“(3) Where a deportation order is in force against any person, he may be detained under the authority of the Secretary of State pending his removal or departure from the United Kingdom (and if already detained by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) or (2) above when the order is made, shall continue to be detained unless he is released on bail or the Secretary of State directs otherwise).”
“(i) The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose; (ii) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances; (iii) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention; (iv) The Secretary of State should act with the reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal. Principles (ii) and (iii) are conceptually distinct. Principle (ii) is that the Secretary of State may not lawfully detain a person “pending removal” for longer than a reasonable period. Once a reasonable period has expired, the detained person must be released. But there may be circumstances where, although a reasonable period has not yet expired, it becomes clear that the Secretary of State will not be able to deport the detained person within a reasonable period. In that event, principle (iii) applies. Thus, once it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect the deportation within a reasonable period, the detention becomes unlawful even if the reasonable period has not yet expired. It is not possible or desirable to produce an exhaustive list of all the circumstances that are or may be relevant to the question of how long it is reasonable for the Secretary of State to detain a person pending deportation pursuant to paragraph 2(3) of schedule 3 to theImmigration Act 1971 . But in my view they include at least: the length of the period of detention; the nature of the obstacles which stand in the path of the Secretary of State preventing a deportation; the diligence, speed and effectiveness of the steps taken by the Secretary of State to surmount such obstacles; the conditions in which the detained person is being kept; the effect of detention on him and his family; the risk that if he is released from detention he will abscond; and the danger that, if released, he will commit criminal offences.”
“Non-cooperation with return The most common examples of non-cooperation are (i) a refusal by a person who does not have a valid passport to cooperate with the obtaining of travel documents to enable him to return and (ii) a person's refusal to avail himself of one of the Home Office schemes by which he may leave the United Kingdom voluntarily. Most of the discussion in the cases has centred on (ii). It is common ground that a refusal to return voluntarily is relevant to an assessment of what is a reasonable period of detention if a risk of absconding can properly be inferred from the refusal. But I would warn against the danger of Detention Reviewawing an inference of risk of absconding in every case. It is always necessary to have regard to the history and particular circumstances of the detained person. What is, however, in issue is whether a failure to return voluntarily can of itself justify a period of detention which would otherwise be unreasonable and therefore unlawful. … It is necessary to distinguish between cases where return to the country of origin is possible and those where it is not. Where return is not possible for reasons which are extraneous to the person detained, the fact that he is not willing to return voluntarily cannot be held against him since his refusal has no causal effect. But what if return would be possible, but the detained person is not willing to go? Here it is necessary to consider whether the detained person has issued proceedings challenging his deportation… What about those who have no outstanding legal challenges? Here, the fact that the detained person has refused voluntary return should not be regarded as a "trump card" which enables the Secretary of State to continue to detain until deportation can be effected, whenever that may be. That is because otherwise, as I said at para 51 of my judgment in R (I), "the refusal of an offer of voluntary repatriation would justify as reasonable any period of detention, no matter how long, provided that the Secretary of State was doing his best to effect the deportation." If the refusal of voluntary return has any relevance in such cases even if a risk of absconding cannot be inferred from the refusal, it must be limited. That was the view of Simon Brown LJ in R (I) and Keene LJ in R (A) and I agree with them.”
“…Without, I hope, doing an injustice to the well-formulated and clearly articulated arguments, they amounted to little more than the following: (a) "If only the Claimant would change his stance, there is a chance that we can make the necessary arrangements to send him back to Iran"; (b) "there may be a possibility that the Iranian authorities will change the policy concerning the evidence needed to confirm the identity of someone the UK authorities wish to return to Iran.” … 70. As to (a), all the evidence of the last 33 months suggests that there is no prospect at all of a change of heart on behalf of the Claimant despite two spells in prison in consequence of having failed to cooperate with the authorities. I am bound to say, having read the Claimant's letter of13 May 2007 (see paragraph 37), it seems to me that his position is likely to have become even more entrenched with the recent re-election of the government from the influence of which, I infer, he fled originally in 2005. I think that the only legitimate conclusion I can draw on the evidence is that he has a firmly settled intention not to return to Iran and that he will do nothing to facilitate any process by which that will be achieved. As to (b), this can be nothing more than speculation on the evidence before me. … 71. If I apply conscientiously, as I must, the test established by previous cases of whether the Secretary of State has proved on the balance of probabilities that there is a reasonable prospect of securing the Claimant's removal within a reasonable time, then the answer on the evidence before me is clear – the Secretary of State has not established this. If anything, the evidence is weaker than it was in the case of I (see paragraphs 13-15 above) where all that was established was a hope that removal might be achieved within a few months. … 72. I do not reach the conclusion to which I have referred with much enthusiasm given that it is the Claimant's own failure to co-operate that leads to it. It brings to mind the comments of GolDetention Reviewing J to which I drew attention in paragraphs 18 and 19 above. However, as the cases to which my attention has been drawn and to some of which I have referred make clear, that may be the inevitable consequence of applying the test thus established. At least in the Claimant's case, there is no basis for thinking that he will represent a threat to the public by the commission of the kind of serious criminal offences that those in other cases have committed. His only brush with the law is his resolute failure to co-operate with securing his return to Iran. It is impossible to say that there is no risk of him absconding given the resolute nature of his attitude to returning to Iran. However, that cannot now, in my view, override the consideration that his period in immigration detention should now be brought to an end. … 73. For those reasons, it seems to me that there is no alternative but to declare that the Claimant's detention is now unlawful.”
“There can, however, be a realistic prospect of removal without it being possible to specify or predict the date by which, or period within which, removal can reasonably be expected to occur and without any certainty that removal will occur at all. Again, the extent of certainty or uncertainty as to whether and when removal can be effected will affect the balancing exercise. There must be a sufficient prospect of removal to warrant continued detention when account is taken of all other relevant factors. Thus in A (Somalia) itself there was "some prospect of the Home Secretary being able to carry out enforced removal, although there was no way of predicting with confidence when this might be" (per Toulson LJ at para 58); and that was held to be a sufficient prospect to justify detention for a period of some four years when regard was had to other relevant factors, including in particular the high risk of absconding and of serious re-offending if A were released”
“The conclusion I have come to is that in these circumstances the defendant has been unable to establish that as from the 23rd of February 2009 there was ever a reasonable prospect of removing the Claimant within a reasonable time. Given the length of the detention prior to that date , a far more predictable date within a much shorter time frame than " anything between 6 and 12 months " or " up to 24 months " was required to be established, than that which the defendant in reality could point to in this case.”
“It is of considerable significance that the application for the Claimant’s ETD has not yet been decided by the Moroccan authorities, but remains outstanding. In circumstances where increasing pressure is being placed on the Moroccan authorities, and the Moroccan authorities do produce such documents even after significant periods of time, the SSHD expects a resolution of the Claimant’s situation”
“The reality is that there has been a nil response for 10 months from Morocco in relation to this Claimant and all others, apart from the one negative match reported in September 2010. For all those reasons, I have determined that there is not a realistic prospect that deportation will take place within any known timeframe, if at all. If it does occur, it will take at the very least many months, especially as, even if there was a positive match for the Claimant, there would then have to be an ETD procedure to be gone through.”
“Pending the service of evidence as to the likelihood of a Moroccan ETD for the Claimant the SSHD accepts that…an ETD may take 24 months”
“There is one final matter I need to deal with: the Secretary of State's tardy disclosure of highly relevant documents and failure throughout to file any evidence whatever in relation to the necessarily serious allegation of unlawful detention.”
“This is far from being the first occasion when the judges have had to complain about deficiencies in the Secretary of State's response to claims such as the one which is before us. If, despite all this, the court is again left having to draw inferences in such a situation, then the Secretary of State should anticipate that the inferences drawn may well be adverse to him.”
“If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within a reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention”
“must be exceptional to regard lengthy administrative detention as lawful where there is some prospect of removal but no clearly predicted date for it”