“7. In any case, where an expert tribunal is the fact finding body the threshold of Wednesbury unreasonableness is a difficult obstacle for an appellant to surmount. That difficulty is greatly increased in most planning cases because the Inspector is not simply deciding questions of fact, he or she is reaching a series of planning judgments… 8. Moreover, the Inspector’s conclusions will invariably be based not merely upon the evidence heard at an inquiry or an informal hearing, or contained in written representations but, and this will often be of crucial importance, upon the impressions received on the site inspection. Against this background an applicant alleging an Inspector has reached a Wednesbury unreasonable conclusion on matters of planning judgment faces a particularly daunting task.”
“ 18. …The Council has monitored its use over the years. … the Council carried out a site visit in October 2001 at which it found clear evidence of the current use of the dwelling in all the main rooms of the goat shed, including the presence of food and drink and used pots in the kitchen, a made-up bed, clothes in the bedroom and personal care items in the bathroom. 19. The appellant … acknowledged that he was content for the Council to arrive at the conclusion that the goat shed was in use for residential purposes, albeit in contravention of the [goat shed] enforcement notice, as this was part of a plan to mislead the Council into finding that he was living in the goat shed when, all along, he was living in the log cabin. At the site visit, the Council did not inspect the log cabin. 21. … in my view the log cabin and the goat shed were, to all intents and purposes, one dwelling unit as, from 1997 to early 2002, the accommodation in the goat shed was in a liveable condition. … The appellant’s video evidence showed that the goat shed was in poor condition by late 2002 and early 2003, but this is not surprising as the building was severely damaged by a tree branch falling through the roof in may 2002. By this time, however, the appellant was able to live in the completed log cabin building.”