Dirdova v District Court of Spisska Nova Ves Slovak Republic [2014] EWHC 4027 (Admin)

Case No CO/2389/2014[2014] EWHC 4027 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate Monday, 3rd November 2014
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
MR JUSTICE MITTING
Between
EVA DIRDOVAClaimantv
Between
DISTRICT COURT OF SPISSKA NOVA VES SLOVAK REPUBLICDefendant
Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes ofWordWave International LimitedA Merrill Communications Company165 Fleet Street London EC4A 2DYTel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Miss L Collins (instructed by TV Edwards Solicitors) appeared for ClaimantMr Siefert (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) appeared for Defendant
J U D G M E N T
[1]MR JUSTICE MITTING: In this case the appellant's extradition is sought by an Accusation European Arrest Warrant, issued by a judge of the District Court of Spisska Nova Ves, Slovakia, on 24th April 2012 to stand a trial for an offence categorised in box (e) as "threatening moral education of youths" ... "by dissoluteness by enabling them to conduct idle life" and did so in an aggravated manner.[2]The allegations are set out in greater detail and rather more comprehensibly in a descriptive passage in box (e):
"In the period from September 2010 to January 31, 2011, as mother of minor children [six are then named, with dates of birth between March 1995 and April 2003] despite of warnings and measures taken by [their] schools, she neglected the care of the above children and their mandatory school attendance as a result of which during the school year 2010/2011 they were absent from school without lawful excuse..."
The number of days absences is then given. It ranges from 99 in the case of one child up to 174 lessons in the case of another.[3]The offence is not in the Framework list but it is conceded that there is an English equivalent under section 444(8)(a) of the Education Act 2014 which carries a term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 months.[4]The warrant was certified by the NCA on 11 November 2013. The appellant was arrested on 4 December 2013. After a contested hearing her extradition was ordered by District Judge Evans on 20 May 2014.[5]The requesting authority asserted that the appellant was a fugitive and described in a three-page letter, dated 25 March 2014, the circumstances in which she had been notified of the proceedings and what the requesting authority knew about her response. The District Judge concluded so that he was sure that she was a fugitive. He noted as the further information stated that she had been previously convicted of a similar offence and had a 9 month sentence to serve. He noted that the proceedings were not old and that she had fled soon after they were initiated, abandoning her children to the care of the Slovakian State.[6]Two grounds of challenge were therefore raised in front of him; that her rights to respect for family and private life would be infringed if she were to be extradited and that because of her medical condition, which apparently involved serious heart problems, her extradition ought to be barred under section 25 of the 2003 Act. The latter ground is not pursued. The appeal has been adjourned on at least one occasion to permit medical evidence to be obtained to substantiate that ground but it has not been. I therefore proceed, as did the District Judge, on the basis that there is no health reason why she should not be extradited on this warrant.[7]Her family and private life circumstances are not unusual amongst those of the Roma community with roots in central Europe. She has eight children. She is 52 years old. She lives with the father of her children, her husband, and now with two of her children in the United Kingdom. She is entirely dependent on UK State benefits. Four of the six children named in the warrant are still in care in Slovakia. Two adult children are still in Slovakia and two in the United Kingdom. She describes her family as "close". That may well be so in relation to her husband and the two children who live in the United Kingdom and perhaps also with one of the two adult children, whom she says intends to come to the United Kingdom when he can.[8]But it is not an entirely accurate or acceptable definition of her relationship with her four youngest children, all of whom are, as I have noted, in the care of the Slovakian State. She did not impress District Judge Evans as a witness. He found her answers to be vague and evasive and Miss Collins, who appears for her, suggests that may be because Slovakian was not her first language (Roma is) but plainly having lived and been brought up in Slovakia for not far short of 50 years, she can be expected to have a reasonable command of Slovakian.[9]The District Judge had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that her rights to respect for family and private life in the United Kingdom were substantially outweighed by the need for the United Kingdom to fulfill its treaty obligations. He asked himself, in response to the submissions that have been made to him, the question how serious was the offence in Slovakia. He stated that he did not think that 5 years' imprisonment was the likely answer but that nonetheless the offence alleged was serious. He referred not only to a previous conviction and 9 months sentence of imprisonment yet to be served but also to the seriousness of abandoning six children into the care of the State as a result of failing to ensure that their educational requirements were fulfilled.[10]I detect no flaw in his reasoning in reaching that conclusion. The Slovak authorities are plainly entitled, for a number of reasons, to regard the conduct alleged against the appellant as serious. Not only does it involve, if proved, an abandonment of parental responsibility for minor children to their disadvantage, it also imposes a burden on the tax payers of the Slovak State. Slovakia is perfectly entitled to take the view that it does, by setting the maximum sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, that this offence is serious.[11]Against it and against the United Kingdom's obligations all that can be put is that the appellant's family and private circumstances in the United Kingdom. Those are to be judged without the assistance of medical evidence supporting her claim to be in moderately serious ill-health. They are to be judged accepting, as I do and as District Judge Evans appears to have done, that the appellant's relationship with her husband and two adult children living in the United Kingdom is close and of importance both to her and to them. This, like many of these cases, is inevitably one in which a degree of hardship will be caused to all four of them.[12]However, applying the traditional and unamended approach to Article 8 it is impossible for me to say that District Judge Evans' decision was wrong. On the contrary it seems to me that he correctly balanced factors that were advanced on both sides and reached an unassailable conclusion.[13]Miss Collins submits that he and I should have regard to the provisions of section 21A of the 2003 Act, which came into force on 21st July 2014. Because the extradition hearing took place before 21st July 2014, it has no direct application. It is not in force in respect of these proceedings. But she submits that I should have regard to the factors there identified as if it had been in force, so as to inform a judgment under Article 8 and section 21.[14]The specified matters in section 21A(3) are:
"(a) the serious of the conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offence. (b) the likely penalty that would be imposed if D was found guilty of the extradition offence. (c) the possibility of the relevant foreign authorities taking measures that would be less coercive than the extradition of D."
[15]While I do not consider that this exercise is required or even appropriate, I will nevertheless express a view about these three specified matters. As regards seriousness of conduct, like the District Judge, I do regard the conduct as serious. As regards likely penalty, it seems to me in the light of the previous conviction and the view Slovak law takes about this type of offence that the penalty imposed is likely to be significant if she is convicted. As to the possibility of the Slovakian authorities taking measures that would be less coercive than the appellant's extradition I cannot see that any such measures could in practice be put in place. The additional information provided on 25 March 2014 demonstrates that all of the preliminary steps such as the submission of an indictment and the initiation of the investigatory stage of the proceedings have already been undertaken. Given the approach that the Slovakian authorities take to offences of these kind, it seems to me that there are no measures available to them that would be less coercive than extradition for her to stand trial. Certainly no preliminary steps have been suggested which could realistically be taken which might avoid the need for extradition or even postpone it. Accordingly even if section 21A were applicable, which it is not, I would not have upset the order of the District Judge on that ground. For the reasons that I have given this appeal must be dismissed.

MR JUSTICE MITTING: Miss Collins, do you want the usual order?

[17]MISS COLLINS: Yes please.[18]MR JUSTICE MITTING: Yes of course. Thank you both.