Kurucz v District Court In Mlada Boleslav [2010] EWHC 671 (Admin)

Case No CO/7986/2009[2010] EWHC 671 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate Thursday, 25 February 2010
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
MR JUSTICE OWEN
MR JUSTICE CALVERT SMITH
Between
KURUCZClaimantv
Between
DISTRICT COURT IN MLADA BOLESLAVDefendant(A Czech Judicial Authority)Defendant
Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes ofWordWave International LimitedA Merrill Communications Company165 Fleet Street London EC4A 2DYTel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
The Claimant appeared in person for in personMiss Rebecca Hill (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) appeared for Defendant
J U D G M E N T
[1]MR JUSTICE OWEN: This is an appeal against the decision of District Judge Wickham, sitting in the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court, made on 17 July 2009, to extradite the appellant to the Czech Republic, a Part 1 Territory.[2]Extradition had been sought by a judicial authority - the District Court of Mlada Boleslav - to execute a custodial sentence of 15 months' imprisonment imposed on 27 May 1999 for two offences of theft and an offence of fraud committed in 1998. The European arrest warrant was issued on 3 June 2008 and certified on 17 September 2008. The appellant was arrested under the warrant on 19 December 2008.[3]On the same day the appellant appeared before the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court when the matter was adjourned to allow for further information to be obtained both by the appellant and by the judicial authority. Three requests for further information were then transmitted to the judicial authority, addressing issues that had been raised on behalf of the appellant, and to each of which the judicial authority responded.[4]When the matter came before District Judge Wickham on 17 July the appellant was represented by Nicholas Yeo of counsel who, in the light of the further information that had been provided by the judicial authority, abandoned the objections to extradition that had formerly been raised. The hearing then proceeded uncontested.[5]The appellant's notice completed by him in English - and I interject that today the appellant appeared before us and was able to address the court in English - stated that he sought to appeal on the basis that the order made on 17 July 2009 was made as a consequence of professional negligence on the part of those then representing him. He set out his grounds in the following terms:
"Seeking to appeal the order made on 17.07.09 due to professional negligence on behalf of Mr Kurucz's legal team. Counsel for Mr Kurucz attended court without the case papers and did not make any attempt to defend Mr Kurucz. Mr Kurucz is currently in communication with the solicitors' firm who are in the process of deciding whether they will take his case forward and appeal the above-mentioned order."
No further information has been put before the court. The grounds of appeal as they now stand are therefore based on an unparticularised and, essentially, unsubstantiated assertion.[6]In fairness to the appellant, who, as I have indicated, was not represented before this court, it is necessary shortly to consider the four arguments that his former legal advisers had raised prior to the receipt of further information from the judicial authority.[7]First, they have raised the question of the passage of time. Under Section 11 (1) (c) and Section 11 (3) of the Extradition Act 2003 the judge must discharge a requested person if he determines that their extradition is barred by reason of passage of time. Section 14 of the Act provides interpretive assistance in determining whether the person's extradition should be so barred following a delay. So far as it is relevant, it states:
"A person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have ..... become unlawfully at large ..... "
But it is settled law, as recently confirmed in Goodyear and Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21, that a person who fled a jurisdiction and evaded arrest cannot rely upon any resulting delay in proceedings in order to resist his extradition.[8]It is clear from the further information dated 9 June 2009 that the appellant was present during his trial on 27 May 1999. Accordingly the judicial authority concluded that for the past eight years the appellant has illegally stayed at large. In those circumstances the appellant cannot rely on the passage of time as a bar to his extradition.[9]Secondly, those representing him raised the question of whether there were extraneous considerations barring extradition under Section 13 of the Act which it is not necessary, for present purposes, to relate.[10]The appellant is a Roma. In his proof of evidence, supported by a translated letter from Richard Polmer, the appellant had asserted that the requesting judge - Judge Havelka - was biased against Roma. But in a letter dated 8 April 2009, the President of the Court in Mlada Boleslav - Mr Jiri Rajm - addressed the concerns raised by Mr Kurucz that he would be prejudiced against because of his Roma origin and in particular because of the requested judge's bias. Any suggestion of prejudice or bias is firmly disputed. The allegation that Judge Havelka is biased is made in the form of a bare assertion and is directly contradicted by the letter to which I have just made reference.[11]In those circumstances I am satisfied that no credence can be attached to the allegation of bias.[12]Thirdly, there is the question of the breach of the appellant's Article 3 rights. Mr Kurucz today - in his submission to us - has explained his current position in the United Kingdom. In my judgment the matters that he has put before us do not give rise to a potential breach of his Article 3 rights.[13]Finally, the assertion is made in his proof of evidence that he was not aware of the proceedings giving rise to the convictions in relation to which his extradition is sought. That is an assertion that is expressly contradicted by the judicial authority in its response of 9 June 2009 which states that the appellant was personally present at his trial.[14]In those circumstances I can find no basis for allowing this appeal and I would dismiss it.

MR JUSTICE CALVERT-SMITH: I agree.

[16]I add this. From what Mr Kurucz has told us this morning, it seems that he came here in June 1999, which must have been days after the conviction which was recorded against him in the Czech Republic. He was granted indefinite leave to remain in this country. It is unlikely - though he did not tell us - that he would have declared the fact that he was wanted in his own country to serve a sentence of imprisonment. He has explained to us that since 1999 he has always worked and has never been in trouble. His first wife left him in 2006. He now has a new partner with a baby, the baby having been born in this country being British. He has explained his apprehension that if he is extradited to the Czech Republic to serve his sentence it will damage both him and also his family.[17]However for the reasons that my Lord has explained, he is a person who is a classic fugitive and cannot pray in aid the protection of Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. Hence the appeal has to be dismissed.

MR JUSTICE OWEN: This appeal is therefore dismissed.