“Arrest landlord spied on flat couple”, followed immediately below by: “Friend in jail for paedophile crimes”, followed immediately below by: “Cops now probe 36 –years old murder.”
“Posh ex-teacher who was “arrogant and rude.””
“Joanna Yeates’s killer may have been waiting for her inside her basement flat as she returned home. Detectives yesterday sent towels and bedding for DNA tests after finding no signs of a break-in”
“The strict liability rule applies only to a publication which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.”
“…an appeal on the ground of prejudice would not succeed, no more should the publisher be guilty of contempt. The prospective risk of serious prejudice cannot be any greater than the actual possibility, in the assumed situation, that it has occurred. By parity of reasoning, a case in which an appeal would in the assumed events succeed will ordinarily be a case where contempt is made out.”
“It seems to me necessarily to follow…that one and the same publication may well constitute a contempt and yet, even though not substantially mitigated in its effect by a temporary stay and/or change of venue, not so prejudice the trial as to undermine the safety of any subsequent conviction. To my mind that can only be because section 2(2) postulates a lesser degree of prejudice than is required to make good an appeal against conviction…In short section 2(2) is designed to avoid (and where necessary punish) publications even if they merely risk prejudicing proceedings, whereas a stay will generally only be granted where it is recognised that any subsequent conviction would otherwise be imperilled, and a conviction will only be set aside…if it is actually unsafe.”
“I still think that to create a seriously arguable ground of appeal is a sufficient basis for finding strict liability contempt. Clearly it is a relevant consideration too that when a judge at first instance is deciding whether or not to grant a temporary stay. But more particularly the trial judge will ask himself: “is there a real danger that the jury cannot reach a just verdict, or the defendant have a fair trial?”
“The statutory question for this court…is whether the publication created a substantial risk that the course of justice will be substantially impeded or prejudiced. It is not the statutory question posed bysection 2(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 , namely whether the conviction was unsafe…the trust which is placed on juries…cannot always be relied upon by those whose publications put the prospects of a fair trial at substantial risk.”
“It must always be remembered that the law of contempt is concerned with preventing a publication because it creates a substantial risk of serious prejudice whereas the Court of Appeal will be concerned with whether there has been such prejudice as renders the conviction unsafe. The fact that no actual prejudice has resulted from the publication cannot prevent it being a contempt within the meaning of section 2(2), although no doubt the lack of actual prejudice may be relevant in deciding whether there really was a substantial risk of serious prejudice.”
“The course of justice is not just concerned with the outcome of proceedings. It is concerned with the whole process of the law, including the freedom of a person accused of a crime to elect, so far as the law permits him to do so, the mode of trial which he prefers and to conduct his defence in the way which seems best to him and to his advisers. Any extraneous factor or external pressure which impedes or restricts that election or that conduct, or which impels a person so accused to adopt the course in the conduct of his own defence which he does not wish to adopt, deprives him to an extent of the freedom of choice which the law confers upon him and is, in my judgment, not only a prejudice but a serious prejudice.”