“Without prejudice to any jurisdiction of the High Court apart from this section, the court shall order the applicant’s discharge if it appears to the court in relation to the offence, or each of the offences, in respect of which the applicant’s return is sought, that:……… (b) by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed it or to have become lawfully at large, as the case may be; or (c) because the accusation against him is not made in good faith in the interests of justice, it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him.” (b) by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed it or to have become lawfully at large, as the case may be; or (c) because the accusation against him is not made in good faith in the interests of justice, it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him.” it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him.”
“I was taken to a room and shown many photographs of Nadejda which had been taken after her murder……I was then interrogated about my knowledge of Nadejda and my whereabouts on the night of her murder. I was fingerprinted and had hair and saliva samples taken. At the time I was told it was to eliminate me from their inquiries. I was asked to take a lie detector test, which I agreed to because I thought it would prove what I was saying about Filchev. However, it was horrendous. I was made to sit opposite a panel of about 10 or 11 people with a lamp shining in my face. They terrorised me. If they did not like the answers I gave, they kept repeating the question over and over again. They would not accept what I was saying. This went on for a long time, all the time with this bright light shining in my face. In particular, they kept asking me whether I knew how Nadejda had been killed and demanding that I answer “yes” or “no”
“On28 January 2008 , the case was suddenly suspended. It was suspended because it became known that (the applicant) had been arrested under an arrest warrant in London. The events in court on this date were tumultuous. It was the defence who notified the court that (the applicant) had been arrested in the UK. (The applicant) has been represented throughout by a public defence lawyer, Mr Tankov. This has been on the basis that her whereabouts were unknown to the prosecution. Mr Tankov informed the court of her arrest under the extradition request. It was clear that although this extradition request was made in 2001 the prosecution had absolutely no idea about it, let alone that (the applicant) had been arrested. The judge was furious and demanded an explanation from the prosecution. None was given. It appears that the extradition request was submitted by Filchev acting alone and not proceeded with through the ordinary official channels. As a matter of Bulgarian law, the proceedings cannot now continue because (the applicant’s) location is now known. As such, the case cannot proceed in her absence until a decision is taken in London with regard to the extradition proceedings. Therefore the case in Bulgaria has now been adjourned.”
“…..in my judgment the term “good faith” has to be given a reasonably generous interpretation so that if the proceedings were brought for a collateral purpose, or with an improper motive and not for the purpose of achieving the proper administration of justice, they would not be regarded as complying with the statutory requirement. Likewise the accusations would not be made in good faith and in the interests of justice if the prosecution deliberately manipulates or misuses the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection to which he is entitled by law.”
“Accusation is broad enough to encompass the accusation of a witness or witnesses and the offence charged in consequence. By making a request for extradition, reliance is placed upon the evidence of any witness and the offence disclosed thereby. The protection afforded by the subsection would be rendered “sterile”, as Mr Nicholls submitted, if the issue of bad faith could be divorced from the underlying facts supporting the request.”
“Thus, although this is a European Convention case and it was unnecessary for the district judge to consider the sufficiency of the evidence, the issues raised under section 11(3)(c) do require this court to consider “the underlying facts”.”
“As there is no suggestion that any organ of the Swiss state or its prosecuting authorities or the examining magistrate have acted in bad faith, the central issue in the present case is whether the accusations made against the applicant by Mr Rafael and Ms Brink are made in good faith in the interests of justice. The burden is upon the applicant to establish on a balance of probabilities, that they are so made.”
“It is incumbent on this court to apply the “good faith in the interest of justice” test to the material which is now before it……..Whilst the good faith of the Swiss authority is not in doubt, that of the principal witness is improbable. In these circumstances, although the applicant would undoubtedly be treated justly by the Swiss courts we conclude that it would be oppressive to return her on the Brink charges. She must therefore be discharged in relation to them. That is a decision which we do not take lightly. It is based on the unusual facts and history of this case. We do not intend or anticipate that it will provide any comfort to future applicants.”