Garbet, R (on the application of) v Circle 33 Housing Trust [2009] EWHC 3153 (Admin)

[2009] EWHC 3153 (Admin)Case No CO/891/2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 7 December 2009
Before
MR JUSTICE MUNBY(now LORD JUSTICE MUNBY)
Between
R (JOAN GARBET)ClaimantCIRCLE 33 HOUSING TRUSTDefendantEASTBOURNE HOMES LIMITEDInterested Party
Miss Yvonne Hossack (of Hossacks Solicitors) for ClaimantMs Fenella Morris (instructed by Trowers & Hamlins LLP) for DefendantThe Interested Party was neither present nor representedHearing Hearing dates: 2-3 April 2009Further written submissions by Mr Stephen Knafler (instructed by Hossacks Solicitors) for Claimant were filed on 3 and 10 July 2009Further written submissions by Ms Fenella Morris for Defendant were filed on 3 and 10 July 2009
Judgment
[1]These are judicial review proceedings which I heard when I was still a puisne judge of the High Court.

Background

[2]The Claimant is, and has since July 2001 been, an assured tenant of sheltered accommodation provided, initially by the United Women’s Homes Association Limited (“UWHA”) and since April 2005 by the Defendant, at Alexandra House, part of a complex in Eastbourne which also includes Alexandra Court.[3]When the Claimant moved in to Alexandra House, there was a resident warden, Ms Jennifer Billich. She had been employed by UWHA at Alexandra House since 15 October 1990, her original terms of employment being set out in two letters dated 5 September 1990 which described her “prime responsibility” as being towards the well being of the tenants and the maintenance of harmony between them. Her contract at the time the Claimant arrived was dated 1 March 1999. I have also been shown her ‘Contract of Employment Statement’ dated 2 January 2004. So far as is material for present purposes both these later documents are to the same effect. Ms Billich was employed as “Resident Warden” and provided with rent-free accommodation at Alexandra House. Her normal hours of work were from 9 am to 5 pm Monday to Friday “together with such additional hours outside these hours at weekends or during holidays, as are necessary for the proper performance of your duties.”[4]Neither party has been able to produce a complete copy of the Claimant’s tenancy agreement as executed (assuming it ever was) but it is common ground that the Claimant’s tenancy is on the terms of an undated tenancy agreement between UWHA and the Claimant (referred to as “the Tenant”) which recites, so far as material for present purposes, that UWHA is a registered social landlord registered with the Housing Corporation, that the tenancy begins on 23 July 2001, and that it is an assured weekly tenancy “the terms of which are set out in this agreement.”[5]So far as material for present purposes, clause 1(1) of the agreement stipulated for a weekly service charge of £22.32, whilst clause 1(4) provided that: “UWHA shall provide the services set out in Appendix A in connection with the premises for which the Tenant shall pay the service charge”.[6]Appendix A was not attached, but the parties are agreed that it was in, or to the same effect as, the terms of a document headed ‘Description of Services Provided to Your Property’, the material parts of which provided as follows:
“Code 2570: Warden Call System – non GC&S Maintenance contract to respond to emergency call-outs within 24 hours of receiving notification of a fault … This contract also includes the maintenance of the door entry system where this is connected to the Warden Call System. This code is used where the cost of the warden call system is treated as a Service Charge cost rather than General Counselling & Support. Code 2572: Warden Service – non GC&S Total cost of providing the Warden Service, plus expenditure on the Guest Room. This is used at schemes where this charge is treated as a Service Charge cost rather than a General Counselling & Support charge. Code 2573: Warden Costs – non GC&S Rent loss on the Warden’s flat. This is used at schemes where this charge is treated as a Service Charge cost rather than a General Counselling & Support charge.”
Code 2572: Warden Service – non GC&S

Code 2573: Warden Costs – non GC&S

[7]Clause 1(5) provided for alteration in the service charge on notice and continued:
“The notice may also add to, reduce, remove or vary the services provided by UWHA after consultation with the Tenant.”
[8]Clause 1(8) provided as follows:
“UWHA and the Tenant agree that the terms of this Tenancy may be varied by the same mechanism set out in Sections 102 and 103 of the Housing Act 1985. In summary, this means, UWHA may change any of the conditions of the Agreement either by agreement between UWHA and the Tenant or by UWHA giving 28 days written notice of the variation. Before serving such a Notice UWHA will inform the Tenant in writing of the details of any proposed change and will consider the Tenant’s comments, if any, provided these are received by UWHA within a time limit specified by UWHA.”
[9]Clause 4(8)(i) provided that:
“The Tenant has the following rights: … To be consulted by UWHA before UWHA makes changes in matters of housing management or maintenance which are likely to have a substantial effect on the Tenant … The Tenant also has the right to be informed about UWHA’s management policies.”
[10]Clause 4(11) provided that:
“The Tenant has the following rights: … If the Tenant feels that UWHA has broken this agreement or not performed any obligation contained in it, he or she should [sic] first complain to UWHA in accordance with UWHA’s complaints procedures. After the UWHA’s complaints procedures has [sic] been exhausted the Tenant may refer by complaint to the relevant Independent Housing Ombudsman Service.”
[11]In her witness statement of 28 January 2009 (see below) the Claimant refers to a “contract” she was provided with when she moved in to Alexandra House. The document she refers to (so Miss Hossack tells me) is a document headed ‘Living at Alexandra House or Court’ which states that it was “compiled” by Ms Billich.[12]The Defendant’s evidence about this document, which has not been challenged, is set out in the witness statement dated 24 March 2009 of Jacqueline Airey, a Director of the Defendant. Referring to this and another document she says:
“These documents were not produced by Circle 33 or Eastbourne Homes but by Mrs Billich herself. Until these proceedings, I had not seen this document nor was I aware of its existence. It would appear from their introductory paragraphs that these documents would have been handed to tenants once they had arrived at the Properties, rather than at the time when they were considering whether to enter into a tenancy with Circle 33. In the circumstances, whilst it is noted that some residents who have submitted witness statements in support of this application contend that they came to live at the Properties on the basis of a promise of a resident warden, there is no documentary evidence to support any such promise having been made. … The … documents Mrs Billich produced herself demonstrate that as warden, Mrs Billich did not in fact purport to provide services to tenants, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Further … the tenants at the Properties are served by Lifeline which is the first port of call should they need assistance in the case of an emergency. On occasions, if a designated contact has not been available in emergency situations, Lifeline had contacted Mrs Billich to attend where necessary. They will now contact Eastbourne Homes (which has offices 250 yards from the Properties) who will arrange for someone to attend the Properties as a matter of urgency. It has, however, always been the case that in the first instance cover would be provided via the Lifeline service in such situations rather than Mrs Billich.”

Events leading up to the proceedings

[13]With effect from 7 April 2008 the management of Alexandra House and Alexandra Court was undertaken by the Interested Party, Eastbourne Homes Limited (“EH”). It seems to have been this that set in train the sequence of events leading up to the present proceedings.[14]On 20 February 2008 there was a meeting for the residents of Alexandra House and Alexandra Court when some of the implications of the forthcoming transfer of management to EH were explained. In answer to the question ‘Will our Warden / Scheme Manager still be resident on site, at all times?’ the following answer was given:
“Eastbourne Homes runs a scheme called floating support, which the government support and they contribute a payment system called Supporting People. This allows them to receive money to pay for the services of a Scheme Manager. Residents that receive any type of Housing Benefit will get 100% of their Supporting People charge paid. With this in mind, all Eastbourne Homes Staff are Floating Wardens. This is where they are not based full time at one scheme if there are not enough properties to receive full time support. The floating support workers will provide similar services you receive to people living in the community in their own homes. It is envisaged that Jennie will remain working the same pattern as she does now, but will receive support and training to allow the position to become the same as their own staff.”
[15]In answer to further questions, ‘Will our Warden have any input with lettings?’ and ‘Will Jennie be staying with us?’ the answer in each case was “Yes”. This was confirmed in a letter to Ms Billich dated 26 March 2008: “you remain employed … and all your terms and conditions remain the same”.[16]On 16 April 2008 EH wrote to the tenants of Alexandra House and Alexandra Court:
“On the 6th March 2008 you were invited to a meeting to talk about the handover of management of your scheme from Circle Anglia to Eastbourne Homes. At that time we told you about the new Floating Support Service which is available to all of our customers over the age of 60. I am pleased to tell you that this service is now available in your Scheme. To access the service, we have to make an assessment of your needs. This will take a short amount of time and will be done by one of the Floating Support Officers. The Officers are visiting your Court at the moment and will be calling on you and your neighbours to offer the service.”
[17]On 27 May 2008 the assurances previously given to Ms Billich were repeated:
“Your role remains as it is and any changes proposed would need to be done through formal consultation with yourself and residents. There are no proposals for your role at this time. EH are bringing in floating support for residents in addition to your role for extra support.”
[18]Much the same thing was said again on 18 June 2008.[19]On 24 June 2008 Ms Billich was given a very different message:
“It appears that you were misinformed … as to your future role and employment following the transfer to Eastbourne Homes in April 2008. For clarification, it was never agreed that you will automatically assimilate into the proposed Floating support officer role. EH will consult with C33 as to their proposals for the future and a review of the business case for your role will be undertaken. Circle 33 will then consider the options available to you as a circle 33 employee. I hope this clears up the matter.”
I hope this clears up the matter.”[20]Unsurprisingly this information came to the knowledge of the tenants, who apparently sent the Defendant a petition expressing opposition to any changes to the resident warden role. This prompted a letter to the tenants from the Defendant which, although undated, seems to have been sent in early August 2008:
“I am sorry to hear that the uncertainty surrounding the future of the present Resident Warden has caused some anxiety amongst residents at Alexander [sic] Court. Any matters relating to employees are confidential and cannot be discussed openly. However, if there were to be any proposed changes to the role, residents of Alexander Court would be fully consulted with.”
[21]On 7 October 2008 Ms Billich wrote to the Defendant asking if she might stay on working beyond her 65th birthday in January 2009. That request was considered at a ‘retirement consultation meeting’ on 29 October 2008 held between Ms Billich and representatives of the Defendant and EH.[22]On 15 November 2008 one of the residents of Alexandra Court, a Mr Smith, wrote to the Defendant in response to the letter sent to the tenants in August 2008:
“I refer to the letter you sent me Re Petition Resident Warden that I received on 9/8/08 – you stated that if there were to be any changes to this the residents here would be fully consulted. Our warden Mrs J Billich now tells me that her employment will end here in Jan 2009. In view of this and also what you have told me I now ask why no consultation has taken place? You may well decide that a resident warden is no longer required here but as this involves not just myself but other tenants in Alexander Court and House it will affect us all. I do feel that you have failed in your duty as landlord because you have an obligation towards the living conditions of your tenants, to discuss such matter honestly. I have lived here since the days of United Women’s Home and am sorry to say that now that conditions for living here have deteriorated a lot.”
[23]The reply on 27 November 2008 read as follows:
“Thank you for your letter dated 15th November 2008, concerning consultation in relation to the future of the resident warden service. You are clearly aware that the resident warden for Alexander House and Court has decided to retire in January 2009. Circle 33 has agreed that Eastbourne Homes will start the consultation with residents on the way forward after Jennie has retired from service. I am sorry that the timing of the consultation was not made clear in my earlier correspondence. It is always pleasing to hear that a member of staff is offering a good service to our customers. I am aware of the work Jennie Billich has done for circle 33 and United Women’s Homes Association Ltd prior to Circles ownership. Please be assured that if Circle 33 put forward a proposal to change the way we deliver warden services in this property all tenants who may be affected by change will be consulted with fully before any decision is made. Circle 33 through Eastbourne homes aims to consistently deliver a professional service to our customers, together we are actively working to improve service levels and your feedback is always welcome.”
[24]The assertion that Ms Billich had “decided to retire” was disingenuous to say the least – some might understandably think a much stronger word more apt – for the very next day, on 28 November 2008, the appeal hearing against the Defendant’s decision that Ms Billich should be required to retire on her 65th birthday took place. The minutes of the meeting record Ms Billich’s representative asking, in relation to the change from warden to floating support, what stage the consultation was at and being told “We haven’t consulted as both are currently in use” and then again, a little later, “There is no business case to change the service at this moment in time. No consultation process so, whether you retire or not a warden role would continue, either you or someone else until the process of consultation is finished.”[25]On 12 December 2008 the Defendant wrote to Ms Billich telling her the outcome of her appeal: she was to retire at 65 and therefore her last date of employment would be 31 January 2009. On 26 January 2009 the tenants of Alexandra House and Alexandra Court were invited by EH to a farewell party for Ms Billich to be held on 30 January 2009.[26]In the meantime, on 21 January 2009 the Claimant’s solicitor had written a letter before action to the Defendant, saying that she was acting for “a number” of (unidentified) tenants at Alexandra House, asserting that “the decision that you have made” – namely, as it was put, that “the permanent resident warden will be retired by yourselves as of the 31st January 2009, and that she will not be replaced by a further permanent resident warden” – “is actionable on the basis of breach of legitimate expectation and failure to take into account the consequences that there are likely to be to our Clients” and suggesting a meeting with a view to a negotiated settlement. The Defendant replied on 26 January 2009 pointing out, correctly, that the letter did not identify any legal basis or authority on which the Defendant was capable of being judicially reviewed, denying any breach of promise or legitimate expectation and saying that:
“Notwithstanding the present warden’s retirement, support services will continue to be provided in line with Supporting People contractual requirements, with residents being consulted about the service going forward. Residents will be aware through the consultation that occurred prior to the transfer of management to Eastbourne Homes at the end of 2007/8 that the nature of the support service would be subject to further consultation, and no final decision will be taken until this process has occurred.”
[27]So much for the sorry tale of events down to the point at which the proceedings were launched on 29 January 2009. I shall pick up the subsequent story in due course.[28]I am not at all surprised that His Honour Judge McKenna, in the course of his judgment on 5 February 2009 (see below) should have commented (see R (Garbet) v Circle 33 Housing Trust [2009] EWHC 384 (Admin) at para [2]), that “it does seem extraordinary that the Defendant should wait until after the retirement date of the existing warden before even commencing any consultation as to how the provision of services for residents should continue.” For my own part, and even with the benefit of such explanations as the Defendant has since been able to provide, I can only say that there seems to have been, right down to the day of Ms Billich’s departure, what many might see as a disturbing lack of frankness and openness on the part of both the Defendant and EH in their dealings with the Claimant and the other tenants of Alexandra House and Alexandra Court.

The proceedings

[29]The application for judicial review was issued on 29 January 2009. The decision to be judicially reviewed was described as the decision of the Defendant on 23 December 2008 “to retire the current Resident Warden of Alexandra House on her 65th birthday on January 31st 2009, with the view to not providing the residents with a new Resident Warden, and against the will of the current Resident Warden.” The essential ground of complaint was succinctly set out in the attached Statement of Grounds as being that:
“The Claimant had a legitimate expectation … that in entering into Alexandra Court Sheltered Housing, the arrangements for oversight and supervision by a Resident Warden would remain.”
[30]The relief sought was(1) “for the decision to cease the employment of the permanent Resident Warden to be Quashed” and, further or in the alternative(2) “for the Defendant’s decision not to provide a permanent on-site Resident Warden from the 1st February 2009 to be Quashed.” The Claimant sought in addition for the matter to be expedited (specifically a substantive hearing by 13 February 2009) and “Interim Relief within 24 Hours that the Court mandate the Defendant to keep the current Resident Warden to the Claimant whilst these proceedings are on foot.”[31]It may be noted that no mandatory relief was sought by way of final order. Moreover, as the Claimant’s Form N461 acknowledged, she had not complied with the pre-action protocol, reference in this context being made to the letters of 21 and 26 January 2009 which I have already mentioned. EH was identified as an interested party. In the event it has played little part in the proceedings, neither filing an acknowledgement of service nor appearing at the hearing and confining itself to filing evidence in support of the Defendant.[32]The matter was considered as a table application by His Honour Judge McKenna (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) on 30 January 2009. He directed that the Claimant’s application for interim relief was to be heard on 5 February 2009 and that, pending that hearing, the Defendant was to continue to provide the services of a resident warden at Alexandra House.[33]The matter came before Judge McKenna inter partes on 5 February 2009. Having read the written evidence submitted on behalf of the Claimant and the Defendant (see below), and having heard Miss Hossack on behalf of the Claimant and Ms Morris on behalf of the Defendant, Judge McKenna refused “on the balance of convenience” to continue the injunction he had granted on 30 January 2009: R (Garbet) v Circle 33 Housing Trust [2009] EWHC 384 (Admin) at para [4]. He ordered the Defendant to file an acknowledgement of service by 13 February 2009 and directed that the papers were to be passed to a judge immediately upon receipt of the acknowledgement of service.[34]The Defendant’s acknowledgement of service was filed on 13 February 2009. The Claimant responded on 16 February 2009 filing a significant volume of further evidence (see below).[35]The papers were considered by Pitchford J on 19 February 2009. He directed a ‘rolled up’ hearing to be listed urgently after 28 days, observing that there was a live issue as to whether the Defendant was a public body and/or performing, in the present context, a public function, that that issue was sufficiently important to require full argument, and that expediency therefore demanded that all issues be considered at a single hearing should the public law issue be resolved in the Claimant’s favour.[36]In due course the matter was listed for hearing on 2 April 2009. On 31 March 2009, and in the light of the Claimant’s objection, the Administrative Court’s Senior Legal Manager refused the Defendant’s application for an adjournment to await what was said to be the “imminent” decision of the Court of Appeal on the appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court in R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2008] EWHC 1377 (Admin).

Events since the commencement of the proceedings

[37]Because of the order made by Judge McKenna on 30 January 2009, Ms Billich continued in post for a few further days. Her last day was 5 February 2009. The Defendant’s case – see, for example, the witness statement dated 4 February 2009 of Robert Granville, the Director of Housing Services of EH, and Ms Airey’s witness statement of 24 March 2009 – is that EH has since provided “equivalent services” to the residents of Alexandra House. The detail of those services is set out in tabular form in a schedule exhibited by Mr Granville to his witness statement of 4 February 2009, and confirmed in his later witness statement of 24 March 2009, to which I shall return in due course.[38]It is convenient at this stage to carry forward the story of consultation.[39]The first point to be noted is that it is quite clear from Ms Airey’s two witness statements (see below) that the Defendant does not assert that there was any relevant consultation with the Claimant or other tenants at Alexandra House prior to Ms Billich’s departure on 5 February 2009. Ms Airey exhibits to her second witness statement of 10 July 2009 what she describes as “all correspondence with tenants during the course of the consultation”, the earliest document exhibited being a letter dated 6 February 2009 from Mr Granville.[40]Thus the consultation process, according to the Defendant, began with the letter from Mr Granville dated 6 February 2009. Headed ‘Interim arrangements to cover warden services’ it enclosed a table setting out “the core elements of the service [which] will be provided over the coming weeks, during which time we will meet with you to discuss what the future service arrangements might be.” The letter asserted that “Having attended High Court yesterday the Judge accepted that the interim arrangements proposed by us would provide a level of service similar to that of the warden service.” What Judge McKenna actually said, in the context of an assessment of the balance of convenience, was rather different (R (Garbet) v Circle 33 Housing Trust [2009] EWHC 384 (Admin) at para [4]): “It seems to me that in the short term the interim arrangements proposed by the Defendant should suffice”.[41]On 17 March 2009 EH wrote to the tenants saying “we want to consult residents as to how the services at Alexandra Court and House are to be provided in the future.” It said that “At this point no decision has been made about the future of the services” and announced a consultation meeting to be held on 24 March 2009.[42]I have seen various accounts of the meeting on 24 March 2009. I need not go into the details – which are far from agreed – but it is apparent that views differed amongst the tenants.[43]I break off the narrative at this point to deal with the hearing.

The hearing

[44]The hearing before me began on 2 April 2009 and lasted two days. Miss Hossack appeared on behalf of the Claimant and Ms Morris on behalf of the Defendant.[45]A bare three days before the hearing, on 30 March 2009, Miss Hossack had indicated to the Defendant that she intended to make an application at the hearing for a protective costs order (PCO). In her skeleton argument the following day she referred to the difficulties the Claimant had been experiencing in obtaining public funding, asserted that the case raised a novel point of public interest to some 400-800,000 people – namely whether the provision of warden services is a public function – and said that it is “disgraceful” that a test case should leave a claimant exposed to risk. Ms Morris, in a supplemental skeleton argument dated 1 April 2009, complained, as it seems to me with some justification, that the application was not merely late – “deplorably late” as she had put it in her main skeleton argument – but unsupported by any proper application setting out the grounds. Referring to the relevant authorities (something that Miss Hossack had not condescended to) Ms Morris submitted that the Claimant was not entitled to a PCO. Amongst the many compelling points she made was this, that insofar as the present case raises the point of general public interest identified by Miss Hossack, it was being resolved by the Weaver litigation. Moreover, as she pointed out, the Claimant plainly has a very significant private interest in the outcome of the case. In the event, the matter was not pressed by Miss Hossack, so I say no more about it except to indicate that I had and have difficulty in seeing any way in which Miss Hossack could realistically have hoped to overcome Ms Morris’s compelling arguments.[46]The evidence filed on behalf of the Claimant consisted of witness statements dated 28 January 2009 by Ms Billich and the Claimant – the evidence which was before Judge McKenna – together with three further witness statements by the Claimant, each seemingly dated 12 February 2009, and witness statements, all also seemingly dated 12 February 2009, by various other residents at Alexandra House, David Smith (two), Grace Jackson (two), Doris Leigh (two), Frederick Glenister, Graham Lewis, Joanne Denair, Barbara Legge, Mena Morrison and Doreen Beaumont-Jones. Finally there are witness statements dated 26 March 2009 by Norman Adams – this was not referred to by anybody and its significance, I fear, eludes me – and by Vernon Yarker, who is the Chairman of a national organisation called Sheltered Housing UK and who helpfully set out some general background information about sheltered housing schemes.[47]The evidence filed on behalf of the Defendant consisted of the witness statement dated 4 February 2009 by Mr Granville – the evidence which was before Judge McKenna – together with the further witness statements dated 24 March 2009 by Mr Granville and Ms Airey to which I have already referred.[48]At the end of the hearing I was persuaded to adjourn the matter part-heard (any further submissions to be made in writing) to await what I was assured was the imminently expected judgment of the Court of Appeal in Weaver. The order which I made on 3 April 2009 provided for the parties to give notice, within seven days of the Court of Appeal handing down judgment, of any intention to make further submissions. I also gave directions for the filing of the same, and spelt out that any additional submissions were to be confined to the outcome of the decision in Weaver and whether any private law remedy is available to the Claimant in the event that no public law remedy is.[49]In the event, judgment in Weaver was not handed down until 18 June 2009: R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust, Equality & Human Rights Commission Intervenor [2009] EWCA Civ 587. In accordance with my order of 3 April 2009, both parties gave notice of their intention to file further submissions, the Defendant on 25 June 2009 and the Claimant on 26 June 2009.[50]The Claimant’s submissions, prepared by Mr Stephen Knafler of counsel (who, it will be appreciated, had not appeared before me during the hearing), were dated 3 July 2009, a supplemental note from him following on 10 July 2009. Ms Morris’s submissions were likewise dated 3 and 10 July 2009, the latter being accompanied by the further witness statement from Ms Airey dated 10 July 2009 to which I have already referred.

Events since the hearing

[51]I pick up the narrative of events in relation to the consultation process.[52]In a letter dated 8 April 2009 EH identified four options for consideration by the tenants:(i) full time warden resident in site;(ii) full time warden not resident on site,(iii) part time warden not resident on site, and(iv) a specialist support service. Details of each option were given. A meeting on 6 May 2009 to “share the results of the consultation” was announced in a letter dated 29 April 2009. The result was that 32 out of 47 eligible households had responded. Of those 32, seven expressed a preference for option (i), six a preference for option (ii), four a preference for option (iii) and 15 a preference for option (iv).[53]Following the meeting on 6 May 2009, EH wrote to the tenants on 19 May 2009 to announce that, following discussion at that meeting, “the option that will be implemented is option (iv), but in view of the number who supported a warden service of some type this will be put in place as a pilot for one year,” starting from 1 June 2009.[54]It is to be noted that, although in his submissions Mr Knafler makes various references to this decision (see below), the Claimant has not made any application to the court, whether by way of an application to amend her existing grounds of judicial review or by way of a fresh application for judicial review: cf, R (B by her litigation friend MB) v London Borough of Lambeth [2006] EWHC 639 (Admin), [2007] 1 FLR 2091. Nor, so far as I am aware, has the Claimant made any application to the court by way of private law proceedings, either in the High Court or in the County Court. I am therefore concerned, and concerned only, with the issues raised by the Claimant in her original application for judicial review as slightly extended by my order of 3 April 2009.

The issues

[55]I turn first to identify the issues as they were put before me during the hearing in April 2009.[56]In her skeleton argument dated 31 March 2009 Miss Hossack identified three issues:(i) Is the Defendant a public authority?;(ii) Whether or not it is a public authority, was the Defendant carrying out a public function in relation to the decisions under challenge?; and(iii) Whether it is right and/or necessary for the court to exercise discretion to quash the decision(s)? She identified the two decisions under challenge as being (a) to cease the employment of the permanent resident warden and (b) not to provide a permanent on-site resident warden from 1 February 2009. Understandably, for Miss Hossack’s skeleton argument followed very much the approach which she had earlier set out in her Statement of Grounds, Ms Morris in her skeleton argument dated 30 March 2009 adopted much the same course.[57]For my own part I propose to adopt a different course.[58]In the first place it is necessary to identify precisely what the decision is which is properly under challenge.[59]In this respect there are, as it seems to me, three fundamental points to be made: i) In the first place, I am not concerned with any claims or complaints that Ms Billich may think she has. She is not a party to the proceedings. Nor am I concerned with any claims or complaints that other residents at Alexandra House or Alexandra Court may think they have. There is only one Claimant and she is not suing on behalf of the general body of residents or in some other representative capacity; she sues – and sues only – on her own behalf. ii) Secondly, and this is a point which, analytically, is distinct from the previous point, I simply fail to understand how the Claimant can bring any claim, whether in public law or in private law, in relation to the decision (whether it was taken by the Defendant or by EH) that Ms Billich should be required to retire on her 65th birthday. The Claimant may or may not have a right, whether in private law or in public law, to demand that the Defendant continue to provide a resident warden (a topic to which I return below), but I have neither read nor heard anything which begins to suggest any right to demand that Ms Billich continue indefinitely to be the resident warden, whatever her age, just because she is willing to continue in that post. Indeed, the proposition verges on the absurd. So unless Miss Hossack’s formulation of the first decision under challenge is no more than a different way of formulating the second decision under challenge – in which case it adds nothing except obscurity to the debate – the only remotely plausible decision that could be challenged as at the date when the proceedings were issued was the decision (if such decision there was) not to continue to provide a resident warden following Ms Billich’s retirement. iii) Thirdly, and as I have already mentioned, the Claimant has not made any application to the court, whether by way of an application to amend her existing grounds of judicial review or by way of a fresh application for judicial review, in relation to the decision of 19 May 2009, implemented with effect from 1 June 2009.[60]It follows that the only decision with which I am concerned is the Defendant’s decision not to continue to provide a resident warden following Ms Billich’s retirement, a decision which, as Mr Knafler correctly concedes, had effect only from 5 February 2009 until 1 June 2009 (being, with effect from the later date, superseded by the subsequent decision of 19 May 2009).[61]In addressing the lawfulness or otherwise of that decision it seems to me that before plunging into the question of whether the Claimant’s remedies (if any) lie in public law, as she asserts, or in private law, as the Defendant asserts, I should first focus attention on two logically prior questions: first, what was the nature and content of the relevant obligations (if any) owed by the Defendant to the Claimant and, second, has the Defendant breached any of those obligations?[62]First, however, it will be convenient for me to consider the evidence.

The evidence: discussion

[63]I have already set out most of the relevant facts. I can take the remaining evidence quite shortly.[64]As I pointed out during the hearing, much of the evidence and other factual material put before me was, to a greater or lesser extent, irrelevant to anything I have to decide, given the limited ambit of the issues before me.[65]So far as concerns the witness statement from Ms Billich, all that matters for present purposes is her evidence that she carried out work for tenants beyond what her employment strictly required and “obviously I have developed great affection for them.”[66]So far as concerns the evidence from the other residents at Alexandra House or Alexandra Court – David Smith, Grace Jackson, Doris Leigh, Frederick Glenister, Graham Lewis, Joanne Denair, Barbara Leigh, Mena Morrisson and Doreen Beaumont-Jones – none of it is of any assistance to me at all. I say this for two reasons: i) In the first place, although these witnesses all depose, in more or less detail, to the circumstances in which they became tenants at Alexandra House or Court and, in some cases, to their understanding of the arrangements they had entered into – and in almost every case even this evidence is sketchy in the extreme –, none of them even professes to be able to give any specific evidence in relation to the Claimant, and none does so. ii) Even taking this material at its highest, it does not begin to make good the proposition, even assuming it is being put forward, that there was any representation by the Defendant (I use the phrase in the widest sense) that it would provide, or that there was any understanding, belief, assumption or expectation on the part of the tenants (again I use these phrases in the widest sense) that they would be provided by the Defendant with, services in excess of those spelt out in their tenancy agreements.[67]The only relevant evidence from any of these witnesses is David Smith’s and Doreen Beaumont-Jones’s evidence that their service charge is paid from Housing Benefit – evidence which may go to the question of whether the Defendant is a public authority or exercising public functions.[68]The evidence from the Claimant is curious and, it might be thought, more significant for what it does not say than for anything it does say. She does not even exhibit her tenancy agreement – that was put in evidence by Ms Airey – and notwithstanding that her case is explicitly put on the basis of ‘legitimate expectation’ all she says on the topic is this:
“When I moved into the flat, I was provided with a contract. Within this contract, it was stated that there was a permanent Resident Warden on site, and her hours were given to me on the contract.”
[69]That “contract”, as I have already described, was in fact the document prepared by Ms Billich. The remainder of the Claimant’s evidence is confined in large part to explaining how important from her point of view Ms Billich’s services were and how “very upset” she was on being told Ms Billich was going.[70]So far as concerns the Defendant’s evidence, I shall refer to it as necessary in due course.

The issues – discussion

[71]The first issue, as I have said, is, what was the nature and content of the relevant obligations (if any) owed by the Defendant to the Claimant?[72]Despite the amount of ink which has been spilled in the course of this case, the answer to this question, as it seems to me, is really very clear and very simple. On the evidence, the only relevant obligations of any kind (whether sounding in private law or in public law) entered into by the Defendant were those contained in the Claimant’s tenancy agreement. What were those obligations? So far as is material for present purposes there were two obligations: i) First, the obligation under clause 1(4), read in conjunction with Appendix A, to provide a “Warden Service”. ii) Secondly, the obligation under clauses 1(5), 1(8) and 4(8)(i) to “consult” before “varying” the services, “changing the conditions of the Agreement” or making “changes in matters of housing management” – an obligation which quite manifestly, in my judgment, arose in relation to any proposed change in the provision of the Warden Service which, subject to the obligation to consult, might otherwise be permissible in accordance with either clause 1(5) or clause 1(8).[73]Ms Morris seeks to escape from the implications of this analysis by asserting that the obligation to provide a “Warden Service” was not an obligation to provide a resident warden; it was, she submits, an obligation to provide various services which together amounted to a “Warden Service”. I do not agree.[74]In the first place, as Mr Knafler points out, Appendix A itself refers to the “Warden’s flat” – so the “Warden Service” was to be provided by someone with a “Warden’s flat” – in other words by a resident warden.[75]Moreover, and as Mr Knafler correctly submits, this was part of the ‘factual matrix’ at the time when the Claimant entered into her tenancy agreement, there was in fact a resident warden in post – and had been for over ten years – that is, a warden who lived in a flat at Alexandra House and whose contractual duties were as I have described them in paragraph [3] above. (I deliberately refer to Ms Billich’s contractual duties. The Claimant has demonstrated no remotely arguable basis for any assertion that the obligations owed to her by the Defendant in this respect extended any further than the duties owed by Ms Billich to the Defendant. So the fact that Ms Billich was actually providing services to the tenants additional to those she was contractually obliged to provide cannot, in my judgment, extend or enhance the obligations owed by the Defendant to the Claimant. On the other hand, as a matter of fact and evidence, for there is no suggestion that she was not doing everything her contract required of her, it means that Ms Billich was at all material times actually and visibly present on site as a resident warden and performing her contractual duties.) So the factual matrix against which the tenancy agreement falls to be understood and construed included the visible reality of a resident warden.[76]I agree with Mr Knafler. The Defendant’s obligation under clause 1(4) was to provide the service of a resident warden. And that is the obligation which is relevant for present purposes.[77]Miss Hossack’s presentation of the case during the hearing, as in the original application, was focussed on the assertion that the relevant obligation arose as a matter of ‘legitimate expectation’. In her skeleton argument she identified what she said were three legitimate expectations: the first, said to be established by the evidence that “all those entering into Alexandra House or Alexandra Court did so because there was a Resident Warden” and that “all were informed that this service would be provided at the complex”; the second arising under clause 4(8)(i) of the tenancy agreement; and the third arising out of what was said in the letter sent out by the Defendant in August 2008.[78]If it is being said that the first of these so called ‘legitimate expectations’ adds anything to the obligations arising under the tenancy agreement, and in particular if it is being said that it gives rise to a substantive rather than a merely procedural expectation, specifically, a legitimate expectation that a resident warden service would be provided for ever, then the claim simply fails on the facts. As I have already explained, there is nothing, either in the Claimant’s evidence or in the evidence of any of the other residents, which on any possible view of the doctrine of legitimate expectation creates or gives rise to any obligations extending any further than those to be found in the tenancy agreements, specifically, in the case of the Claimant, the tenancy agreement she entered into.[79]So Miss Hossack’s first asserted legitimate expectation takes her nowhere. Nor does the third, for it adds nothing to – it merely acknowledges – an obligation which already existed, namely the obligation under clause 4(8)(i) of the tenancy agreement. So, however the case is put, it all comes back at the end of the day to the single and simple question of the obligations which arise under the tenancy agreement. And those obligations arise ex contractu, whether there is also some overlaid public law obligation. Framing the debate in terms of legitimate expectation adds nothing to the analysis; all it has done here is to muddy the waters by tempting the Claimant into adducing a significant amount of irrelevant evidence which does not even establish the factual case which alone might have justified the exercise.[80]The second issue, as I have said, is, has the Defendant breached any of the obligations owed by it to the Claimant? To this, in my judgment, there can be only one answer: it has.[81]The Defendant accepts that there was no consultation prior to Ms Billich’s departure. So the only possible escape from what Mr Knafler submits is the inevitable corollary, is to assert, as Ms Morris does, that there was no breach by the Defendant of its ongoing obligation under clause 1(4) of the tenancy agreement. But in the light of my conclusions as to the extent and ambit of the Defendant’s obligation under clause 1(4), her argument is doomed.[82]I have already referred to the services (set out in tabular form in the schedule exhibited by Mr Granville to his witness statement of 4 February 2009) which were provided by the Defendant, through EH, following Ms Billich’s departure on 5 February 2009. I need not go into the details. The short fact is that there is no resident warden; there is no person ‘on site’ during the hours Ms Billich worked and performing, on site and as resident warden, the functions she was contracted (that is, contracted to the Defendant) to perform. Nor does either the Defendant or EH assert that there is. Their case, as we have seen, is that they have provided “equivalent services”. It is supplemented by what Ms Airey said in her witness statement of 24 March 2009:
“The services which are provided by the warden at the Properties do not involve any element of care or include those matter relied upon in the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds. Indeed, I note that in her witness statement, the former warden, Jennifer Billich acknowledges that many of the things she did for tenants were not required by Circle 33 as part of her employment. This included caring for the sick, collecting shopping and prescriptions and calling doctors. I refer to the second witness statement of Robert Granville which comments further on such issues. In addition, the provision of sheltered housing does not require a warden to be resident (indeed as explained below this has the effect of increasing the service charge tenants are required to pay) as many schemes have a warden or (as they are more commonly referred to now) scheme manager who operates off site.”
[83]I do not see how any of these arguments can take the Defendant anywhere. The question is not whether, pending consultation, the Defendant was providing “equivalent services”; the question is whether it was continuing to provide a Warden Service by means of a resident warden – and to that question there can be only one answer. The fact, if fact it be, that sheltered housing does not “require” a resident warden is neither here nor there, the only question here being as to what was required by the Claimant’s tenancy agreement. And the fact, if fact it be, that in support of her case the Claimant was relying upon services provided by Ms Billich in excess of those she was contractually obliged to provide is, again, neither here nor there, for my analysis of the extent of the Defendant’s obligations to the Claimant is carefully framed so as to exclude any ‘excess’ services being provided by Ms Billich.[84]In my judgment Mr Knafler is plainly correct when he submits that the Defendant failed to provide the service it had contracted for, even though the tenancy agreement required it to provide that service until it was removed after consultation, just as he is plainly correct when he submits that the Defendant’s claim that it has provided “equivalent services” is, as he puts it, manifestly unsustainable on the facts and in any event irrelevant as a matter of law – for which latter proposition he appropriately cites Arcos Limited v E A Ronaasen and Son [1933] AC 470.[85]In her first witness statement of 24 March 2009 Ms Airey explains why there was no earlier consultation:
“As to the Claimant’s criticism that such a consultation exercise should have been carried out prior to the retirement of Mrs Billich, first we have not changed the services provided to tenants upon her retirement, the only change being one of personnel but we are now consulting as to the future of the service. Secondly, we had serious concerns about carrying out a consultation exercise in circumstances where the incumbent warden did not wish to retire and had made this known to a number of tenants who have become very vocal in their support of her. As is apparent from the witness statements provided in support of this application, a number of tenants at the Properties had close personal relationships with Mrs Billich and their main grievance relates to the removal of Mrs Billich herself, rather than the services provided. Had the consultation exercise been carried out whilst Mrs Billich was still employed at the Properties, there was a real danger that the consultation exercise would not have been genuinely about the services being provided to the tenants but about Mrs Billich personally, with those tenants who did not wish to see her retire, unduly influencing the outcome of the consultation.”
[86]As to that I would comment only that the proposition set out in the first sentence is bad for reasons I have already explained and that, whatever sympathy one may have for the Defendant in the circumstances as described by Ms Airey, her attempted justification is, as a matter of law and contractual obligation, entirely unsound.[87]It follows that the Claimant has established the essential proposition which is the core of her case: namely, that the Defendant acted in breach of its obligations and thus unlawfully; not, so far as concerns the Claimant, in terminating Ms Billich’s employment as such but in doing so without continuing to provide the services of a resident warden, at the very least pending consultation in accordance with clauses 1(5), 1(8) and 4(8)(i) of the tenancy agreement.[88]The Claimant accordingly succeeds as to the substance of her case. But there remain, at least in theory, two further questions.[89]First, there is the question whether the Claimant’s remedy lies in public law or only in private law. But on the Claimant’s case as pleaded this question, in the light of my conclusions, goes at most only to the form of the relief to which she is entitled. For if her claim is, in truth, a public law claim, the Claimant would, in principle, be entitled to a quashing order in addition to the declaratory relief which, in my judgment, she is entitled to on either basis. One has to ask, however, what practical advantage the Claimant would gain from obtaining a quashing order in addition to a suitably framed declaration. I can think of none. And even were she to establish a public law claim, I would, in the circumstances, be justified in the exercise of my discretion in holding that the Claimant needs no relief beyond a suitably drafted declaration. So there is, in my judgment, no need for me to go on to consider the further question which, in the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weaver, is not at all straightforward, as to whether or not the Claimant has a public law claim. Accordingly I decline to do so.[90]Secondly, there is the fact (see below) that Mr Knafler submits that the decision currently under challenge is unlawful for a more fundamental reason than the Defendant’s mere failure to consult, namely, as he submits, that it is simply not open to the Defendant to remove the resident warden service. Again, it is not necessary for me to decide that issue in order to find, as I have, that the Defendant is in any event in breach of its obligations to the Claimant. And it is, in my judgment, better that I do not. After all, this part of Mr Knafler’s submissions extended far beyond anything ventilated by Miss Hossack, either in her pleaded grounds or in her written or oral submissions, and raise issues which he himself recognises may well not be suitable for decision on the basis only of the written submissions I have thus far received.[91]I shall therefore make a declaration, in a form to be drafted by counsel, to the effect that the Defendant acted unlawfully in withdrawing the resident warden service after 5 February 2009 without having first consulted with the Claimant in accordance with clauses 1(5), 1(8) and 4(8)(i) of the tenancy agreement. The declaration can be expressed, if Mr Knafler so wishes, as being without prejudice to the Claimant’s contention that the decision was also unlawful on other grounds.[92]One of Ms Morris’s submissions was that the Claimant should in any event be denied relief, because she has an alternative remedy available to her under clause 4(11) of the tenancy agreement to which she could, and therefore should, have had recourse first. Accepting the importance of the principle upon which Ms Morris relies, I cannot accept that it applies here as she would wish. Clause 4(11) is somewhat oddly drafted, but seems to me, properly construed, to be intended to confer additional rights on the Claimant, not to impose any fetters on her. And in any event, I see no basis for denying the Claimant what, in my judgment, is her plain right to sue for the declaration I have found her to be entitled to.[93]There remains the question of whether the Claimant should have permission, this having been, in the light of Pitchford J’s order of 19 February 2009, a ‘rolled up’ hearing. In my judgment she should. She has succeeded in the essence of her claim. The fact that the question of whether she has a public law claim has been left ‘hanging in the air’ is no reason to deny her permission. I shall give her permission.

The issues – subsequent events

[94]As I have already indicated the only issues before the court are those which arise under the original claim, save to the limited extent that further elaboration of the arguments in relation to those issues was permitted by the order I made on 3 April 2009. And the Claimant has not, whether by amendment of her existing claim or otherwise, sought to mount any properly formulated challenge, either to the decision taken by the Defendant on 19 May 2009 or to the implementation of that decision with effect from 1 June 2009.[95]Mr Knafler has helpfully sketched out arguments that might be deployed by the Claimant in relation to these later events. Thus, he says, even if the Claimant has no public law claim, and is therefore confined to a claim in private law, she has the following arguments open to her: i) Clause 1(5) on its true construction is confined to minor alterations to the contracted services, including minor alterations by way of addition or removal of services, and does not extend to a decision (such as here) to make major or extensive alterations or to substitute a qualitatively different service; specifically it does not extend to a decision to withdraw the resident warden service. The argument is sought to be supported by reference to the principle of construction ejusdem generis and the contra proferentem rule. ii) More specifically, and as a separate point, if it has the meaning contended for by the Defendant, clause 1(5) is not binding on the Claimant because of regulations 4-8 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (this latter contention being developed at some length in his submissions of 3 July 2009). iii) The Defendant was required but failed to exercise its power under clause 1(5) reasonably, justly and fairly and in such a way as to further the purposes for which it was conferred. iv) Even now the Defendant has not issued a ‘notice’ as required by clause 1(5).[96]But in any event, he says, relying upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weaver, the Defendant is acting as a public authority – which means not merely that it is amenable to judicial review but also, and this is a matter of substance rather than mere procedure, that it is therefore bound to act in a manner compatible with Article 8 of the Convention. Therefore, he says, and quite apart from any private law remedy the Claimant may have, the decision to discontinue the resident warden service involved a breach of Article 8 because the ‘interference’ with the Claimant’s private life and home which it involved was, for the reasons already given in the private law context, not ‘in accordance with the law’. Nor was the discontinuance of the resident warden service ‘necessary’ in the sense in which that expression is used in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. And, he says, the decision cannot be justified merely because of the support it received from other tenants during the consultation process.[97]Ms Morris submits that the decision in Weaver is not determinative and that, properly understood, it does not lead to the conclusion Mr Knafler would have me accept. And in any event, she says, Article 8 is not engaged. Indeed, given the terms of the order I made on 3 April 2009, she disputes that it is even open to the Claimant to take the point at this stage in the way in which Mr Knafler seeks to.[98]So far as concerns the various private law arguments deployed by Mr Knafler, Ms Morris submits that no decision should be made as to the Defendant’s liability until the issues have been properly pleaded and then, following appropriate case management, determined upon evidence and oral submissions in the usual way. Given the absence as yet of any appropriately formulated claim, she says that this is not a case where I should exercise my jurisdiction to transfer the proceedings to another court. And in any event, she disputes each of Mr Knafler’s contentions on the substantive private law issues.[99]I do not propose to embark upon any further consideration of any of these issues. If the Claimant wishes to pursue her litigation against the Defendant she must first set out her further claims in accordance with whatever are the relevant procedures of whichever court she chooses to sue in. There is, in this respect, as it seems to me, compelling force in Ms Morris’s submissions. Indeed, as I have already recorded, Mr Knafler recognises that these are issues which may not be suitable for decision on the basis only of the written submissions I have thus far received.[100]In my judgment it is for the Claimant now to decide whether or not she wishes to bring any further, and if so what, claims and, if so, in which court. That must be a matter for her. I observe only, referring for this purpose to what Lord Collins of Mapesbury said in the Court of Appeal in Weaver at para [86], that seemingly the only advantage to the Claimant of seeking to litigate her claims in the Administrative Court and as a matter of public law is that she may thereby be enabled to rely upon Article 8 (and this, as I understand Mr Knafler’s submissions, would seem to be the only advantage he identifies). But if that is so then the Claimant may wish to consider what Lord Collins went on to say in relation to the implications of the decision of the House of Lords in Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465.