“The court found that all guarantees for fair proceedings are available according to the requirements of the Bulgarian Procedure Law and the related conventions of the Council of Europe and European Union’s directives. All the defendants have their own defenders were great professional skills in this scope and a long experience as well. At the request of the defence a lot of experts and witnesses were personally interrogated by the court until this moment. When the defendant Atanasova-Kalaidzhieva appears personally and is being heard by the Bulgarian Court, the same will have all procedure guarantees stipulated in the Bulgarian Criminal Procedure Code, namely: she will have access to the entire case, she will have the possibility to give personal explanations, to require witness’s interrogation, to present other evidence, she will have the right to be represented and defended by the [lawyer] chosen by her and in such a case the court will have to remove the lawyer appointed officially. The defendant will have the right to appeal all indictments of the court including the enacted sentence … the solicitor Victor Banev mentioned in the letter is the defender of the defendant Plamen Dimitro Kalaydjiev – the defendant Dimitrinka Atanasova-Kalaidzhieva’s husband and what was said by him, and namely that the case could only continue after giving the defendant, completely corresponds to the recent situation. According to the mentioned above we kindly ask you to confirm the request of the Republic of Bulgaria …”
“The problem in the present case is that the evidence of the applicant and Banev is unanswered and, if true, raises some very disturbing concerns. Mr Hardy points out that the concept of bad faith has disappeared entirely from the 2003 Act, although some matters that might have been relevant to the question of bad faith might fall to be considered under abuse of process. The thrust of his argument is that Bulgaria is now a member of the European Community and we can rely on the Bulgarians conducting a fair criminal trial process. Events have moved on since the days when Filchev was general prosecutor. It is accepted by both sides that issues under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights are not relevant on the present application and would in any event fall for consideration before the applicant’s removal.”
“His efforts to secure evidence and investigate were frustrated, however, apparently as a result of repeated information leaks. Since the only persons who knew about the planned searches and seizures had been the Chief Public Prosecutor and five high ranking prosecutors from his close circle, the leak must have come from them. The Chief Public Prosecutor personally supervised the course of the investigation despite his close relationship with the victim. Also Mr I discovered that two persons probably implicated in the murder had fled the country with the help of the Chief Public Prosecutor. As “punishment” for his probing of these facts Mr I was later unlawfully ordered to retire.”
“The Chief Public Prosecutor had introduced an authoritarian style and unlawfully “punished” prosecutors by transferring them or depriving them of salary bonuses and that an atmosphere of fear was paralysing the normal functioning of the prosecution system. On the basis of these and other findings concerning specific violations of the administrative rules, the council called on Mr F to resign. The 25 member council adopted the decision by 13 votes to 9 with one abstention. The decision was not legally binding, as at the relevant time the constitutional ground for termination of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s appointment was very limited … Mr F refused to resign.”
“That is so because, as the court has stated in previous cases, the investigation’s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of enquiry undermines the investigation’s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and the person responsible. Such an investigation cannot be seen as effective …”
“204. Indeed, until September 2003 it was legally impossible in Bulgaria to bring criminal charges against the Chief Public Prosecutor without his consent. As a result he could not be removed from office against his will even if he happened to commit the most serious crime, as his suspension was a pre-requisite for the termination of his term of office under the constitution, as in force at the relevant time … Moreover, the Chief Public Prosecutor could not be temporarily suspended from duty, as that could only be done if charges had been brought against him … In these circumstances, in the initial period of the investigation into Mr Kolev’s murder, it was legally impossible to investigate any suspected involvement in the Chief Public Prosecutor. 205. Furthermore, even though the above deficiency was eventually remedied …, the court observes that it is undisputed by the respondent government that as a result of the hierarchical structure of the prosecution system and, apparently, its internal working methods, no prosecutor would issue a decision bringing charges against the Chief Public Prosecutor. This appears to have been due to the fact that the Chief Public Prosecutor and high ranking prosecutors have the power to set aside any such decision taken by a subordinate prosecutor or investigator. As a result, it is still the case that the Chief Public Prosecutor cannot be temporarily suspended from duty against his will, as that can only be done if charges had been brought against him … 206. In the proceedings before the court, the Government have not shown that at least some of the numerous grave allegations made during the relevant period against Mr F, the Chief Public Prosecutor … were ever investigated, at least at the level of preliminary enquiry. In the court’s opinion this fact is highly relevant in the present case as it corroborates the applicants’ allegation concerning the absence in Bulgarian law of sufficient guarantees for an independent investigation into offences of which the Chief Public Prosecutor or other high ranking officials close to him may be suspected. 207. This situation was apparently the result of a combination of factors including the impossibility of bringing charges against the Chief Public Prosecutor, the authoritarian style of Mr F as Chief Public Prosecutor, the apparently unlawful working methods he resorted to and also institutional deficiencies. In particular, the Prosecutors’ exclusive power to bring criminal charges against offenders, combined with the Chief Public Prosecutor’s full control over each and every decision issued by prosecutor or an investigator and the fact that the Chief Public Prosecutor can only be removed from office by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council, some of whose members are his subordinates, is an institutional arrangement that has been repeatedly criticised in Bulgaria as failing to secure sufficient accountability … 208. The court is not oblivious to the fact that a variety of state prosecution systems and divergent procedural rules for conducting criminal investigations may be compatible with the convention, which does not contemplate any particular model in this respect … Independence and impartiality in cases involving high-ranking prosecutors or other officials may be secured by different means, such as investigation and prosecution by a separate body outside the prosecution system, special guarantees for independent decision making despite hierarchical dependence, public scrutiny, judicial control or other measures. It is not the court’s task to determine which system best meets the requirements of the convention. The system chosen by the member state concerned must however guarantee, in law and in practice, the investigation’s independence and objectivity in all circumstances and regardless of whether those involved are public figures. 209. In the present case, the court accepts as plausible the applicants’ assertion that, given the centralised structure of the Bulgarian prosecution system, based on subordination, its exclusive power to bring charges and the procedural and institutional rules allowing full control by the Chief Public Prosecutor over every investigation in the country, in the circumstances prevailing when Mr F was the Chief Public Prosecutor it was practically impossible to conduct an independent investigation into circumstances implicating him, even after the constitutional amendment allowing in theory the bringing of charges against him.”
“The former undercover agent to Bulgaria’s State Agency [for] national security, Alexsei Petrov, who is charged with a number of crimes will take the witness stand in another high profile case. The Sofia City Court ruled Monday to call Petrov to testify in the 10 year old murder of the lawyer from the city of Yambol, Nadazheda Georgieva, over the fact she has worked since October 1999 until her death at the swimming complex “Spartac” in Sofia owned by the ex-agent. Petrov’s testimony was requested by the attorney for Georgieva’s parents. He will be asked if he was informed about the murder before the police and how exactly he has received the information. According to the attorney, evidence went missing from the case mysteriously in a move that cannot be attributed to recklessness.”
“1. A European warrant of arrest was issued for the accused Dimitrinka Atanasova-Kalaidzhieva. The court insist on its execution. 2. The proceedings are put on hold already 4 years precisely because of waiting to the competent authorities of the United Kingdom to pronounce whether they will extradite the accused or not to the Bulgarian courts. 3. The court finds that all guarantees for fair trial are present insofar as the requirement of the Bulgarian procedural code are met and also the respectively conventions of the European Council and the European directives. All accused are represented in proceedings by their own defendant counsels having rich professional experience and of many years practice. Upon demand of the defence so far many witnesses and experts are allowed to appear before court and were heard. The accused Atanasova-Kalaidzhieva after her personal appearance before and hearing by the Bulgarian court will benefit in full of all procedural guarantees, provided for in the Bulgarian CPC. The accused will be secured full access to all files and possibility to give personal explanation, to demand hearing of witnesses, to provide other evidences, to be represented and defended by a defender of her choice, in which case the court will remove the ex-officio appointed lawyer should she have objections against him. The accused will have possibility to appeal all decisions of the court, including the issued sentence when it is not in her interest, before the Court of Appeal of the city of Sofia and then before the Supreme Cassation Court of the Republic of Bulgaria. 4. The Court has already replied these same questions of the British authorities with a letter of 7.10.2009.”
“I must decide whether to stay these proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court. An earlier, and higher court, has already found bad faith and said that bad faith at any point in the process would taint the allegation. Mr Hardy has conceded, properly, that a finding of bad faith will almost always constitute a finding of abuse of process. In the admittedly unusual circumstances of this case it would nevertheless have been possible for the Bulgarian court to answer the central allegation, which is that their proceedings are tainted by the irregular original investigations. Perhaps a new, untainted, investigation has taken place. Perhaps the original “serious questions about the background” could have been answered, at the least sufficiently for current purposes. However the reality is that there is no significant difference in the factual picture presented to this court to the factual position presented in 2009. The application has been made by a judicial authority under the European Arrest Warrant scheme introduced in 2003. There is a strong presumption of confidence in our European counterparts. I have confidence in the Bulgarian Judicial Authority. I accept that the trial process itself would be fair (albeit tainted by the original investigation). Nevertheless I cannot escape from the conclusion, on the uncontroverted evidence before me that the original investigation in 2000 was tainted. It was tainted by the way this defendant was treated at the time. It was tainted by a complete failure to properly investigate the allegations against Mr Filchev. It may be that that failure is not completely irremediable. It would be possible for the Bulgarian authorities to conduct a complete fresh investigation. That investigation might, or might not, discover independent and untainted evidence against the defendant. However there have in effect been two prominent decisions, one from the High Court and the other from the European Court of Human Rights that separately and together raise the most serious questions. Those questions require an answer. None has been provided. It is not so much that the judgment of the previous court has a bearing on this decision, as that the facts remain substantially as before.”
“I should not leave the point without considering the nature of the juridical exercise involved in concluding, as I would, that the judge conducting an extradition hearing under the 2003 Act possesses a jurisdiction to hold that the prosecutor is abusing the process of the court. … The implication arises from the express provisions of the statutory regime which it is his responsibility to administer. It is justified by the imperative that the regime’s integrity must not be usurped. Where its integrity is protected by other powers, as in the Atkinson Schmidt and Gillingham cases, the implication is not justified. But under the 2003 Act that is not the case. The inference of an abuse jurisdiction – Lord Reid’s inference – follows.”
“33 …The focus of this implied jurisdiction is the abuse of the requested state’s duty to extradite those who are properly requested, and who are unable to raise any of the statutory bars to extradition. The residual abuse jurisdiction identified in R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office[2007] QB 727 and the Tollman case[2007] 1 WLR 1157 concerns abuse of the extradition process by prosecuting authority. We emphasise those latter two words. That is the language of those cases. It is the good faith of the requesting authorities which is at issue because it is their request coupled with their perverted attempt and purpose which constitutes the abuse. If the authorities of the requesting state seek the extradition of someone for a collateral purpose, or when they know that the trial cannot succeed, they abuse the extradition processes of the requested state. 34. The abuse jurisdiction of the requested state does not extend to considering misconduct or bad faith by the police of the requesting state in the investigation of the case or the preparation of evidence for trial. 35. The reason for the distinction lies in the respective functions of the courts of the requested and requesting state in the European arrest warrant framework. The former are entitled to ensure that their duties and the functions under theExtradition Act 2003 Part 1 are not being abused. It is the exclusive function of the latter to try the issues relevant to the guilt or otherwise of the individual. This necessarily includes deciding what evidence is permissible, and what weight should be given to particular pieces of evidence having regard to the way in which an investigation was carried out. It is for the trial court in the requesting state to find the facts about how statements were obtained, which may go to admissibility or weight, both of which are matters for the court conducting the trial. It is the function of that court to decide whether evidence was improperly obtained and if so what the consequences of the trial are. It is for the trial judge to decide whether its own procedures have been breached. 36. As those issues are for decision by the trial court in the requesting state, it cannot be an abuse of the extradition process of the requested state for such an issue to be shown to exist and for its resolution to be available only in the courts of the requesting state. The courts of the requested state cannot decide, let alone do so on partial and incomplete evidence, what it is for the courts of the requesting state within the European Arrest Warrant Framework (European Council Framework Decision of13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender of procedures between member states … “the framework decision”) to decide about such issues and with what effect on the trial.”
“33. The Deputy Prosecutor General knew full well the nature of the criticism made by the Divisional Court as to the procedure in the 1930 code and as to the evidence. Yet he has not chosen to meet either the evidential or the procedural defects which the Divisional Court identified. He merely contends that he does not have to do so. 34. I do not agree. It is true that the new regime depends upon trust in the integrity and fairness “of each other’s judicial institutions”