Sanjari, R (on the application of) v The Crown Court at Birmingham [2015] EWHC 2037 (Admin)

Case No CO/783/2015[2015] EWHC 2037 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 15/07/2015
Before
THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALESMR JUSTICE HADDON CAVE
Between
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SHARIF SANJARIClaimantTHE CROWN COURT AT BIRMINGHAMDefendantTHE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SHARIF SANJARITHE CROWN COURT AT BIRMINGHAM
Adam Tear (Higher Court Advocate employed by Duncan Lewis) for claimantHearing Hearing date: 25 June 2015
JudgmentLord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, CJ:This is the judgment of the court.Introduction
[1]This renewed application for permission to bring judicial review raises important issues regarding applications to judges of the Crown Court to transfer representation orders and the revocation of legal representation orders by the Court.[2]The circumstances in which the Court may order a change of provider are carefully laid down by the provisions of regulation 14 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Determinations by a Court and Choice of Representative) Regulations 2013 (SI 614 of 2013) (the Regulations)which we set out at paragraph 33 below. The rationale behind the legislation is clear and designed to further the interests of justice: i) Defendants in criminal proceedings cannot be permitted unnecessarily to delay and complicate proceedings by the device of changing their representatives. A judge must, in the light of general experience, always be astute to guard against this risk which has significantly increased in recent years. ii) It is particularly important in the overall interests of justice to encourage lawyers to give realistic advice to defendants in criminal proceedings. Lawyers of integrity invariably do so. A defendant’s unhappiness or disagreement with such advice is not a ground which ordinarily will permit the transfer of the representation order. iii) Legal aid resources are limited. They must not to be wasted in unnecessary transfers of legal instructions from one lawyer to another. It is self-evident that the effect of any waste of resources is to disadvantage other defendants in the criminal justice system and the lawyers who represent them. In addition, judges must, in the current state of the market for legal services, also be astute to the risk that some will try to induce a defendant to change his solicitor for commercial reasons and therefore be astute to the conflicts of interest that might arise. Judges of the Crown Court are already heavily burdened. They are entitled to expect that solicitors making such applications will act with the highest standards of objectivity and integrity. It is evident, however, that the judges of the Crown Court must, for the reasons we have given, subject applications for transfers to rigorous and searching scrutiny. The application to the Recorder of Birmingham and the refusal of permission by the single judge[3]In the application, the claimant seeks permission to bring judicial review proceedings challenging the decision by the Recorder of Birmingham, HHJ Melbourne Inman QC, on 2 December 2014 in which he refused to permit the legal representation order granted to the claimant to be transferred to Duncan Lewis, a large firm of solicitors with offices in locations across England and in Cardiff, and ultimately had to revoke the claimant’s representation order.[4]Permission was refused on paper by the single judge, McGowan J, on 31 March 2015, who held that the Recorder of Birmingham was entitled to reach the conclusions he did on the merits of the claimant’s repeated applications to transfer his legal representation to new solicitors and there were no grounds to support the contention that his decisions were either unreasonable or irrational. In the course of her reasons for refusing permission, McGowan J made the following observation:
“Although a defendant in criminal proceedings is entitled to legal aid, subject to satisfying the relevant criteria, that is not a right to change solicitors and counsel at will. Nor does a defendant have a greater “choice” dependant on the seriousness of any sanction he faces.”

Jurisdiction

[5]The issue of jurisdiction to bring these judicial review proceedings was not drawn to the attention of McGowan J (as was the clear duty of those representing the claimant).[6]S. 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 excludes matters relating to trial on indictment from the purview of judicial review:
“(3) In relation to the jurisdiction of the Crown Court, other than its jurisdiction in matters relating to trial on indictment, the High Court shall have all such jurisdiction to make mandatory, prohibiting and quashing orders as the High Court possesses in relation to the jurisdiction of an inferior court.”
(emphasis added)[7]The approach to this provision is set out in the judgment of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Smalley [1985] AC 622 and the judgment of Lord Slynn in Ashton [1994] 1 AC 9. A number of decisions of this court have held that decisions by a Crown Court judge regarding representation and legal aid are regarded as matters relating to trial on indictment. In R (Wellington) v. Isleworth Crown Court [1993] 1 WLR 713 the Divisional Court held that a decision by a Crown Court judge to revoke an order discharging a legal aid certification was an exercise of “its jurisdiction in matters relating to trial on indictment” within s.29 of the Supreme Court Act 1981; see also R v Chichester Crown Court, ex p Abodunrin 79 Cr App R 293 and the more recent decisions in R (Faithful) v Crown Court at Ipswich [2007] EWHC 2763 (Admin) and R (CPS) v Croydon Crown Court [2015] EWHC 1739 (Admin).[8]The issue on jurisdiction was drawn to the attention of the legal representatives of the claimant by the Administrative Court Office. It was, therefore, addressed by Mr Adam Tear, the higher court advocate employed by Duncan Lewis in his submissions to us on behalf of the claimant. He contended that we should reconsider the decisions to which we have referred; that there was no intelligible purpose in restricting the right to review decisions in respect of representation orders or other matters in relation to legal aid, as it would be far better to permit challenges to be made to decisions on legal aid as soon as they were made rather than to await the outcome of the proceedings that had been heard on the basis of the decision made by the trial judge as to legal aid. This course was open to this court as confiscation proceedings were no longer part of the sentence: s. 13(4) of POCA provided that a court must leave the confiscation order out of account in deciding the appropriate sentence[9]We did not find the arguments remotely persuasive. We see no basis on which the cases can be distinguished: confiscation proceedings are decisions about sentence. Moreover, there are the important public policy reasons why decisions of this kind in the course of proceedings in the Crown Court cannot be challenged in this court but must await the decision of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division on any appeal after the hearing of the trial and confiscation proceedings in the Crown Court. However as we did not have the benefit of adversarial argument, it is not necessary to base our decision on a lack of jurisdiction, in circumstances where we have reached a clear conclusion on the merits of the application on which we heard full argument on the assumption that there was jurisdiction.

The offence committed by the claimant

[10]On 30 October 2012, the claimant was arrested with two others on suspicion of drug trafficking. It was alleged by the prosecution that the claimant and his co-conspirators were caught red-handed taking delivery of 65 boxes at Tilbury Docks thought and intended by them to contain 1.3 tons of cannabis shipped from Jamaica to Tilbury via Amsterdam. The authorities had intercepted the shipment at Amsterdam and removed the cannabis and replaced it with sand and bricks. The boxes containing the cannabis were part of a larger shipment of vegetables but each box that had contained the cannabis was marked with a blue ‘X’. The claimant worked for a company involved in importing vegetables from the Caribbean. The claimant and his co-conspirators were arrested after being observed separating out the 65 boxes bearing the blue ‘X’ and loading them into a separate van.[11]On 31 January 2014, the claimant was convicted of conspiracy to import and supply cannabis following a trial at Birmingham Crown Court before HHJ Burbidge. His co-defendants were acquitted. On 14 March 2014, the claimant was sentenced to 8 years 6 months imprisonment. The claimant was represented at the trial and sentence by counsel and solicitors (Messrs Rahman Ravelli).

The POCA proceedings

[12]On 14 March 2014, in the Crown Court at Birmingham, HHJ Burbidge made an order under s.18 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) for the provision of Financial Information and set a timetable for the proceedings. On 19 June 2014, a s.16 Statement of Information was served alleging that the claimant had benefited from his criminal conduct to the extent of £1,603,510.65. Under s.139 (4) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, therefore, the claimant may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to 10 years in default of payment.The Statement of Information asserted that the claimant had large amounts of unexplained cash passing through his various accounts (viz. £15,409.22 in his Bank of Scotland Accounts, £45,975.00 and £75,030.00 in his Barclays Accounts), as well as numerous other unexplained payments.[13]The claimant has appealed against conviction and expressed his intention to challenge the POCA proceedings.

The rulings made by the Recorder of Birmingham

[14]A series of applications in 2014 and 2015 were made on behalf the claimant to change his solicitors, the claimant having expressed discontent with Rahman Ravelli. An initial application was made on behalf the claimant by DPP Law and then further applications were made by Duncan Lewis and the claimant. The Recorder of Birmingham made four rulings in relation to these applications in all, as we shall explain.

First ruling – 10 October 2014

[15]On 26 September 2014, DPP Law wrote to Birmingham Crown Court requesting transfer of the representation order from Rahman Ravelli to them. DPP Law enclosed a copy of a letter from the claimant to Rahman Ravelli which complained that Rahman Ravelli had failed to interview a key defence witness (whose evidence was now the basis of the claimant’s appeal) and informed them that he wished to transfer his case to DPP Law. DPP Law stated that Rahman Ravelli had written that they did not object to a transfer.[16]On 10October 2014, the Recorder of Birmingham refused the claimant’s application to transfer his representation order from Rahman Ravelli to DPP Law. The Recorder of Birmingham did so on two grounds: i) The question of whether there was any merit in the claimant’s criticisms of Rahman Ravelli regarding the conduct of the trial was a matter for the Court of Criminal Appeal and not for the Crown Court; the funding of representation would be decided by that court at the leave stage. ii) The other criticisms made by the claimant of Rahman Ravelli, in particular regarding the lack of attention he had received regarding the POCA proceedings, could not justify a transfer order.[17]It was, therefore, a matter for DPP Law whether they wished to assist the claimant in his appeal, but they could not do so at the public expense. The Recorder of Birmingham then made clear that:
“6. If the defendant is unsuccessful in any appeal procedure he must understand that if he places Rahman Ravelli in a position that they can no longer act for him then an application for transfer at that stage may well be unsuccessful and he would then have to represent himself in any outstanding confiscation proceedings.”
[18]On 18November 2014, Rahman Ravelli wrote to Birmingham Crown Court explaining that they had received further complaints by the claimant, but were satisfied that none of these was made out. Whilst preparing for the POCA proceedings, they were in the invidious position of facing correspondence from another firm of solicitors who had not seen the papers but were acting solely on the instructions of the claimant. The position had been reached exactly as the Recorder of Birmingham had set out in paragraph 6 of his ruling of 16 October 2014. The claimant had put them in that position and they therefore had to apply to come off the record immediately. Rahman Ravelli added the following concluding paragraph:
“We are sure the Court appreciates that during the course of representing defendants on POCA matters it can on occasion be necessary to give unpalatable advice and with the backdrop that we have had with this defendant and the numerous allegations and complaints consider that this advice would not be received on the basis of it coming from a foundation of being given in the defendant’s best interests.”
[19]On 27 November 2014, the Recorder of Birmingham gave the claimant until 2 December to make any further submissions he wished in writing. The claimant then wrote to the court enclosing copies of his earlier letters of complaint to Rahman Ravelli dated 13 and 19 November 2014 and stating that, notwithstanding the court’s refusal to transfer representation, he had no intention of going back to Rahman Ravelli but could not afford to instruct anyone else.

Second ruling – 2 December 2014

[20]On 1 December 2014, yet further solicitors, Duncan Lewis, lodged with the Crown Court at Birmingham an 11 page “Application for Transfer of Representation” under Regulation 14 on behalf of the claimant alleging that the relationship between the claimant and Rahman Ravelli had “irretrievably broken down” to such as extent that the claimant had lost all faith and confidence in their ability to act for him. The application detailed a number of grounds in support of the application to allow the claimant change his legal representatives including, in particular: i) failure by Rahman Ravelli to attend upon the claimant regularly in order to obtain his instructions to prepare a sufficiently detailed response to the s.16 Statement; ii) concern that Rahman Ravelli had failed to instruct an expert regarding the valuation of the drugs seized; iii) ‘shock and disappointment’ on the part of the claimant that Rahman Ravelli had failed to instruct a forensic accountant to challenge the prosecution’s benefits figure; and iv) ‘grave concern’ that if his legal aid order was not transferred to Duncan Lewis he would not be able to challenge the Prosecution’s assertions in the s.16 statement and make sure that any Confiscation Order was properly and fairly made.[21]On 2December 2014, the Recorder of Birmingham issued a second ruling refusing this fresh application to transfer by Duncan Lewis. After rehearsing the history of the matter and referring to his earlier refusal of 10 October 2014, the Judge noted that this further application to transfer was received from a different firm and included further criticisms of Rahman Ravelli not previously made. The Recorder of Birmingham stated:
“5. … The matters raised in this application do not justify a transfer. It is not simply a matter for the defendant to decide if he would like a forensic accountant instructed not for him to decide whether an urgent conference with counsel is required. Nor is it sufficient for another firm of Solicitors to set out steps of instructing various experts when they are not acting for the defendant and cannot therefore have had access to the full papers or taken full instructions.”
[22]The Recorder of Birmingham noted his previous warning to the claimant and stated that opportunity was afforded to him to decide whether he was willing to co-operate with Rahman Ravelli but he had declined to do so and “clearly made it impossible for them to continue to act”. In these circumstances, the Recorder of Birmingham refused an oral hearing, pointing out the significant court time that such applications occupied, and issued the following ruling:
“7. … The legal representation order is therefore revoked. The defendant will not be further represented at the public expense and unless he arranges his own representation he will represent himself.”

Third ruling – 21 January 2015

[23]On 9 December 2014, the claimant wrote at length directly to the Recorder of Birmingham, rehearsing many of the points he had made before, stating that he could not afford to pay for alternative representation and effectively asking for reconsideration of the decision on transfer.[24]On 21 January 2015, the Recorder of Birmingham issued his third ruling on the matter. He dismissed the claimant’s application of 9 December 2014 with the following observations:
“6. There is no further relevant information provided. The defendant has obviously not co-operated with Rahman Ravelli. The consequences of how the defendant chose to act in relation to his Solicitors was made very clear to him. The Court has ruled on each occasion that there are no grounds for transfer of the legal representation order and the order has not been revoked. 7. The defendant must now finance his own representation or represent himself. Further applications on the same grounds will not be entertained.”

Fourth ruling – 9 February 2015

[25]On 22 January 2015, a trainee solicitor from Duncan Lewis contacted the court and requested copies of(i) the claimant’s application and the decision by the Recorder of Birmingham made on 10 October 2014,(ii) any correspondence between the claimant, the court, Rahman Ravelli and DPP Law, and(iii) the most recent application and decision by the Recorder of Birmingham.[26]On 9 February 2015, the Recorder of Birmingham issued a fourth ruling refusing Duncan Lewis’s request to be given copies of these documents. The Recorder of Birmingham made the following observations: “2. Duncan Lewis do not appear on the court record as acting for the defendant. 3. The court does not disclose or provide such documentation to third parties. 4. If Duncan Lewis are now acting privately for the defendant they must:(a) inform the court immediately and come onto the record(b) seek disclosure of any earlier documentation relating to these proceedings direct from the defendant’s previous Solicitors in the usual way with the appropriate authority. 5. The court does not act as an intermediary between Solicitors. 6. I have previously ruled and refused applications by the defendant for transfer of his legal representations order on the 10th October 2014, 2nd December 2014 and 21st January 2015. Significant court time has been taken ruling on applications which have no merit.” (a) inform the court immediately and come onto the record (b) seek disclosure of any earlier documentation relating to these proceedings direct from the defendant’s previous Solicitors in the usual way with the appropriate authority.

Complaint about trial counsel

[27]In parallel, in or about October 2014, the claimant’s partner, Asfar Kouser, lodged a complaint regarding trial counsel with his chambers. This was referred by the Head of Chambers to a member of chambers to investigate. On 7 October 2014, a report of the investigation was sent to claimant containing some criticisms of trial counsel.[28]Duncan Lewis did not include a copy of this report in the papers before HHJ Inman QC on 2 December 2014. Indeed, the transfer application lodged by Ducan Lewis only made what Mr Tear accepted was a ‘weak’ reference to admissions having been made by trial counsel’s chambers regarding trial counsel by way of background. This was not something, therefore, that the Recorder of Birmingham could take into account when reaching his decision.[29]On 6 February 2015, an appeal against conviction was lodged on behalf of the claimant. It was settled by new counsel (Mr Balbir Singh of Equity Chambers) on instructions from yet another firm of solicitors (Messrs BH Mohammed) alleging failures by trial counsel.

The Legislation

(a) Legal Aid Act 2012

[30]S.16 of the Legal Aid Act 2012 provides that an individual who qualifies under Part 1 of the Act is entitled to representation for the purposes of criminal proceedings at public expense:
“Representation for criminal proceedings (1) Representation for the purposes of criminal proceedings is to be available under this Part to an individual if— (a) the individual is a specified individual in relation to the proceedings, and (b) the relevant authority has determined (provisionally or otherwise) that the individual qualifies for such representation in accordance with this Part (and has not withdrawn the determination). (2) Representation for the purposes of criminal proceedings is to be available under this Part to an individual if— (a) the proceedings involve the individual resisting an appeal to the Crown Court otherwise than in an official capacity, and (b) the relevant authority has determined (provisionally or otherwise) that the individual qualifies for such representation in accordance with this Part (and has not withdrawn the determination). (3) Where an individual qualifies under this Part for representation for the purposes of criminal proceedings (“the principal proceedings”), representation is also to be available to the individual for the purposes of— (a) any related bail proceedings, and (b) any preliminary or incidental proceedings. …”
[31]S.27(4) of the Legal Aid Act 2012 provides that a defendant to criminal proceedings may select a representative to act for him: “Choice of provider of services etc … (4) An individual who qualifies under this Part for representation for the purposes of criminal proceedings by virtue of a determination under section 16 may select any representative or representatives willing to act for the individual, subject to regulations under subsection (6).” (b). Legal Aid Regulations 2013[32]Regulation 9 of the Regulations provides that the Court may withdraw a determination that an individual qualifies for representation under Legal Aid where that individual does not agree to the terms of the funding, the individual asks that the determination be withdrawn or the provider declines to act:
“9. Withdrawal of determinations by the court (1) The court before which any criminal proceedings other than those listed in regulation 9(a), (b) and (d) to (i) of the General Regulations are taking place may withdraw a determination under section 16 of the Act that an individual qualifies for representation where— (a) the individual declines to accept the determination in the terms which are offered; (b) the individual requests that the determination is withdrawn; or (c) the provider named in the representation order which recorded the original determination declines to continue to represent the individual. …”
[33]Regulation 14 of the Regulationsprovides that the right under s.27(4) of the Legal Aid Act 2012 does not include a right to select a provider in place of the original provider:
“14 Change of provider (1) Subject to paragraph (2), where an individual has selected a provider in criminal proceedings, the right conferred by section 27(4) of the Act does not include a right to select a provider in place of the original provider. (2) The relevant court may determine that the individual can select a provider in place of the original provider in the circumstances set out in paragraphs (3) or (4). (3) The circumstances are that the relevant court determines that— (a) there has been a breakdown in the relationship between the individual and the original provider such that effective representation can no longer be provided by the original provider; or (b) there is some other compelling reason why effective representation can no longer be provided by the original provider. (4) The circumstances are that the relevant court determines that— (a) the original provider— (i) considers there to be a duty to withdraw from the case in accordance with the provider's professional rules of conduct; or (ii) is no longer able to represent the individual through circumstances outside the provider's control; and (b) the original provider has supplied the relevant court with details as to— (i) the nature of any such duty to withdraw from the case; or (ii) the particular circumstances that render the provider unable to represent the individual. …”

Claimant’s submissions

[34]It was submitted on behalf of the claimant by Mr Tear of Duncan Lewis that the Recorder of Birmingham had exercised the discretion under regulation 14 in an impermissible way and he had been wrong to revoke the representation order under regulation 9: i) Where there was a threat of prison, there was a presumption that a person should be represented: see King’s Lynn and West Norfolk Council v Bunning and another [2013] EWHC 3390 (QB). The claimant was currently in custody serving a substantial sentence and faced a significant additional prison term, given the very large sum claimed. ii) The claimant had lost confidence in his original solicitors, Rahman Ravelli. He did not think they could properly conduct the POCA proceedings. They had considered they could no longer act for him. It was clear from a statement provided to the court by a consultant to Duncan Lewis with experience in POCA work that POCA proceedings were too complex for a layman, particularly for the claimant whose command of English was poor. It would be contrary to the claimant’s rights under Article 6 ECHR to deny him legal representation iii) When read together the Regulations indicated that funding should only be withdrawn where there was no alternative provider willing to act. While, in principle, the court could withdraw funding because the first lawyers had declined to continue to act, the court had the power to transfer the representation order under regulation 14 which it should have exercised so that the claimant could be represented by Duncan Lewis and the claimant’s Article 6 ECHR rights thus protected iv) The application made by Duncan Lewis properly identified the steps that should be taken. The claimant was entitled to apply to the Legal Aid Agency for the three types of expert identified. He was unable to afford to pay for them because he was in custody. The court should not interfere in applications for experts; that was a matter for the Legal Aid Agency. Detailed reasoning was required by the judge to explain why the claimant was refused the ability to access an expert, contrary to his rights under Article 6 ECHR. v) It was open to the Legal Aid Agency under regulation 15 of the Regulations to restore to the claimant legal aid. The regulation provided it would have to be restored to the original provider; it would not be just in such circumstances to force the claimant to use the original solicitors. He should be permitted to transfer the representation to Duncan Lewis. Our conclusion The decision to refuse transfer under regulation 14

Our conclusion

[35]It is pertinent to begin by setting out (as Lord Judge LCJ did in R v Ulcay [2007] EWCA Crim 2379) the observations of an earlier Recorder of Birmingham, HHJ Wakerley QC (subsequently Wakerley J), in his judgment in R v Ashgar Khan dated 10 July 2001 when he expressing his concern at the increasing number of applications for transfer of representation in the Crown Court:
“…. This court will insist on strict compliance with the provisions of Regulation 16 …. The grounds of the application and full particulars need to be specified by the existing representatives. Next, the substantial compelling reason under subparagraph 2(4), if relied on, needs to be specified so that I can identify it. It will not generally be sufficient to allege a lack of care or competence of existing representatives … only in extremely rare cases, and where full particulars are given in the application, will a general ground of loss of confidence or incompetence be entertained. It must further be pointed out that it will not be sufficient simply to say that there is a breakdown in the relationship between solicitor and client. Many breakdowns are imagined rather than real or as a result of proper advice”
The regulation referred to by HHJ Wakerley QC is regulation 16 of the Criminal Defence Service (General) (No 2) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1437) which was the precursor to regulation 14 of the 2013 Regulations. The wording of the two regulations is not materially different for present purposes.[36]Judges of the Crown court have day-to-day experience of the issues to which we have referred at paragraph 2. They are entitled to proper assistance by solicitors who represent a person who has the benefit of a representation order and to proper assistance by solicitors who seek a transfer. We cannot emphasise enough the vital importance of integrity and adhere to the highest professional standards, particularly as significant sums of public money are involved in the discharge of these duties.[37]It is clear from the letter from Rahman Ravelli dated 18 November 2014 to which we have referred at paragraph 18 above that they attempted to assist the court to the best of their ability and with integrity.[38]In contrast, we regret to conclude that Duncan Lewis failed to provide the assistance which the court was entitled to expect. The assessment set out in letter was not objective. They failed to exercise any proper or independent judgment when determining whether the grounds that they put forward on behalf of the claimant in support of the application were, in fact, properly justifiable. For example: i) As Mr Tear accepted, there was no substance in Duncan Lewis’ criticism that Rahman Ravelli had failed to instruct an expert regarding the valuation of the drugs seized. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such a ground of criticism could be advanced consistent with the integrity to be expected of a solicitor. Moreover, we can see no proper basis on which a solicitor acting consistently with his duties in respect of public money could have advanced the submission to the Recorder of Birmingham that he would request prior authority from the Legal Aid Agency to ascertain whether the value of the drugs put forward by the Crown was correct. ii) While the claimant may have expressed ‘shock and disappointment’ that Rahman Ravelli had failed to instruct a forensic accountant to challenge the prosecution’s benefits figure, that was irrelevant. What was needed was an objective assessment of the criticism of Rahman Ravelli. We cannot discern any proper grounds on which a solicitor responsibly discharging his duties with integrity could have sought to criticise Rahman Ravelli at that point of time for failing to instruct a forensic accountant on the facts of this case; the criticism of Rahman Ravelli was not objective iii) It was plainly right for the judge to have dealt with this in his ruling of in the manner we have set out at paragraph 21 above. He was expressing a view necessary for the proper supervision of the funds made available by the State for legal aid. iv) There was nothing in the contention that the claimant’s command of English was poor. He had provided a 10 page statement to the court in fluent English; the court was assured by Mr Tear that the statement comprised the actual language of their client and not the words of someone retained by Duncan Lewis, nor was it a translation. He had also written a manuscript letter dated 16 September 2014 in his own hand which amply demonstrated his English language skills. In short, the grounds put forward by Duncan Lewis lacked the objectivity, independent judgment and high standards of professional conduct that a court on such an application is entitled to expect of a solicitor. As the Recorder of Birmingham succinctly observed, the application failed to provide any proper grounds which would have justified a transfer.[39]In the light of the letter from Rahman Ravelli and the application made by Duncan Lewis, the Recorder of Birmingham was entitled to come to the conclusion he did. This was not a case where the material before the Recorder of Birmingham established that there was a proper basis for transfer.

The revocation of the representation order under regulation 9

[40]The Recorder of Birmingham was also entitled to revoke the representation order. He had made clear in his first ruling the consequence that would follow if the claimant placed Rahman Ravelli in the position that they could no longer act for him. The claimant, despite that clear warning, far from cooperating with Rahman Ravelli, put Rahman Ravelli in the position where they could no longer act for him. As he not only failed to heed the warning, but continued to act in such a way to bring about the decision of Rahman Ravelli, the judge was entitled to revoke the representation order. He was, in short, responsible for the fact that he lost his representation order.

Other grounds

[41]Other grounds were advanced, including criticism of the lack of detailed reasoning by the Recorder of Birmingham in the rulings he handed down. There is nothing in these points. Neither is there anything of assistance in Mr Tear’s post hearing note. Summary[42]In short, the Recorder of Birmingham subjected the various applications to rigorous and searching scrutiny. He was astute to the dangers to which we have referred. His rulings were succinct and a model of clarity. They set out clear reasons why the transfer of legal representation was properly refused. Although it would be sufficient for us to say that we can discern no grounds upon which his refusal to transfer the legal representation can we challenged, we can go further and say that he was right to do so and acting in the interests of justice. The revocation of the representation order followed from the claimant’s own actions about which he had been clearly warned.[43]This renewed application for judicial review is totally without merit. A defendant in a criminal trial must appreciate that the provision of a representation order does not give him a right to act in any way he chooses. It comes with conditions which are necessary in the interests of justice, with which each defendant must comply.