“(4) Condition D is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary for the purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorist related activity for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual”
“… (2) The individual to whom a TPIM notice relates may make an application to the Secretary of State for the variation of measures specified in the TPIM notice. (3) The Secretary of State must consider an application made under subsection (2) (4) An application under subsection (2) must be made in writing (5) The Secretary of State may by notice request the provision within such a period of time as the notice may specify of further information from the individual in connection with an application under subsection (2) (6) The Secretary of State is not required to consider an application further unless any information requested under subsection (5) is provided in accordance with the notice mentioned in that subsection …”
“For the purpose of determining what measures may be imposed on an individual, it is immaterial whether the involvement in terrorist related activity to be prevented or restricted by the measures is connected with matters to which the Secretary of State’s belief for the purpose of condition A relates.”
“63. Whether it is necessary to impose any particular obligation on an individual in order to protect the public from the risk of terrorism involves the customary test of proportionality. The object of the obligations is to control the activities of the individual so as to reduce the risk that he will take part in any terrorism related activity. The obligations that it is necessary to impose may depend upon the nature of the involvement in terrorism related activities of which he is suspect. They may also depend on the resources available to the Secretary of State and the demands on those resources. They may depend on arrangements that are in place, or that can be put in place, for surveillance. 64. The Secretary of State is better placed that the Court to decide the measures that are necessary to protect the public against the activities of a terrorist suspect and, for this reason, a degree of deference must be paid to the decisions taken by the Secretary of State. That it is appropriate to accord such deference in matters relating to state security has long been recognised, both by the Courts of this country and by the Strasbourg Court … 65. Notwithstanding such deference there will be scope for the Court to give intense scrutiny to the necessity for each of the obligations imposed on an individual under a control order, and it must do so. The exercise has something in common with the familiar one of fixing conditions of bail. Some obligations may be particularly onerous or intrusive and, in such cases, the court should explore alternative means of achieving the result. The provision of section 7(2) for modification of a control order “with the consent of the controlled person” envisages dialogue between those acting for the Secretary of State and the controlled person and this is likely to be appropriate, with the assistance of the court, at the stage that the court is considering the necessity for the individual obligations.”
“(all) significant material – should be sufficiently disclosed … by significant I mean material which could be regarded as essential in establishing either element of what is required for a particular control order.”
“47. For the reasons set out in my closed judgment, I have come to the clear conclusion that the Secretary of State had and has reasonable grounds for suspecting or believing (respectively) that CF had been involved in terrorism related activity. In particular, the evidence before the Secretary of State supports that conclusion in the following respects: 1. In 2008 CF attempted to travel to Afghanistan to fight “jihad” and engage in suicide operations. This attempt at travel was with an associate Mohammed Abushamma who is also assessed to be an Islamist extremist. Whilst CF was acquitted (following his absconding from bail) at a criminal trial where he was charged with offences contrary tosection 5(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2006 arising out of his attempted travel in 2008, there is clear evidence that CF had sought to travel to Afghanistan for terrorism related activity. 2. CF undertook terrorist training in Somalia after June 2009, having travelled to Somalia for Islamist extremist reasons in June 2009, following his absconding from bail during the criminal trial in the United Kingdom. CF attended a terrorist training camp in Somalia and was involved in fighting alongside Al-Shabaab. 3. CF provided advice on travelling to Somali to others and attempted to recruit fighters in the United Kingdom for fighting overseas, including wanting to assist Hisham Kelifa’s travel to Somalia in 2010 for terrorism related activity. 4. CF was engaged in fundraising activities for Al-Shabaab. 5. CF was potentially involved in attack planning when, shortly before his arrest, he was involved with CC and Jama Hersi’s attack plans to target Western interests in Somaliland.”
“CF was not merely involved in the network but played a substantial role”
“As the Security Service and Secretary of State recognise, an exit strategy has to be planned. Deportation is impermissible and prosecution unlikely. The only viable exit strategy is encouraging and facilitating a change in outlook by AM. To that end, it is imperative that he is encouraged to lead as normal a life as possible, consistent with the requirements of public protection. Maintenance of a measure which is either over restrictive or ineffective does not serve that end. Accordingly, even giving due deference to the views of the Security Service and the Secretary of State I am satisfied that the decision to maintain the requirement for prior notification is flawed. It should be replaced by a requirement for notification after the first meeting or gathering or visit at AM’s home. This possibility was canvassed during the open hearing and initial drafts have been circulated. I will leave it to the parties to discuss the precise terms of revision of measure 7.2. If agreement cannot be reached I will resolve the difference on paper. ”
“8.1 You must not associate or communicate with any of the following persons (including at your residence or by attending any meeting or gathering) unless the Home Office has given you permission to do so; …. 8.2 You must not meet any other person (including by attending any meeting or gathering) unless: (a) you meet the person at your residence; (b) (for a person) you have notified the Home Office of the name and address of the person and the time and location of the meeting at least two working days before the first time you meet them; … (c) you meet the person by chance, but you do not continue or resume the meeting at another place or time without providing notification under 8.2(d) (e) the person is: … (viii) someone you are meeting for the purpose of work or studies which you have notified to the Home Office under the work or studies measure” (a) you meet the person at your residence; (b) (for a person) you have notified the Home Office of the name and address of the person and the time and location of the meeting at least two working days before the first time you meet them; … (c) you meet the person by chance, but you do not continue or resume the meeting at another place or time without providing notification under 8.2(d) (e) the person is: … (viii) someone you are meeting for the purpose of work or studies which you have notified to the Home Office under the work or studies measure”