“The FCO has gathered the material held by the Government in order to complete a review of the claimant’s designation against the criteria set out in the relevant resolutions, in particular (SIC) UNSCR 1617 (2005), and in accordance withthe review procedure as set out in the section 9 of the Guidelines. Following the completion of the review procedure the FCO has concluded that the claimant’s listing under the 1267 regime is no longer appropriate. Further information was requested, but has not yet been provided by the designating state. The UK will therefore contact the 1267 Committee to state that the claimant’s listing is no longer appropriate and the UK will also submit and pursue a de-listing request in respect of the claimant.”
“The decision taken rests on the conclusion that on the basis of the information available to him, the Secretary of State does notconsider that the claimant now meets the criteria for inclusion on the Consolidated List. The conclusion reached by the Secretary of State is not determinative of the decision that will be taken by the 1267 Committee. Most obviously, any decision as to whether a person’s name should be included on the Consolidated List or should remain on that list is a decision for the 1267 Committee, not for the Secretary of State acting unilaterally. Further, the decision taken by the Secretary of State is based on the information available to him. As stated above, the United Kingdom did not nominate the claimant for inclusion in the consolidated list; nor did it provide information in support of that nomination. The decision to be taken by the 1267 Committee will necessarily be taken on the basis of all information available to that committee. The 1267 Committee will determine, based on all information available to it, whether or not the claimant continues to meet the criteria for inclusion on the consolidated list.”
“(1) For the purposes of this Order – (a) Usama Bin Laden (b) Any persons designated by the Sanctions Committee, and (c) Any person identified in a direction, is a designated person (2) In this part, ‘direction’ (other than Articles 4 (2)(d) and 5(3)(c)) means a direction given by the Treasury under Article 4(1).” (a) Usama Bin Laden (b) Any persons designated by the Sanctions Committee, and (c) Any person identified in a direction, is a designated person 19. Article 4(1) provides that HMT may give a direction that a person identified in the direction is designated for the purposes of the order where any condition in 4(2) is satisfied. 4(2) provides – “(2) The conditions are that the Treasury has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is or maybe – (a) Usama Bin Laden; (b) a person designated by the Sanctions Committee; (c) a person named or controlled, directly or indirectly by a designated person; or (d) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person.” (c) a person named or controlled, directly or indirectly by a designated person; or (d) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person.”
“The Al Qaida Order 146. The particular vice identified in the Al Qaida Order is that it is self-executing. The respondent G thus had no way of challenging his designation once he was named by the Security Council. The unnerving aspect of his case – and there is no reason why it should be unique – is that it was the United Kingdom’s security services which asked the Security Council to nominate him in the first place. By this simple means, given the provisions of the Order, judicial oversight is apparently avoided. 147. Unless an effective form of judicial review is available to challenge the nomination, this would in my view be a use of delegated powers to block access to the courts and accordingly a fatal flaw in the Order. But, although I am not sanguine about the viability of a merits review in the face of security-sensitive material, I do not dissent from the holding of the Master of the Rolls that such review is in principle available under the Al Qaeda Order. I stress the word “under”: contrary to the Treasury’s submission, it is not necessary for the individual affected to show the material part of the Order to be ultra vires; it will be sufficient if he can establish that he should not have been listed. 148. But the foregoing, which is necessarily broad and predictive, may prove over-optimistic. If it does, and if it turns out either generally or in any one case that judicial review is unable for legal or practical reasons to afford an effective challenge to listing, I see no reason why the present claim might not be renewed, since the premise of our decision upon it would have proved false. In that event it is the vires of this part of the Order which will be in issue.”
“157. In my view therefore, subject to severance of the three words, the TO is valid. The issue as to the validity of the AQO raises a particular problem to which, in my view, the Master of the Rolls finds a sufficient, creative solution in [113] to [120] above, namely in a merits-based judicial review of the executive’s response to a person’s application to it that it should request, or support his own request, for de-listing by the Sanctions Committee. I cannot associate myself with the observation of Sedley LJ at [146] above that it is unnerving that it was our own government which requested the Committee to designate G. In relation to him it clearly wanted to achieve the global effect of designation at UN level; although its grounds must have seemed good to the Committee, it is impossible for us to assess their strength. Nor can I endorse his observation, at [149] above, that the process to which G has been made subject “sidesteps”
“… must know either all or most of the facts which led to G’s designation by the Committee. ”
“I consider first whether there is any principle of construction which requires the court, in certain cases, to construe general words contained in the statute as being impliedly limited. In my judgment there is such a principle. It is well established that Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum; statutes are drafted on the basis that the ordinary rules and principles of the common law would apply to the express statutory provisions …As a result Parliament is presumed not to have intended to change common law rules unless it has clearly indicated such intention either expressly or by necessary implication”
“A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is not to be taken to authorise the doing of acts by the donee of the power which adversely effect the legal rights of the citizen or the basic principles upon which the law of the United Kingdom is based unless the statute conferring the power makes it clear that such was the intention of Parliament.”
“Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights.The Human Rights Act 1998 will not detract from this power. The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overwritten by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of the unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document.”