“…For the purposes ofsection 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 , a pregnancy is ‘terminated by a registered medical practitioner’ where the registered medical practitioner prescribes an abortifacient drug with the intention of terminating a pregnancy and the administration of that drug to the pregnant woman is not ‘any treatment for the termination of pregnancy’.”
“…The policy of the Act, it seems to me is clear. There are two aspects to it: the first is to broaden the grounds upon which abortions may be lawfully obtained: the second is to ensure that the abortion is carried out with all proper skill and in hygienic conditions.”
“In construing an onging Act, the interpreter is to presume that Parliament intended the Act to be applied at any future time in such a way as to give effect to the true original intention. Accordingly the interpreter is to make allowances for the relevant changes that have occurred, since the Act’s passing.”
“‘Termination of pregnancy’ is an expression commonly used, perhaps rather more by medical people than by laymen, to describe in neutral and unemotive terms the bringing about of an abortion. So used, it is capable of covering the whole process designed to lead to that result, and in my view it does so in the present context. Other provisions of the Act make it clear that termination of pregnancy is envisaged as being a process of treatment.”
“I have spoken of the requirements of the Act as the way in which ‘treatment for the termination of the pregnancy’ is to be carried out rather than using the word ‘termination’ or ‘terminated’ by itself, for the draftsman appears to use the longer and the shorter expressions indiscriminately, as is shown by a comparison between sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 1, and by the reference in the conscience clause to ‘treatment authorised by this Act’. Furthermore if ‘termination’ or ‘terminated’ meant only the event of miscarriage and not the whole treatment undertaken with that object in mind, lack of success which apparently occurs in one or two per cent of cases, would make all who had taken part in the unsuccessful treatment guilty of an offence under section 58 or 59 of theOffences Against the Person Act 1861 . This cannot have been the intention of Parliament. The requirement of the Act as to the way in which the treatment is to be carried out, which in my view throws most light upon the second aspect of its policy and the true construction of the phrase in sub-section (1) of section 1 which lies at the root of the dispute between the parties to this appeal, is the requirement in sub-section (3) that, except in cases of dire emergency, the treatment must be carried out in a National Health Service hospital (or private clinic specially approved for that purpose by the minister). It is in my view evident that in providing that treatment for termination of pregnancies should take place in ordinary hospitals, Parliament contemplated that (conscientious objections apart) like other hospital treatment, it would be undertaken as a team effort in which, acting on the instructions of the doctor in charge of the treatment, junior doctors, nurses, para-medical and other members of the hospital staff would each do those things forming part of the whole treatment, which it would be in accordance with accepted medical practice to entrust to a member of the staff possessed of their respective qualifications and experience.”
“Statutory exposition Where the legal meaning of an enactment is doubtful, and a later enactment having power to override it is so worded as to show that the legislator treated it as having a particular meaning, this is said to be a statutory exposition of it. Whether statutory exposition is equivalent to implied amendment depends on whether the later enactment indicates an intention to clarify the meaning of the earlier one (thus serving as a declaratory enactment) or merely refers to it. In the latter case it is of persuasive authority only.”
“In my opinion, the legislature cannot have intended the meaning of a sub-section to change (emphasis added) as a result of amendments to other provisions of the same statute, when no amendments were made to that sub-section, unless, of course, the effect of one of the amendments was, for instance, to change the definition of an expression used in the sub-section.”
“Where an Act has been interpreted in a particular way without dissent over a long period, those interested should be able to continue to order their affairs on that basis without risk of it being upset by a novel approach. That applies particularly in a relatively esoteric area of the law such as the present, in relation to which cases may rarely come before the courts, and the established practice is the only guide for operators and their advisers.”