“The Law 102. The SSHD’s powers to detain are contained in Schedule 3 paragraphs 2(2) and 2(3) of theImmigration Act 1971 (as amended). Hardial Singh Principles 103. There are limitations on the SSHD’s power to detain. These were originally articulated by Woolf J in Re Hardial Singh[1984] 1 WLR 704 , but then usefully distilled by Dyson LJ in R (I)v SSHD[2002] EWCA Civ 888 , [2003] INLR 196 [46]. Dyson LJ’s distillation was approved by the SC in R (Lumba and Mighty) v Home Secretary[2011] UKSC 12 ,[2011] 2 WLR 671 at [22] and is as follows: (1) The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose. (2) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances. (3) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention. (4) The Secretary of State should act with the reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal. 104. The factors relevant to determining what is a “reasonable” period of detention will include (per Dyson LJ at [48]): • The length of the period of detention; • The nature of the obstacles which stand in the path of the Secretary of State preventing a deportation; • The diligence, speed and effectiveness of the steps taken by the Secretary of State to surmount such obstacles; • The conditions in which the detained person is kept; • The effect of detention on him and his family; • The risk that if he is released from detention he will abscond; and • The danger that, if released, he will commit criminal offences. Ten further useful principles 105. The following further ten useful principles can be gleaned from other leading cases (such as R (Lumba and Mighty) v SSHD[2011] UKSC 12 and Richards LJ’s judgment in R (MA) v SSHD[2010] EWCA Civ 1112 ): (1) There can be a ‘realistic’ prospect of removal without it being possible to specify or predict the date by which the removal can reasonably be expected to occur and without any certainty that removal will occur at all (MH) at [65]) (2) The extent of certainty or uncertainty as to whether and when removal can be effected will affect the balancing exercise, but there must be a sufficient prospect of removal to warrant continued detention when account is taken of all other relevant factors ((MH)) at [65]) (3) The risks of absconding and re-offending are relevant considerations, but the risk of absconding should not be overstated, otherwise it will become a trump card (Lumba [108]-[110] and [121] citing Dyson LJ in R (I) at [53]). (4) The weight to be given to time taken up by an appeal depends on the facts, but much more weight should be given to detention during a period when the detained person is pursing a meritorious appeal than to detention during a period when he is pursuing a hopeless one (Lumba at [121]). (5) A detainee who will not comply with the ED process or other requirements of detention and is doing everything he can to hinder the deportation process, may reasonably be regarded as likely to abscond (Lumba at [123]; MH at [68(iii)]) (6) Refusal of voluntary return does not necessarily permit an entrance of risk of absconding (Lumba at [123]). (7) Where return is not possible (for reasons that are extraneous to the person detained), the fact that he is not willing to return voluntarily cannot be held against him, since his refusal has no causal effect (Lumba at [127]). (8) Where a person has issued proceedings challenging his deportation, then it is reasonable that he should remain in the UK pending determination of those proceedings and his refusal to accept an offer of voluntary return is irrelevant (Lumba at [127]). (9) Even where there are no outstanding challenges, refusal of voluntary return should not be regarded as a trump card for the SSHD’s wish to detain. If it is relevant, its relevance is limited (Lumba at [128]). (10) There is no maximum period after which detention becomes unlawful. 106. In my view, citation of particular cases in which different periods of detention were, or were not, held to be unlawful if not particularly helpful since, in this area, cases are highly dependent on their own facts.”