“10. There is no dispute as to the relevant legal principles. In Porter v Magill [2002]UKHL 67,[2002] 2AC 357 , Lord Hope expressed the objective test as follows (at paragraph 103): "Whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased." 11. In Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2008] 1 WLR 2416 , Lord Hope returned to the attributes of the fair-minded and informed observer. He said (at paragraphs 2 to 3): "The observer who is fair-minded is the sort of person who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully understood both sides of the argument. She is not unduly sensitive or suspicious, as Kirby J observed in Johnson v Johnson(2000) 201 CLR 488 , 509, para 53. Her approach must not be confused with that of the person who has brought the complaint. The 'real possibility' test ensures that there is this measure of detachment. The assumptions that the complainer makes are not to be attributed to the observer unless they can be justified objectively. But she is not complacent either. She knows that fairness requires that a judge must be, and must be seen to be, unbiased. She knows that judges, like anybody else, have their weaknesses. She will not shrink from the conclusion, if it can be justified objectively, that things that they have said or done or associations that they have formed may make it difficult for them to judge the case before them impartially. Then there is the attribute that the observer is 'informed'. It makes the point that, before she takes a balanced approach to any information she is given, she will take the trouble to inform herself on all matters that are relevant. She is the sort of person who takes the trouble to read the text of an article as well as the headlines. She is able to put whatever she has read or seen into its overall social, political or geographical context. She is fair-minded, so she will appreciate that the context forms an important part of the material which she must consider before passing judgment." 12. Further elucidation was provided by Richards LJ in National Assembly for Wales v Condron[2006] EWCA Civ 1 573 (at paragraph 50): "The court must look at all the circumstances as they appear from the material before it, not just at the facts known to the objectors or available to the hypothetical observer at the time of the decision." 13. It is common ground that the question whether, on the facts found by the CAT, apparent bias exists is a question of law: Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions[2006] 1 WLR 781 , per Lord Hope at paragraphs 2 to 7. At appellate level, it is for the courts "To assume the vantage point of a fair-minded and informed observer with knowledge of the relevant circumstances. It must itself make an assessment of all the relevant circumstances and then decide whether there is a real possibility of bias." (AWG Group Ltd v Morrison[2006] EWCA Civ 6 per Mummery LJ, at paragraph 20) 14. It is also pertinent to keep in mind the words of Lord Bingham in Locabail (UK) v Bayfield Properties Ltd[2000] QB 451 , 472, that, because proof of actual bias is very difficult, "The policy of the common law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a real danger of bias without requiring to show that such bias actually exists."”
“It is important in this regard to keep in mind that we are considering apparent and not actual bias and that, for this purpose, "appearances are not without importance": R v Abdroikov[2007] UKHL 37 ,[2007] 1 WLR 2679 , at paragraph 16, per Lord Bingham. I accept Lord Pannick QC's submission that BAA ought not to be put in the position of having to prove operative effect once apparent bias has been established. That would be to blur the distinction between actual and apparent bias...”
“When applying the test of real danger or possibility (as opposed to the test of automatic disqualification under Dimes and Pinochet (No. 2) it will very often be appropriate to enquire whether the judge knew of the matter relied on as appearing to undermine his impartiality, because if it is shown that he did not know of it the danger of its having influenced his judgment is eliminated and the appearance of possible bias is dispelled. As the Court of Appeal of New Zealand observed in Auckland Casino Ltd v. Casino Control Authority[1995] 1 NZLR 142 at 148, if the judge were ignorant of the allegedly disqualifying interest:”
“Participation can manifestly be more than voting or discussion. A justice who, on retirement, tells his colleagues that it is his car which the defendant is charged with taking and wrecking, and who then sits with arms folded while the other justices reach a conclusion, might not be regarded by this court as having abstained from participation simply by having declared his or her interest and neither spoken nor voted.”
“There were suggestions that the document was not clear enough in its intent and that the timing for receipt of proposals needed to be clearer along with the fact that the thematic papers would allow for further submissions at a later date. Ricky Burdett suggested that as this would be the first paper of the Commission, it needed to be taken as an opportunity to demonstrate that the Commission would be looking at a range of issues and needed to open the door to taking a fresh look at the matrix of criteria used to evaluate proposals.”