, and refusal to fund would increase inequality between these patients and previous patients treated at approved centres if these criteria were not adhered to. The panel noted that UCLH is not an SCG approved centre for gamma knife treatment. The panel asked for the commissioning arrangements to be clarified after the meeting to ensure that there is consistency of approach. As the lead commissioner for UCLH has funded gamma knife treatments at UCLH and the SCG criteria were met, commissioning approval was given after the meeting for the treatment to proceed for all three patients at UCLH.”
“2. From1st April 2013 the NHS CB, as part of its portfolio of directly commissioned services will be responsible for the commissioning of all ‘specialised’ services (referred to as prescribed services in this report). This document sets out our commissioning intentions for 2013/14 and beyond for these services. 3. The commissioning and contracting of prescribed services will radically change for 2013/14; however, this is in the context of the phased transition programme for these services which has been underway since 2011. In addition, the changes being implemented are also in support of the direction of travel set out by Sir David Carter’s 2006 independent review of specialised commissioning arrangements Review of Commissioning Arrangements for Specialised Services May 2006. .”
“Specialised services commissioners have an additional role in preventing the proliferation of specialist centres to the point where there are too many centres, each treating too few patients, to provide a safe, high quality, value for money service. Designation of specialised service providers by SCGs would secure an appropriate concentration of clinical expertise and activity at designated centres located to maximise geographical access. Designation would safeguard patient access to high quality, cost effective services and prevent unsafe and unplanned proliferation of services. Commissioners should be able to choose how many providers to designate for each service so as to promote choice for patients but maintain sufficient critical mass in each provider to ensure clinical safety, quality and value for money.”
“There will be a single operating model for the commissioning of all Prescribed services, operationally delivered via ten nominated Local Area Teams (LATs). Within these arrangements London will have a more integrated structure with the LATs working as an essential part of the overall pan- London arrangements for direct commissioning. In addition, these arrangements will also include the integration of highly specialised services currently commissioned via NHS London/National Specialised Commissioning Team (NSCT), and high secure psychiatric services.”
“… The gamma knife business case and the IFRs were discussed separately and not explicitly linked. On the gamma knife we ran through our concerns given the late inclusion plus the fact that there are a number of other business cases up for consideration at other Trusts. Hence risk of over capacity. We agreed that UCLH would continue to submit IFRs for cases which would be mapped against existing commissioning policies (and the Trust suggested draft service specifications) whilst a more robust assessment of service need across London was carried out. Mike was quite happy with this and given he wasn’t clear himself on the Trust’s relationship with the actual service provider thought quite reasonable and we’d given him a roll forward on how to manage requests. Mike raised the concern about IFRs and the fact that to date they’d had no acknowledgments for requests made. Although they didn’t think anything was clinically urgent they didn’t think this was a reasonable position especially as it meant they didn’t know where the patient was in the process. He did say he did feel constrained to mention this to Anne Rainsbury (sic) Dr Anne Rainsberry was the Region Director (London) for NHSE. this afternoon when she visits.”
“It was found that your patient meets the current policy NHSCB/D05/P/d access criteria. Please refer your patient to one of the two NHSE commissioned providers in London, the BUPA Cromwell Hospital or Barts Health NHS Trust to carry out the required treatment.”
“I believe it would be appropriate for you to explain the reasoning for the decision made by NHSE to commission services from these providers to the exclusion of NHNN. I believe a similar letter was sent recently by our Medical Director, Mr Neil Kitchen, but no response was given. Therefore please note that QSRC requests a formal and detailed written response on the rationale why preference has been made in commissioning these other providers in preference to NHNN. Is this made on clinical grounds? Has your commissioning of these providers been subject to transparent procurement? We await an expeditious response before transfer of this patient can be considered further.”
“I note that you describe the service at [NHNN] as an established service. I reiterate the request made in my email to you of 6 June to provide evidence of commissioner support for this service development. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no business case approved for the development of SRS by any commissioners and the SRS service at UCLH has not been formally commissioned, although some London PCTs have approved treatment via their IFR process. From April 2013, SRS became the commissioning responsibility of NHS England for which it has agreed policies and guidance and NHS England made appropriate arrangements to commission the provision of this service. As I have previously stated, NHS England has two contracted providers for Gamma Knife in London, to whom all activity has been referred in the past and should continue to be referred until such time as we have completed the needs assessment and determined, from this, what additional capacity, if any, is required. Should we reach that position, we will need to follow an appropriate procurement route to secure this additional capacity. It is our intention to complete the activity and capacity analysis by the end of August, following which, all providers who have an interest in providing SRS/SABR, will have the opportunity to be considered for this additional capacity. I trust that this also addresses the issue you raise regarding Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition. As you are aware, the act does provide for circumstances where a provider may not be included, and an excess of providers to be included is one determinant. Equally, commissioners should not favour one provider over another and I am aware of other London Providers who wish to undertake this work.”
“11. There are currently not only variations in price for the same services across providers, but also differential pricing arrangements and currencies in existing contracts for the same providers. With the new model for a nationally commissioned portfolio of services, there will be a requirement for consistent pricing, currencies and contracting arrangements. This could therefore represent significant risk in 2013/14 for both providers and the NHS CB, therefore, in order to avoid destabilising services in the transition to consistent pricing and currencies, a financial envelope will be set with each provider based on historic expenditure. Consistent prices will be set for each provider based on net zero impact at 2012/13 prices. The envelope will then be adjusted for net tariff deflator (inflation less efficiency deflator) and QIPP programmes The Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention programme. . This will be a time limited transitional arrangement to avoid destabilising any part of the system. The NHS CB will work with providers to rebase currencies and prices on a national basis for the 2014/15 contracting round. … 77. The move to a national model for specialised commissioning has a range of implications and potential financial impacts. Specialised services will be funded via a finite budget that will be set by the NHS CB, rather than on a subscriptions basis funded by PCTs. This has significant potential impacts for providers which are detailed below. It is essential that providers note the changes and ensure that they are prepared to respond with effect from1st April 2013 . It is acknowledged that the move to consistent pricing across the specialised services portfolio has significant inherent risk with the potential to destabilise providers. In order to introduce this in a planned and managed way and to give providers and the NHS CB sufficient time to move towards this, 2013/14 will be a preparatory year. Financial envelopes will be set based on historic expenditure adjusted for Operating Framework requirements. The NHS CB and providers will work collaboratively to ensure that costs are managed within these envelopes.”
“62. Given the very significant system change at that time it was simply not possible to re-procure from first principles all specialised services immediately following the reorganisation. At its starting point for 2013/14 NHS England thus adopted the position arrived at by its predecessor specialised commissioning groups (SCGs). 63. To ensure critical mass of patients and infrastructure, specialised services needed to be concentrated in a managed number of providers, with appropriate geographic distributions to optimise patient access. Where there were existing contracts in place before March 2013 services would continue to be procured from those providers on an interim basis until a review of commissioning for the relevant service. There were 200 specialised services and it was not going to be possible to carry out national reappraisals of all of those services and indeed issue tenders for the provision of those services in time for the new NHS contract year starting on1 April 2013 .”
“When signing contracts with Barts [and the Cromwell] the former SCG agreed expected levels of activity. These contracts were rolled over on1 April 2013 and expected levels of activity agreed with the providers (in line with NHS England commissioning policy to permit time for a fundamental review of the commissioning of radiostatic surgery services …). NHS England would be breaking its existing contracts with the existing London providers of gamma knife as having three providers rather than two when two already provide sufficient capacity, would reduce the expected levels of activity for the existing contract providers. There is no penalty for NHS England if the expected levels of activity fall below those agreed, but NHS England has an interest in the sustainability of the providers with which it contracts.”
“We have decided to close our investigation into the commissioning of radiosurgery services. This document explains our reasons for closing the case. To assist commissioners facing similar circumstances in the future, we also intend to publish guidance on some of the issues raised in this investigation.”
“To ensure we use our resources in a way which delivers the greatest potential benefit to patients, we apply a prioritisation frameworkwhen deciding whether or not to open an investigation. We also apply this framework when we consider whether or not to continue an investigation once under way. Since we opened our investigation, NHS England has confirmed that it has now entered into a contract with Thornbury. In the circumstances, it appears to us that closing our investigation and issuing guidance is the course of action likely to create the greatest potential benefit to patients and is a proportionate means of achieving our objectives. This will enable us to support commissioners facing similar issues in the future and ensure that patients benefit from what we have learned in this case. Closing our investigation prior to a final decision being taken means that we have not made findings in relation to the matters under investigation. In particular, we have not determined whether or not the conduct carried on by NHS England or its predecessor was consistent with the applicable rules. The decision to close our investigation does not prevent us from opening a new investigation in relation to the commissioning of radiosurgery services if concerns arise. Any decision to open a new investigation would be made in line with our duty to protect and promote the interest of patients.”
“Having reviewed your complaint and the documentation you provided we took a number of steps to obtain further information. As well as speaking with you, we spoke with and sought information from NHS England. We also spoke with University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust on the matters set out in the complaint. We have considered whether we should investigate the matter further based on our administrative priorities having regard to our published prioritisation criteria and have assessed the complaint with reference to the likely benefit for patients and the likely costs of taking action. Having considered all the information in the round, we have decided not to investigate this matter further. This assessment does not constitute a view on the substance of the complaint. Our prioritisation criteria are intended to ensure that we make the right choices about which projects and programmes of work we undertake to ensure that we use our resources in a way that creates the greatest potential benefit to patients The essence of the complaint we received in January is that NHS England had prevented Queens Square Radiosurgery Centre Limited from providing gamma knife services by only funding this treatment in London if it is undertaken at London Barts Health NHS Trust or at the Bupa Cromwell Hospital. We have decided it would not be a good use of our resources to investigate this complaint further. This is because our substantive guidance on the Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations and the further guidance published following our investigation into the commissioning of radiosurgery services, a case involving similar services, set our expectations on how commissioners should behave. We expect commissioners to consider proposals from providers on their merits having regard to our published guidance. We realise this may be disappointing news for you, but we nevertheless appreciate the time you have taken in bringing this matter to our attention. Monitor is keen to ensure that choice and competition in the NHS continues to work well for patients and the complaints we receive are used to help assess and the shape our future work programme.”
“We would not therefore wish to meet to discuss the April 2013 commissioning decision or the rejected IFRs which [the Claimant] treated without authorisation. Once the national procurement process has been scoped and timetabled, we would be keen to meet with [the Claimant] and other potential providers as part of plans for market development.”
“In its complaint [the Claimant] says that following our letter it has tried unsuccessfully, to engage with NHS England regarding its proposal to provide gamma knife services. [The Claimant] says that NHS England has been unwilling to meet with [the Claimant] and its correspondence has not addressed the issues raised by [the Claimant]. If that is accurate, it is not the outcome we had in mind when sending our letter.”
“It was agreed that the most likely solution would be to award a contract in the interim period, but that any proposal would need to be reviewed in the light of the responses received by NHS England in relation to the National SRS consultation to sure (sic) there were no major conflicts.”
“28. The process of reviewing all specialised services, nationally and regionally, is a mammoth task. The workload required in doing this, by gathering evidence, consulting with patients and providers, dealing with other relevant stakeholders including Monitor and NICE, developing service specifications, running fair and transparent procurements, developing new contracts and addressing any TUPE issues is a significant undertaking. NHS England has to ensure it focusses on opportunities to review services in a structured way. That permits concentration upon those services where changes would have the greatest benefit for patients. 29. There are restrictions placed (by central government) on NHS England management expenditure which includes the costs of service reviews and procurements and there are finite staff with the expertise to undertake this work. Accordingly NHS England has had to prioritise and stage its different service reviews and has not been able to complete a review of every specialised service undertaken since NHS England came into being on1st April 2013 . A key part of the role of my team is to ensure that we focus on opportunities to provide services in a structured way so that we can consider all services in the fullness of time. We cannot simply review services on the basis of prioritising those who make the greatest noise, nor create instability for existing service providers by undertaking repeated reviews in a short space of time. We believe we will achieve the best results for patients from a thorough and considered process which allows for durable solutions.”
“… Low volume yet capital intensive services such as SRS/SRT are best undertaken with a national footprint to assess the total market requirement, rather than based on decisions in one region or town that have knock on effects on the sustainability of adjacent services.”
“Between31 October 2012 and31 March 2013 , QSRC treated a total of 51 (42 NHS and 9 private) patients. All bar two NHS patients were approved for treatment by local commissioners. Further, from1 April 2013 until August 2013, QSRC treated patients for whom QSRC had already obtained approval for the treatment from PCTs prior to1 April 2013 . This was for a further 10 NHS patients, which were paid for by NHS England.”
“36.4 … awarding a contract to another London provider would have exacerbated the problem of oversupply in London, would have failed to address the issue of unmet demand outside London and could also undermine the viability of commissioned providers. It would have added another commissioned provider to the market in London without tackling the problem of oversupply. The national review of SRS/SRT undertaken by NHS England demonstrated the need to rationalise the overcapacity by taking a national approach; 36.5 NHS England made a decision that it was not going to commission any additional providers of existing services, except where there were known problems with supply, cost or quality. There were no known problems with supply, cost or quality in relation to SRS/SRT in London; 36.6 NHS England is committed to a national procurement for these services; there is no financial or service justification for undertaking a separate London procurement for a short term contract ahead of this. And without procurement there is no fair basis on which to award a contract to QSRC and not to any of the other non-commissioned London providers.”
“Where the application for judicial review relates to a decision governed by thePublic Contracts Regulations 2006 , the claim form must be filed within the time limit within which an economic operator would have been required by regulation 47D(2) of those Regulations (and disregarding the rest of that regulation) to start any proceedings under those Regulations in respect of that decision.”
“(1) This regulation limits the time within which proceedings may be started where the proceedings do not seek a declaration of ineffectiveness. (2) Subject to paragraphs (3) to (5), such proceedings must be started within 30 days beginning with the date when the economic operator first knew or ought to have known that grounds for starting the proceedings had arisen ….”