“2(1) Subject to subparagraphs (2) to (5) you must comply with this Code whenever you- (a) conduct the business of the council (which, in this Code, includes the business of the office to which you are elected or appointed); or (b) act, claim to act or give the impression you are acting as a representative of the council, and references to your official capacity are construed accordingly. (2) subject to subparagraphs (3) and (4), this Code does not have effect in relation to your conduct other than where it is in your official capacity. 3 (1) you must treat others with respect 5 you must not conduct yourself in a manner which could reasonably be regarded as bringing your office or your council into disrepute”
“33. There can be no doubt that restraints imposed by a code of conduct designed to uphold proper standards in public life are in principle likely to be within article 10(2). But it is important that the restraints should not extend beyond what is necessary to maintain those standards. There has always been a debate over the extent to which conduct in private as opposed to public life should be regulated and that debate continues. The government has, it seems, recognised that Paragraph 4 of the Code may go too far but that does not of itself mean that it is not necessary in the circumstances. It must, however, raise some doubts. Added to that is the recognition that it is not considered necessary to go that far in Scotland. 34. Mr Maurici has suggested that the appellant was making a political comment so that there is a higher threshold to be surmounted in establishing that the restraint was proportionate. Interference with the right of free speech which impedes political debate must be subjected to particularly close scrutiny: see Sanders v Kingston[2005] LGR 719 in which at page 745h Wilkie J refers to the high level of protection given to expressions of political views. 38. The burden is on the defendant to justify the interference with freedom of speech. However offensive and undeserving of protection the appellant’s outburst may have appeared to some, it is important that any individual knows that he can say what he likes, provided it is not unlawful, unless there are clear and satisfactory reasons within the terms of article 10(2) to render him liable to sanctions…”
“Moreover, the court has to consider the value of the right not in the abstract but in the context in which the appellants seek to exercise it. While it must be borne in mind that the right to freedom of expression extends not only to ideas that are favourably received, or are inoffensive, but also to ideas that shock or disturb, when it comes to balancing rights or interests, the fact that the communication relates to a matter of public interest is a factor to be put in the side of the scales in favour of allowing the exercise of the right (see Axel Springer v Germany (APP No 3994/08)). When conflicting rights are balanced, contribution to debate on matters of public interest is “an essential initial criterion”: Axel Springer at [78]. Here the communication relates to a matter of public interest. Indeed I accept Miss Montgomery’s submission that the exercise of the right in this case had an exceptionally high value. The link with the public interest is far from tenuous. The appellants seek to exercise their article 10 rights in Parliament. As is common knowledge and can be seen to some degree from Parliament’s website, there are frequently meetings in Parliament and the subject matter obviously does not have to be approved by the government or be compatible with national policy. The value of free debate in a democratic society cannot be underestimated. It increases knowledge and understanding on national and international affairs.”
“31. The first, and most straightforward, question is who decides whether or not a claimant’s Convention rights have been infringed. The answer is that it is the court before which the issue is raised. The role of the court in human rights adjudication is quite different from the role of the court in an ordinary judicial review of administrative action. In human rights adjudication, the court is concerned with whether the human rights of the claimant have in fact been infringed, not with whether the administrative decision-maker properly took them into account. If it were otherwise, every policy decision taken before the 1998 Act came into force but which engaged a Convention right would be open to challenge, no matter how obviously compliant with the rights in question it was…”
“72 In my judgment the questions that I must answer are as follows: 1. Was the Case Tribunal entitled as a matter of fact to conclude that councillor Sanders’ conduct was in breach of paragraph 2(b) and/or paragraph 4 of the Code of Conduct? 2. If so, was the finding in itself or the imposition of a sanction prima facie a breach of article 10? 3. If so, was the restriction involved one which was justified by reason of the requirements of article 10(2)?”
“It is a largely Indian community who say they deplore this behaviour but yet it is that very same community that harbours and exploits their own people in squalid third world living conditions… The exploding population of illegal immigrants is a constant on the public purse. Illegal immigrants don’t pay tax. The legitimate immigrants exploiting them in the squalid bed sheds don’t pay tax on their rental income. If these are the sorts of people who exploit the desperate what other scams are they perpetrating I ask? Criminality is endemic in Southall.”
“6.10 The second part of the post addresses, raises issues in Southall specifically for the first time. Opening with the words “Back to Southall”