“A building, monument, site, place, area or landscape identified as having a degree of significance meriting consideration in planning decisions, because of its heritage interest. Heritage asset includes designated heritage assets and assets identified by the local planning authority (including local listing).”
“132. When considering the impact of a proposed development on the significance of a designated heritage asset, great weight should be given to the asset’s conservation. The more important the asset, the greater the weight should be. Significance can be harmed or lost through alteration or destruction of the heritage asset or development within its setting. As heritage assets are irreplaceable, any harm or loss should require clear and convincing justification…” “133. Where a proposed development will lead to substantial harm to or total loss of significance of a designated heritage asset, local planning authorities should refuse consent, unless it can be demonstrated that the substantial harm or loss is necessary to achieve substantial public benefits that outweigh that harm or loss, or all of the following apply: - the nature of the heritage asset prevents all reasonable uses of the site; - no viable use of the heritage asset can be found in the medium term through appropriate marketing that will enable its conservation; and - conservation by grant-funding or some other form of charitable or public ownership is demonstrably not possible; and - the harm or loss is outweighed by the benefit of bring the site back into use.” “134. Where a development proposal will lead to less than substantial harm to the significance of a designated heritage asset, this harm should be weighed against the public benefits of the proposal, including securing its optimum viable use.” “135. The effect of an application on the significance of a non-designated heritage asset should be taken into account in determining the application. In weighing applications that affect directly or indirectly non designated heritage assets, a balanced judgement will be required having regard to the scale of any harm or loss and the significance of the heritage asset.” “137. Local planning authorities should look for opportunities for new development within Conservation Areas and World Heritage Sites and within the setting of heritage assets to enhance or better reveal their significance. Proposals that preserve those elements of the setting that make a positive contribution to or better reveal the significance of the asset should be treated favourably.” “138. Not all elements of a …Conservation Area will necessarily contribute to its significance. Loss of a building (or other element) which makes a positive contribution to the significance of the Conservation Area .. should be treated either as substantial harm under paragraph 133 or less than substantial harm under paragraph 134, as appropriate, taking into account the relative significance of the element affected and its contribution to the significance of the Conservation Area .. as a whole.”
“ the dwelling has little group value and very limited individual significance. Despite this, the Appeal site contributes positively to the overall character and appearance of the conservation area due to its extensive shrub and tree coverage and the contribution the dwelling makes to the diverse range of housing.”
“An application under section 288 is not an opportunity for a review of the planning merits of an Inspector's decision. An allegation that an Inspector's conclusion on the planning merits is Wednesburyperverse is, in principle, within the scope of a challenge under section 288, but the court must be astute to ensure that such challenges are not used as a cloak for what is, in truth, a rerun of the arguments on the planning merits. In any case, where an expert tribunal is the fact finding body the threshold of Wednesburyunreasonableness is a difficult obstacle for an applicant to surmount. That difficulty is greatly increased in most planning cases because the Inspector is not simply deciding questions of fact, he or she is reaching a series of planning judgments. For example: is a building in keeping with its surroundings? Could its impact on the landscape be sufficiently ameliorated by landscaping? Is the site sufficiently accessible by public transport? et cetera. Since a significant element of judgment is involved there will usually be scope for a fairly broad range of possible views, none of which can be categorised as unreasonable. Moreover, the Inspector’s conclusions will invariably be based not merely upon the evidence heard at an inquiry or an informal hearing, or contained in written representations but, and this will often be of crucial importance, upon the impressions received on the site inspection. Against this background an applicant alleging an Inspector has reached a Wednesbury unreasonable conclusion on matters of planning judgment, faces a particularly daunting task ...” 36. The exercise of planning judgment and the weighing of the various issues are entirely matters for that decision-maker and not for the Court: Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment(1981) 42 P & CR 26 , at 28 and Tesco v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W1.R 759, at 780. In the latter case Lord Hoffmann said, at 780F-H, "If there is one principle of planning law more firmly settled than any other, it is that matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local planning authority or the Secretary of State”. 37. In my judgment, there was ample evidence upon which the Inspector could justifiably base her assessment of the house and its significance. She received a heritage assessment report and planning statement from Mr Hearn’s representatives, both of which were thorough and impressive. She also had the benefit of seeing the report on the house from English Heritage, when it refused to list it. Although the Council’s appraisal of the Conservation Area was still in draft form, she was able to see the draft, annotated by the BPCG with its comments and recommendations. The appraisal conspicuously did not include the house on its local list of buildings making a particularly important contribution to the Conservation Area, and she confirmed with the parties at the site visit that this remained the position. In a description of the properties in the road, the house was described as “a secluded courtyard bungalow … by architect David Branch” and more valuable than the “unassuming semis” nearby. Other post-war properties, in particular the Span schemes, were considered to be much more significant. 38. Of course there was evidence to the contrary, notably from the BPCG and the Twentieth Century Society, and the Council’s own decision. But it was the Inspector’s task to evaluate the competing evidence, look at the property, and form her own planning judgment. In my view, she did so carefully and thoroughly. Her conclusions cannot be characterised as irrational. The Claimant suggested that the Inspector was misled by the report of the Council’s planning officers which partially misquoted the English Heritage report. It is not suggested it misled the Council, who did not follow their officers’ recommendation to grant approval. I think it most improbable that it misled the Inspector, who had the benefit of the full report. 39. The Claimant alleged that the Inspector failed to take into account the evidence and representations which demonstrated that the house was of architectural and historical significance, as summarised in paragraph 76 of Ms Tafur’s skeleton argument. 40. The Claimant focused in particular upon paragraph 7 in which she stated that the house “is not referred to as being innovative or of any particular architectural merit in any of the documents submitted in relation to these Appeals”, as indicative of her failure to consider the evidence that the house was distinctive and of architectural merit. I agree that there is some ambiguity as to which documents the Inspector was referring to. Her choice of the word “documents” indicates, in my view, that she was probably referring to the documentary evidence such as the English Heritage report and the extracts from articles and books annexed to the heritage assessment report. I do not consider that she was referring to the representations received by the parties on appeal, nor to the representations/objections made by the BPCG and the Twentieth Century Society. 41. Counsel for the Secretary of State had access to the PINS file, and it was not in dispute that the Inspector was provided with all the material. This included representations from BPCG to English Heritage and on the Council’s draft appraisal, as well as the formal objections lodged by BPCG and the Twentieth Century Society, when the Council was considering its decision, and submissions made to the Inspector on appeal. In my view, it would be exceptionally careless and unprofessional for the Inspector not to have taken into account this body of evidence which argued that the house had historical and architectural significance. After all, this was the basis of the Council’s decision which was the subject of appeal. The Council’s own Appeal Statement echoed many of the points made by BPCG and concluded that “the architectural and historic qualities of the house are highly significant and .. the house makes a valuable contribution to the Conservation Area..”. 42. The decision letter is careful and conscientious. It demonstrates that, throughout, the Inspector applied her mind to the correct issues. She made detailed findings on the architecture, history, and group value of the house, and its contribution to the Conservation Area. The findings which she made in paragraph 9, on the basis of the English Heritage report were, in my view, legitimate, and do not demonstrate a failure to read or understand the full report. She addressed the extent of the house’s contribution to the “notable group” of post-war housing in paragraph 18. However, it is true that she did not set out the evidential cases presented by the parties and the objectors before proceeding to her findings. I do not consider that this indicates that the Inspector failed to take this evidence into account. I think the explanation for this omission is that she did not think she was obliged to do so. 43. Lord Brown set out the standard of decision-writing required in South BucksDistrict Council and another v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WL.R. 1953: “36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal important controversial issues, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced." 44. Applying these principles, given the limited scope of the issues in this case, it was not necessary for the Inspector to recite the evidence which she was rejecting before setting out her findings. She could act on the assumption that the readers of the decision letter were well aware of the evidence and issues involved. She was entitled to give reasons which were “briefly stated” and which referred to the “main issues”, not “every material consideration”